Withdraw 3,961,538 ada for Bringing Real-World Payments to Cardano with Wirex
154 DReps voted · 57 with a rationale · 3 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- No870.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes862K ₳No rationale
- No830.3K ₳Rationale
Previous experience with Wirex and Cardano Card was not positive. Most LatinAmerican countries are excluded. Very high fees.
- Yes799.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes795K ₳No rationale
- No626K ₳Rationale
Voting NO. Wirex is a capable company with a real vision, Cardano-native payments for 7M users. But ₳3.85M as a pure grant to a commercial entity with no return mechanism, no open-source specifics, and no budget transparency doesn't meet Treasury standards.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Wirex addresses a real and important gap in Cardano's ecosystem: the lack of integrated real-world payment rails. A regulated fintech with 7M users, 1.5M cards issued, and $20B+ in transaction volume building Cardano-native payments infrastructure is not a frivolous idea. The intent is genuine and the problem is worth solving.
However, this proposal asks the Treasury to fund a commercial company's infrastructure build with no return mechanism, no detailed open-source commitments, no evidence of productive ecosystem effects, and no transparency on how the budget is spent. The "public good" framing is thin, what Wirex keeps proprietary (banking rails, Visa network, compliance infrastructure, user relationships) is far more valuable than what they promise to open-source. And what they promise to open-source lacks specifics: no license, no repository, no architecture detail.
For ₳3.85M, I expect proportionate value capture. A commercial beneficiary with demonstrated revenue should share upside, not receive a pure grant. This proposal does not meet that standard.Wirex is a capable company addressing a real problem. The vision of Cardano-powered real-world payments is compelling. But the structure of this proposal, a pure grant to a commercial entity with no return mechanism, no detailed open-source commitments, no productive ecosystem evidence, and no budget transparency, does not meet the standard for Treasury funding.
The Cardano Treasury is not a venture capital fund. It is public capital meant to create public goods, share upside with the ecosystem, and avoid creating private gatekeepers. This proposal fails on all three counts.
If Wirex resubmits with open-source specifics, a revenue-sharing or repayment mechanism, named downstream integrators, a detailed budget, an ADA volatility policy, and a co-funding commitment, I will evaluate it with a genuinely open mind. The problem is worth solving. This proposal, as structured, does not solve it fairly for the Treasury. - Abstain620K ₳No rationale
- Yes590K ₳Rationale
As per ekklesia, I approve.
- No587.6K ₳No rationale
- No535.2K ₳Rationale
Don't believe this is where we should be focusing our efforts but do wish for the best if passed.
- Abstain480.2K ₳No rationale
- No444.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes431.9K ₳No rationale
- No415.3K ₳No rationale
- No377.7K ₳Rationale
My strong opinion is that treasury ADA should be exclusively used to fund basic technical infrastructure that is available to all people in the Cardano ecosystem.
Providing funding to single for-profit businesses shall in my opinion not be done from the treasury.
- No365.9K ₳No rationale
- No360.4K ₳No rationale
- Abstain321.3K ₳No rationale
- No309.6K ₳Rationale
Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]
Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.
My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.
In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.
At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.
Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.
Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.
This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.
Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:
- Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
- Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
- Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
- Lack of credible execution capacity;
- Structural governance or transparency concerns;
- Severe budgetary or coordination risks.
Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.
This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.
Governance Action Review — Vote: NO
1. Introduction
The “Consensus Upgrades” treasury withdrawal requests ₳27,714,342 to continue Leios development as a consensus-layer scalability upgrade for Cardano. The proposal presents Leios as an enhancement to Ouroboros Praos, intended to increase throughput capacity and support faster settlement while preserving Cardano’s security guarantees.
The proposal positions Leios as necessary for Cardano’s 2030 strategy, which targets growth from approximately 800,000 transactions per month to more than 27 million monthly transactions.
The 2026/2027 cycle focuses on moving Leios from an early public testnet stage toward mainnet readiness. The work is organized around three objectives: producing a release candidate, increasing confidence through testing and adversarial validation, and enabling the conditions for a future Leios hard fork.
