Cardano Vision 2026: Human Centred, Scalable, Post Quantum Secure - IO Research
211 DReps voted · 82 with a rationale · 19 changed their vote · 6 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 18 to yes, 1 to abstain, together voting with 2B ₳ of voting power.
- Yes338.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes329.7K ₳No rationale
- Abstain318.1K ₳Rationale
Abstaining, as I’m part of the Cardano Constitution Committee Tingvard.
Reading proposals and staying updated, just like you.
Thanks to all fellow DReps who are also doing the hard work.
Follow and DM me on X: @kenerik if you have any questions. - Yes314.4K ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on Cardano Vision 2026. Cardano = Science. Without our scientific foundation, we are no better than a random meme coin. Dedicating less than 10% of our protocol's annual revenue to critical, existential R&D is a sound and absolutely essential investment in our future.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Science is our fundamental identity. One must look through this prism to understand why funding of this proposal is essential and why voting "YES" is so obvious.
Cardano’s entire Unique Selling Proposition (USP) is built on rigorous, peer-reviewed science. If we strip away that scientific foundation, Cardano becomes less useful than a random shitcoin. Our narrative, our security, and our future rely on the application of groundbreaking technologies, just like the Ouroboros protocol, which would never have existed without this exact type of foundational research.
We cannot risk defunding our research arm and watching our brightest scientists migrate to competing ecosystems. The work packages outlined in this proposal, particularly post-quantum resistance and advanced scalability, are NOT optional "nice-to-haves". They are critical, existential imperatives. We must move forward.
I understand that a ₳32.9M ask might seem big when viewed in isolation. However, as a DRep committed to responsible treasury spending, I look at the macroeconomics: The Cardano protocol generates roughly ₳350M annually through its monetary engine and fees. This means CV26 represents an R&D allocation of less than 10%. In the high-tech sector, it's typical for companies to spend 15% to 30% of their annual revenue on R&D just to stay relevant. By that metric, spending under 10% on research for a protocol that literally defines itself by science is not just rational - it is highly conservative.
Finally, I want to acknowledge that this proposal provides a much higher level of granularity and budget transparency compared to previous IO requests, which I have criticized in the past.
Science is the foundation of our home. Without it, we break apart. I am voting YES to keep Cardano at the forefront of innovation.
- Yes313.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes308.2K ₳No rationale
- YesChanged301.3K ₳Rationale
Well, here we have a problem, and it's the following: How can a person who is not a cryptographer or from a related field evaluate this proposal? It becomes very, very complicated for the general public who wants to participate in governance to evaluate this proposal it is extremely high-level and practically forces me to delegate my stake to another DRep, which I am not going to do.
Going back to the proposal and trying to analyze it (thanks for providing the PDF), I feel it is necessary to split this into parts, but making sure that things which are co-dependent go together. Evaluating the proposal with so much condensed information is not easy at all. I do want to highlight that there is very important work here that I would like to see in Cardano, but at the same time I feel that some things are more of a priority than others, and I don't think it's right to approve things that are not necessary at this moment.
I also notice there is a lot of research. I have a discomfort regarding research. It makes me a little uncomfortable to invest in research that, let's say, ends up forgotten or never gets used. I am against spending treasury money on that. It's like throwing things at the wall to see if something sticks, and if not, it just gets discarded. Cardano is not sitting at #1 in market cap to be throwing money away like that. I've been looking into it and I have examples like Ouroboros Chronos and Ouroboros Crypsinous, which in the end never saw the light of day in terms of implementation. I feel that right now, with blockchain falling positions in CMC, we should focus on key aspects that put us in the game in the market — because at this moment we are not on the radar, and blockchains like Solana and Ethereum keep advancing and absorbing the market. Imagine not having an Oracle like Chainlink (luckily we now have Pyth) but already thinking about Post-Quantum Security. This is like a team building an ultra-secure space rocket protected against future asteroids and quantum radiation, spending years on perfect shields. But they still lack a reliable fuel tank or simple GPS to take off today.I'll abstain this time.
Earlier votes
Abstain4mo agoSuperseded
Well, here we have a problem, and it's the following: How can a person who is not a cryptographer or from a related field evaluate this proposal? It becomes very, very complicated for the general public who wants to participate in governance to evaluate this proposal it is extremely high-level and practically forces me to delegate my stake to another DRep, which I am not going to do.
Going back to the proposal and trying to analyze it (thanks for providing the PDF), I feel it is necessary to split this into parts, but making sure that things which are co-dependent go together. Evaluating the proposal with so much condensed information is not easy at all. I do want to highlight that there is very important work here that I would like to see in Cardano, but at the same time I feel that some things are more of a priority than others, and I don't think it's right to approve things that are not necessary at this moment.
I also notice there is a lot of research. I have a discomfort regarding research. It makes me a little uncomfortable to invest in research that, let's say, ends up forgotten or never gets used. I am against spending treasury money on that. It's like throwing things at the wall to see if something sticks, and if not, it just gets discarded. Cardano is not sitting at #1 in market cap to be throwing money away like that. I've been looking into it and I have examples like Ouroboros Chronos and Ouroboros Crypsinous, which in the end never saw the light of day in terms of implementation. I feel that right now, with blockchain falling positions in CMC, we should focus on key aspects that put us in the game in the market — because at this moment we are not on the radar, and blockchains like Solana and Ethereum keep advancing and absorbing the market. Imagine not having an Oracle like Chainlink (luckily we now have Pyth) but already thinking about Post-Quantum Security. This is like a team building an ultra-secure space rocket protected against future asteroids and quantum radiation, spending years on perfect shields. But they still lack a reliable fuel tank or simple GPS to take off today.I'll abstain this time.
