Withdraw ₳1,500,000 for Complement Catalyst: Extended Quadratic Funding---Zer...
207 DReps voted · 75 with a rationale · 5 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes16.4M ₳Rationale
Treasury withdrawals
Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs ResearchAbstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations. - Yes14.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes14.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes13.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain13.3M ₳Rationale
RCADA has chosen to** abstain at this time while reserving the option to review and update this vote prior to the voting deadline**. This approach allows RCADA to allocate focus where immediate evaluation is most impactful, particularly on proposals that are close to threshold or raise significant procedural or constitutional concerns. If this proposal reaches the approv-al threshold prior to our review, the abstention will stand as a neutral signal of deferral, not op-position. Should further analysis be warranted, RCADA will update this vote accordingly.
- YesRevoted12.1M ₳Rationale
Disclaimer: This is a general rationale we have prepared to support our “yes” vote on all the 39 treasury withdrawal actions. This follows careful review and consideration of the metadata of these treasury withdrawal proposals and hence is not a blanket voting practice.
We, the Wada DRep Committee, have decided to upvote on all 39 Treasury Withdrawal governance actions currently live on-chain and submitted under the administration of IntersectMBO. These actions are the necessary implementation step following the community's approval of the ₳275.3 million Cardano Ecosystem Budget, the necessary budget info action that precedes the treasury withdrawal process. Our support reflects not only continuity with our earlier "yes" votes on the overarching budget info action and its constituent proposals but also our confidence in the smart contract guide and project execution mechanisms Intersect has established as an administrative body for these proposals.
Each of these 39 withdrawals corresponds directly to proposals that have already passed a respective Budget Info Action with wide community and DRep support of 64.23%. As Wada DRep, we reviewed, scored, and supported many of these initiatives during the budgeting phase, using our internal ₳280M Net Change Limit framework. Our endorsement of the full ₳275.3M package was not a blanket approval but the outcome of detailed deliberation. Therefore, we see it as our responsibility to honor those community-approved funding decisions by affirming these follow-up Treasury withdrawal governance actions.
Importantly, we are confident in Intersect’s role as the administrator of these treasury disbursements. We have independently reviewed the Smart Contract Guide, disbursement architecture, and accountability structures associated with these withdrawals. The use of milestone-gated smart contracts, multi-signature treasuries, and on-chain/off-chain tracking mechanisms provides strong assurance of transparency, risk management, and community accountability. We are particularly satisfied that Intersect has adopted security-audited contract templates and provides public documentation on how treasury funds will be administered, paused if necessary, and even returned if unused.
In our view, rejecting or abstaining from these Treasury Withdrawals at this stage would risk destabilizing delivery timelines, undermining community trust, and introducing administrative conflicts that may violate the spirit of the Constitution’s Articles on budgeting. We believe that treasury funding is not just about allocation; it’s about consistent and credible execution. As such, the DRep role requires continuity and follow-through, especially when prior voting outcomes have clearly mandated action.
Therefore, in alignment with our constitutional responsibilities, community-aligned decision-making, and our assessment of Intersect’s administrative protocols, we have decided to upvote on all 39 Treasury Withdrawals Governance Actions.
Earlier votes
Yes0y agoSuperseded
- Yes10.9M ₳No rationale
- No10.8M ₳Rationale
I do not observe enough information to properly understand what the goal/intent here is, nor the quantified impact. To the best of my understanding, I observe a highly experimental catalyst-like funding program that relies on donations. I do not believe this is an efficient use of treasury funding.
- Yes10.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes8.8M ₳Rationale
「275M ADA Administered by Intersect」に含まれるすべての個別提案に対して、エクレシア投票の段階では必ずしもすべてに賛成していたわけではありませんが、最終的には本ガバナンスアクションに賛成票を投じました。Cardanoエコシステム全体への貢献を高く評価し、その前進を後押しする立場から、今回提出された39件すべての提案に賛成票を投じる判断をいたしました。\n\nWhile I did not necessarily support every individual proposal included in "275M ADA Administered by Intersect" during the Ekklesia vote, I ultimately voted Yes on this governance action. Recognizing its overall contribution to the Cardano ecosystem and in support of continued progress, I cast a Yes vote on all 39 proposals submitted under this initiative.
- Yes8.1M ₳No rationale
- No7.6M ₳Rationale
I originally voted NO for this proposal in the Ekklesia temp poll check. I am voting NO again.
The team does seem uniquely qualified to deliver this project. However, it seems to be based on several suppositions that have not convinced me sufficiently to risk treasury funds on this proposal. I do commend them for putting it forward to a vote.These ideas seem worth experimenting with. Anyhow, the ask is too large for the current moment in Cardano imho and the zero‑operational‑costs claim opens more questions to me. I feel this to be more of a risk for the treasury. As a very different alternative to Catalyst that is based on several presumptions (such as willing donations) - would probably benefit from starting with a smaller pilot. Maybe financed through Catalyst itself. This pilot would be best gated by hard KPIs (donor‑matching ratio, active‑user growth, impact‑reporting dashboard) before scaling to seven figures.
