Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME
108 DReps voted · 34 with a rationale · 3 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes435.8M ₳Rationale
Please check the following link for the reasons for the vote.（投票理由は次のページを参照してください。)
https://adatool.net/treasury-votes
I vote YES on PRIME and YES on the NCL change.
I support this after deeply analyzing the demand-side risks of the proposal (measured data and the full picture of both sides: adatool.net/cardano-growth-primer).
Two premises must be accepted as fact.
Spending will not stop at ₳120M — incentive TVL is management-dependent, and this is year one of a multi-year growth function. Both the measured track record and the proposer's own responses confirm this. Year two is its own action; large integrations are separate withdrawals. A serious multi-year commitment can total hundreds of millions of ADA. The vote must be cast on the annuity-like total cost of a continuing program, not on the ₳120M sticker.
Ultimately the incentives must be replaced by incentives funded by the dApps themselves and become self-sustaining — this has never been measured anywhere; Cardano becomes the first test case.
Even with those premises, I weigh the following.
As laid out at adatool.net/cardano-growth-primer, growing DeFi users and usage is a precondition for Cardano to win. The rails and tools have been built, but they alone do not grow users or usage; attractive products and incentives are needed, and this proposal puts a team with a real track record on exactly that. Cardano's users and usage are low against same-scale competitors, so solving this deserves investment.
Everyone shouts that Cardano needs marketing and adoption; in my view this is a well-aimed attempt at marketing and adoption grounded in measurable KPIs. Zooming out, after years of enormous investment and experimentation, transactions on Cardano — as on almost every public blockchain — are mostly DeFi. And this proposal ties a track record, measurable KPIs and solid governance together. It may not be perfect, but it looks like a well-aimed attempt.
https://adatool.net/tx-roiIt is possible to list reasons this effort is imperfect — most likely ₳120M will not be enough for the DeFi ecosystem this proposal ultimately aims for — but I have not yet seen a better alternative. Several internal governance mechanisms are built in, and the program can be stopped if it does not work.
Accordingly, I also vote YES on the NCL change.
Under the current NCL's remaining headroom (₳76.8M), legitimate proposals — including PRIME (₳120M), which I voted YES on — physically cannot be executed. The budget ceiling is not the place to judge the merits of individual proposals; that judgment is expressed in each proposal's own vote — and I voted YES on PRIME individually, after tough analysis (analysis: adatool.net/cardano-growth-primer).
The NCL is a ceiling, not a spending plan. Raising it approves nothing by itself; every withdrawal must still clear the 67% DRep threshold on its own merits. Rather than killing growth investment on the procedural grounds of "no headroom", I vote to keep each proposal judgeable on substance. - Abstain332.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes254.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes92.2M ₳No rationale
- No84.3M ₳Rationale
This is far too much money and a severe abdication of the power of the purse. A very easy "no" vote.
- Yes76.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes75.2M ₳Rationale
I know that there is a potential conflict for NCL problem. However, even though this vote becomes to info action like, I would like to put YES for this proposal.
Reason 1 : This action was agreed by Charles in SNS. My main delegetors are almost always to encourage to Chales opinion.
Reason 2 : The centralized tactics is necessary for present Cardano situation. Therefore, such kind of large promotion should be performed by powerful partner like they.From these reason, I put Yes in early stage of voting term and also put almost first priority to this. It would be affected to other GA until NCL voting make a result.
- Abstain74.5M ₳Rationale
First, I strongly agree with the problem this proposal is trying to solve. Cardano has made significant progress in infrastructure, but that infrastructure has not yet translated into sufficient liquidity, DeFi activity, or capital inflows. I also agree that TVL and liquidity are more than just headline metrics. They are important signals of market maturity for institutional participants and RWA projects. Through direct conversations with people working on real-world asset initiatives, I have consistently heard that liquidity and TVL are among the first metrics they evaluate. From that perspective, I believe strengthening Cardano's liquidity is a worthwhile objective.
However, I do not believe this proposal is sufficiently mature to justify a Treasury withdrawal of this size.