- YesRevoted297K ₳Rationale
Voting YES on Cardano Vision 2026: Human Centred, Scalable, Post Quantum Secure - IO Research
May 25th 2026
Summary
This proposal requests a withdrawal of approximately ₳33M, to be managed by Intersect and distributed to IOG and various subcontractors for seven work packages designed to further the research on which Cardano is built.
A Brief Review Of The Work Packages
Name Main focus Trust, Security & Reliability Infrastructure Consensus (Leios/Peras, MEV), post-quantum security, node/key security (HSM/MPC) Scalability & Execution Layer Fee markets & L2 data availability, sharding study, P2P/pub-sub, ZK verification & L2 settlement Developer Platform & User Experience Plutus (verifying compiler, formal methods), light clients (Cavefish), Babel fees & intents Applications, Adoption & Liquidity Bridge security, atomic swaps, agent-based cross-chain coordination Economic Systems & Incentives SPO incentive recalibration, multi-resource consensus / PoUW, utility-weighted throughput metrics Governance, Identity & Social Infrastructure Governance incentives & DAO DSL, proof of personhood, verifiable credentials Delivery, Dissemination & Partnerships Program management, R&D sessions, CIP translation, ecosystem communication (in-kind via IOG) Conclusion
Much of the success of Cardano can be attributed to its scientific approach. And I'm excited to see this proposal continue the research which got us this far. These work packages are very exciting.
I'm particularly excited to see the PQC elements of the first work package. A recent landmark paper from Google [1] urges all vulnerable cryptocurrency communities to join the migration to PQC without delay. I happen to know a little bit [2, 3, 4, 5] about this issue and I'm very happy to see it begin to be addressed. I am however fearful that this may be too little, too late. I hope IOG and the community will show even more emphasis on delivering post-quantum Cardano.
I'm voting in favor of this proposal.
Signed,
William DoyleYour friendly neighbourhood DRep!
$computerman
drep1yfpgzfymq...pzw3nt
@william00000010 on 𝕏
contact@williamdoyle.caReferences
Babbush, R., Zalcman, A., Gidney, C., Broughton, M., Khattar, T., Neven, H., Bergamaschi, T., Drake, J., & Boneh, D. (2026). Securing elliptic curve cryptocurrencies against quantum vulnerabilities: Resource estimates and mitigations. arXiv:2603.28846 [quant-ph].
Dallaire-Demers, P.L., Doyle, W., & Foo, T. (2026). Brace for impact: ECDLP challenges for quantum cryptanalysis. arXiv:2508.14011 [quant-ph].
Dallaire-Demers, P.L., & Doyle, W. (2023). Post-quantum security for Cardano accounts. Catalyst Fund 10 proposal.
Dallaire-Demers, P.L., & Doyle, W. (live). Anchor Vault: A post-quantum smart contract wallet for Ethereum. Chrome Web Store extension.
Doyle, W. (live). EBP: Quantum-secure identity and email. Website.
Earlier votes
Yes3mo agoSuperseded
Voting YES on Cardano Vision 2026: Human Centred, Scalable, Post Quantum Secure - IO Research
May 25th 2026
Summary
This proposal requests a withdrawal of approximately ₳33M, to be managed by Intersect and distributed to IOG and various subcontractors for seven work packages designed to further the research on which Cardano is built.
A Brief Review Of The Work Packages
Name Main focus Trust, Security & Reliability Infrastructure Consensus (Leios/Peras, MEV), post-quantum security, node/key security (HSM/MPC) Scalability & Execution Layer Fee markets & L2 data availability, sharding study, P2P/pub-sub, ZK verification & L2 settlement Developer Platform & User Experience Plutus (verifying compiler, formal methods), light clients (Cavefish), Babel fees & intents Applications, Adoption & Liquidity Bridge security, atomic swaps, agent-based cross-chain coordination Economic Systems & Incentives SPO incentive recalibration, multi-resource consensus / PoUW, utility-weighted throughput metrics Governance, Identity & Social Infrastructure Governance incentives & DAO DSL, proof of personhood, verifiable credentials Delivery, Dissemination & Partnerships Program management, R&D sessions, CIP translation, ecosystem communication (in-kind via IOG) Conclusion
I'm particularly excited to see the PQC elements of the first work package. A recent landmark paper from Google [1] urges all vulnerable cryptocurrency communities to join the migration to PQC without delay. I happen to know a little bit [2, 3, 4, 5] about this issue and I'm very happy to see it begin to be addressed. I am however fearful that this may be too little, too late. I hope IOG and the community will show even more emphasis on delivering post-quantum Cardano.
I'm voting in favor of this proposal.
Signed,
William DoyleYour friendly neighbourhood DRep!
$computerman
drep1yfpgzfymq...pzw3nt
@william00000010 on 𝕏
contact@williamdoyle.caReferences
Babbush, R., Zalcman, A., Gidney, C., Broughton, M., Khattar, T., Neven, H., Bergamaschi, T., Drake, J., & Boneh, D. (2026). Securing elliptic curve cryptocurrencies against quantum vulnerabilities: Resource estimates and mitigations. arXiv:2603.28846 [quant-ph].
Dallaire-Demers, P.L., Doyle, W., & Foo, T. (2026). Brace for impact: ECDLP challenges for quantum cryptanalysis. arXiv:2508.14011 [quant-ph].
Dallaire-Demers, P.L., & Doyle, W. (2023). Post-quantum security for Cardano accounts. Catalyst Fund 10 proposal.
Dallaire-Demers, P.L., & Doyle, W. (live). Anchor Vault: A post-quantum smart contract wallet for Ethereum. Chrome Web Store extension.
