Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment
163 DReps voted · 56 with a rationale · 2 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- No1.1M ₳Rationale
I think we can all agree that Cardano really needs more native liquidity, and perpetual futures are one of the few crypto products that have shown real demand. Strike’s success is definitely important for Cardano. However, this proposal is asking the Treasury to sell ADA for USDM and take on risks related to protocol, stablecoin, market, custody, and opportunity costs just so ONE trading platform can grow. That's where I draw the line.
Keep in mind that once ADA leaves the Treasury, it takes on counterparty and execution risks! Calling it “productive deployment” doesn’t change that fact. There’s no guarantee of returns, it’s just a PowerPoint presentation. The promise of a return is there, but it’s not backed by any solid protocol-level mechanics. The whole “Treasury retains ownership” phrasing is pretty weak legally and operationally unless the governance system really has enforceable rights over the assets after withdrawal. I’m not comfortable pretending that a multisig council provides the same level of control as a Treasury should have, especially when some members have previously asked for loans and didn’t pay them back.
I also have an issue with the modeling anchor. Assuming ADA is at $0.15 is a significant gamble. If ADA goes up, the Treasury could do much worse than just holding onto it. If USDM faces any issues, the Treasury will have to deal with that too. If Strike does well, they'll gain strategic advantages and fee growth while the Treasury just gets a projected 10% yield and a bunch of risk paperwork. Seriously, what’s good about this? The growth targets are super ambitious without substantiation, aiming to go from $50M to $1B in 30-day volume, and from about $172k to $5M in revenue run-rate. We’re talking a massive leap of 20x to 29x! I’ve seen enough media and trading businesses to know the difference between building traction and achieving scale, and this proposal mixes the two up.
I’m all for smart treasury moves, but not for treasury-funded market-making where there’s loose control, stablecoin risks, and asymmetrical venture-style upsides. This is an interesting financial idea, but it’s not responsible treasury management yet.
- Yes988.7K ₳Rationale
We vote YES on this proposal because Strike Finance is one of the few lighthouse projects currently live on Cardano and one of the strongest examples of real product-market fit in the ecosystem.
Strike is already one of the most used Cardano-native DeFi products, has meaningful trading volume, and also attracts cross-chain users from outside the Cardano ecosystem. In our view, this is exactly the type of application Cardano should support: a working product with real users, real volume, and a clear path to increasing on-chain activity.
We also support the structure of this proposal because it is not a grant, but a productive treasury deployment. The treasury-owned liquidity is intended to deepen Strike’s markets, improve execution, increase trading activity, and generate yield that flows back to the Cardano Treasury. If successful, this can become an important blueprint for how treasury capital can be deployed productively rather than simply spent.
For these reasons, we support this proposal as a strategic investment into one of Cardano’s most important DeFi applications.
- Abstain988.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes924.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes870.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes862K ₳No rationale
- No830.3K ₳Rationale
As a representative committed to safeguarding user trust, maintaining strict transparency, and ensuring the long-term viability of the Cardano network, I cannot support the direct utilization of public treasury funds for protocol market-making or liquidity provisioning. While Strike Finance provides high-performance derivative tooling that advances Cardano's technical capabilities, deploying community funds into live trading protocols poses undue financial risk.
Cardano's treasury resources should remain anchored to sustainable growth vectors—such as independent third-party verified tooling, core platform maintenance, and ecosystem infrastructure—rather than being exposed to market-driven impermanent loss or liquidation events within specific DeFi environments. Strike Finance should instead pursue community bootstrap strategies through decentralized liquidity providers (LPs) or external capital partnerships that do not depend on the public reserve.
- Yes799.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes795K ₳No rationale
- Yes753.7K ₳No rationale
- Abstain747.8K ₳No rationale
- Abstain620K ₳No rationale
- No608.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes590K ₳Rationale
The chain needs liquidity and I strongly believe the treasury should help jump start this!
- Yes587.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes546.2K ₳No rationale
- No535.2K ₳Rationale
Very hard to say no, but Strike is doing great and the ADA returned would be worth much less if paid later when ADA price recovers. Also I'm in direct conflict being a token holder of $STRIKE
- Yes480.2K ₳No rationale
- No478.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes466.2K ₳No rationale
- No444.7K ₳No rationale
- No431.9K ₳No rationale
- No415.3K ₳No rationale
- No399.2K ₳No rationale
- Abstain385.5K ₳Rationale
Abstaining, as I’m part of the Cardano Constitution Committee Tingvard.
