Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME
208 DReps voted · 86 with a rationale · 9 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes321.6K ₳Rationale
After following the evolution of the Matter at hand, Panda votes YES! Panda is not smiling at the ever-coming-for-sure-needed-extra-budget-for-everything. However, Panda thinks that holding ashes instead of embers in hand is NOT good!
- Yes315.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes304K ₳No rationale
- No296.8K ₳Rationale
That's a lot of money. I'm not convinced this is what we need right now. No thank you.
- No282.6K ₳No rationale
- No275.1K ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on “Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME.” The proposal requests 120,000,000 ADA to fund a 12‑month, community‑overseen program designed and executed by AlphaGrowth to benchmark Cardano DeFi, identify gaps, deploy ecosystem grants and liquidity incentives, and run marketing and capital‑attraction campaigns aimed at growing “qualifying TVL” by at least $200M. Intersect serves as Constitutional Administrator and fund custodian, a five‑member Operating Group provides oversight and gating, and AlphaGrowth receives fixed advisory fees plus a TVL‑linked performance fee from a 29M ADA equivalent reserve.
While the proposal is thoughtfully structured on paper, with an Operating Group, advisory council, audited treasury‑management contracts, independent assurance allocation, and return‑to‑treasury triggers for unused or unearned funds, the underlying model is one I do not support. In practice, this creates a large, centralized allocator program focused on DeFi incentives and marketing, overseen by a small group and executed by a single vendor, with a very substantial fee opportunity tied to TVL outcomes. It asks the Treasury to commit over one‑third of the full 350M ADA Net Change Limit window to a single one‑year DeFi growth initiative, at a time when Cardano already faces multiple competing demands for core infrastructure, security, and continuity funding.
I also disagree with the underlying strategic emphasis. PRIME is explicitly modeled on large‑scale TVL incentive programs from other ecosystems and is heavily focused on DeFi liquidity, structured incentives, and growth metrics such as qualifying TVL, volume, and “organic APR.” Although DeFi activity and capital retention matter, this approach reflects a tunnel vision that treats Cardano primarily as a platform for liquidity mining and TVL competition. That is not where I believe Treasury resources should be concentrated in this budget cycle, particularly at this scale.
Finally, PRIME depends, by its own terms, on a Net Change Limit large enough to accommodate such a withdrawal within the current epoch window. I view mid‑period attempts to raise the NCL specifically to make room for very large spending proposals as a misuse of the guardrail mechanism, and I am not prepared to support a program whose enactment implicitly relies on that pattern. For these reasons, even acknowledging the effort put into the proposal, I do not consider PRIME an appropriate use of Treasury funds at this time, and I am voting NO.
- Yes268.8K ₳No rationale
- No260.7K ₳Rationale
Voting No due to the size of the 120M ADA request from the Treasury. While liquidity growth is important, a withdrawal of this magnitude poses a risk to treasury reserves and potential market pressure without guaranteed long-term TVL retention.
- Yes252.5K ₳No rationale
- No246K ₳Rationale
I can't vote yes on this as it would severely exceed my 200M personal spend limit for the year, but let's break this down regardless:
This proposal would drain 120M Ada from the Treasury with no revenue share, no equity, no repayment obligation, and no retained ownership of anything deployed - only unspent funds ever come back but we should always assume that someone will find a way to spend unspent funds (our of caution of course). The proposal's own sustainability argument rests on fee generation, so let's test it:
At ~0.17 ADA average transaction fee and the Treasury's 20% share of the reward pot, that's ~0.034 ADA per transaction, meaning ~3.5 billion transactions to recover 120M. At Cardano's historical ~25M transactions per year, that's roughly 140 years - and even at the full Cardano 2030 target of 324M annual transactions, it takes over a decade of the entire network's fee income to repay this one withdrawal. Meanwhile the proposal itemizes only 2M Ada of the 120M, leaves the return triggers, attribution methodology, gate criteria, Operating Group and performance fee unspecified, and ties that fee to TVL growth the executing party purchases with our own money. This is optimism substituting for arithmetic. - Yes233.1K ₳Rationale
I am voting Yes on AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME proposal because Cardano has spent years building strong technical infrastructure, but that infrastructure has not yet translated into the depth of liquidity, stablecoin activity, users, fees, and sustained DeFi participation the ecosystem needs.
