Withdraw 1,193,000 ada for Intersect Technical Steering Committee Support
158 DReps voted · 51 with a rationale · 5 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes881.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes870.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes862K ₳No rationale
- Yes830.3K ₳Rationale
We support Intersect's budget process. This proposal is part of it.
- Yes799.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes795K ₳No rationale
- Yes626K ₳Rationale
Voting YES. The TSC funds independent technical governance Cardano genuinely needs: parameter advice, CIP editorial coordination, hard fork planning, and a technical review program that helps DReps vote informed. ₳1.19M is modest for the function. Structural concerns noted but not blocking.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
This proposal funds the Technical Steering Committee (TSC) for 12 months, covering:
- WP1: Community-facing technical coordination (events, technical reports, expert attendance)
- WP2: Protocol governance and evolution (Parameter Committee, CIP editors, Hard Fork Working Group)
- WP3: Independent technical review program pilot
The TSC performs a function that Cardano genuinely needs: independent technical governance. The Parameter Committee's evidence-based parameter recommendations, the CIP editorial process, and hard fork coordination are foundational infrastructure for a decentralized blockchain. Without them, protocol evolution becomes either stagnant or captured by single vendors.
The ask at ₳1.19M is modest and proportionate. The technical review program (WP3) is especially valuable: it directly addresses the information asymmetry that makes DRep voting difficult.
However, this proposal has the same structural issues I flag in every Intersect-administered ask: self-funding, thin budget detail, no ADA volatility policy, and invisible milestones. It is also contingent on the main Intersect MBO budget passing, if that fails, this may not execute even if ratified. These concerns temper my enthusiasm but do not block a Yes vote at this scale.
The Technical Steering Committee performs governance infrastructure functions that Cardano genuinely needs: independent parameter advice, CIP editorial coordination, hard fork planning, and most valuably a technical review program that helps DReps make informed votes.
The concerns I raise like self-funding structure, thin budget detail, no ADA volatility policy, and deepening Intersect dependency, are real and would be more severe at a larger amount. At ₳1.19M with specific, verifiable functions, they are manageable concerns, not blockers.
I distinguish this proposal sharply from the main Intersect Ops ask (₳25.4M, Abstain). The TSC has a clear remit, modest price, and externally verifiable outputs. The main Intersect proposal is a massive, opaque operational catch-all. Scale and specificity matter.
If the TSC resubmits in future with more granular budget detail, an ADA volatility policy, and a diversification roadmap, I would evaluate it even more favorably. As it stands, the public value justifies the vote.
- Yes620K ₳No rationale
- Yes608.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes590K ₳No rationale
- Yes587.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes535.2K ₳Rationale
Intersect will drive Cardano Governance forward in an efficient way is critical to support and grow.
- Yes501.2K ₳Rationale
Not much to say except the TSC has been the most efficient committee at intersect. They’ve done enormous work for this ecosystem. I sometimes wonder if they can exist independent of intersect and maybe it’ll make them more efficient but Thats just my “intrusive thoughts”. 🙃
- Yes480.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes444.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes431.9K ₳No rationale
- No415.3K ₳No rationale
- No377.7K ₳Rationale
Intersect should be abolished, not funded!
- Yes365.9K ₳No rationale
- No360.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes321.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes309.6K ₳Rationale
Governance Action Review [EN]
1. Introduction
Intersect Technical Steering Committee Support requests 1,193,000 ADA, equivalent to US$298,250 at the exchange rate specified by the proposer, for a twelve-month period. The proposal is divided into three work packages. WP1 funds attendance by approximately twelve technical experts at ecosystem events and the commissioning of up to four technical reports. WP2 funds the Parameter Committee, CIP editors, and the Hard Fork Working Group. WP3 establishes a pilot independent technical review programme for the 2027 budget cycle, with an average of three reviews for up to thirty-five core infrastructure proposals. Intersect will administer the funds, all expenditure will be accounted for, and any unspent balance will be returned to the Cardano Treasury. Technical workshops, the Security Council, and the Bug Bounty Programme are funded through Intersect’s main budget and are excluded from this request. Execution of the work packages is contingent on approval of the IntersectMBO budget proposal.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Positive aspects
The Technical Steering Committee performs an important function in Cardano’s technical governance, and the presented work packages fund activities necessary for the continuity, security, and orderly evolution of the protocol. These activities include the work of the Parameter Committee, the CIP editors, the Hard Fork Working Group, the production of technical reports and studies, and the creation of an independent evaluation programme for infrastructure proposals.
The budget presents an acceptable level of detail. Each item is associated with identifiable activities, with quantities, rates, or limits that make it possible to understand the origin of the requested amounts. Estimates are provided for specialist participation in meetings, report preparation, benchmarking studies, event attendance, CIP editor compensation, hard fork coordination, and technical proposal evaluations. This is a relevant difference from proposals that concentrate large amounts in generic categories without disclosing rates, numbers of professionals, or units of delivery.
The amounts allocated to participation in the Parameter Committee and the Hard Fork Working Group appear reasonable and even modest given the expected level of specialisation. Compensation of up to twelve specialists at US$250 per month in the Parameter Committee does not appear excessive for people expected to participate in recurring meetings, review parameter proposals, and contribute to formal recommendations. Similarly, monthly payment of US$500 for up to six specialists involved in hard fork coordination appears prudent, especially considering the responsibility associated with preparing upgrades, monitoring dependencies, and assessing the readiness of different ecosystem participants.
The planned compensation for CIP editors also appears justifiable. This is a specialised and relevant function, historically performed largely on a voluntary basis, involving triage, organisation, editorial review, and monitoring of the CIP lifecycle. A monthly rate of approximately US$4,000 may be appropriate for significant dedication. The nominal amount is plausible, although the absence of an estimate of hours or expected percentage of dedication prevents a precise determination of whether it is below, within, or above market levels.
The amounts of US$10,000 per technical report or benchmarking study also appear reasonable as an initial reference. Depending on complexity, a technical report may require specialised research, analysis, data collection, review, and publication. An empirical study of node performance may require substantially more work than a synthesis report on a technical subject. Time estimates and minimum scope criteria would be useful, but the unit amount does not appear excessive.
The budget for specialist participation in events also appears prudent. An average of US$2,000 per specialist, covering flights and accommodation, does not stand out as high, particularly because events may take place in different regions. These participations should produce publicly available results, such as post-event reports, discussion summaries, recommendations, or records of identified demands, so that the benefit is not measured only by the specialist’s physical presence.
WP3 provides for up to thirty-five proposals to be evaluated, with an average of three reviews per proposal, totalling approximately 105 evaluations at US$250 each. Based on Agora’s experience as a proposal reviewer in Project Catalyst, US$250 is a fair rate for a structured evaluation. Depending on length and complexity, this amount could correspond to approximately two to five hours of work. As the proposals would mainly concern technical infrastructure, some reviews can reasonably be expected to require specialised knowledge and substantial dedication.
Some dReps opposed to the proposal argued that there could be overlap between this funding and Intersect’s main operating budget, or that these activities should be incorporated into Intersect’s 25.4 million ADA proposal. Although this concern is legitimate, the existence of a separate proposal is not, by itself, a problem. DReps and the community frequently request more granular proposals that are less dependent on large bundles. A dedicated budget makes it possible to evaluate and fund the Technical Steering Committee specifically, without requiring approval of all other operational, administrative, and coordination activities of Intersect.
This separation also recognises that different committees do not necessarily have the same level of importance or performance. They should not all be funded automatically as part of a single package. The Technical Steering Committee has a more essential function and a more positive performance than other areas of Intersect. Protocol technical coordination, the CIP process, parameter recommendations, hard fork readiness, and technical support for dReps constitute institutional infrastructure that merits separate consideration.
A basic participation reward would not prevent specialists from receiving additional compensation for specific technical activities. When members receive only a relatively low stipend to attend meetings and perform general institutional duties, it is reasonable for additional work, such as preparing recommendations, coordinating hard forks, or conducting specialised proposal reviews, to receive separate compensation. The issue is not necessarily receipt of both payments, but ensuring that the same activity or working period is not paid twice.
The proposal includes quantitative delivery targets, such as numbers of reports, studies, participations, specialists, and reviews. It also includes milestone completion criteria, including publication of recommendations, annual reports, readiness assessments, and creation of the evaluation framework. These elements make it possible to verify whether the activities were performed.
The absence of a more robust set of KPIs is not a determining factor for rejecting the proposal. This is not an adoption project in which value depends on reaching future numbers of users, transactions, or integrations. Much of the benefit is already embedded in the outputs themselves. The publication of technical evaluations, benchmarking studies, parameter recommendations, reports, and readiness documents already produces materials that can be used by the ecosystem. The principal uncertainty concerns the quality of these deliverables, not whether their existence can be verified.
WP3 includes specific independence mechanisms: open reviewer selection, documented criteria, publication of recusals, no single organisation holding a majority of reviewing capacity, and full publication of reviews. These mechanisms are positive.
The evaluation of Intersect’s main proposal was different because broader problems of coordination, granularity, accountability, and performance were identified in certain areas. Approval of this proposal does not represent unrestricted approval of Intersect’s structure or general budget. It is a specific decision concerning a committee whose function is more essential, whose activities are more concrete, and whose operating history appears more positive.
Negative aspects
The proposal could better specify the workload or expected percentage of dedication for CIP editors. Without that estimate, the nominal monthly amount may be regarded as plausible, but it cannot be determined precisely whether the compensation is below, within, or above market levels.
The proposed US$10,000 reference amount for each technical report or benchmarking study is not accompanied by a sufficiently precise definition of length, methodology, depth, or expected number of hours. An empirical study of node performance may require much more work than a synthesis report on a technical topic. Time estimates and minimum scope criteria would allow the relationship between cost and expected delivery to be evaluated more precisely.
Specialist participation in events should produce publicly available outputs, such as post-event reports, summaries of discussions, recommendations, or records of identified demands. Without these outputs, the benefit may be measured only through physical attendance.
The required depth of the WP3 reviews is not completely defined. It is unclear whether they will be relatively objective and standardised evaluations or in-depth technical due diligence covering architecture, feasibility, security, team capacity, and execution risks. The proposed rate may be appropriate for the first case and relatively low for the second. The rate itself appears appropriate, but the relationship between compensation, time, and expected quality should be more explicit.
The proposal attempts to establish boundaries by stating that technical workshops, the Security Council, and the Bug Bounty Programme are funded through Intersect’s main budget and are excluded from this request. However, the separation is not sufficiently clear at the level of people, hours, and activities. The main budget also mentions basic rewards for committee participation, but does not disclose unit amounts or explain how those rewards relate to the specific fees included in this proposal.
A clear matrix of responsibilities and funding sources should identify which activities are covered by Intersect’s main budget, which are funded by this proposal, and under what circumstances the same person could receive both payments. The absence of this distinction does not prove overlap, but prevents it from being ruled out completely. This is a relevant transparency limitation, although not sufficient to reject the proposal, particularly because the individual amounts are modest and the funded activities are important.
The proposal contains few KPIs with targets for measuring quality, usefulness, or effectiveness. Expressions such as “active throughput”, the absence of an “unreasonable” backlog, stakeholders being “adequately informed”, or reports that “demonstrably inform” discussions do not provide baselines or objective targets. Useful measures could include average CIP review time, changes in the backlog, timeliness of evaluations, dRep satisfaction, and the perceived usefulness of reports and reviews.
A qualitative or quantitative survey of dReps, SPOs, developers, and other users of TSC outputs could measure clarity, independence, relevance, and usefulness. It would also be possible to track how many dReps used the technical evaluations, how many recommendations were considered in decisions, and whether hard fork processes were positively evaluated by the participants involved.
The most important recommendation is to strengthen measurement of the quality and usefulness of publicly available materials. The absence of these indicators reduces the ability to evaluate the committee’s subsequent performance, but does not invalidate the expected value of the activities.
The proposal also contains editorial inconsistencies and gaps in time estimates, the separation between funding sources, and the measurement of quality.
Risks and concerns
The main overlap concern is the possibility of duplicate compensation for the same activity or working period. The lack of a complete distinction between the main Intersect budget and this proposal does not establish that duplication exists, but it prevents the risk from being fully excluded.
The Technical Steering Committee should not be characterised as completely independent. It is a standing committee of Intersect, depends on the organisation’s operational structures, and will have its resources administered by Intersect. The independence safeguards included in WP3 are positive, but their effectiveness depends on implementation.
The TSC’s function should remain consultative and technical, providing evidence, evaluations, and recommendations without replacing the judgement of dReps or becoming a central authority that determines the technically correct answer for the ecosystem.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: YES.
The budget is sufficiently granular and the requested amounts appear reasonable. The work packages fund activities necessary for Cardano’s technical governance, including the Technical Steering Committee, the Parameter Committee, CIP editors, the Hard Fork Working Group, technical reports and studies, and independent evaluations of infrastructure proposals. The proposal contains identifiable activities, quantities, rates, limits, and verifiable deliverables, and its separate submission permits a more granular decision than inclusion of these functions in a large operating budget.
The gaps in workload estimates, quality criteria, separation from Intersect’s main budget, safeguards against duplicate compensation, and measurement of output usefulness remain relevant. They do not, however, outweigh the expected value of the proposal. The vote is accompanied by recommendations for greater clarity on workload, quality standards, the relationship with Intersect’s main budget, prevention of duplicate compensation, and periodic evaluation of the usefulness of outputs by dReps and the community.