- No7.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.9M ₳Rationale
Voting decision was made to be consistent with my reconciliation back in May 2025;
https://2025budget.intersectmbo.org/voters/drep1yfdfs28uwafjgmrkatdektlzrvha2cmvqjhuz700e04mawq23rmrgReady to move forward overall with the budgeting process and look forward to a smoother process next year. I voted for a lower NCL overall (200M), however found in supporting things that we really ought to have funded to keep momentum in development and enhancements on-chain (supporting both open and non-open-sourced projects) I came a bit higher than that (250M+).
We will need to strike a balance in treasury withdrawels for projects that push development forward (and therefore the chains efficiency, performance, resiliancy, and seucrity) -- and businsess that wish to participate, of any size, and extend the capabilities and real-world use cases of Cardano.
My votes, I hope, align with my overall goal as a DRep to see continuous improvement in the ecosystem. https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Tarrant64/mr_cata_gov/refs/heads/main/mr_cata_gov%20.txt
- No5.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.3M ₳Rationale
This proposal offers a funding mechanism that complements Catalyst by addressing vote centralization, treasury limitations, and impact tracking. The model is technically sound, Socious team is experienced and committed to Cardano, and 100% of funds go directly to projects. At STORM Partners, we support it as a strategic experiment to evolve funding infrastructure in Cardano.
- No4.8M ₳Rationale
Maintenance of the source code itself has overhead. Also, no justification to the superiority of the quadratic model compared to traditional proof of stake model.
Maintenance of the source code itself has overhead. Also, no justification to the superiority of the quadratic model compared to traditional proof of stake model.
- Yes4.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.7M ₳No rationale
- No4.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.6M ₳No rationale
- Abstain4.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.4M ₳Rationale
Researching alternative voting mechanisms is essential not only for Catalyst but also for the wider blockchain ecosystem.
- No4.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.1M ₳Rationale
[Portuguese]
Optamos por votar "SIM" nesta ação de governança (gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlzw4qas92), pois é preciso avaliar outros modelos de financiamento coletivo comunitário além do modelo do Catalyst, e o modelo de Financiamento Quadrático Estendido proposto está alinhado com princípios que podem beneficiar o próprio Catalyst a partir do seu resultado. Além disso, a justificativa de gastos apresentada, bem como as métricas de avaliação e controle, foram bem apresentadas.
[English]
We chose to vote "YES" on this governance action (gov_action13tfag48nf94rtjcdq7c06vhkslmxxw9h6c88sl7q5g5nnewcsvlzw4qas92), because it is necessary to evaluate other models of community crowdfunding beyond the Catalyst model, and the proposed Extended Quadratic Funding model is aligned with principles that can benefit Catalyst itself based on its results. Furthermore, the expense justification presented, as well as the evaluation and control metrics, were well presented. - No4M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.8M ₳Rationale
I am strongly in favor of improving the barriers to abuse and grifting the Catalyst project.
- No3.8M ₳Rationale
I vote NO as not my core DRep priorities and quite opaque.
Strength and honor.
- No3.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.1M ₳Rationale
I am following through with my YES vote from the Cardano Budget 2025 Ekklesia process. This proposal falls within my personal NCL of 250,000,000 ADA.
- No3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain3M ₳No rationale
- No2.8M ₳Rationale
Maybe you should consider submitting this proposal to Catalyst instead?
- Yes2.8M ₳No rationale
- No2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳Rationale
A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.
Each of these proposals has already received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.
Each of these proposals has already undergone extensive scrutiny and received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision and the work these prospective developers have put in by voting yes on all the proposals from the Intersect Budget team.
- Yes2.6M ₳Rationale
本提案は、Catalystを補完する形で二乗投票＋寄付マッチングを活用し、少額多数の意思を反映しやすくする資金配分モデルを提案しています。運用コストゼロで全額が支援対象に回る設計、実証済のSociousフレームワーク、ROIや透明性の課題への明確なアプローチを評価し、賛成します。
This proposal introduces an extended quadratic funding model that complements Catalyst by democratizing fund allocation, enhancing ROI clarity, and operating at zero cost. Backed by the Socious platform and targeting known Catalyst pain points, I support it as a cost-efficient innovation mechanism.
- Yes2.5M ₳No rationale
- No2.5M ₳Rationale
Quadratic voting and funding is certainly an interesting topic but I do not see the need for the treasury to pay 1.5M ada for this experiment. Most holders are here to profit and so the community of people with appetite beyond Catalyst is very small. This would be spending treasury funds on a microcommunity. Technically interested but not broadly valuable.
- No2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- No2.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- Abstain2M ₳No rationale
- No2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale