Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME
208 DReps voted · 86 with a rationale · 9 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes13.2M ₳Rationale
RCADA votes YES on Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME.
This is a cautious YES on a large, high-stakes Treasury proposal.
RCADA supports this proposal because Cardano DeFi needs a serious and coordinated growth effort. Cardano has made progress on infrastructure, integrations, and tooling, but that progress has not yet translated into enough durable liquidity, application depth, LP participation, stablecoin activity, institutional awareness, or sustained DeFi usage. If Cardano wants stronger transaction activity, fee generation, capital retention, and long-term Treasury sustainability, then DeFi liquidity and market readiness matter.
RCADA recognises that the request is very large at 120,000,000 ADA. This is one of the most significant Treasury allocations currently before DReps, and it should not be treated as an ordinary grant. A proposal of this size must meet a higher standard for custody, oversight, reporting, release controls, risk management, and value-for-money. RCADA does not take the scale lightly.
However, RCADA also recognises that PRIME is not simply a request to hand 120 million ADA to AlphaGrowth. The proposal includes a structured operating model where Intersect manages the withdrawn funds, AlphaGrowth provides analysis and recommendations, and an Operating Group reviews, conditions, vetoes, or approves material actions. This separation between strategy, oversight, and custody is important.
RCADA is particularly focused on the Month 4 Phase 3 release gate. A large portion of the program capital is not intended to be deployed automatically at the start. The program first requires a current-state audit, gap analysis, published recommendations, and Operating Group approval before the most sensitive deployment phase proceeds. This gives the program a chance to test its assumptions before major liquidity, incentive, marketing, and performance-fee capital is released.
RCADA also views the return-to-Treasury mechanisms as important. Unused, unearned, unreleased, or excess funds should be returned to the Cardano Treasury under the defined triggers. RCADA understands that DReps cannot simply claw back funds that have already been properly spent or deployed, so these release gates and return mechanisms matter. They are the practical safeguards that protect Treasury funds before they are committed.
The performance-fee structure is another important area. RCADA is cautious about incentive programs that reward temporary or mercenary TVL. DeFi growth should not be measured only by short-term liquidity spikes. RCADA therefore expects strict application of the attribution methodology, exclusion of ADA price effects and non-PRIME-attributable growth, meaningful retention requirements, and Operating Group sign-off before any performance fee is released. Any unearned performance-fee reserve should return to the Treasury.
RCADA also notes positively that AlphaGrowth has not previously received Cardano Treasury funding and that the PRIME proposal appears to have gone through a public draft and feedback process before on-chain submission. The team has continued engaging with DRep and community concerns, including adjustments around marketing spend and longer retention requirements for performance-fee eligibility. RCADA views this responsiveness positively, while recognising that responsiveness does not remove the need for strong oversight.
The risks remain significant. Liquidity incentives can create short-term activity that disappears when rewards stop. TVL attribution is difficult. Downstream protocol recipients may benefit unevenly. Market conditions can change quickly. A program of this size could consume a meaningful share of available Treasury headroom. The Operating Group will carry serious responsibility, and the community will need clear reporting to understand whether the program is creating durable value or simply subsidising temporary growth.
RCADA’s support is therefore not a blank cheque for aggressive liquidity mining or loose incentive spending. PRIME should prioritise durable liquidity, protocol readiness, responsible incentive design, transparent recipient selection, risk controls, and long-term ecosystem value. Any grants, incentives, or market-expansion activity should be justified through published analysis and should avoid favouritism, unnecessary concentration, or weak value-for-money.
RCADA expects Intersect and the Operating Group to apply a conservative interpretation of their powers, especially before releasing Phase 3 capital. The Operating Group should be willing to delay, reduce, condition, or veto deployment if the evidence does not support it. The Treasury should not spend simply because funds have been approved; spending should only proceed where the analysis, controls, and expected ecosystem benefit justify it.
On balance, RCADA believes the safeguards are sufficient to support a controlled attempt at a major DeFi growth program. The proposal is large and risky, but it is also structured, gated, professionally administered, and aimed at a strategic weakness in the Cardano ecosystem. RCADA votes YES because Cardano needs to convert infrastructure progress into real economic activity, and PRIME provides a serious, overseen attempt to do that.
RCADA’s YES vote should be understood as support for a tightly controlled growth experiment, not a guarantee of success and not automatic approval of every future deployment decision. This support depends on rigorous oversight, transparent reporting, strict performance attribution, responsible capital deployment, return of unused or unearned funds, and clear evidence that PRIME is producing durable value for Cardano.
RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here: "https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/."
- Yes11.8M ₳Rationale
We acknowledge that the proposed intervention is expensive, and we have concerns around the overall scale of the treasury commitment and the cost of execution. However, we view the underlying intervention as necessary to address Cardano's liquidity fragmentation, capital inefficiency, and limited DeFi growth. The proposal provides a structured pathway from ecosystem assessment, to targeted recommendations, to milestone-gated deployment of grants and liquidity incentives.