4. Conclusion
The proposal combines necessary technical governance functions with identifiable costs and verifiable outputs. The remaining gaps concern workload, quality measurement, funding separation, and duplicate-compensation safeguards. These limitations do not outweigh the expected benefit of sustaining the TSC’s specialist groups and technical review activities.
Revisão de Ação de Governança [PT]
1. Introdução
A proposta Intersect Technical Steering Committee Support solicita 1.193.000 ADA, equivalentes a US$ 298.250 na taxa de câmbio indicada pelo proponente, para um período de doze meses. A proposta está dividida em três work packages. O WP1 financia a participação de aproximadamente doze especialistas técnicos em eventos do ecossistema e a contratação de até quatro relatórios técnicos. O WP2 financia o Parameter Committee, os CIP editors e o Hard Fork Working Group. O WP3 estabelece um programa-piloto de avaliações técnicas independentes para o ciclo orçamentário de 2027, com média de três avaliações para até 35 propostas de infraestrutura central. A Intersect administrará os recursos, todas as despesas serão contabilizadas e qualquer saldo não utilizado será devolvido ao Tesouro da Cardano. Workshops técnicos, o Security Council e o Bug Bounty Programme são financiados pelo orçamento principal da Intersect e estão excluídos deste pedido. A execução dos work packages depende da aprovação da proposta orçamentária da IntersectMBO.
2. Análise da Ação de Governança
Aspectos positivos
O Technical Steering Committee exerce uma função importante na governança técnica da Cardano, e os work packages apresentados financiam atividades que a Agora considera necessárias para a continuidade, a segurança e a evolução ordenada do protocolo. Isso inclui o trabalho do Parameter Committee, dos CIP editors, do Hard Fork Working Group, a produção de relatórios e estudos técnicos e a criação de um programa de avaliações independentes para propostas de infraestrutura.
O orçamento apresenta um nível de detalhamento aceitável. Cada item está associado a atividades identificáveis, com quantidades, taxas ou limites que permitem compreender de onde vêm os valores solicitados. Há estimativas para participação de especialistas em reuniões, elaboração de relatórios, estudos de benchmarking, presença em eventos, remuneração de CIP editors, coordenação de hard forks e avaliações técnicas de propostas. Isso representa uma diferença relevante em relação a propostas que concentram valores elevados em categorias genéricas sem informar taxas, número de profissionais ou unidades de entrega.
Os valores destinados à participação no Parameter Committee e no Hard Fork Working Group parecem razoáveis e até modestos diante do nível de especialização esperado. A remuneração de até 12 especialistas a US$ 250 por mês no Parameter Committee não parece excessiva para pessoas que devem participar de reuniões recorrentes, revisar propostas de parâmetros e contribuir para recomendações formais. Da mesma maneira, o pagamento de US$ 500 mensais para até seis especialistas envolvidos na coordenação de hard forks parece prudente, especialmente considerando a responsabilidade associada à preparação de upgrades, ao acompanhamento de dependências e à avaliação da prontidão dos diferentes participantes do ecossistema.
A remuneração prevista para os CIP editors também parece justificável. Trata-se de uma função especializada e relevante, historicamente exercida em grande parte de forma voluntária, que envolve triagem, organização, revisão editorial e acompanhamento do ciclo de vida dos CIPs. Uma taxa mensal de aproximadamente US$ 4 mil pode ser apropriada para uma dedicação significativa. O valor nominal é plausível, embora a ausência de uma estimativa de carga horária ou percentual de dedicação esperado impeça determinar com precisão se está abaixo, dentro ou acima do mercado.
Os valores de US$ 10 mil por relatório técnico ou estudo de benchmarking também parecem razoáveis como referência inicial. Dependendo da complexidade, um relatório técnico pode exigir pesquisa especializada, análise, coleta de dados, revisão e publicação. Um estudo empírico sobre desempenho de nós pode demandar muito mais trabalho do que um relatório de síntese sobre um tema técnico. Seria recomendável apresentar estimativas de tempo e critérios mínimos de escopo, mas o valor unitário não parece excessivo.
O orçamento para participação de especialistas em eventos também parece prudente. A média de US$ 2 mil por especialista, cobrindo voos e acomodação, não chama atenção como um valor elevado, principalmente considerando que os eventos podem ocorrer em diferentes regiões. Essas participações deveriam produzir resultados publicamente disponíveis, como relatórios pós-evento, sínteses das discussões, recomendações ou registros das demandas identificadas, para que o benefício não seja medido apenas pela presença física do especialista.