Reading proposals and staying updated, just like you.
Thanks to all fellow DReps who are also doing the hard work.
Follow and DM me on X: @kenerik if you have any questions. - No383.2K ₳No rationale
- No377.7K ₳Rationale
My strong opinion is that treasury ADA should be exclusively used to fund basic technical infrastructure that is available to all people in the Cardano ecosystem.
Providing liquidity to one competitor in the ecosystem – granting them an advantage over the others – is not what the treasury should do.
Moreover, I find rather questionable if this loan is really as risk-reduced as the proposal claims.
- No365.9K ₳No rationale
- No360.4K ₳Rationale
I would love to vote yes on this if it was really a loan with proper collateral (it is one of my exceptions for a YES).
Unfortunately the proposal does not fit that criteria.
Best of luck
- Yes321.3K ₳No rationale
- No314.6K ₳No rationale
- No309.6K ₳Rationale
Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]
Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in mid 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.
My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.
In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.
At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.
Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.
Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.
This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.
Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:
- Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
- Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
- Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
- Lack of credible execution capacity;
- Structural governance or transparency concerns;
- Severe budgetary or coordination risks.
Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.
This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.
Governance Action Report
1. Introduction
The Strike Finance V2 Treasury Deployment Proposal requests 9,000,000 ADA for a 12-month deployment into Strike Finance V2 liquidity infrastructure. The ADA would be sold for USDM and supplied as stablecoin-denominated liquidity for Cardano-native perpetual futures markets. The capital would remain owned by the Cardano Treasury and would not constitute grant funding.
Using an assumed ADA price of USD 0.15, the deployment would represent approximately 1,350,000 USDM. A modeled annual return of approximately 900,000 ADA-equivalent is presented, although returns are not guaranteed. Yield realized during the first six months would be returned at month 6. At month 12, the remaining principal and realized yield would be returned to the Treasury.
Operational custody would be controlled by an independent multisig council, without unilateral control by Strike Finance. Monthly public reporting, third-party assurance, drawdown review thresholds, and early termination procedures are included. Success targets include USD 1 billion in 30-day volume, 5,000 traders, and a USD 5 million annualized revenue run rate within 12 months.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Positive aspects
This position does not constitute criticism of the people or teams involved, many of whom have positive reputations in the ecosystem. It also does not require a conclusion that Strike lacks a functional product or economic activity.
Negative aspects
The objection lies in the concept of using collective resources to replace liquidity that should be attracted organically from market makers and liquidity providers.
When there is insufficient interest in providing liquidity, that absence represents an economic signal. It may reflect high risk, insufficient returns, limited demand, or more attractive opportunities in other markets. Using the Treasury to fill this gap does not necessarily correct these causes. It may only temporarily hide the problem through a public subsidy.
The Cardano ecosystem has already allocated significant resources over several years to stimulate projects that, in many cases, did not achieve economic sustainability. Expanding this model so that the Treasury also provides the liquidity required to sustain or expand private commercial models is not appropriate.
There is a difference between funding the initial creation of infrastructure or an application and using the Treasury to continuously replace the private capital required for a market to function. The first may create productive capacity. The second may distort economic signals, make real problems more difficult to identify, and reduce incentives to develop self-sustaining solutions.
Public liquidity provision also creates political selection among protocols, favoring certain participants with collective capital and potentially harming those required to compete for liquidity under normal market conditions.
Risks and concerns
Experience with yield farming programs and liquidity incentives demonstrates that subsidized capital frequently remains only while incentives exist. When support ends, the structural problem reappears.
There is also a risk that an initially temporary deployment creates dependency and generates political pressure for further withdrawals to preserve volume, liquidity, and revenue.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO
The vote will be NO due to a principle-based objection to using the Cardano Treasury as a liquidity provider for DeFi protocols.
The objection lies in using collective resources to replace liquidity that should be attracted organically from market makers and private providers. When sufficient interest in supplying liquidity does not exist, that absence represents an economic signal that may reflect high risk, insufficient returns, limited demand, or more attractive opportunities in other markets. Treasury resources do not necessarily correct these causes and may only temporarily hide the problem through a public subsidy.