Importantly, PRIME does not treat TVL growth alone as the measure of success. Its theory of change seeks to convert targeted liquidity support into durable ecosystem activity, with transaction volume, fees, active users, and TVL persistence forming part of the performance assessment. The Phase 3 funding gate, attribution methodology, independent verification, reporting requirements, and governance safeguards provide meaningful mechanisms to test whether the intervention is producing incremental and sustainable value.
While we consider the cost significant, we believe the proposed intervention addresses a genuine ecosystem need and presents a sufficiently credible pathway toward stronger liquidity, DeFi activity, and long-term ecosystem capacity. On balance, we therefore support the governance action.
- Yes10.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes10.4M ₳Rationale
After reviewing the latest PRIME updates and having constructive discussions around the proposal, I will be voting YES.
I was hesitant of this proposal because of the Operating Group. dReps should ask hard questions, especially when a proposal involves large budgets, DeFi incentives, marketing, vendor selection, Operating Group oversight, potential conflicts and possible influence from major ecosystem institutions.
My concerns were not about whether Cardano DeFi needs support. It absolutely does.
Cardano needs deeper liquidity, stronger stablecoin markets, better DeFi rails, more users, better routing, stronger incentives, more integrations and a credible path to attracting external capital. DeFi is one of the most important pieces of Cardano's long term success.
Without healthy DeFi, we limit onchain activity, liquidity, fees, capital formation and the ability for builders to create real financial products on Cardano.
So the question for me was never - "Should Cardano support DeFi?" The question was - "Is PRIME structured well enough to deserve support?"
The recent changes move the proposal in the right direction. The marketing budget has been reduced from $2.4 million to around 650k and broken down more clearly.
Performance based unlocks are being back loaded - 30% after 30 days, 30% after three months, and 40% after six months. Accelerated payouts for over performance are being removed.
The TVL observation window is being extended from 12 months to 24 months, while preserving the six month retention requirement.
And based on dRep feedback, Alpha Growth has committed to introducing term limits and expanding/diversifying the Operating Group once the proposal is operational in Phase 1. They show that feedback was heard. That said, my biggest concern remains the current Operating Group.
For a program of this size, the OG must be more neutral, more diverse and more broadly trusted by the ecosystem. No single institution, faction, or political bloc should be perceived as having outsized influence over a 120 million $ADA DeFi program.
The OG needs to change sooner rather than later. More neutral voices should be added. Conflict disclosures should be clear. Vendor selection should be transparent. Cardano native DeFi builders should feel the process is fair. Treasury funded marketing should be disclosed and should never become narrative control.
This is with the expectation that PRIME follows through on the commitments it has now made.
I also want to be clear on something personal. There have been past and present attacks on Iagon, on me and on people around me
But Cardano's success is more important than my personal feelings. I will continue to criticize hard. Ask uncomfortable questions. Demand changes. Then vote according to the best interests of the ecosystem.
I will be voting YES. YES to improve DeFi on #Cardano
- Yes9.5M ₳Rationale
dOSPO/OMF: Still abstain.
ALPHAGROWTH: YES. I support this proposal because growing Cardano's DeFi ecosystem, liquidity, and competitiveness is a strategic priority. While I would have preferred stronger attribution and performance metrics upfront, I believe the proposal contains sufficient milestone-based funding, reporting, and governance oversight to justify support. On balance, the opportunity cost of delaying a coordinated growth initiative outweighs the remaining execution risk.
Bifrost: NO. While I support Bitcoin interoperability as a concept, I am not convinced this proposal sufficiently demonstrates the value it will create for Cardano relative to its cost. This is the first phase of a multi-phase initiative that explicitly anticipates a future Treasury proposal for launch and operations, yet the proposal primarily relies on the expectation that Bitcoin liquidity and activity will naturally translate into meaningful value for Cardano. I would have preferred stronger evidence that this infrastructure is likely to drive measurable adoption, on-chain economic activity, and sustainable benefit to the ecosystem before committing Treasury funding to a longer-term roadmap.
Version 12 von Bergen: ABSTAIN, however know that this is starting to get a bit morbid.
Cardano Enterprise Ticketing: ABSTAIN. I support enterprise adoption as a strategic priority for Cardano, and I believe this proposal represents a legitimate opportunity. However, I remain divided on whether this is the right path for funding initiatives of this nature. I would have preferred to see enterprise opportunities evaluated through a dedicated catalyst or accelerator-style program rather than as standalone Treasury withdrawals. Given that uncertainty—and the broader community's differing views on the appropriate funding model—I am abstaining.
- Yes9.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes8.5M ₳Rationale
本提案に賛成します。CardanoにおけるDeFi流動性の拡大と持続可能な市場形成は、エコシステムの発展にとって重要な取り組みであると考えます。本提案は、段階的な実施計画を採用し、Operating Groupによる監督、Intersectによる資金管理、独立した監査または保証のための予算、四半期ごとの報告、未使用資金等のTreasury返還の仕組みなど、説明責任と透明性を重視した運営体制を示しています。また、成果報酬についても検証可能な指標に基づく仕組みが示されています。これらの点を総合的に評価し、説明責任と透明性を備えた実施体制の下でCardanoにおけるDeFi流動性の拡大と持続可能な市場形成を目指す取り組みであると判断したため、私はこの提案に賛成します。\n\nI vote Yes on this proposal. I believe that expanding DeFi liquidity and fostering sustainable market development on Cardano are important objectives for the growth of the ecosystem. This proposal adopts a phased implementation model and establishes governance mechanisms that emphasize accountability and transparency, including Operating Group oversight, fund administration by Intersect, a dedicated budget for independent audit or assurance, quarterly reporting, and treasury return mechanisms for unused funds. The proposal also ties its performance fee to verifiable metrics. Taking these factors into account, I believe this proposal provides an accountable and transparent implementation framework for expanding DeFi liquidity and fostering sustainable market development on Cardano, and therefore I vote Yes on this proposal.
- NoRevoted7.5M ₳Rationale
Update my vote to base it on my Cardano DRep Commercial Treasury Rule Book v17
Use a blockchain explorer like https://cexplorer.io/ to read this rationale with Markdown enabled, it will allow you to see the tables properly and click on the links, etc.
I scored this proposal using my public rulebook and scoring system, available here: Cardano DRep Commercial Treasury Rule Book version 17 - the Unified Commercial, Infrastructure, Marketing and Public-Goods Edition (https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ed-IkSj4tDqys3D1jDMspgIZ7O9xSmxQsMPpB_b3DXA/edit?usp=sharing). The document is still evolving, but it reflects how I assess commercial and hybrid Treasury proposals.
The point of this process is to give some actionable feedback to proposers - in case they wish to resubmit.
I use AI assistance in this process because I want a scoring method that reflects my own thinking, but that I can apply as neutrally and consistently as possible across the large number of proposals. AI does not make the decision for me. It helps me structure the review, test the proposal against the same criteria, and spot issues I may otherwise miss. When a proposal is close to the necessary number of points, then I look at it even more closely. The point of the scoring framework is also to guide proposers towards elements I find important.
Rationale
Vote: No. I presupposed an increase in the currently valid NCL. I assumed a new NCL of ₳500 million. NCL capacity therefore does not decide this vote. PRIME still uses 24% of that assumed limit. Cardano needs deeper DeFi markets and stronger liquidity. The immutable proposal offers several strong controls. Intersect receives the funds, not AlphaGrowth. The Operating Group gates about ₳90 million after Month Four. Public reports and careful TVL exclusions also add value. The proposal tracks fees, users, volume, and retained TVL. Yet one action authorizes the entire ₳120 million withdrawal. Later spending remains staged inside Intersect’s project structure. Key legal and custody details follow withdrawal approval. The independent assurance provider remains unnamed before voting. Most grants and incentives lack mandatory recovery rights. Treasury ownership remains optional, not standard. AlphaGrowth can receive up to ₳40 million. That equals one-third of the request. AlphaGrowth shows relevant Compound and Uniswap experience. Its Compound report claims substantial growth and external incentives. Those results remain mainly applicant-reported. (Comp) Earlier OpenZeppelin reviews criticized AlphaGrowth’s transfer controls. PRIME greatly improves those earlier structures. (Comp) The Uniswap record shows useful work and mixed feedback. Critics questioned costs, overlap, and KPI-linked payments. (Uniswap Governance) The supplied Charles Hoskinson interview gives strategic context. It does not verify price or delivery. I scored PRIME 75/100. Its marketing workstream scored 60/100. Both miss their 90-point thresholds. Several systemic gates also remain unmet. The request is not worth this exposure today. There is no conditional Yes vote.
Commercial, Hybrid and Infrastructure Scorecard
The request exceeds ₳20 million. Rule Book v17 therefore classifies it as systemic. Systemic proposals need 90 points and every systemic gate.
# Category Maximum Score Explanation 1 Public value, additionality, timing, and counterfactual harm 12 11 Cardano has a credible DeFi depth problem. PRIME targets liquidity, users, fees, products, and public research. 2 Team quality, traction, adaptive execution, and domain fit 7 6 AlphaGrowth has relevant Compound and Uniswap experience. Delivery at Cardano’s proposed scale remains unproven. 3 Material improvement, innovation, and productive effect 6 5 The audit, grants, incentives, and LP work could reinforce each other. The claimed step-change remains forecast. 4 Price, budget realism, and ADA volatility discipline 7 5 The budget is itemized. ADA price triggers protect excess funds. Supplier quotes and market-rate comparisons remain limited. 5 Integrity, conflicts, prior delivery, and outcomes record 8 6 Recusal and disclosure rules are detailed. Prior results remain partly self-reported. Earlier Compound structures had serious control weaknesses. 6 Public asset, composability, openness, verifiability, and continuity 11 8 Reports, analyses, recommendations, and records become public. Licensing, raw-data rights, and long-term stewardship need more detail. 7 Treasury return, instrument fit, and risk sharing 12 7 Unearned fees and unused funds return. Recoverable capital remains optional. Most program spending lacks repayment rights. 8 Milestones, independent verification, anti-gaming, and enforceability 12 9 The Month Four gate and attribution exclusions are strong. Contracts, custody details, and verifier selection occur later. 9 Risk management, safety, and obsolescence resilience 9 7 PRIME covers conflicts, price changes, termination, and attribution disputes. Full custody-loss and market-failure tests remain absent. 10 Sustainability, operator reality, exit, and succession 8 6 Termination and balance returns are defined. Durable liquidity after incentives remains uncertain. 11 Portfolio exposure, neutrality, dependencies, and decentralization 6 4 Eligibility and recusal rules help neutrality. One program consumes 24% of the assumed NCL. 12 Ecosystem coordination and external demand quality 2 1 The Operating Group and Advisory Council aid coordination. Few binding partner or matching-capital commitments exist. Total 100 75 Systemic threshold: 90 points and every systemic gate. The proposal’s budget includes ₳11 million in fixed compensation and a ₳29 million performance reserve. It also allocates ₳35 million for grants, ₳27 million for incentives, and ₳15 million for marketing.
Category-Minimum Test
Required category Systemic minimum Score Result Public value 8/12 11/12 Pass Integrity and prior delivery 5/8 6/8 Pass Public asset and continuity 7/11 8/11 Pass Treasury return and instrument fit 8/12 7/12 Fail Milestones, verification, and enforceability 10/12 9/12 Fail Risk and safety 7/9 7/9 Pass Sustainability and operator reality 7/8 6/8 Fail Portfolio exposure and neutrality 5/6 4/6 Fail Overall systemic score 90/100 75/100 Fail These minimums come directly from the commercial and infrastructure scorecard.
Marketing and Adoption Scorecard
PRIME assigns ₳15 million to marketing. This is a material, very-large workstream. I therefore scored it separately. The rulebook requires separate assessment for material mixed workstreams.
# Marketing category Maximum Score Explanation 1 Cardano-specific public value and strategic fit 12 9 Better distribution could attract protocols, liquidity, and users. 2 Audience quality, not audience size 12 7 PRIME targets LPs and institutions. Binding audience-access commitments remain scarce. 3 Additionality, timing, and market-failure case 10 6 Cardano has an awareness gap. The case against greater private co-funding remains weak. 4 Price, benchmarks, and ADA volatility discipline 12 5 The allocation is indicative. Vendor quotes, rate cards, and competitive bids are missing. 5 Track record, integrity, prior delivery, and outcomes 8 6 AlphaGrowth reports large reach and incentive sourcing. Independent conversion evidence remains limited. 6 Public deliverables and content or data rights 10 7 Content and dashboards may become public. Reuse licenses and source-data rights need strengthening. 7 Conversion and retained impact 14 8 PRIME tracks economic metrics. It lacks a clear marketing-to-retention attribution model. 8 Independent verification and anti-fake-metric controls 12 7 General attribution controls are useful. Marketing-specific source exports remain incomplete. 9 Co-funding, discounts, or risk sharing 5 1 Substantial mandatory partner co-funding is absent. 10 Brand safety, conflicts, neutrality, and portfolio fit 5 4 Oversight and public eligibility help. Winner-selection risks remain. Total 100 60 Very-large marketing threshold: 90 points. The marketing budget remains indicative. AlphaGrowth and the Operating Group set its final allocation later.
Marketing Minimums
Requirement Minimum Score Result Cardano-specific public value 8/12 9/12 Pass Audience quality 8/12 7/12 Fail Price and benchmarks 8/12 5/12 Fail Conversion and retained impact 10/14 8/14 Fail Independent verification 9/12 7/12 Fail Very-large total 90/100 60/100 Fail Substantial co-funding Required Limited Fail Systemic-Gate Review
Systemic gate Result Explanation Exposure staging Not met The action authorizes one ₳120 million withdrawal. Internal gates limit spending, but not initial custody exposure. Independent pre-approval review Not met Tooling audits exist. No complete review covers PRIME’s legal, financial, market, and attribution model. Separation of duties Pass AlphaGrowth recommends. The Operating Group reviews. Intersect administers funds. Enforceability and recovery Not met Key legal arrangements follow approval. Recoverability exists only where later deployment records create it. Stress testing Not met Price triggers exist. Custody loss, depegs, exploits, freezes, and demand failure need fuller treatment. Portfolio resilience Not met The request consumes 24% of the assumed NCL. The opportunity-cost analysis remains insufficient. Executable controls Not met Vetoes, pauses, and termination exist. Some powers still depend on later contracts. Public accountability Pass PRIME requires public decisions, reports, audit records, and final reconciliation. The Sundae treasury contracts include pause, disbursement, expiry, and return mechanisms. Two independent firms audited the contract code. These audits cover the tooling, not PRIME’s full program. (GitHub)
Improvement Packages
The estimates below require a complete rescore. They are not automatic additions.
Package Specific changes Likely effect A — Treasury-level staging Submit a ₳12 million first action. Fund only research and setup. Submit later tranches after independent verification. Require another governance decision before releasing the final ₳90 million. Main score: +5 to +6 B — Mandatory Treasury return Make at least half of grants and LP capital recoverable. Use Treasury-owned LP positions, loans, or repayable grants. Require 1:1 matching above ₳1 million. Main score: +4 to +5 C — Complete controls before voting Name the verifier. Publish the signed contract, jurisdiction, custody rules, insurance, disputes, clawbacks, and replacement rights. Freeze the attribution methodology before voting. Main score: +4 to +5 D — Stronger performance measurement Pay fees using retained TVL, fees, users, utilization, and market share. Measure retention after 90 and 180 days. Exclude related wallets, leverage loops, and circular deposits. Main score: +2 to +3 M — Rebuild marketing Reduce the budget or separate it. Require 50% partner co-funding. Obtain competitive quotes. Pay after verified activation and 90-day retention. Publish source exports and reuse rights. Marketing score: +28 to +32 P — Evidence-first pilot Request no more than ₳4 million. Deliver the public audit and measurement system. Run two capped liquidity pilots. Publish fees, utilization, retention, and market-share results. Changes threshold to 85 Examples of Better Terms
Current weakness Stronger example Optional recoverable capital “At least ₳31 million must remain Treasury-owned.” Unnamed verifier “Xerberus verifies every performance-fee calculation.” TVL-heavy performance fee “No fee accrues before 180-day liquidity retention.” Indicative marketing spending “Three quotes are required above ₳250,000.” Limited co-funding “Recipients match every Treasury ADA above ₳1 million.” One full withdrawal “Each phase requires a separate governance action.” Later contract details “Signed agreements form immutable proposal attachments.” Potential Pathways to Success
Resubmission pathway Expected main score Marketing result Likely outcome Current proposal 75 60 No Packages A and C 84–87 60 Still below threshold Packages A, B, and C 89–92 60 Marketing still blocks approval Packages A, B, C, D, and M 91–94 90–92 Eligible for a full Yes review Remove the material marketing pool, then apply A, B, and C 90–92 No separate material failure Eligible for a full Yes review ₳4 million pilot, plus C and limited co-funded marketing 86–89 Not material Strongest lower-risk route Separate ₳20 million first stage 90–92 Separately assessed Plausible after every gate passes A future proposal must clear every applicable gate. Reaching 90 points alone would not guarantee approval.
Sources Reviewed
Source How it informed the assessment Evidence weight CExplorer governance action and AdaStat action Action identity, withdrawal type, title, and amount. High for on-chain facts. (cexplorer.io) Immutable proposal on IPFS and uploaded copy Primary source for budget, custody, oversight, contracts, metrics, and return rules. Highest proposal evidence. PRIME briefing Applicant’s shorter explanation of benefits and safeguards. Applicant-authored summary. Rule Book v17 and uploaded copy Thresholds, category minimums, mixed-workstream rule, and systemic gates. Assessment framework. Intersect treasury-tooling explanation Explained reserve contracts, vendor contracts, milestone payments, and custody design. Strong tooling context. (Intersect MBO) Sundae treasury-contract repository, TxPipe audit, and MLabs audit Confirmed the tooling and published audits. These do not audit PRIME’s entire program. High for tooling only. (GitHub) AlphaGrowth Compound year review Applicant-reported TVL, market launches, incentives, and marketing results. Relevant but self-reported. (Comp) Compound Growth Program V4 Showed reduced scope, lower cost, vesting, and response to feedback. Useful evidence of adaptation. (Comp) OpenZeppelin Proposal 381 review and Proposal 416 review Independent criticism of earlier lump-sum transfers and control weaknesses. These reviews concern earlier Compound proposals, not PRIME. Strong independent control evidence. (Comp) Uniswap trial recap Applicant-reported incentives, TVL, partnerships, and media reach. Useful but self-reported. (Uniswap Governance) Uniswap renewal discussion Included positive builder feedback and concerns about cost, overlap, and KPI-linked funding. Mixed governance evidence. (Uniswap Governance) Cardano DeFi map Context for Cardano’s claimed product and infrastructure gaps. Context only. Charles Hoskinson interview and uploaded transcript Strategic context and ecosystem discussion. I awarded no points for endorsement. Context only. Final Decision
Vote Main score Marketing score Required threshold Gate result No 75/100 60/100 90/100 Several systemic gates unmet Earlier votes
No1mo agoSuperseded
Voting NO as presented
IMPORTANT: Use a blockchain explorer like https://cexplorer.io/ to read this rationale with Markdown enabled, it will allow you to see the tables properly and click on the links, etc.
I scored this proposal using my own public rulebook and scoring system, which is available here: Cardano DRep Commercial Treasury Rule Book v15, the v15 Productive Ecosystem, New-Work, Composability, Productive ADA Circulation, Funding Architecture & Decision-Reliability Edition, (https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xUivaYYflaPzGt2FuSqwSoDAsiA-Uk6hJNrClL62OtE/edit?usp=sharing). The document is still evolving, but it reflects how I assess commercial and hybrid Treasury proposals.
I use AI assistance in this process because I want a scoring method that reflects my own thinking, but that I can apply as neutrally and consistently as possible across the large number of proposals requesting funding. AI does not make the decision for me. It helps me structure the review, test the proposal against the same criteria, and spot issues I may otherwise miss. When a proposal is borderline, I look at it even more closely.
Rationale
Vote: No. PRIME addresses a real weakness in Cardano DeFi, and AlphaGrowth has credible experience. Compound approved its 2024 growth mandate through Compound Governance Proposal 251, and independent Arbitrum research later found that Compound’s incentive campaign produced clear product-led results. However, a later full-year renewal vote failed, so the public record is positive but mixed. This proposal still asks Cardano to take too much risk. It requests ₳120 million. Up to ₳40 million goes to AlphaGrowth, including the performance reserve, and ₳15 million goes to marketing. The Month 4 gate and Intersect custody are useful controls, but key TVL attribution rules and legal contracts will be completed after approval. The proposal does not give a final governing law, a clear dispute forum, strong clawbacks for money already paid, or firm public licence and data rights. Most liquidity spending is also not required to remain Treasury-owned. The performance fee can use TVL that has remained for only 30 days, while longer retention is mainly a reporting measure. The request equals 24% of the proposed ₳500 million Net Change Limit and about 34% of the existing ₳350 million limit; the new limit itself remains under vote, as shown in the CardanoCube governance record. I score PRIME 66/100. It falls well below the 90-point requirement for a very large proposal and fails hard minimums for public assets, Treasury upside, enforceability, sustainability, and portfolio fit. A smaller pilot with completed contracts, fixed KPI rules, Treasury-owned liquidity, lower compensation, vendor price evidence, and payment after durable results would deserve a new vote.
Proposal classification
Item Assessment Main classification Hybrid public/commercial DeFi and liquidity programme Secondary classification Ecosystem coordination Material specialist component ₳15 million marketing and adoption programme Request size Very large Applicable v15 threshold 90/100, plus all hard category minimums Decision reliability High enough for a Yes or No decision Actual vote No Layer 0 — Funding architecture and capital-allocation screen
Screen Result Assessment Priority fit Pass DeFi liquidity, stablecoins and application depth are defensible Cardano priorities. Public-capital need Concern The proposal does not show enough private co-funding from protocols, liquidity providers, investors or commercial beneficiaries. Instrument fit Fail Grants and incentive subsidies dominate. Recoverable LP positions and loans are optional rather than the default structure. Cardano value capture Fail Cardano receives reports, programme data and possible liquidity growth, but does not receive firm ownership of most deployed capital, commercial upside or broad public IP rights. Competitive neutrality Concern Published eligibility rules help, but AlphaGrowth still selects recipients, partners and vendors within very large envelopes. ADA volatility discipline Concern ADA amounts are fixed. The main excess-value trigger starts only after ADA remains at or above $0.40 for 30 days, and the Operating Group may approve redeployment instead of return. Opportunity cost Fail ₳120 million creates exceptional concentration and could displace infrastructure, security work and many smaller experiments. Productive-ecosystem potential Promising Better liquidity products, solver infrastructure, risk tooling and integrations could enable independent new work. Evidence of committed downstream adoption is still limited. Layer 0 conclusion No The funding instrument, value capture and opportunity cost do not support this allocation at the requested scale. Productive Ecosystem Diagnostic
Criterion Maximum Score Assessment Material dependency or capability gap 2 2 Fragmented liquidity, weak routing, limited advanced products and risk tooling are credible gaps. Independent downstream new work 2 1 Vaults, solver services, structured products and integrations could emerge, but few firm deployments or counterparties are committed before funding. Reusable and neutral common input 2 1 Public analyses and open eligibility rules help, but the proposal does not secure open standards, permissive licences or portable public infrastructure across the programme. External demand or export pathway 2 2 Institutional LPs, outside protocols and cross-chain users could bring assets and demand from outside the Treasury-funded economy. Diversity and post-Treasury viability 2 1 The programme may broaden Cardano’s supplier base, but continued liquidity after incentives remains an unproven assumption. Total diagnostic 10 7 Useful multiplier potential, but it remains partly dependent on AlphaGrowth and continued subsidies. Core v15 scorecard
# Category Weight Score Scoring explanation 1 Public value, additionality, productive value, timing and counterfactual harm 12 10 The problem is important and timely. Better DeFi depth could increase fees, capital retention and useful economic activity. The proposal does not fully prove that a ₳120 million programme is necessary to solve it. 2 Team quality, traction, adaptive execution and founder-market fit 7 6 AlphaGrowth has relevant Compound and incentive-programme experience. Independent research supports part of its delivery record, although later Compound governance support was mixed. See Compound Governance Proposal 251. 3 10x improvement, innovation, new-work branching and asymmetric upside 6 4 The combination of liquidity campaigns, solver markets, vaults and risk tools could improve Cardano materially. Much of the implementation is decided only after the first four months. 4 Price versus value and ADA volatility discipline 7 3 The request is exceptionally large. Maximum AlphaGrowth compensation equals ₳40 million, or one-third of the withdrawal. Cost benchmarks, competitive bids and protection across normal ADA price changes are weak. 5 Applicant integrity, conflicts, prior delivery and outcomes record 8 6 The proposal discloses governance roles, recusals and the absence of Cardano Treasury receipts in the previous 24 months. I did not find a clearly attributable past Catalyst award, but that search result is not proof that no affiliate ever received funding. 6 Public assets, composability, open source, verification, data rights and continuity 11 6 Public reports, criteria and decision records have value. The proposal does not clearly grant reusable licences, raw-data rights, fork rights, public ownership or continuity rights over most funded outputs. Fails the 7/11 hybrid minimum. 7 Treasury upside, instrument fit and risk sharing 12 6 Unused funds and unearned fees return, and some deployments may become recoverable. However, recoverability depends on later memos. Most grants, incentives and marketing remain non-recoverable, while AlphaGrowth supplies no first-loss capital or material co-funding. Fails the hybrid and very-large commercial minimums. 8 Milestones, independent verification, anti-gaming and enforceability 12 8 Intersect custody, the Month 4 gate, public memos and an audit reserve are meaningful. The TVL methodology is finalised after approval, 30-day persistence is weak for a durability fee, and legal entity, jurisdiction, dispute and clawback terms are deferred. Negative-consent approval also allows recommendations to proceed unless three OG members veto. Fails the 9/12 minimum. 9 Risk management, margin of safety and obsolescence resilience 9 6 Staging, eligibility checks, assurance funding and return triggers control some downside. Principal loss, incentive flight, attribution disputes and broad redeployment discretion remain material risks. 10 Sustainability, post-Treasury reproduction, exit and operator reality 8 5 The proposal reports fee generation and longer-term TVL persistence, but it does not prove that revenue will replace subsidies or explain who finances continued growth after Month 12. Fails the 6/8 minimum. 11 Portfolio exposure, opportunity cost, redundancy, dependencies, neutrality and decentralisation 6 2 The request consumes 24% of the proposed ₳500 million limit and about 34% of the existing ₳350 million limit. This creates severe portfolio concentration and winner-selection risk. See the CardanoCube governance record. Fails the 4/6 minimum. 12 Productive ecosystem and coordination quality 2 2 The Operating Group, advisory council, Intersect administration and preference for Cardano-native suppliers create credible coordination value. Base score 100 64 Productive Ecosystem Multiplier Premium +5 max +2 The programme could create downstream liquidity products and attract external capital, but neutral shared assets and post-Treasury reproduction are not firm enough for a larger premium. DRep Conviction Adjustment −5 to +5 0 The hard-gate and numerical findings already capture the main concerns. Final score 100 66 Below the 90-point threshold for a very large request. Hard minimum check
Hard minimum Required Score Result Public value and additionality 8/12 10/12 Pass Applicant integrity and prior delivery 5/8 6/8 Pass Public asset and continuity for a hybrid proposal 7/11 6/11 Fail Treasury upside and risk sharing At least 8/12 for hybrid; higher for very large commercial exposure 6/12 Fail Milestones, verification and enforceability 9/12 8/12 Fail Risk and margin of safety 6/9 6/9 Pass Sustainability and operator reality 6/8 5/8 Fail Portfolio, neutrality and decentralisation 4/6 2/6 Fail Very-large-request total 90/100 66/100 Fail Appendix A — Marketing and Adoption score
The ₳15 million marketing envelope is material and separable, so I also tested it under the v15 Marketing and Adoption Annex. The proposal lists indicative conference, content, distribution, co-marketing and research spending, but final vendor allocation comes later.
| Category | Weight | Score | Assessment
- Yes7.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.8M ₳No rationale
- No5.6M ₳Rationale
I cannot support this proposal.
It requests 80M ADA, plus a 50% performance fee for AlphaGrowth. I am surprised by the level of enthusiasm this proposal has received in the ecosystem.Roughly 1/3 of the funds would go toward LP incentives, essentially paying users to interact with our DeFi protocols. I strongly oppose this approach, as it represents a short term and unsustainable model.
Another large portion (nearly half) is allocated to “Ecosystem Grants,” a very vague category with little to no clear explanation of how these funds will be distributed or what outcomes are expected.
I am not familiar with AlphaGrowth, but paying them 40M ADA, a significant amount both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total request, simply to distribute our ADA to various pools, only for them to later list Cardano as a success story on their website, does not seem like a responsible use of treasury funds.
This is my current position based on the information available.
I will continue to monitor the team and community discussions and remain open to changing my vote if more convincing details emerge. - Yes5.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.2M ₳Rationale
We vote YES on this proposal.