The 120 million ADA request is substantial, so my support is not based on writing AlphaGrowth a blank check. PRIME uses a phased structure that begins with a public ecosystem audit and gap analysis before large-scale capital deployment. Roughly three-quarters of the budget remains behind a Month 4 release gate, subject to review by an independent Operating Group. The proposal also separates AlphaGrowth’s recommendations from oversight and custody, includes milestone-gated releases, quarterly reporting, conflict-of-interest protections, independent audit funding, and triggers for returning unused or unearned funds to the treasury.
I also support the proposal because its goal is not merely to purchase temporary TVL through short-lived incentives. It is designed to identify why capital is not entering or remaining in Cardano, close infrastructure and market gaps, deepen liquidity, support native builders, and create economic activity capable of surviving after incentives taper. Success should be measured not only by headline TVL, but by stablecoin liquidity, users, transactions, fees, productive markets, and sustained capital retention.
There is execution risk, and approval must be followed by continued scrutiny. However, Cardano cannot expect DeFi growth without making serious, accountable investments in liquidity, integration, distribution, and market development. In my judgment, PRIME provides enough oversight, performance alignment, and staged accountability to justify giving the program the opportunity to deliver.
For those reasons, I vote Yes.
- Yes196.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes189.6K ₳No rationale
- YesChanged184.3K ₳History
Earlier votes
No1mo agoSuperseded
- Yes182.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes181.9K ₳No rationale
- No164.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes163K ₳No rationale
- Yes161.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes157.8K ₳No rationale
- YesChanged157.6K ₳History
Earlier votes
No1mo agoSuperseded
Yes1mo agoSuperseded
No1mo agoSuperseded
- No149.7K ₳Rationale
The decisive factor is the outsized absolute size of the request. 120 million ADA represents a very large single withdrawal relative to remaining Net Change Limit capacity, prior aggressive treasury drawdowns, and ongoing ADA price weakness. Even with the safeguards and gating, committing this amount of capital in one action creates unacceptable risk to long-term treasury runway and forces an all-or-nothing trade-off against other potential high-leverage opportunities. Selectivity and runway protection must take priority; a smaller, more tightly scoped pilot or staged series of withdrawals would better balance ambition with fiscal discipline.
- Yes142.8K ₳Rationale
Hoping that someone will discover that Cardano is a very insecure network without a native oracle as well-designed as Orcfax
- No138.3K ₳Rationale
Cardano PRIME Treasury Withdrawal (₳120,000,000) — Voting Rationale
Governance Voting Rationale GAID gov_action122w...vlfpu7 Title Cardano PRIME — Treasury Withdrawal of ₳120,000,000 (AlphaGrowth) Type of GA Treasury Withdrawals Date submitted Epoch 642 (Jul 9, 2026) Expiration Date Epoch 649 (Aug 12, 2026) Contents
1.0 Introduction {#1.0-introduction}
1.1 Summary {#1.1-summary}
We are voting NO (remediable) on the Cardano PRIME treasury withdrawal — and the shape of that NO matters, because it is not a judgment on how the program is built.
On construction, Cardano PRIME is close to a model treasury withdrawal, and this DRep says so at the outset and without reservation. Read as what it plainly is — an openly declared program with a named executor, a named oversight group, a named custodian, and its asset flows on the face of the proposal — it binds its own builder by very nearly the same instruments it would use to bind an ordinary participant. That is exactly the even-handedness one wants to see, and it holds up under scrutiny.
The NO rests on two findings that the quality of the construction does not answer. The first is upstream and is not really the program's own: Cardano PRIME is the consuming half of a spend-before-ceiling pair, and that sequencing problem is addressed in the companion rationale on the Net Change Limit. The second belongs to the program itself: a for-profit withdrawal has to show that its claim on the shared treasury rests on maintaining something the whole ecosystem depends on and can freely use — and this withdrawal's claim rests instead on growth it projects, with a private performance fee attached. Both findings name their own remedy, which is why the vote is remediable rather than terminal: each is specific, and each is fixable in a resubmission.
1.2 Description of Governance Action {#1.2-description-of-governance-action}
This Treasury Withdrawals action requests 120,000,000 ada to fund Cardano PRIME, a twelve-month program to improve DeFi protocol readiness, activate incentives, and grow durable liquidity across the ecosystem. AlphaGrowth executes the program under the oversight of an Operating Group, with Intersect acting as Constitutional Administrator and holding the funds in a separate, auditable account.