For these reasons, direct liquidity provision to private protocols is not an appropriate use of Treasury resources. The ecosystem should prioritize projects capable of attracting users, capital, and liquidity sustainably instead of perpetuating models whose scale depends on subsidies financed by the community.
4. Conclusion
Direct liquidity provision to private protocols is not an appropriate use of Treasury resources. Projects capable of attracting users, capital, and liquidity sustainably should be prioritized instead of perpetuating models whose scale depends on subsidies financed by the community.
Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]
Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas no meio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.
Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.
Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.
Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.
Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.
Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.
Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.
Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:
- Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
- Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
- Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
- Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
- Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
- Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.
Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.
Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.
Relatório de Ação de Governança
1. Introdução
A Strike Finance V2 Treasury Deployment Proposal solicita 9.000.000 ADA para uma implantação de 12 meses na infraestrutura de liquidez da Strike Finance V2. O ADA seria vendido por USDM e fornecido como liquidez denominada em stablecoin para os mercados de futuros perpétuos nativos da Cardano. O capital permaneceria sob propriedade do Tesouro da Cardano e não constituiria financiamento por grant.
Com base em um preço presumido de USD 0,15 por ADA, a implantação representaria aproximadamente 1.350.000 USDM. É apresentado um retorno anual projetado de aproximadamente 900.000 ADA equivalentes, embora os retornos não sejam garantidos. O rendimento realizado durante os primeiros seis meses seria devolvido no sexto mês. No décimo segundo mês, o principal restante e o rendimento realizado seriam devolvidos ao Tesouro.
A custódia operacional seria controlada por um conselho multisig independente, sem controle unilateral pela Strike Finance. Estão previstos relatórios públicos mensais, assurance independente, limites de drawdown para revisão e procedimentos de encerramento antecipado. As metas incluem USD 1 bilhão em volume de 30 dias, 5.000 traders e um run rate anualizado de receita de USD 5 milhões dentro de 12 meses.
2. Análise da Ação de Governança
Aspectos positivos
Essa posição não constitui uma crítica às pessoas ou equipes envolvidas, muitas das quais possuem reputação positiva no ecossistema. Também não exige uma conclusão de que a Strike não possui um produto funcional ou atividade econômica.
Aspectos negativos
A objeção está no conceito de utilizar recursos coletivos para substituir a liquidez que deveria ser atraída organicamente de market makers e provedores de liquidez.
Quando não existe interesse suficiente em fornecer liquidez, essa ausência representa um sinal econômico. Pode refletir risco elevado, retorno insuficiente, demanda limitada ou oportunidades mais atrativas em outros mercados. A utilização do Tesouro para preencher essa lacuna não necessariamente corrige essas causas. Ela pode apenas esconder temporariamente o problema por meio de um subsídio público.
O ecossistema Cardano já alocou recursos significativos durante anos para estimular projetos que, em muitos casos, não alcançaram sustentabilidade econômica. Não se considera adequado expandir esse modelo para que o Tesouro também passe a fornecer a liquidez necessária para sustentar ou ampliar modelos comerciais privados.
Há uma diferença entre financiar a criação inicial de infraestrutura ou de uma aplicação e utilizar o Tesouro para substituir continuamente o capital privado necessário ao funcionamento de um mercado. O primeiro pode criar capacidade produtiva. O segundo pode distorcer os sinais econômicos, dificultar a identificação de problemas reais e reduzir os incentivos para o desenvolvimento de soluções autossustentáveis.
A provisão pública de liquidez também cria uma seleção política entre protocolos, favorecendo determinados participantes com capital coletivo e potencialmente prejudicando aqueles que precisam competir por liquidez em condições normais de mercado.
Riscos e preocupações
A experiência de programas de yield farming e incentivos de liquidez demonstra que capital subsidiado frequentemente permanece apenas enquanto os incentivos existem. Quando o apoio termina, o problema estrutural reaparece.
Existe ainda o risco de que uma implantação inicialmente temporária produza dependência e gere pressão política por novas retiradas para preservar volume, liquidez e receita.
3. Voto e Justificativa
Voto: NO
O voto será NO por uma objeção de princípio ao uso do Tesouro da Cardano como fornecedor de liquidez para protocolos DeFi.
A objeção está no uso de recursos coletivos para substituir a liquidez que deveria ser atraída organicamente de market makers e provedores privados. Quando não existe interesse suficiente em fornecer liquidez, essa ausência representa um sinal econômico que pode refletir risco elevado, retorno insuficiente, demanda limitada ou oportunidades mais atrativas em outros mercados. Os recursos do Tesouro não necessariamente corrigem essas causas e podem apenas esconder temporariamente o problema por meio de um subsídio público.