Doyle, W. (live). EBP: Quantum-secure identity and email. Website.
- No285.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes275.2K ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on “Cardano Vision 2026: Human Centred, Scalable, Post Quantum Secure – IO Research,” while explicitly recognising the concerns raised about bundling, conversion, and milestone structure.
I acknowledge that this proposal aggregates multiple research agendas—post‑quantum cryptography, Leios/Peras analysis, sharding exploration, ZK/L2 infrastructure, bridge and atomic‑swap security, light‑client and decentralized API design, Babel/intent markets, PoUW, governance incentives, and identity—into a single, large envelope. This bundling reduces the precision with which DReps can prioritise: it is not possible to approve, for example, PQ security and consensus analysis while rejecting lower‑priority or more experimental topics such as PoUW in this funding cycle. I also recognise the research‑to‑deployment conversion concern. IO Research reports more than 250 peer‑reviewed papers historically, of which around 20% have been implemented in Cardano, and CV26 itself is still primarily framed around 38 papers/reports, 8 CPSs, 12 prototypes, and 5 CIPs, rather than direct production delivery. Finally, the tranche design—four equal 25% releases keyed to contract execution, an interim report, a Q3 R&D session, and a final report—are process checkpoints rather than tightly output‑bound payment gates per work package, which several DReps have reasonably highlighted as weak for a programme of this size.
Even with those caveats, I judge the proposal’s content and track record to justify a YES this cycle. CV26 squarely targets long‑term differentiators that are difficult to source elsewhere at comparable depth: adversarial analysis and optimisation of Leios/Peras, MEV and mempool safety in an eUTxO setting, post‑quantum primitives and PQ‑secure Ouroboros, node key security via HSMs and MPC, eUTxO‑native data‑availability and fee‑market design, ZK verification infrastructure and zk‑rollups, a formal foundation for Plutus (state machines and verifying compiler), trust‑minimised light‑client and intent architectures (Cavefish and decentralised indexers), Babel/intent market design and minUTxO redesign, bridge and atomic‑swap protocols, multi‑resource consensus/PoUW, and governance/identity primitives including proof‑of‑personhood and ZK credentials. These are structured with explicit TRL targets and clear “out of scope” boundaries for implementation, and they build directly on a CV25 year that exceeded its research and validation targets and handed several concrete artefacts (e.g. Leios CIP, Phalanx, RSnarks, Cavefish) to engineering. The consortium—IO Research plus leading universities such as Edinburgh, Oxford, IST Tokyo, Buenos Aires, Sydney, and Berkeley, along with applied partners like Eryx—is, in my view, uniquely positioned to deliver this category of work for Cardano.
I also consider the governance and custody structure to be appropriate for a Tier‑2c research programme at this scale. Funds are held in Intersect‑administered treasury reserve and project‑specific smart contracts developed by Sundae Labs and audited by TxPipe and MLabs, with multi‑party controls over fund movements, delegation to auto‑abstain, third‑party assurance of milestones, and an obligation to return undisbursed funds at the end of the delivery period. The proposal includes a clear reporting cadence—public R&D sessions, a mid‑year interim report, and a year‑end final report with financial breakdown—which, together with CV25’s published reports, gives the community a reasonable basis to track progress and judge research‑to‑deployment conversion over time.
That said, my support comes with expectations for future cycles. For any follow‑on “Cardano Vision 20xx” programmes, I will look for: (1) tighter bundling or modularisation so that high‑priority research lines (e.g. PQ security, consensus robustness) can be evaluated and funded independently of lower‑priority or more speculative work; (2) stronger evidence that prior cycles’ outputs—CV25 and CV26—are translating into deployed capabilities, CIPs, and measurable network outcomes, not just additional publications; and (3) more granular, output‑based milestone and disbursement structures for large research envelopes, rather than only broad reporting checkpoints. I am voting YES on CV26 because I believe maintaining Cardano’s research foundation and this particular research network is strategically important at this stage, but future renewals should expect a higher bar on prioritisation, conversion, and milestone discipline. - YesRevoted272.2K ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes3mo agoSuperseded
- Yes268.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes260.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes233.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes227.5K ₳No rationale
- No216.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes202.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes198.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes196.9K ₳Rationale
Research is the Cardano differentiator. This is an inviolable long term investment needed to maintain our unique selling point.
- Yes189.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes185K ₳No rationale
- Yes183.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes182.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes163K ₳No rationale
- Abstain161.1K ₳No rationale
- No157.8K ₳No rationale
- Abstain155.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes150.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes149.8K ₳Rationale
This proposal funds critical forward-looking research across three balanced pillars: human centered design, scalability, and post-quantum security. While I remain cautious on broad treasury spending and believe quantum threats are still 8–15+ years away, proactive work on post-quantum primitives and Ouroboros migration is prudent long-term insurance for a chain built to last decades. The scalability and developer experience components directly tackle real adoption bottlenecks like usability, throughput, and friction that go beyond generic infrastructure. At ~₳33M this is a significant but contained allocation for a full-year program with clear deliverables (papers, prototypes, and CIPs). IO Research has a proven track record on foundational work. This is an exception to my usual fiscal discipline stance because it strengthens Cardano’s core competitiveness and future-proofing.
- Yes148.6K ₳No rationale
- YesChanged142.9K ₳Rationale
Due to the shortage of funds and the large number of proposals, such broad proposals should be broken down into smaller packages with 12 months of funding.
Earlier votes
No3mo agoSuperseded
Due to the shortage of funds and the large number of proposals, such broad proposals should be broken down into smaller packages with 12 months of funding.