The proposal is unusually well-instrumented. It runs a phased model — public audit, then gap analysis, then gated deployment, with a decision gate at Month 4 before the third phase. It allocates 2,000,000 ada to independent audit or assurance. It defines six triggers that return funds to the treasury. It ties its performance fee to verified, attributable growth in total value locked, explicitly excluding price effects and TVL not attributable to the program. It reports quarterly, delegates held funds to abstain, discloses that AlphaGrowth has received no treasury funding within the prior twenty-four months, is denominated in ada, and is written to be conditional on an applicable Net Change Limit having enough capacity at enactment. This rationale addresses the withdrawal; a companion rationale addresses that Net Change Limit.
2.0 Discussion {#2.0-discussion}
2.1 What the construction gets right {#2.1-what-the-construction-gets-right}
Because Cardano PRIME states plainly what it is building, the right first question to ask of it is one of even-handedness: does the program bind its own builder by the same instruments it would apply to an ordinary participant — the ability to inspect, to appeal, to reverse — or does it gather discretion at the top while pointing accountability downward? Run across the parts of the proposal where that question actually bites, the answer is largely reassuring, and that deserves to be stated with the same care a criticism would get.
On transparency, the program's operation is verifiable on the same terms it would ask of others: a separate auditable account, published disbursement records, a funded independent audit, and quarterly metrics. Visibility runs toward the participant rather than being reserved to the operator. On accountability, disbursement decisions carry a published recommendation-and-review process with an Operating Group veto, which means those decisions are reasoned and checkable rather than final and unappealable. And on the durable position the program accumulates, the six return triggers and the twelve-month term bind the program by its own stated terms and cap how much standing it can build up. The asymmetries that do remain — the program holds funds, and it recommends how they are spent — are scoped by a defined mandate and milestone gates, and they are reversible through the return triggers, the term limit, and the audit. This is not a structure that entrenches itself. On its face it guards against the failure it is worried about without quietly reconstituting that failure in a new form. That affirmation is real, and this DRep does not want it lost in what follows.
2.2 Where the finding lives: the private-surplus claim {#2.2-where-the-finding-lives-the-private-surplus-claim}
There is a distinct test that any withdrawal drawing treasury funds into a for-profit venture has to meet, and it is worth stating carefully, because it is easy to misread as a question about tax status. It is not about whether the recipient is a company. It is about the structure of the claim being made on the shared treasury. A for-profit that maintains something the whole ecosystem depends on and can freely use — a non-rival, forkable good — has a claim rooted in the commons itself, and that claim is legitimate. A for-profit that projects growth and asks the treasury to fund it while keeping a share of the upside is making a different kind of claim, and expected-value and ecosystem-growth arguments, however sincere and however well-modeled, do not by themselves meet the bar.
Cardano PRIME does not clear that bar, and the reason is structural rather than a matter of controls. The withdrawal funds a growth program — turning existing infrastructure into total value locked and liquidity — rather than the maintenance of an existing non-rival good. And it carries a performance fee, a private surplus, justified expressly by the growth it projects. That is an ecosystem-growth claim with a private surplus attached to it, which is exactly the case this test is designed to catch. The program's genuine strengths — the attribution methodology, the return triggers, the funded audit — constrain how the surplus is taken and verified; they do not change what the underlying claim is.
Because the defect is a specific property of this action with a nameable fix, the honest token is NO (remediable) rather than an abstention. Reaching for abstention here would, in mechanical effect, lower the bar for exactly the private-surplus transfer that most warrants scrutiny — which is the opposite of what care requires. The failing structure names its own cure: a resubmission discharges the burden by tying the program's private upside to something the ecosystem keeps rather than to growth it projects — for example, converting the performance fee into a return-to-commons mechanism, or binding the upside to a durable, non-rival asset the ecosystem retains and can freely build on.
2.3 A second reading of the same defect: the fiduciary check {#2.3-a-second-reading-of-the-same-defect-the-fiduciary-check}
This DRep's framework deliberately reads relations rather than pricing allocations — it asks how an action treats the commons and its participants, not whether the number is a good deal. The allocation question is real and separate, and to read it this DRep runs the proposal through a distinct capital-stewardship instrument: the DRep Treasury Rule Book maintained by a peer DRep, which reads the things a relational framework by design does not — price, instrument fit, upfront exposure, and opportunity cost against everything else the treasury could fund.