Por essas razões, a provisão direta de liquidez a protocolos privados não constitui um uso adequado dos recursos do Tesouro. O ecossistema deve priorizar projetos capazes de atrair usuários, capital e liquidez de maneira sustentável, em vez de perpetuar modelos cuja escala dependa de subsídios financiados pela comunidade.
4. Conclusão
A provisão direta de liquidez a protocolos privados não constitui um uso adequado dos recursos do Tesouro. Devem ser priorizados projetos capazes de atrair usuários, capital e liquidez de maneira sustentável, em vez de perpetuar modelos cuja escala dependa de subsídios financiados pela comunidade.
- No299.1K ₳Rationale
If we are going to deploy liquidity at this time it would be best to deploy it on the largest dex on Cardano: Minswap. I am voting NO.
- No298.3K ₳No rationale
- No279.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes271.8K ₳No rationale
- No270.3K ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on “Strike Finance Liquidity Deployment.” Strike is one of the stronger live DeFi products on Cardano, with meaningful trading activity, user traction, and a credible case that deeper liquidity could improve execution and keep more derivatives activity inside the ecosystem. The proposal is also more thoughtfully structured than many treasury investment-style requests, with independent multisig custody, monthly reporting, 6-month yield distribution, 12-month return of principal and realized yield, and defined review and wind-down triggers.
However, this proposal still asks the treasury to sell 9,000,000 ADA into USDM and take protocol, custody, stablecoin, execution, and opportunity-cost risk for a protocol-specific liquidity deployment. In my view, positions of this type should sit inside a clearly defined active-management treasury sleeve with formal portfolio rules, exposure limits, benchmarks, and public monitoring tools, rather than being approved one by one as isolated withdrawals. Strike may be a strong candidate for such a framework in the future, but I do not think the current treasury structure is mature enough to support this kind of deployment responsibly, so I am voting NO.
- No260.4K ₳Rationale
Rationale: NO
High Opportunity Cost and Risk Profile: Converting 9,000,000 treasury ADA into USDM for a 12-month liquidity deployment exposes the Treasury to significant opportunity cost if ADA appreciates during the deployment period. The proposal also expands the Treasury's role beyond funding public ecosystem development into deploying capital in a derivatives liquidity strategy, introducing smart contract, stablecoin, custody, operational, and market risks. While the proposal presents modeled returns, these are not guaranteed and may underperform a simple hold-ADA strategy. Given the scale of the requested deployment and its risk profile, the proposal does not provide a sufficiently compelling risk-adjusted case for the use of Treasury assets.
- Yes246.1K ₳Rationale
This deploys otherwise-idle treasury ADA into a proven, Cardano-native product rather than spending it as a grant: the treasury retains ownership throughout, and 100% of principal plus realized yield is contractually returned within 12 months, making this net-positive rather than an outflow. Strike has already shown real product-market fit with over $1.13B in cumulative volume and more than half of Cardano's trading activity - so it funds existing momentum, not a speculative bet. Custody is protected by an independent multisig that controls both funds and wind-down, so return doesn't depend on Strike, and the deployment is bounded by drawdown triggers, monthly reporting, third-party assurance, and a fresh vote for any renewal. It generates yield, keeps derivatives activity inside Cardano, and models a low-dependency approach to productive treasury use.
My only concern with this proposal is the market timing. I have a hard time letting 9 million ADA get swapped to a stablecoin at the bottom of the market, when a market rebound of significantly more than 10% is expected within the year, meaning that if the treasury held the ADA instead, it would still be 9 million ADA - whereas if Strike turns a 10% profit in USD value, that USD might not even be able to buy 9 million ADA to return to the treasury. I would like to see USDM returned to the treasury instead of ADA in this case, and for the partnership to continue for another year after that, setting the precedent that the treasury invests in yield-generating business partnerships and not just endless grants. - Yes232.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes228.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes227.9K ₳No rationale
- No215.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes191.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes167.9K ₳No rationale
- No162.9K ₳No rationale
- No142.6K ₳Rationale
There is no audit of the infrastructure
- Abstain131.9K ₳No rationale
- No123.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes119K ₳No rationale