The proposal identifies Carlos Lopez De Lara and Sebastian Nagel as leads, with an expected duration of 6–9 months.
The budget allocates ₳23,834,334, or 86% of the total treasury ask, to Development. Additional categories include Infrastructure, Security & Audits, Legal & Compliance, Engagement & Ecosystem Support, Operations & Delivery, Governance, and Others.
2. Governance Action Analysis
1. Introduction
Wirex Limited requests 3,961,538 ADA, equivalent to US$1.03 million at the proposal’s fixed conversion rate of US$0.26 per ADA, for a nine-month Treasury Withdrawal administered by Intersect. The new technical initiative would deliver open-source infrastructure for real-world payments on Cardano, connecting on-chain settlement to Visa, banking rails, fiat ramps, wallets, APIs, and stablecoin-compatible systems.
Delivery is divided into five phases: core smart-contract infrastructure; Visa and banking integration; a wallet and API ecosystem layer; security and external audit; and launch and ecosystem activation. The proposed outputs include account abstraction, batched transactions, settlement logic, public SDKs, documentation, developer tooling, sandbox environments, independent audits, penetration testing, mainnet deployment, at least one live wallet integration, and one institutional or program partner onboarded.
The budget allocates US$350,000 to Core Infrastructure, US$250,000 to Visa & Banking Integration, US$200,000 to the Wallet & API Ecosystem Layer, US$100,000 to Security & External Audit, US$100,000 to Launch & Ecosystem Activation, and US$30,000 to Intersect’s administration fee. Unspent ADA resulting from favorable exchange-rate movements would be returned to the Treasury at the end of the project.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Negative aspects
2.1. Budget with insufficient detail
The proposal requests 3,961,538 ADA, equivalent to US$1.03 million, but presents the budget only through large aggregated categories:
US$350,000 for Core Infrastructure; US$250,000 for Visa & Banking Integration; US$200,000 for the Wallet & API Ecosystem Layer; US$100,000 for Security & External Audit; US$100,000 for Launch & Ecosystem Activation; and US$30,000 for Intersect administration.
Although each category contains a general list of activities, there is insufficient itemization to permit a responsible evaluation of the costs. The proposal does not disclose the number of professionals, roles and seniority levels, FTEs, working hours or dedication percentages, hourly rates, cost per activity, infrastructure costs, suppliers, regulatory costs, partner integration costs, or the internal distribution of each allocation.
Consequently, amounts ranging from US$100,000 to US$350,000 are presented as lump sums associated with generic descriptions. Knowing that US$350,000 will be spent on smart contracts, account abstraction, batched transactions, settlement logic, and internal audits does not reveal how much each component costs, how many people will work on them, or whether the amount requested is proportional to the effort required.
The same problem occurs in the remaining categories. The proposal identifies the broad destinations of the funds but does not demonstrate how the amounts were calculated. For a request exceeding one million dollars, this level of granularity is unacceptable.
2.2. Near absence of KPIs with relevant impact targets
The proposal contains some technical completion criteria but presents very few quantitative KPIs capable of demonstrating real impact for Cardano.
The main numerical targets are at least two external developers or teams integrating in the sandbox, one active wallet integration, one institutional or program partner onboarded, and the remediation of critical and high-severity vulnerabilities before launch.
These targets have limited usefulness for evaluating adoption or return to the ecosystem.
The integration of two external developers or teams is a small and poorly defined target. It is unclear who may be counted as an external developer, what depth of integration will be required, whether a basic sandbox test will be sufficient, whether the integration must reach production, whether it will produce users, volume, or transactions, and how long it must remain active.
A single wallet integration also demonstrates only that the infrastructure can be connected to a wallet. It does not demonstrate relevant usage, retention, number of users, processed volume, or sustainable adoption.
The onboarding of only one institutional or program partner has the same problem. There is no minimum requirement related to the size of the partner, number of users, volume transferred, geographic reach, or activity effectively generated on Cardano.