No WP3, a proposta prevê até 35 propostas avaliadas, com uma média de três reviews por proposta, totalizando aproximadamente 105 avaliações a US$ 250 cada. Com base na experiência da Agora como revisora de propostas no Project Catalyst, US$ 250 é uma taxa justa para uma avaliação estruturada. Dependendo da extensão e da complexidade, esse valor poderia corresponder a aproximadamente duas a cinco horas de trabalho. Como as propostas em questão seriam voltadas principalmente para infraestrutura técnica, é razoável esperar que algumas análises exijam conhecimento especializado e dedicação substancial.
Alguns dReps contrários à proposta argumentaram que poderia haver sobreposição entre est
- Yes299.1K ₳Rationale
We probably need this
- No298.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes271.8K ₳No rationale
- No270.3K ₳Rationale
I am voting NO because, although technical governance capacity is important, this proposal funds an additional administrator-centered committee layer under Intersect rather than directly strengthening open, decentralized infrastructure. The work packages focus on event attendance, commissioned reports, specialist groups, and a pilot review program that extend Intersect’s footprint across protocol governance, while related security and workshop functions are already funded elsewhere in its budget.
Under my rubric, this structure carries higher structural-risk and centralization concerns than I am comfortable supporting, and it does not deliver enough direct, Cardano-facing infrastructure or user benefit to justify another Treasury stream for Intersect and its committees in a tightening NCL environment.
- Yes260.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes246.1K ₳Rationale
The TSC is foundational, non-discretionary technical governance infrastructure and one of the more productive committees for Cardano's growth and sustainability. At ~$298K for 12 months it's cheap insurance on high-consequence work, with independence safeguards against vendor capture and a strong accountability wrapper - Appold assurance, milestone drawdowns, on-chain auditability, and return of unspent funds. My one reservation is the missing FTE/rate breakdown behind WP2, which I'd want in future reporting, but it doesn't outweigh the value.
- Yes227.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes215.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes196.1K ₳No rationale
- Abstain191.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes182.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes181.9K ₳No rationale
- No167.9K ₳No rationale
- No162.9K ₳No rationale
- No157.4K ₳Rationale
- Not clear ROI given my criteria bulletin points below
- Treasury runway is shrinking rapidly and must be protected. The 350M ADA 2026-27 NCL already risks ~21% drawdown. Aggressive prior spending + ADA weakness demands selectivity to avoid depletion before real adoption.
- Infrastructure is important, but it is not the primary bottleneck. Cardano's core tech is solid. The ecosystem stalls on adoption, liquidity, developer experience, and compelling use cases (DeFi, RWAs, revenue-generating apps). Broad infrastructure funding without adoption KPIs won't drive organic ADA demand.
- Hoskinson's concerns deserve respect, but governance requires balance. Core maintenance matters for competitiveness. DRep duty is long-term sustainability: not unlimited spending. Past allocations often failed to yield proportional TVL/users/ADA utility. Prioritize evidence-based proposals.
- Better capital allocation strategy: Favor high-leverage use-case initiatives, especially RWAs and revenue generating applications that commit to direct revenue or ADA return mechanisms back to the treasury, with clear milestones, private co-funding, and proven traction. Target specific tech unlocks only when tightly tied to measurable adoption impact. This builds real value without creating dependency.
- Abstain142.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes137.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes131.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes129.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes123.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes119K ₳Rationale
I am voting yes because effective decentralized governance depends not only on participation, but on access to independent technical expertise. As Cardano's governance system matures, DReps are increasingly asked to evaluate complex protocol upgrades, parameter changes, treasury proposals, and technical standards. Providing structured, evidence-based technical analysis strengthens governance without replacing it.
I view the Technical Steering Committee as complementary to Intersect's broader coordination role. While Intersect helps facilitate governance processes and ecosystem operations, the TSC focuses specifically on technical stewardship through parameter analysis, CIP editing, hard fork coordination, and independent technical reviews. These functions help ensure that governance decisions are informed by sound engineering rather than speculation or incomplete information.
I also appreciate the proposal's emphasis on transparency, independent technical review, conflict-of-interest policies, and returning unspent funds to the Treasury. While technical expertise should never replace community governance, it should help empower DReps to make better-informed decisions. For these reasons, I believe supporting the Technical Steering Committee is an investment in the quality, resilience, and long-term success of Cardano's governance.
- Yes92.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes63.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes56K ₳No rationale
- No50.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes47.8K ₳Rationale
I vote YES to support the Intersect Technical steering commitee
- No45.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes31.7K ₳No rationale