My primary concern is that Phase 1 focuses on assessing the current state, while Phase 2 is dedicated to identifying gaps and developing implementation recommendations. For a proposal requesting 120 million ADA, I believe much of this research and analysis should already have been completed before asking the community to commit such a significant amount of Treasury funding. I would have liked to see clearer evidence explaining why these specific actions are the right solution, why they should happen now, and why this funding level is appropriate.
I also have questions regarding AlphaGrowth's compensation. My concern is not simply that the amount is large, but that the proposal does not sufficiently explain why that level of compensation is justified. Greater transparency around the budget, resource allocation, and comparable prior work would strengthen confidence.
While I recognize that TVL is an important metric, I do not believe it should be viewed in isolation. Long-term success should also be measured through user onboarding, real on-chain activity, and sustainable adoption. At the same time, I understand that liquidity and TVL are important signals for institutional participants and RWA initiatives. For that reason, I would have liked to see more concrete evidence addressing which RWA companies or institutions are expected to participate, what level of liquidity is considered sufficient for their participation, what the current bottlenecks actually are, and how many new participants or strategic partnerships PRIME realistically expects to attract. Providing that level of evidence would make the investment thesis much more compelling.
My biggest concern, however, is the Net Change Limit (NCL).
Even if the NCL is increased in the future, that alone would not justify approving this proposal. At that point, this proposal would still need to compete with many other Treasury opportunities, including Bitcoin DeFi initiatives, infrastructure improvements, scalability efforts, and other ecosystem priorities. Additional Treasury capacity does not automatically make this the highest-priority allocation.
Overall, I strongly support the direction and believe improving Cardano's liquidity is important for the ecosystem's long-term success. However, at this stage, I do not believe the proposal provides sufficient evidence regarding its readiness, likelihood of success, justification for its requested budget, or why now is the appropriate time to proceed.
For those reasons, I am unable to support this proposal in its current form. If these concerns are addressed with stronger evidence and clearer supporting data in a future revision, I would be happy to evaluate it again with an open mind.
まず、この提案が解決しようとしている課題には強く共感しています。Cardanoには優れたインフラが揃いつつありますが、それが十分な流動性やDeFi利用、資本流入に結び付いていないという認識には僕も同意します。また、TVLや流動性は単なる数字ではなく、機関投資家やRWA事業者にとって市場の成熟度を判断する重要な指標でもあります。実際に、RWA事業に取り組む企業関係者からも、流動性やTVLを重視しているという話を直接聞いており、その意味でTVLを成長させる方向性自体には大きな価値があると考えています。
一方で、この規模のTreasury資金を要求する提案としては、まだ十分な準備が整っていないという印象を受けました。
特に気になったのは、Phase 1で現状調査を行い、Phase 2で課題分析や実行方針を策定する構成になっている点です。僕としては、120M ADAという大型の予算を要求するのであれば、それらの調査や分析は提案提出前に相当程度完了しているべきだと考えています。その上で、「なぜこの施策なのか」「なぜ今なのか」「なぜ120M ADAが必要なのか」を、より具体的なデータや分析をもとに示してほしかったと思います。
また、AlphaGrowthの固定報酬および成果報酬についても、その金額そのものより、「なぜその金額が妥当なのか」という説明が十分ではないように感じました。より詳細な内訳や、過去の実績との比較が示されていれば、納得感はさらに高まったと思います。
成果指標についても、TVLは重要な指標ではあるものの、それだけでは十分ではありません。最終的に重要なのは、実際のユーザー数、オンチェーン利用、継続的なアダプションなど、実需を伴った成長です。その一方で、TVLや流動性がRWA事業者や機関投資家にとって重要な判断材料であることも理解しています。だからこそ、どのRWA事業者や機関をターゲットとしているのか、どの程度の流動性が実現すれば参入の可能性が高まるのか、現在のボトルネックは何なのか、そしてPRIMEによって具体的に何件程度の新規参入や提携を見込んでいるのかといった、より具体的な裏付けを見たかったと感じました。
そして、僕にとって最大の論点はNet Change Limit（NCL）です。
仮に将来的にNCLが引き上げられたとしても、それだけでこの提案を承認する理由にはなりません。その時点では、Bitcoin DeFi、インフラ、スケーリング、その他のTreasury提案など、多くの候補と比較しながら限られた予算を配分する必要があります。そのため、NCLの追加枠が確保されたとしても、本提案が最優先になるとは限らないと考えています。
方向性には強く共感しています。しかし現時点では、準備状況、成功可能性を裏付ける分析、NCLとの整合性、そしてこのタイミングで実施すべき理由について、まだ十分な説明が示されていないと感じました。
そのため、今回はYesを投じることはできませんでした。今後、これらの点がより具体的な根拠や一次情報とともに示され、提案の完成度がさらに高まれば、改めて前向きに検討したいと考えています。
- Yes69.4M ₳No rationale
- No66M ₳Rationale
120m ADA?
- Abstain50M ₳Rationale
Because of fundamental concerns with the current treasury process, I vote Abstain on all Treasury Withdrawal proposals until the treasury budgeting process undergoes fundamental reform.
More information: https://x.com/ada_stat/status/2068315882539921703
- No49.5M ₳No rationale
- No47.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes40.1M ₳Rationale
Pushing DeFi adoption is currently the most sure way to make Cardano successful.
- Yes37.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes36.9M ₳No rationale
- No34.6M ₳No rationale
- No31.4M ₳Rationale
NO — This proposal requests an exceptionally large withdrawal (₳120M) for a DeFi incentive program rather than core infrastructure. Under my criteria, Treasury funds must prioritize essential, non‑optional infrastructure that preserves network reliability and user access. PRIME is an application‑layer liquidity initiative with uncertain long‑term impact, high Treasury dependency, and significant depletion risk. While governance controls are strong, the scale, volatility exposure, and non‑infrastructure nature of the program make it incompatible with responsible Treasury stewardship. I therefore vote NO.
- Yes31.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes26.1M ₳Rationale
Operationally this is the right move, my yes vote along with every other dreps votes is moot though if the new NCL for 500 million is not approved. The team has a proven track record of achieving its goals so even thought the ask is high I am not being asked to go out on a limb to approve a grant that may or may not work like so many others that we have funded here in the past.
The 5 member admin is more then capable of managing the deliverables and the majority of the payment the Alpha Growth team receives is merit based so that also allows me to sleep at night. There are two people in particular on the Admin in Christina and Kris which also make me more comfortable, the first has been a stalwart proponent of good funds management and has been outspoken about there they may not have been in the past. She also created her own treasury funding working group reviewing the past grants and auditing their deliverables. The second is a very pragmatic and business driven individual who also spend a lot of his time freely to our ecosystem, there is no reason to believe either of them would allow anyone to spend mismanage these fundds as it just isn't a part of who they are.
I expect them along with the other members to work as hard as they possibly can to ensure Alpha team do their very best to help our chain succeed, of this I have a supreme confidence in.
- Yes25.3M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME. As an entrepreneur I believe we've lost DeFi. That being said, the best DeFi minds in our ecosystem beleive this will be beneficial and give us a real shot at winning, so we owe it to the ecosystem to try. And if we fail here to capture meaningful DeFi market then that's the indicator for the ecosytem to aggressively pursue adotion outside of DeFi.
- Yes23.5M ₳Rationale
Let's go!
- Yes21.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain21.4M ₳No rationale
- Abstain20.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes19.9M ₳Rationale
We absolutely need this for Cardano DeFi. The AlphaGrowth team has an excellent track record and I am confident they will execute their palybook on Cardano.
- Yes14.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes8.1M ₳No rationale
- No7.6M ₳Rationale
Voting NO as presented
IMPORTANT: Use a blockchain explorer like https://cexplorer.io/ to read this rationale with Markdown enabled, it will allow you to see the tables properly and click on the links, etc.
I scored this proposal using my own public rulebook and scoring system, which is available here: Cardano DRep Commercial Treasury Rule Book v15, the v15 Productive Ecosystem, New-Work, Composability, Productive ADA Circulation, Funding Architecture & Decision-Reliability Edition, (https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xUivaYYflaPzGt2FuSqwSoDAsiA-Uk6hJNrClL62OtE/edit?usp=sharing). The document is still evolving, but it reflects how I assess commercial and hybrid Treasury proposals.
I use AI assistance in this process because I want a scoring method that reflects my own thinking, but that I can apply as neutrally and consistently as possible across the large number of proposals requesting funding. AI does not make the decision for me. It helps me structure the review, test the proposal against the same criteria, and spot issues I may otherwise miss. When a proposal is borderline, I look at it even more closely.
Rationale
Vote: No. PRIME addresses a real weakness in Cardano DeFi, and AlphaGrowth has credible experience. Compound approved its 2024 growth mandate through Compound Governance Proposal 251, and independent Arbitrum research later found that Compound’s incentive campaign produced clear product-led results. However, a later full-year renewal vote failed, so the public record is positive but mixed. This proposal still asks Cardano to take too much risk. It requests ₳120 million. Up to ₳40 million goes to AlphaGrowth, including the performance reserve, and ₳15 million goes to marketing. The Month 4 gate and Intersect custody are useful controls, but key TVL attribution rules and legal contracts will be completed after approval. The proposal does not give a final governing law, a clear dispute forum, strong clawbacks for money already paid, or firm public licence and data rights. Most liquidity spending is also not required to remain Treasury-owned. The performance fee can use TVL that has remained for only 30 days, while longer retention is mainly a reporting measure. The request equals 24% of the proposed ₳500 million Net Change Limit and about 34% of the existing ₳350 million limit; the new limit itself remains under vote, as shown in the CardanoCube governance record. I score PRIME 66/100. It falls well below the 90-point requirement for a very large proposal and fails hard minimums for public assets, Treasury upside, enforceability, sustainability, and portfolio fit. A smaller pilot with completed contracts, fixed KPI rules, Treasury-owned liquidity, lower compensation, vendor price evidence, and payment after durable results would deserve a new vote.
Proposal classification
Item Assessment Main classification Hybrid public/commercial DeFi and liquidity programme Secondary classification Ecosystem coordination Material specialist component ₳15 million marketing and adoption programme Request size Very large Applicable v15 threshold 90/100, plus all hard category minimums Decision reliability High enough for a Yes or No decision Actual vote No Layer 0 — Funding architecture and capital-allocation screen
Screen Result Assessment Priority fit Pass DeFi liquidity, stablecoins and application depth are defensible Cardano priorities. Public-capital need Concern The proposal does not show enough private co-funding from protocols, liquidity providers, investors or commercial beneficiaries. Instrument fit Fail Grants and incentive subsidies dominate. Recoverable LP positions and loans are optional rather than the default structure. Cardano value capture Fail Cardano receives reports, programme data and possible liquidity growth, but does not receive firm ownership of most deployed capital, commercial upside or broad public IP rights. Competitive neutrality Concern Published eligibility rules help, but AlphaGrowth still selects recipients, partners and vendors within very large envelopes. ADA volatility discipline Concern ADA amounts are fixed. The main excess-value trigger starts only after ADA remains at or above $0.40 for 30 days, and the Operating Group may approve redeployment instead of return. Opportunity cost Fail ₳120 million creates exceptional concentration and could displace infrastructure, security work and many smaller experiments. Productive-ecosystem potential Promising Better liquidity products, solver infrastructure, risk tooling and integrations could enable independent new work. Evidence of committed downstream adoption is still limited. Layer 0 conclusion No The funding instrument, value capture and opportunity cost do not support this allocation at the requested scale. Productive Ecosystem Diagnostic
Criterion Maximum Score Assessment Material dependency or capability gap 2 2 Fragmented liquidity, weak routing, limited advanced products and risk tooling are credible gaps. Independent downstream new work 2 1 Vaults, solver services, structured products and integrations could emerge, but few firm deployments or counterparties are committed before funding. Reusable and neutral common input 2 1 Public analyses and open eligibility rules help, but the proposal does not secure open standards, permissive licences or portable public infrastructure across the programme. External demand or export pathway 2 2 Institutional LPs, outside protocols and cross-chain users could bring assets and demand from outside the Treasury-funded economy. Diversity and post-Treasury viability 2 1 The programme may broaden Cardano’s supplier base, but continued liquidity after incentives remains an unproven assumption. Total diagnostic 10 7 Useful multiplier potential, but it remains partly dependent on AlphaGrowth and continued subsidies. Core v15 scorecard
# Category Weight Score Scoring explanation 1 Public value, additionality, productive value, timing and counterfactual harm 12 10 The problem is important and timely. Better DeFi depth could increase fees, capital retention and useful economic activity. The proposal does not fully prove that a ₳120 million programme is necessary to solve it. 2 Team quality, traction, adaptive execution and founder-market fit 7 6 AlphaGrowth has relevant Compound and incentive-programme experience. Independent research supports part of its delivery record, although later Compound governance support was mixed. See Compound Governance Proposal 251. 3 10x improvement, innovation, new-work branching and asymmetric upside 6 4 The combination of liquidity campaigns, solver markets, vaults and risk tools could improve Cardano materially. Much of the implementation is decided only after the first four months. 4 Price versus value and ADA volatility discipline 7 3 The request is exceptionally large. Maximum AlphaGrowth compensation equals ₳40 million, or one-third of the withdrawal. Cost benchmarks, competitive bids and protection across normal ADA price changes are weak. 5 Applicant integrity, conflicts, prior delivery and outcomes record 8 6 The proposal discloses governance roles, recusals and the absence of Cardano Treasury receipts in the previous 24 months. I did not find a clearly attributable past Catalyst award, but that search result is not proof that no affiliate ever received funding. 6 Public assets, composability, open source, verification, data rights and continuity 11 6 Public reports, criteria and decision records have value. The proposal does not clearly grant reusable licences, raw-data rights, fork rights, public ownership or continuity rights over most funded outputs. Fails the 7/11 hybrid minimum. 7 Treasury upside, instrument fit and risk sharing 12 6 Unused funds and unearned fees return, and some deployments may become recoverable. However, recoverability depends on later memos. Most grants, incentives and marketing remain non-recoverable, while AlphaGrowth supplies no first-loss capital or material co-funding. Fails the hybrid and very-large commercial minimums. 8 Milestones, independent verification, anti-gaming and enforceability 12 8 Intersect custody, the Month 4 gate, public memos and an audit reserve are meaningful. The TVL methodology is finalised after approval, 30-day persistence is weak for a durability fee, and legal entity, jurisdiction, dispute and clawback terms are deferred. Negative-consent approval also allows recommendations to proceed unless three OG members veto. Fails the 9/12 minimum. 9 Risk management, margin of safety and obsolescence resilience 9 6 Staging, eligibility checks, assurance funding and return triggers control some downside. Principal loss, incentive flight, attribution disputes and broad redeployment discretion remain material risks. 10 Sustainability, post-Treasury reproduction, exit and operator reality 8 5 The proposal reports fee generation and longer-term TVL persistence, but it does not prove that revenue will replace subsidies or explain who finances continued growth after Month 12. Fails the 6/8 minimum. 11 Portfolio exposure, opportunity cost, redundancy, dependencies, neutrality and decentralisation 6 2 The request consumes 24% of the proposed ₳500 million limit and about 34% of the existing ₳350 million limit. This creates severe portfolio concentration and winner-selection risk. See the CardanoCube governance record. Fails the 4/6 minimum. 12 Productive ecosystem and coordination quality 2 2 The Operating Group, advisory council, Intersect administration and preference for Cardano-native suppliers create credible coordination value. Base score 100 64 Productive Ecosystem Multiplier Premium +5 max +2 The programme could create downstream liquidity products and attract external capital, but neutral shared assets and post-Treasury reproduction are not firm enough for a larger premium. DRep Conviction Adjustment −5 to +5 0 The hard-gate and numerical findings already capture the main concerns. Final score 100 66 Below the 90-point threshold for a very large request. Hard minimum check
Hard minimum Required Score Result Public value and additionality 8/12 10/12 Pass Applicant integrity and prior delivery 5/8 6/8 Pass Public asset and continuity for a hybrid proposal 7/11 6/11 Fail Treasury upside and risk sharing At least 8/12 for hybrid; higher for very large commercial exposure 6/12 Fail Milestones, verification and enforceability 9/12 8/12 Fail Risk and margin of safety 6/9 6/9 Pass Sustainability and operator reality 6/8 5/8 Fail Portfolio, neutrality and decentralisation 4/6 2/6 Fail Very-large-request total 90/100 66/100 Fail Appendix A — Marketing and Adoption score
The ₳15 million marketing envelope is material and separable, so I also tested it under the v15 Marketing and Adoption Annex. The proposal lists indicative conference, content, distribution, co-marketing and research spending, but final vendor allocation comes later.
| Category | Weight | Score | Assessment
- Yes7.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.3M ₳Rationale
This could be good for Cardano. Changed vote on NCL to have this go through. Good luck team.
- Yes4.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.6M ₳No rationale
- No4.4M ₳Rationale
I cannot support this proposal.
It requests 80M ADA, plus a 50% performance fee for AlphaGrowth. I am surprised by the level of enthusiasm this proposal has received in the ecosystem.Roughly 1/3 of the funds would go toward LP incentives, essentially paying users to interact with our DeFi protocols. I strongly oppose this approach, as it represents a short term and unsustainable model.
Another large portion (nearly half) is allocated to “Ecosystem Grants,” a very vague category with little to no clear explanation of how these funds will be distributed or what outcomes are expected.
I am not familiar with AlphaGrowth, but paying them 40M ADA, a significant amount both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total request, simply to distribute our ADA to various pools, only for them to later list Cardano as a success story on their website, does not seem like a responsible use of treasury funds.
This is my current position based on the information available.
I will continue to monitor the team and community discussions and remain open to changing my vote if more convincing details emerge. - Yes4.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes4M ₳No rationale
- Abstain3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.8M ₳Rationale
After reviewing the proposal, I am confident that this will be extremely beneficial to the Cardano Ecosystem.
Raise the NCL.
- No2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.6M ₳No rationale
- No2.6M ₳Rationale
私は本Treasury Withdrawalに反対します。
Cardano DeFiの流動性、資本効率、risk toolingを改善しようとするPRIMEの方向性と、Intersectによる資金管理、独立監査、未使用資金返還の設計は評価します。
しかし、本提案では、最初の4か月間に現状監査とギャップ分析を行い、その結果を基にPhase 3の助成先、LP対象、資本展開方法を決定します。つまり、Phase 3の具体的な使途と必要額が確定していない段階で、120M ADA全額をTreasuryから引き出す構造です。
また、Phase 3資金の解放判断をOperating Groupの3-of-5承認に委ねており、DRepが診断結果や確定KPIを確認した上で、大部分の資金支出を再評価する機会がありません。
固定報酬とTVL連動の成果報酬が設定される一方、LP損失、protocol事故、インセンティブ終了後の資本流出などは、主としてTreasury側の負担となる可能性があります。このリスクと報酬の非対称性も慎重に評価すべきです。
まずPhase 1・2に必要な資金のみを承認し、診断後に助成先、LP対象、利益相反、確定KPI、成果算定方法、損失上限を公開した上で、Phase 3を別のTreasury Withdrawalとして再提出すべきです。
I oppose this Treasury Withdrawal.
I recognize the value of PRIME’s goal to improve Cardano DeFi liquidity, capital efficiency, and risk tooling. I also appreciate the use of Intersect for fund administration, independent audits, and the return of unused funds to the Treasury.
However, during the first four months, PRIME will conduct an ecosystem audit and gap analysis. The recipients of grants, LP targets, capital deployment plans, and the actual funding required for Phase 3 will be decided only after this work is completed. Despite this, the proposal requests the full 120M ADA in advance.
The release of most Phase 3 funding would then depend on a 3-of-5 approval by the Operating Group. DReps would not have another opportunity to review the audit results, final KPIs, and specific uses of the funds before this large deployment begins.
The proposal also includes fixed compensation and a TVL-based performance fee, while LP losses, protocol incidents, and liquidity leaving after incentives end may be mainly borne by the Treasury. This creates an imbalance between rewards and financial risk.
Only the funding required for Phases 1 and 2 should be approved first. After the audit, the proposal should disclose the grant recipients, LP targets, conflicts of interest, final KPIs, attribution methodology, and loss limits. Phase 3 should then be submitted as a separate Treasury Withdrawal for DRep review.
- Abstain2.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.5M ₳Rationale
It's a bold move but the team is incredibly solid. Let's see what the community says. I may be updating this vote on the fly as I learn more.
- Yes2.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.3M ₳No rationale