- Yes138.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes126.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes124.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes115.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes107.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes102.4K ₳No rationale
- No90.6K ₳Rationale
Governance Action Review [EN]
1. Introduction
Cardano Vision 2026 is an IO Research proposal focused on three strategic themes: human-centred design, scalability, and post-quantum security. The programme is organised as an integrated delivery model combining Input Output Research, Applied Research & Creative Engineering, and the Cardano Business Unit into a single pipeline from fundamental research to technology validation and implementation support.
The proposal covers seven work packages: Trust, Security & Reliability Infrastructure; Scalability & Execution Layer; Developer Platform & User Experience; Applications, Adoption & Liquidity; Economic Systems & Incentives; Governance, Identity & Social Infrastructure; and Delivery, Dissemination & Partnerships. These work packages include research and validation activities related to consensus, Leios and Peras, post-quantum cryptography, node security, ZK and Layer 2 infrastructure, light clients, Babel fees, bridge security, SPO incentives, governance incentives, proof of personhood, decentralized identity, and dissemination.
The requested budget is ₳32.917M, approximately US$7.9M, to support 36 FTEs. The proposal presents the programme as part of a broader effort to improve the consistency, speed, and impact of research translation, with outputs including papers, technical reports, CPSs, prototypes, CIPs, and implementation-readiness work.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Positive aspects
Several research areas included in this proposal appear strategically important for the ecosystem, and some may even deserve funding in the current budget cycle.
To be fair, this proposal appears to improve on the pattern of research remaining only theoretical by including implementation-readiness outputs, such as CIPs, rather than only papers. That is a positive evolution.
Highly specialized protocol research, cryptography, formal methods, and applied engineering may justify above-average rates. The issue is not that senior research talent should be cheap.
Negative aspects
The main concern is the structure of this proposal.
The proposal bundles multiple research workstreams across distinct and highly specialized domains, however these workstreams are not all equal in urgency, maturity, implementation readiness, or strategic priority. Some may be highly relevant for Cardano this year. Others appear more exploratory, less urgent, or more appropriate for a future funding cycle.
This distinction matters because the proposal is submitted as one indivisible treasury withdrawal. Bundling does not merely create operational coordination. In governance terms, it forces compromise. DReps are asked to either approve lower-priority workstreams in order to support higher-priority ones, or reject valuable research because it was packaged together with less urgent components.
In a competitive budget cycle, this is a serious problem. Treasury resources are limited, and less urgent workstreams still consume budget capacity. When many different research efforts are bundled into a single vote, DReps lose the ability to prioritize funding based on urgency, expected impact, implementation readiness, and ecosystem need.
This is not only a procedural concern. It is also an evaluation concern.
Sufficient expertise is not claimed to independently assess every research domain included in this proposal. It is also doubtful that many DReps in the ecosystem would realistically have the expertise required to make a fully informed judgment across all of these specialized workstreams. Evaluating post-quantum cryptography, consensus design, ZK infrastructure, governance incentives, identity systems, bridge security, and economic models requires different forms of technical and domain-specific knowledge.
This is precisely why modularity matters. A more granular submission structure would allow DReps, experts, and community members to evaluate each area more responsibly. It would also allow the ecosystem to support urgent and strategically important research without being forced to approve a broad institutional research portfolio as a single package.
Another concern is the research-to-implementation gap.
Treasury-funded research should not be evaluated only by the production of papers, reports, or theoretical outputs. It should also be evaluated by whether it creates practical implementation pathways, deployed capabilities, governance mechanisms, or measurable ecosystem improvements.
Just to give an example, in the previous research cycle, treasury-funded work included research related to governance incentives and DRep participation. While that work may have produced academic or theoretical outputs, a clear translation into implemented mechanisms that materially improve Cardano governance has not been seen. From the perspective of an active DRep, the governance layer still contains important gaps around incentives, stakeholder participation, concentration of voting power, operational clarity, and accountability.
The broader concern remains: Cardano should not repeatedly fund large research envelopes unless there is stronger evidence that prior research outputs are being converted into practical ecosystem value.
Otherwise an expensive research boutique without justifiable impact is created. The Cardano ecosystem already spent a lot of resources on research and does not have the luxury of continuing this path when Cardano barely accrues transaction fees to subsidize this type of endeavor.
This concern becomes more serious in the current budget context. The Net Change Limit is constrained, total funding demand is high, and a significant share of available treasury resources is already being directed toward large institutional proposals, including proposals from founding entities. In this environment, additional large research requests should face a higher bar for prioritization, modularity, and demonstrated downstream impact.
It is also fair to acknowledge a broader institutional concern. Parts of Cardano’s scaling and governance roadmap were expected by many community members to be delivered fully before the ecosystem entered this stage of treasury-funded completion and extension work. The Voltaire era, in particular, became operational while leaving several practical governance gaps unresolved. Those gaps are now creating additional treasury costs and additional pressure on the budget process.
For that reason, another large bundled proposal that asks the treasury to fund many different research lines at once is not comfortable to approve, especially when some of them may be less urgent than others and when previous research has not always clearly translated into implementation.
A further concern is the implied FTE cost basis.
The proposal requests ₳32.917M, or approximately US$7.9M, to support 36 FTEs. This implies an average cost of approximately US$219.5k per FTE per year, or about US$118 per hour using the proposal’s own assumption of 232 working days.
This should not be interpreted as a direct salary per employee. The proposal states that this average FTE cost is “inclusive of all associated costs,” including personnel, equipment, software licences, cloud and server infrastructure, subcontracting, academic partners, specialist engineers, program management, travel, events, ecosystem engagement, and dissemination.
However, this does not remove the budget concern. It reinforces it.
The implied blended rate of approximately US$219k per FTE/year, or US$118/hour, sits at the high end of public Web3 and blockchain compensation benchmarks. That may be defensible for highly specialized protocol research, cryptography, formal methods, and applied engineering. However, at this funding level, the proposal should provide a much clearer breakdown by role, seniority, geography, partner allocation, overhead, subcontracting, and workstream. Without that granularity, DReps cannot properly assess whether the rate is reasonable across the full bundle.
Based on public compensation references across different markets, including the United States, Europe, and Singapore, the implied annual cost per FTE appears to sit considerably above average compensation benchmarks for many blockchain, Web3, crypto research, and related technical roles. For example, public salary references show US blockchain developer averages around US$111k–158k depending on the source, global blockchain security researcher averages around US$83k with a top 10% around US$156k, Europe Web3 salaries averaging around US$78k with a top 10% around US$144k, and Singapore Web3 or crypto research-related averages commonly ranging below the proposal’s implied US$219.5k per FTE.
The proposal mentions associated costs such as cloud infrastructure, software licences, subcontracting, academic partners, travel, events, and dissemination. But it does not provide a detailed breakdown showing how much is allocated to each of these categories, how much goes to internal staff versus external partners, how rates vary by role or seniority, how costs differ across regions, or how much each workstream actually consumes.
For a treasury request of this size, especially from a founding entity that should help set accountability standards for the ecosystem, this is below what would be expected.
The burden should not be on DReps to infer whether the budget is proportionate from a single blended FTE rate. The burden should be on the proposer to provide enough granularity for proper assessment.
Without that breakdown, DReps cannot reliably evaluate whether the high blended FTE cost is justified, whether lower-priority workstreams are consuming excessive treasury capacity, or whether the budget could be streamlined.
This budget concern is also amplified by the current market context.
The Cardano ecosystem is operating under strained conditions. Many builders, teams, and community initiatives are struggling to survive, reducing costs, pausing operations, or shutting down entirely. In that environment, treasury allocation should be especially disciplined.
It is not appropriate for the treasury to approve a large bundled research proposal with an implied blended FTE cost above many public compensation benchmarks, while much of the ecosystem is being forced to cut deeply into its own operations.
Highly specialized research talent may justify premium rates in some cases. But if the requested FTE cost is above average even when compared with high-salary markets, then the proposer should provide a much stronger budget breakdown and justification. This is especially true for a founding entity requesting a large share of limited treasury resources.
When the broader ecosystem is being asked to survive on less, large institutional proposals should not rely on aggregated blended rates and vague cost categories. They should demonstrate why the requested compensation and associated costs are proportionate, necessary, and aligned with current treasury constraints.
Risks and concerns
Treasury-funded research may remain limited to papers, reports, or theoretical outputs rather than practical implementation pathways, deployed capabilities, governance mechanisms, or measurable ecosystem improvements.
Bundling multiple research workstreams into one indivisible treasury withdrawal may force DReps to approve lower-priority workstreams in order to support higher-priority ones, or reject valuable research because it was packaged together with less urgent components.
The breadth of specialized domains creates an evaluation problem. DReps may not realistically have the expertise required to make a fully informed judgment across post-quantum cryptography, consensus design, ZK infrastructure, governance incentives, identity systems, bridge security, and economic models.
The constrained Net Change Limit, high total funding demand, and large share of available treasury resources already directed toward institutional proposals increase the seriousness of the concern.
The implied blended FTE rate and the lack of detailed budget breakdown prevent reliable evaluation of whether the high FTE cost is justified, whether lower-priority workstreams consume excessive treasury capacity, or whether the budget could be streamlined.
The current market context amplifies the budget concern because many builders, teams, and community initiatives are struggling to survive, reducing costs, pausing operations, or shutting down entirely.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO.
The NO vote is based on governance process, treasury prioritization, and accountability. It is not a rejection of Cardano research.
The decision should not be interpreted as opposition to research. On the contrary, Agora is itself a research-oriented initiative, and research is essential for Cardano’s long-term competitiveness, governance quality, and technical evolution.
The proposal bundles multiple research workstreams across distinct and highly specialized domains, even though these workstreams are not all equal in urgency, maturity, implementation readiness, or strategic priority. Some may be highly relevant for Cardano this year. Others appear more exploratory, less urgent, or more appropriate for a future funding cycle.
Because the proposal is submitted as one indivisible treasury withdrawal, DReps are forced into compromise: either approve lower-priority workstreams in order to support higher-priority ones, or reject valuable research because it was packaged together with less urgent components.
A more granular submission structure would allow DReps, experts, and community members to evaluate each area more responsibly. It would also allow the ecosystem to support urgent and strategically important research without being forced to approve a broad institutional research portfolio as a single package.
There would be more openness to future proposals that separate the highest-priority research streams into more focused submissions, provide clearer evidence of how prior research outputs have translated into implementation, and connect each funding request more directly to concrete ecosystem outcomes.
4. Conclusion
Important research deserves serious funding. But it also deserves serious governance treatment. In its current bundled form, this proposal does not meet that standard. The decision is therefore grounded in governance process, treasury prioritization, accountability, budget proportionality, and the need for clearer conversion from research outputs into practical ecosystem value.
Revisão de Ação de Governança [PT]
1. Introdução
Cardano Vision 2026 é uma proposta da IO Research focada em três temas estratégicos: design centrado no ser humano, escalabilidade e segurança pós-quântica. O programa é organizado como um modelo integrado de entrega que combina Input Output Research, Applied Research & Creative Engineering e Cardano Business Unit em uma única pipeline, da pesquisa fundamental à validação tecnológica e ao suporte à implementação.
A proposta cobre sete work packages: Trust, Security & Reliability Infrastructure; Scalability & Execution Layer; Developer Platform & User Experience; Applications, Adoption & Liquidity; Economic Systems & Incentives; Governance, Identity & Social Infrastructure; e Delivery, Dissemination & Partnerships. Esses work packages incluem atividades de pesquisa e validação relacionadas a consenso, Leios e Peras, criptografia pós-quântica, segurança de nodes, infraestrutura ZK e Layer 2, light clients, Babel fees, segurança de bridges, incentivos para SPOs, incentivos de governança, proof of personhood, identidade descentralizada e disseminação.
O orçamento solicitado é de ₳32,917M, aproximadamente US$7,9M, para suportar 36 FTEs. A proposta apresenta o programa como parte de um esforço mais amplo para melhorar a consistência, a velocidade e o impacto da tradução de pesquisa em resultados, com outputs incluindo papers, relatórios técnicos, CPSs, protótipos, CIPs e trabalho de prontidão para implementação.
2. Análise da Ação de Governança
Aspectos positivos
Várias áreas de pesquisa incluídas nesta proposta parecem estrategicamente importantes para o ecossistema, e algumas podem até merecer financiamento no ciclo orçamentário atual.
Para ser justo, esta proposta parece melhorar o padrão de pesquisas que permanecem apenas teóricas ao incluir outputs de prontidão para implementação, como CIPs, em vez de apenas papers. Isso é uma evolução positiva.
Pesquisa de protocolo altamente especializada, criptografia, métodos formais e engenharia aplicada podem justificar taxas acima da média. O problema não é que talento sênior de pesquisa deveria ser barato.
Aspectos negativos
A principal preocupação é a estrutura desta proposta.
A proposta agrupa múltiplas workstreams de pesquisa em domínios distintos e altamente especializados, porém essas workstreams não são todas iguais em urgência, maturidade, prontidão para implementação ou prioridade estratégica. Algumas podem ser altamente relevantes para a Cardano este ano. Outras parecem mais exploratórias, menos urgentes ou mais apropriadas para um ciclo de financiamento futuro.
Essa distinção importa porque a proposta é submetida como uma retirada de tesouraria indivisível. Bundling não cria apenas coordenação operacional. Em termos de governança, força compromisso. DReps são solicitados a aprovar workstreams de menor prioridade para apoiar workstreams de maior prioridade, ou a rejeitar pesquisas valiosas porque foram empacotadas junto com componentes menos urgentes.
Em um ciclo orçamentário competitivo, isso é um problema sério. Os recursos do tesouro são limitados, e workstreams menos urgentes ainda consomem capacidade orçamentária. Quando muitos esforços de pesquisa diferentes são agrupados em um único voto, DReps perdem a capacidade de priorizar financiamento com base em urgência, impacto esperado, prontidão para implementação e necessidade do ecossistema.
Isso não é apenas uma preocupação procedimental. Também é uma preocupação de avaliação.
Não se reivindica expertise suficiente para avaliar de forma independente todos os domínios de pesquisa incluídos nesta proposta. Também é duvidoso que muitos DReps no ecossistema tenham realisticamente a expertise necessária para tomar uma decisão plenamente informada sobre todas essas workstreams especializadas. Avaliar criptografia pós-quântica, design de consenso, infraestrutura ZK, incentivos de governança, sistemas de identidade, segurança de bridges e modelos econômicos exige diferentes formas de conhecimento técnico e específico de domínio.
É precisamente por isso que modularidade importa. Uma estrutura de submissão mais granular permitiria que DReps, especialistas e membros da comunidade avaliassem cada área de maneira mais responsável. Também permitiria que o ecossistema apoiasse pesquisas urgentes e estrategicamente importantes sem ser forçado a aprovar um amplo portfólio institucional de pesquisa como um único pacote.
Outra preocupação é o gap entre pesquisa e implementação.
Pesquisas financiadas pelo tesouro não devem ser avaliadas apenas pela produção de papers, relatórios ou outputs teóricos. Também devem ser avaliadas por criarem caminhos práticos de implementação, capacidades implantadas, mecanismos de governança ou melhorias mensuráveis para o ecossistema.
Apenas para dar um exemplo, no ciclo anterior de pesquisa, trabalho financiado pelo tesouro incluiu pesquisa relacionada a incentivos de governança e participação de DReps. Embora esse trabalho possa ter produzido outputs acadêmicos ou teóricos, uma tradução clara em mecanismos implementados que melhorem materialmente a governança da Cardano não foi vista. Da perspectiva de um DRep ativo, a camada de governança ainda contém gaps importantes em torno de incentivos, participação de stakeholders, concentração de poder de voto, clareza operacional e accountability.
A preocupação mais ampla permanece: a Cardano não deveria financiar repetidamente grandes envelopes de pesquisa a menos que exista evidência mais forte de que outputs de pesquisas anteriores estejam sendo convertidos em valor prático para o ecossistema.
Caso contrário, cria-se uma boutique de pesquisa cara sem impacto justificável. O ecossistema Cardano já gastou muitos recursos com pesquisa e não tem o luxo de continuar nesse caminho quando a Cardano mal acumula taxas de transação para subsidiar esse tipo de empreendimento.
Essa preocupação se torna mais séria no contexto orçamentário atual. O Net Change Limit é restrito, a demanda total por financiamento é alta, e uma parcela significativa dos recursos disponíveis do tesouro já está sendo direcionada para grandes propostas institucionais, incluindo propostas de entidades fundadoras. Nesse ambiente, pedidos adicionais de pesquisa em larga escala devem enfrentar um padrão mais alto de priorização, modularidade e demonstração de impacto downstream.