Two of its readings matter here. The proposal's handling of upfront exposure is genuinely well-managed, and this is to its credit: milestone gates, the Month 4 phase gate, and the six return triggers stage the exposure over time rather than releasing 120,000,000 ada at once. But the performance-fee instrument, attached to a growth mandate, is exactly the kind of capture structure this instrument is built to flag — and no score high enough elsewhere can rescue a structure that is wrong at the level of 120,000,000 ada of finite treasury.
What is notable is that this capital-stewardship reading and the commons reading in the previous section arrive at the same conclusion from unrelated starting points — one asking about the shape of a claim on a shared resource, the other about prudent allocation of finite funds. They converge on the same feature: a private surplus resting on a growth projection. This second instrument can only ever lower a favorable judgment; it can never rescue an unfavorable one. Here it does not need to move the vote — the commons reading already reached NO — but its independent agreement, from a different foundation, both confirms the finding and sharpens the description of what a resubmission has to fix.
2.4 Two problems, held apart {#2.4-two-problems-held-apart}
It is worth separating the two findings cleanly, because they are not the same kind of problem and they do not have the same owner.
The sequence problem — the spend arriving before the ceiling that is supposed to authorize it — is upstream of this program and belongs to the pairing of the two actions. Cardano PRIME did not create it, and cannot fully resolve it on its own; that finding is carried in the companion rationale. The claim-structure problem — a private surplus resting on projected growth — is the program's own, and it is fixable by the program's authors without waiting on anything the ecosystem decides about the ceiling.
Held as developmental feedback rather than as a verdict, keeping these apart is the more useful message and also the fairer one. It tells the program's authors two separable things. The construction is sound, and this DRep affirms that plainly. And the part to rework is the shape of the claim — a private surplus on a growth projection — which can be reworked independently of the sequencing question entirely. Naming the two apart, rather than letting one contaminate the reading of the other, is the honest way to hold both.
3.0 Conclusion {#3.0-conclusion}
We vote NO (remediable). The program is well-constructed, and the even-handedness it shows toward ordinary participants is real; this DRep affirms that without reservation. But the burden a for-profit withdrawal must meet is not met by an ecosystem-growth claim carrying a performance fee, and an independent capital-stewardship reading reaches the same concern from a different direction. Upstream, the withdrawal sits as the consuming half of a spend-before-ceiling pair, addressed in the companion rationale.
The remedy is specific and within reach: rework the surplus so it rests on something the commons keeps rather than on projected growth, and let the ceiling be set before the spend rather than around it. Do both, and this program earns a YES it does not currently earn.
Thank you for reading this rationale and for supporting it with your delegation.
References / Sources {#references-sources}
The following background may help a reader new to this DRep's approach. Each is linked once, at first relevance:
- The evaluation framework — this DRep's standing method of judging governance actions by their long-run trajectory rather than by a single snapshot, first set out in the rationale on the Cardano Constitution. Coordination Commons
- The claim a for-profit makes on the shared treasury — the distinction between maintaining a non-rival, forkable good the ecosystem depends on and funding projected growth for a private return. Private-Surplus Burden
- The DRep Treasury Rule Book — the capital-stewardship instrument, maintained by a peer DRep, used here as the independent fiduciary check. DRep Treasury Rule Book v17
- Companion rationale — the Net Change Limit Increase, the other half of this pair. NCL
DRep ID: drep1yfaq8dsam...3nq50q
Stay in touch!
X: https://x.com/styg50 - Yes125.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes121.8K ₳Rationale
I am voting yes on this proposal. Cardano has spent years building a secure, research-driven blockchain with world-class infrastructure. The next challenge is ensuring that this technology is actually used. If ADA is to succeed as a global asset and Cardano as a decentralized financial ecosystem, we need to prioritize commercial adoption, deeper liquidity, stronger DeFi, and the ability to attract users and capital from beyond our existing community.
While this proposal is ambitious, I appreciate that it recognizes the gap between technical capability and real-world market adoption. It includes phased execution, oversight through an independent Operating Group, transparent reporting, performance-based compensation, and mechanisms to return unused funds to the Treasury. These guardrails provide greater accountability than many ecosystem growth initiatives.
Ultimately, I am voting Yes because I believe Cardano must invest in becoming economically competitive, not just technically superior. We cannot expect builders, institutions, and users to arrive simply because our technology is strong. Sustainable commercial adoption requires deliberate investment in liquidity, partnerships, market infrastructure, and ecosystem growth. While execution will ultimately determine success, I believe this proposal represents a meaningful step toward making Cardano a destination for real economic activity rather than simply a platform with untapped potential.
- Yes115.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes107.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes95.5K ₳No rationale
- No90.6K ₳Rationale
Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]
Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.
My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.
In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.
At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.
Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.
Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.
This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.
Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:
- Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
- Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
- Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
- Lack of credible execution capacity;
- Structural governance or transparency concerns;
- Severe budgetary or coordination risks.
Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.
This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.
Governance Action Review Note
I do not consider the proposed Operating Group model adequate. A significant degree of authority over the release and allocation of funds is delegated to only five members, whose composition includes individuals affiliated with organizations that may have direct interests in the Cardano DeFi ecosystem. While recusal rules are included, the combination of concentrated decision-making authority and the group’s composition does not, in my assessment, provide sufficient institutional neutrality and independence for a program of this magnitude.
Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]
Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.
Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.
Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.
Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.
Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.
Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.
Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.
Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:
- Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
- Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
- Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
- Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
- Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
- Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.
Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.
Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.
Revisão de Ação de Governança
Não considero adequado o modelo proposto para o Operating Group. Uma parcela muito relevante da autoridade sobre a liberação e alocação dos recursos é delegada a apenas cinco membros, cuja composição inclui representantes vinculados a organizações que podem ter interesses diretos no ecossistema DeFi. Embora existam regras de recusa, a combinação entre concentração decisória e composição do grupo não oferece, na minha avaliação, neutralidade e independência institucional suficientes para um programa dessa magnitude.
- Yes86.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes85.7K ₳Rationale
EN — iFly (SWADA) votes YES. Cardano PRIME targets Cardano's biggest adoption bottleneck: thin DeFi liquidity, which is self-reinforcing — poor trading conditions deter users, which deters builders, which keeps liquidity thin. Three features make the 120,000,000 ADA size acceptable to me: (1) it is phased — the large ~90,000,000 ADA incentive tranche deploys only after a Month-4 release gate and otherwise stays in the treasury; (2) it is ada-denominated, so the treasury bears no USD price risk; and (3) funds sit in an Intersect-administered reserve contract on independently-audited tooling, not paid directly to the operator.
Reservations: ~30,000,000 ADA for the early phases and the fixed fee is committed up front regardless of results; the performance fee can trigger on liquidity retained only 30 days; and the independent assurance provider was unnamed before the vote. I vote YES expecting these controls to be tightened during execution, and I support the return-to-treasury and sunset mechanisms if milestones are missed. My concern is execution quality, not intent.
SV — iFly (SWADA) röstar JA. Cardano PRIME angriper Cardanos största adoptionshinder: tunn DeFi-likviditet, som är självförstärkande — dåliga handelsvillkor avskräcker användare, vilket avskräcker byggare, vilket håller likviditeten tunn. Tre egenskaper gör storleken 120 000 000 ADA acceptabel för mig: (1) den är fasindelad — den stora incitamentsdelen på ~90 000 000 ADA betalas ut först efter en beslutspunkt i månad 4 och stannar annars i statskassan; (2) den är denominerad i ada, så statskassan bär ingen dollarkursrisk; och (3) medlen förvaras i ett Intersect-administrerat reservkontrakt på oberoende granskade verktyg, inte direkt till operatören.
Invändningar: ~30 000 000 ADA för de tidiga faserna och den fasta avgiften är bundna i förväg oavsett resultat; prestationsavgiften kan utlösas av likviditet som behållits i endast 30 dagar; och den oberoende granskaren namngavs inte före omröstningen. Jag röstar JA i förväntan att dessa kontroller skärps under genomförandet, och jag stödjer mekanismerna för återföring och avveckling om delmål missas. Min farhåga gäller genomförandet, inte avsikten. - Yes85.6K ₳Rationale
EN — iFly (SWADA) votes YES. Cardano PRIME targets Cardano's biggest adoption bottleneck: thin DeFi liquidity, which is self-reinforcing — poor trading conditions deter users, which deters builders, which keeps liquidity thin. Three features make the 120,000,000 ADA size acceptable to me: (1) it is phased — the large ~90,000,000 ADA incentive tranche deploys only after a Month-4 release gate and otherwise stays in the treasury; (2) it is ada-denominated, so the treasury bears no USD price risk; and (3) funds sit in an Intersect-administered reserve contract on independently-audited tooling, not paid directly to the operator.
Reservations: ~30,000,000 ADA for the early phases and the fixed fee is committed up front regardless of results; the performance fee can trigger on liquidity retained only 30 days; and the independent assurance provider was unnamed before the vote. I vote YES expecting these controls to be tightened during execution, and I support the return-to-treasury and sunset mechanisms if milestones are missed. My concern is execution quality, not intent.
SV — iFly (SWADA) röstar JA. Cardano PRIME angriper Cardanos största adoptionshinder: tunn DeFi-likviditet, som är självförstärkande — dåliga handelsvillkor avskräcker användare, vilket avskräcker byggare, vilket håller likviditeten tunn. Tre egenskaper gör storleken 120 000 000 ADA acceptabel för mig: (1) den är fasindelad — den stora incitamentsdelen på ~90 000 000 ADA betalas ut först efter en beslutspunkt i månad 4 och stannar annars i statskassan; (2) den är denominerad i ada, så statskassan bär ingen dollarkursrisk; och (3) medlen förvaras i ett Intersect-administrerat reservkontrakt på oberoende granskade verktyg, inte direkt till operatören.
Invändningar: ~30 000 000 ADA för de tidiga faserna och den fasta avgiften är bundna i förväg oavsett resultat; prestationsavgiften kan utlösas av likviditet som behållits i endast 30 dagar; och den oberoende granskaren namngavs inte före omröstningen. Jag röstar JA i förväntan att dessa kontroller skärps under genomförandet, och jag stödjer mekanismerna för återföring och avveckling om delmål missas. Min farhåga gäller genomförandet, inte avsikten. - Abstain65.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes63K ₳No rationale
- Yes62.6K ₳Rationale
I vote yes on the AlphaGrowth withdrawal on its own merits, but no on raising the Net Change Limit to make space for it. A Net Change Limit is meant to be a ceiling the ecosystem plans within, not a number we lift whenever one large request does not fit underneath it. If the cap goes up every time a big withdrawal arrives, it stops meaning anything.
- Yes56K ₳No rationale
- Yes51.8K ₳Rationale
After deliberation with delegators whom reached out to voice opine in regard to the** ALPHA Growth CARDANO PRIME** proposal , as well as listening to the community view points, A decision to await the outcome of the NCL limit proposal to increase the current nearly exhausted Treasury withdrawal limit to 500M $ADA specifically to facilitate this request ,was made before choosing to vote for the ALPHA growth withdrawal request. After gaining a better education and hearing the community as well as weighing and respecting the requests of my delegators, and with the NCL increase vote having passed by a community vote, I find value in leveraging the treasury to bring better Defi readiness to the CARDANO blockchain I have chosen to vote YES for the ALPHA Growth oversight funding Lourde Ouroborus Imperator Aeternalis
- No50.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes50.6K ₳Rationale
Cardano needs this to drive DeFi and grow the ecosystem
- Yes35.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes31.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes19.7K ₳Rationale
I like what this program is trying to do — Cardano's DeFi liquidity has been shrinking for months, and this actually goes after that with real structure: milestones, an audit, ways to pull the money back if it's not working out. That part is solid.
The thing that was holding me back was the treasury math — this ask is close to a third of everything we're allowed to spend this whole period, and the proposal itself said that room wasn't confirmed yet. I went and checked. There was actually a separate vote to raise that treasury limit, and it failed a week ago — which settles it: the original limit stands, and there's still around 314M ADA of room left under it. This ask fits comfortably. The fee split I was also unsure about — turns out the bigger chunk only gets paid if the TVL growth is real and verified, not just handed over. That's a fair structure.
What's left is the normal risk of funding a first-time recipient at this size, and I think the controls here — the audit, the milestone gates, the six ways unused money comes back — are exactly what you want to see for that. Support's moved a lot the last two days too, which tells me I'm not alone in reading it this way.
Voting yes.
- No19.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes16K ₳No rationale
- Yes15.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes9K ₳No rationale
- Yes8.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes8K ₳No rationale
- NoChanged6.8K ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes1mo agoSuperseded