The remediation of critical and high-severity vulnerabilities is an important security condition, but it is not an impact or adoption KPI. It is a basic condition for securely launching financial infrastructure.
The proposal also mentions more than one million incremental transactions per year and US$250 million in annualized transaction volume.
However, these figures are presented as projections rather than binding commitments. They do not appear as milestone acceptance criteria, do not condition payments, and are not accompanied by a measurement methodology, assessment period, or consequence in the event of non-compliance.
Therefore, the proposal uses relevant figures in its impact narrative but avoids transforming them into measurable obligations. There is an important institutional difference between stating that a project may produce one million transactions and contractually committing to deliver a specific result.
The central problem is not the complete absence of numerical targets. It is the absence of robust impact KPIs proportional to the amount requested. The few thresholds presented primarily measure technical availability or minimal integrations, while the most important economic and adoption outcomes remain only narrative expectations.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO
The NO vote results from two serious and independent failures. Either one, by itself, would already be sufficient to prevent approval of the Treasury Withdrawal.
The proposal combines a large financial request without sufficient granularity to evaluate cost-effectiveness and weak impact commitments, with the main adoption estimates presented only as non-binding projections.
It is not necessary to reach a conclusion regarding Wirex’s competence, the strategic importance of payments, or the technical merit of the initiative. The budget and the KPIs each independently fail to meet the minimum level of accountability required for a withdrawal of this magnitude.
For these two reasons, the simplified template applies and the vote is NO.
4. Conclusion
The requested amount exceeds US$1 million without sufficient cost itemization, while the principal economic and adoption estimates remain non-binding projections. The budget and the impact KPIs independently fail to provide the minimum accountability required for approval of the Treasury Withdrawal.
Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]
Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.
Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.
Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.
Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.
Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.
Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.
Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.
Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:
- Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
- Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
- Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
- Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
- Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
- Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.
Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.
Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.
1. Introdução
A Wirex Limited solicita 3.961.538 ADA, equivalentes a US$ 1,03 milhão pela taxa de conversão fixa de US$ 0,26 por ADA utilizada na proposta, para uma retirada do Tesouro com duração estimada de nove meses e administração da Intersect. A nova iniciativa técnica pretende entregar uma infraestrutura open-source para pagamentos no mundo real em Cardano, conectando liquidação on-chain à Visa, sistemas bancários, fiat ramps, wallets, APIs e sistemas compatíveis com stablecoins.
A execução está dividida em cinco fases: infraestrutura central de smart contracts; integração com Visa e sistemas bancários; camada de ecossistema para wallets e APIs; segurança e auditoria externa; e lançamento e ativação do ecossistema. As entregas propostas incluem account abstraction, transações em lote, lógica de liquidação, SDKs públicos, documentação, ferramentas para desenvolvedores, ambientes sandbox, auditorias independentes, testes de penetração, implantação na mainnet, pelo menos uma integração ativa com wallet e o onboarding de um parceiro institucional ou de programa.
O orçamento destina US$ 350.000 à Core Infrastructure, US$ 250.000 à Visa & Banking Integration, US$ 200.000 à Wallet & API Ecosystem Layer, US$ 100.000 à Security & External Audit, US$ 100.000 à Launch & Ecosystem Activation e US$ 30.000 à taxa de administração da Intersect. ADA não utilizados em razão de movimentos cambiais favoráveis seriam devolvidos ao Tesouro ao final do projeto.
2. Análise da Ação de Governança
Aspectos negativos
2.1. Orçamento com detalhamento insuficiente
A proposta solicita 3.961.538 ADA, equivalentes a US$ 1,03 milhão, mas apresenta o orçamento apenas por grandes categorias agregadas:
US$ 350.000 para Core Infrastructure; US$ 250.000 para Visa & Banking Integration; US$ 200.000 para Wallet & API Ecosystem Layer; US$ 100.000 para Security & External Audit; US$ 100.000 para Launch & Ecosystem Activation; e US$ 30.000 para administração da Intersect.
Embora cada categoria contenha uma lista geral de atividades, não existe discriminação suficiente para permitir uma avaliação responsável dos custos. Não são informados o número de profissionais, funções e senioridades, FTEs, carga horária ou percentual de dedicação, hourly rates, custo por atividade, custos de infraestrutura, fornecedores, custos regulatórios, custos de integração com parceiros ou a distribuição interna de cada alocação.
Consequentemente, valores entre US$ 100.000 e US$ 350.000 são apresentados como lump sums associados a descrições genéricas. Saber que US$ 350.000 serão gastos com smart contracts, account abstraction, batched transactions, settlement logic e auditorias internas não permite saber quanto custa cada componente, quantas pessoas trabalharão neles ou se o valor solicitado é proporcional ao esforço necessário.
O mesmo problema ocorre nas demais categorias. A proposta informa os grandes destinos do dinheiro, mas não demonstra como os valores foram calculados. Para uma solicitação superior a um milhão de dólares, esse nível de granularidade é inaceitável.
2.2. Quase ausência de KPIs com alvos relevantes de impacto
A proposta contém alguns critérios de conclusão técnica, mas apresenta pouquíssimos KPIs quantitativos capazes de demonstrar impacto real para Cardano.
Os principais alvos numéricos são pelo menos dois desenvolvedores ou equipes externas integrando no sandbox, uma wallet integration ativa, um parceiro institucional ou de programa onboarded e a correção das vulnerabilidades críticas e de alta severidade antes do lançamento.
Esses alvos têm utilidade limitada para avaliar adoção ou retorno para o ecossistema.
A integração de dois desenvolvedores ou equipes externas é um alvo pequeno e pouco definido. Não está claro quem pode ser contado como desenvolvedor externo, qual profundidade de integração será exigida, se um teste básico no sandbox será suficiente, se a integração deverá chegar à produção, se produzirá usuários, volume ou transações e por quanto tempo deverá permanecer ativa.
Uma única integração com wallet também demonstra apenas que a infraestrutura pode ser conectada a uma wallet. Não demonstra uso relevante, retenção, número de usuários, volume processado ou adoção sustentável.
O onboarding de apenas um parceiro institucional ou de programa sofre do mesmo problema. Não há exigência mínima relacionad
- No299.1K ₳Rationale
I'm just not feeling it. Too many ties to Emurgo.
- No298.3K ₳No rationale
- No271.8K ₳No rationale
- No270.3K ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on “Withdraw 3,961,538 ada for Bringing Real-World Payments to Cardano with Wirex.” In the Intersect budget process I supported this proposal as open‑source, public‑good payments infrastructure, and I still recognise the strategic importance of mature payment rails and the team’s prior experience with the Cardano Card and broader Visa integration.
Since then, the SecondFi incident and permanent shutdown have highlighted how brittle wallet and payments integrations can be in practice, even when external audits exist and participants are acting in good faith. Combined with tight NCL headroom and a more conservative view of treasury purpose, I am less comfortable allocating nearly 4M ADA to deepen a single commercial stack whose primary benefit is making it easier for other wallets and apps to route user spending through that provider’s rails. Many holders treat ADA and other crypto assets as savings or a hedge rather than everyday spending money, and it remains unclear how much genuine, broad-based user demand there is for converting income into crypto specifically to spend it via card rails instead of existing fiat accounts.
For this cycle, I prefer to reserve large treasury withdrawals for core security, scaling, and open, neutral infrastructure where the user value and ecosystem dependency are clearer and less tied to one commercial platform. This is not a judgment on Wirex’s intentions or capabilities, but a prudential decision based on recent events, treasury constraints, and uncertainty about how much of this stack’s value will materialise on-chain for Cardano users versus off-chain within a private payments business.
- Abstain260.4K ₳Rationale
Rationale: ABSTAIN
Commercial Vendor Funding Review. While introducing real-world Visa payment rails and open-source payment primitives is highly beneficial for adoption, Wirex is an established commercial entity with substantial revenue. Treasury funding should prioritize critical open-source Layer-1 infrastructure over subsidizing multi-million dollar corporate integrations during conservative fiscal cycles.
- No246.1K ₳Rationale
With no profit-sharing deal there is no realistic way for the treasury to ever benefit from this grant. 3,961,538 ADA ÷ ~0.035 ADA per tx ≈ ~113 million on-chain transactions just to recoup the grant from the treasury's fee share alone. That's before any value the treasury is supposed to actually gain.
Two things make it worse for fee recovery specifically:- Batching is a design goal here. The proposal explicitly delivers "batched transactions" - meaning thousands of card swipes settle as one on-chain tx. That's good for users and throughput, but it deliberately minimizes the number of fee-generating transactions. Wirex's "$20B volume / 7M users" doesn't translate into 7M on-chain txs; it collapses into far fewer settlements.
- Wirex's scale is off-chain. Card payments, Visa rails, and stablecoin banking mostly happen in Wirex's own systems. Only settlement/anchoring touches Cardano, so the on-chain fee footprint is a small fraction of the headline activity.
Ultimately, this is an irresponsible spend, not an investment. The treasury needs to be doing much more of the latter.
- No215.5K ₳No rationale
- No191.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes182.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes180K ₳No rationale
- No167.9K ₳No rationale
- No162.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes157.4K ₳Rationale
This proposal does pass my filters below which prioritize adoption.
- Treasury runway is shrinking rapidly and must be protected. The 350M ADA 2026-27 NCL already risks ~21% drawdown. Aggressive prior spending + ADA weakness demands selectivity to avoid depletion before real adoption.
- Infrastructure is important, but it is not the primary bottleneck. Cardano's core tech is solid. The ecosystem stalls on adoption, liquidity, developer experience, and compelling use cases (DeFi, RWAs, revenue-generating apps). Broad infrastructure funding without adoption KPIs won't drive organic ADA demand.
- Hoskinson's concerns deserve respect, but governance requires balance. Core maintenance matters for competitiveness. DRep duty is long-term sustainability: not unlimited spending. Past allocations often failed to yield proportional TVL/users/ADA utility. Prioritize evidence-based proposals.
- Better capital allocation strategy: Favor high-leverage use-case initiatives, especially RWAs and revenue generating applications that commit to direct revenue or ADA return mechanisms back to the treasury, with clear milestones, private co-funding, and proven traction. Target specific tech unlocks only when tightly tied to measurable adoption impact. This builds real value without creating dependency.
- Yes142.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes137.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes131.9K ₳No rationale
- No123.8K ₳No rationale
- Abstain119K ₳Rationale
I am voting "abstain" on this proposal because I support the long-term vision of expanding Cardano's role in real-world payments, but I remain unconvinced that this represents the highest-priority Treasury investment at the present time.
Wirex is an established payments company with a strong track record, existing Cardano integrations, and significant experience operating at scale. I recognize the value of improving open-source payment infrastructure, Visa connectivity, and on-chain settlement, and I believe these capabilities will become increasingly important as Cardano's ecosystem grows. However, I am not yet persuaded that payment infrastructure is the primary constraint on adoption today.
My hesitation is one of timing and prioritization, not opposition. Cardano already has an initial foothold in payment infrastructure, and I would have preferred stronger evidence that existing capabilities have reached meaningful adoption limits before expanding them further through Treasury funding. In my view, growing the user base, increasing real-world applications, and driving broader ecosystem adoption remain the more immediate priorities. As those efforts mature, demand for expanded payment rails may become substantially clearer.
For these reasons, I am abstaining. I support the direction of the proposal and believe payment infrastructure will play an important role in Cardano's future, but I am not sufficiently convinced that this is the highest-leverage investment for the ecosystem at this stage.
- Yes92.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes68.4K ₳No rationale
- No63.3K ₳No rationale
- No56K ₳No rationale
- No50.5K ₳No rationale
- Abstain47.8K ₳Rationale
I chose to ABSTAIN from voting on this proposal
- No45.3K ₳No rationale
- No26.7K ₳Rationale
Learn how to spell and write first.
- No24.4K ₳No rationale
- No16.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes9K ₳No rationale
- Yes8.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes6.7K ₳No rationale