Também é justo reconhecer uma preocupação institucional mais ampla. Partes do roadmap de escalabilidade e governança da Cardano eram esperadas por muitos membros da comunidade como entregas completas antes de o ecossistema entrar nesta etapa de trabalhos de conclusão e extensão financiados pelo tesouro. A era Voltaire, em particular, tornou-se operacional deixando vários gaps práticos de governança sem resolução. Esses gaps agora estão criando custos adicionais para o tesouro e pressão adicional sobre o processo orçamentário.
Por esse motivo, não há conforto em aprovar outra grande proposta agrupada que pede ao tesouro para financiar muitas linhas de pesquisa diferentes de uma só vez, especialmente quando algumas delas podem ser menos urgentes do que outras e quando pesquisas anteriores nem sempre se traduziram claramente em implementação.
Uma preocupação adicional é a base de custo FTE implícita.
A proposta solicita ₳32,917M, ou aproximadamente US$7,9M, para suportar 36 FTEs. Isso implica um custo médio de aproximadamente US$219,5k por FTE por ano, ou cerca de US$118 por hora usando a própria premissa da proposta de 232 dias úteis.
Isso não deve ser interpretado como salário direto por funcionário. A proposta afirma que esse custo médio por FTE é “inclusive of all associated costs,” incluindo pessoal, equipamentos, licenças de software, infraestrutura de cloud e servidores, subcontratação, parceiros acadêmicos, engenheiros especialistas, gestão do programa, viagens, eventos, engajamento do ecossistema e disseminação.
No entanto, isso não remove a preocupação orçamentária. Isso a reforça.
A taxa blended implícita de aproximadamente US$219k por FTE/ano, ou US$118/hora, fica no patamar alto de benchmarks públicos de remuneração em Web3 e blockchain. Isso pode ser defensável para pesquisa de protocolo altamente especializada, criptografia, métodos formais e engenharia aplicada. No entanto, nesse nível de financiamento, a proposta deveria fornecer uma decomposição muito mais clara por função, senioridade, geografia, alocação por parceiro, overhead, subcontratação e workstream. Sem essa granularidade, DReps não conseguem avaliar adequadamente se a taxa é razoável em todo o bundle.
Com base em referências públicas de remuneração em diferentes mercados, incluindo Estados Unidos, Europa e Singapura, o custo anual implícito por FTE parece ficar consideravelmente acima de benchmarks médios de remuneração para muitas funções técnicas relacionadas a blockchain, Web3 e crypto research. Por exemplo, referências públicas de salário mostram médias de blockchain developer nos EUA em torno de US$111k–158k dependendo da fonte, blockchain security researcher global em torno de US$83k com top 10% em torno de US$156k, salários Web3 na Europa em torno de US$78k com top 10% em torno de US$144k, e médias relacionadas a Web3 ou crypto research em Singapura comumente abaixo dos US$219,5k por FTE implícitos na proposta.
A proposta menciona custos associados como infraestrutura de cloud, licenças de software, subcontratação, parceiros acadêmicos, viagens, eventos e disseminação. Mas não fornece uma decomposição detalhada mostrando quanto é alocado para cada uma dessas categorias, quanto vai para staff interno versus parceiros externos, como as taxas variam por função ou senioridade, como os custos diferem entre regiões, ou quanto cada workstream realmente consome.
Para uma solicitação de tesouraria desse tamanho, especialmente vinda de uma entidade fundadora que deveria ajudar a estabelecer padrões de accountability para o ecossistema, isso está abaixo do que seria esperado.
O ônus não deveria estar sobre os DReps para inferir se o orçamento é proporcional a partir de uma única taxa FTE blended. O ônus deveria estar sobre o proposer para fornecer granularidade suficiente para uma avaliação adequada.
Sem essa decomposição, DReps não conseguem avaliar de forma confiável se o alto custo blended por FTE é justificado, se workstreams de menor prioridade estão consumindo capacidade excessiva do tesouro, ou se o orçamento poderia ser otimizado.
Essa preocupação orçamentária também é amplificada pelo contexto atual de mercado.
O ecossistema Cardano está operando sob condições pressionadas. Muitos builders, equipes e iniciativas comunitárias estão lutando para sobreviver, reduzindo custos, pausando operações ou encerrando atividades. Nesse ambiente, a alocação do tesouro deve ser especialmente disciplinada.
Não é apropriado que o tesouro aprove uma grande proposta de pesquisa agrupada com um custo FTE blended implícito acima de muitos benchmarks públicos de remuneração, enquanto boa parte do ecossistema está sendo forçada a cortar profundamente suas próprias operações.
Talento de pesquisa altamente especializado pode justificar taxas premium em alguns casos. Mas se o custo FTE solicitado está acima da média mesmo quando comparado com mercados de salários altos, então o proposer deveria fornecer uma decomposição orçamentária e justificativa muito mais fortes. Isso é especialmente verdadeiro para uma entidade fundadora solicitando uma grande parcela de recursos limitados do tesouro.
Quando o ecossistema mais amplo está sendo solicitado a sobreviver com menos, grandes propostas institucionais não devem depender de taxas blended agregadas e categorias vagas de custo. Devem demonstrar por que a compensação e os custos associados solicitados são proporcionais, necessários e alinhados às restrições atuais do tesouro.
Riscos e preocupações
Pesquisas financiadas pelo tesouro podem permanecer limitadas a papers, relatórios ou outputs teóricos, em vez de caminhos práticos de implementação, capacidades implantadas, mecanismos de governança ou melhorias mensuráveis para o ecossistema.
Agrupar múltiplas workstreams de pesquisa em uma retirada de tesouraria indivisível pode forçar DReps a aprovar workstreams de menor prioridade para apoiar workstreams de maior prioridade, ou a rejeitar pesquisas valiosas porque foram empacotadas junto com componentes menos urgentes.
A amplitude de domínios especializados cria um problema de avaliação. DReps podem não ter realisticamente a expertise necessária para tomar uma decisão plenamente informada sobre criptografia pós-quântica, design de consenso, infraestrutura ZK, incentivos de governança, sistemas de identidade, segurança de bridges e modelos econômicos.
O Net Change Limit restrito, a alta demanda total por financiamento e a grande parcela dos recursos disponíveis do tesouro já direcionada a propostas institucionais aumentam a seriedade da preocupação.
A taxa FTE blended implícita e a falta de decomposição orçamentária detalhada impedem uma avaliação confiável sobre se o alto custo FTE é justificado, se workstreams de menor prioridade consomem capacidade excessiva do tesouro, ou se o orçamento poderia ser otimizado.
O contexto atual de mercado amplifica a preocupação orçamentária porque muitos builders, equipes e iniciativas comunitárias estão lutando para sobreviver, reduzindo custos, pausando operações ou encerrando atividades.
3. Voto e Justificativa
Voto: NO.
O voto NO é baseado em processo de governança, priorização do tesouro e accountability. Não é uma rejeição à pesquisa na Cardano.
A decisão não deve ser interpretada como oposição à pesquisa. Pelo contrário, o Agora é uma iniciativa orientada à pesquisa, e pesquisa é essencial para a competitividade de longo prazo da Cardano, a qualidade da governança e a evolução técnica.
A proposta agrupa múltiplas workstreams de pesquisa em domínios distintos e altamente especializados, embora essas workstreams não sejam todas iguais em urgência, maturidade, prontidão para implementação ou prioridade estratégica. Algumas podem ser altamente relevantes para a Cardano este ano. Outras parecem mais exploratórias, menos urgentes ou mais apropriadas para um ciclo de financiamento futuro.
Como a proposta é submetida como uma retirada de tesouraria indivisível, DReps são forçados a compromisso: aprovar workstreams de menor prioridade para apoiar workstreams de maior prioridade, ou rejeitar pesquisas valiosas porque foram empacotadas junto com componentes menos urgentes.
Uma estrutura de submissão mais granular permitiria que DReps, especialistas e membros da comunidade avaliassem cada área de forma mais responsável. Também permitiria que o ecossistema apoiasse pesquisas urgentes e estrategicamente importantes sem ser forçado a aprovar um amplo portfólio institucional de pesquisa como um único pacote.
Haveria mais abertura a propostas futuras que separem as workstreams de pesquisa de maior prioridade em submissões mais focadas, forneçam evidências mais claras de como outputs de pesquisas anteriores se traduziram em implementação, e conectem cada pedido de financiamento mais diretamente a resultados concretos para o ecossistema.
4. Conclusão
Pesquisa importante merece financiamento sério. Mas também merece tratamento sério de governança. Em sua forma atual agrupada, esta proposta não atinge esse padrão. A decisão é, portanto, fundamentada em processo de governança, priorização do tesouro, accountability, proporcionalidade orçamentária e necessidade de conversão mais clara de outputs de pesquisa em valor prático para o ecossistema.
- Yes90.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes83.9K ₳Rationale
These are good priorities and a good team to action them. I am in favor.
- Yes72.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes63.1K ₳Rationale
YES. CV26 advances Cardano 2030 via scalable, secure, human-centered R&D. Support with CPC-aligned KPIs, public milestones, and convenience without dependency.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting YES on Cardano Vision 2026 because it supports foundational capabilities Cardano needs for long-term competitiveness: scalability, post-quantum readiness, developer experience, trust-minimized access, decentralized identity, governance incentives, interoperability, and sustainable economic design.
This proposal is strongest because it is not framed as research alone. It creates a pipeline from foundational research to applied validation, prototypes, CPSs, CIPs, and implementation-readiness. That matters for Cardano 2030 because vision only becomes real when it turns into measurable capabilities the ecosystem can use.
My support is grounded in accountability. I expect delivery to be evaluated through public milestones, clear reporting, usable outputs, third-party assurance, close-out reporting, and transparent evidence of progress. The relevant KPI lens should connect directly with Cardano’s product priorities: monthly active users, monthly transactions, throughput capacity, uptime, TVL, protocol revenue, DRep participation, operational resilience, developer adoption, and public reuse of outputs.
This also connects with my core thesis: Cardano needs convenience without dependency. Work on light clients, decentralized APIs, Babel fees, intent-based interaction, ZK/L2 infrastructure, and better developer tooling can reduce friction for users and builders while avoiding dependency on one provider, one wallet, one API layer, or one closed routing path.
My YES is not a blank check. Treasury funding should move Cardano from service dependency toward open ecosystem capacity. IO has deep capability, but the public return must be visible: research should become reusable infrastructure, open knowledge, implementation pathways, and opportunities for smaller builders to participate in the Cardano economic machine.
I support CV26 as a strategic YES with accountability, transparency, CPC-aligned KPIs, and a clear expectation that funded work translates into measurable public value for Cardano.
- Yes63.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes56.1K ₳Rationale
terribly expensive, as i think the IOR team should/can become leaner, but in principle, yes.
- Yes55.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes51.8K ₳Rationale
good proposal from IO important for the core element as charles point out
- No48K ₳No rationale
- Abstain45.3K ₳Rationale
I wanted to vote "Yes", because anyway IO did the most Cardano-related research work. But the huge budget of 32916000 ADA, which is now (at the moment of voting) more than $8 million dollars made me to choose Abstain.
- Yes26.7K ₳Rationale
Yes. Good governance bill.
- Yes16.3K ₳No rationale