The Cardano ecosystem is currently in dire need of a significant boost in liquidity and total value locked to compete effectively with other Layer-1 networks. AlphaGrowth's Cardano PRIME proposal presents a bold and comprehensive strategy aimed at attracting an additional $200 million in TVL. This breakthrough growth will create a network effect, attracting a host of new developers and capital into Cardano.
While 120 million ADA is a substantial amount, the risk is tightly controlled through a phased release mechanism. This money is not directly given to AlphaGrowth but is held by Intersect and overseen by an independent 5-member Operating Group.
Notably, the majority of the project's compensation (29 million ADA) is performance fees. This requires AlphaGrowth to actually achieve its committed growth targets in order to receive rewards => if it fails, any unused funds will be returned to the Treasury. Sometimes, to achieve exceptional growth, the ecosystem needs large-scale strategic investments. Voting in favor is a choice that gives Cardano the opportunity to break through its current DeFi limitations.
- Yes5.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes5M ₳Rationale
This could be good for Cardano. Changed vote on NCL to have this go through. Good luck team.
- Yes4.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.2M ₳Rationale
[Portuguese]
Optamos por votar "SIM" nesta ação de governança "Withdraw 120,000,000 ADA for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME" (gov_action122w...vlfpu7), pois entendemos que a proposta busca enfrentar um dos principais gargalos atuais do ecossistema Cardano: a baixa profundidade de liquidez e a dificuldade de transformar avanços de infraestrutura em atividade econômica sustentável no DeFi. Embora o valor solicitado, de ₳120 milhões, seja expressivo, avaliamos positivamente a estrutura de execução em fases, com liberação de recursos condicionada ao cumprimento de marcos e critérios previamente definidos, contribuindo para uma relação mais equilibrada entre risco e benefício. Também consideramos relevantes os mecanismos de governança, controle e transparência previstos, incluindo supervisão pelo Operating Group, administração dos recursos pela Intersect em conta separada e auditável, publicação das recomendações e dos desembolsos realizados, orçamento específico para auditoria independente e gatilhos para devolução ao Tesouro dos recursos não utilizados ou não liberados. Esses mecanismos aumentam a verificabilidade da execução, permitem maior acompanhamento pela comunidade e ajudam a reduzir os riscos associados à gestão de uma alocação dessa magnitude.
[English]
We chose to vote "YES" on this governance action "Withdraw 120,000,000 ADA for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME" (gov_action122w...vlfpu7), because we believe the proposal seeks to address one of the Cardano ecosystem’s most significant current challenges: limited liquidity depth and the difficulty of translating infrastructure improvements into sustainable economic activity within DeFi. Although the requested ₳120 million is substantial, we view the phased execution structure positively, with funding releases tied to predefined milestones and criteria, helping to create a more balanced risk-benefit profile. We also consider the proposed governance, oversight, and transparency mechanisms to be important, including supervision by the Operating Group, management of the funds by Intersect through a separate auditable account, public disclosure of recommendations and disbursements, a dedicated budget for independent auditing, and triggers for returning unused or unreleased funds to the Treasury. These mechanisms improve the verifiability of execution, enable greater community oversight, and help mitigate the risks associated with managing an allocation of this magnitude. - Yes4.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes4M ₳No rationale
- Yes4M ₳Rationale
I see this in many ways a Hail Mary pass for Cardano, which I would rather not be making, however, Cardano has fumbled its attempts to interest mainstream finance, DeFi and developers in its go-it-alone and contrarian approach. This has left the ecosystem with good tech, but lacking the liquidity necessary to start a flywheel of growth.
Cardano has tried other approaches with its own stablecoins, when the mainstream players wouldn't come on their own. It has tried various DeFi platforms, but nothing has generated sufficient traction to change our underperforming trendline.
While my major value was to preserve the treasury, especially at a depressed valuation, if we continue doing what we have been doing, I believe our trend toward obsolesce will continue, and the absolute value of the treasury will continue to decline inline with the market perception of Cardano.
Thus, this Hail Mary pass to change the trend.
I see this going very badly if this project turns out to primarily be a device to create more and bigger exit liquidity, and I don't discount this possibility in a bad-state of the world. However, in the good state, this could be a catalyst which can tie into several external macro events - higher throughput technology improvements and rollout, launch of Midnight, passage of the Clarity Act, and Cardano etfs under the streamlined SEC rules.. all of which will be coming at the same time. If any or many of those arrive, then having the deeper liquidity this project offers would critical to giving headroom for smooth market expansion.
If we have an optimistic view of Cardano's future, then this project, while expensive may well be required business infrastructure. I believe there is more downside risk by not passing, and thus vote yes, though threw gritted teeth.
- No3.5M ₳Rationale
120m ADA?
- Yes3.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.5M ₳No rationale
- No3M ₳Rationale
I have to vote NO on this proposal. I have already reached my personal NCL, which is substantially lower than the current set NCL. Voting for this proposal would mean raising the NCL would be required, which is a hard NO for me. We are already spending too much of the treasury on proposals without any measurable benefit to the Cardano ecosystem.
This proposal assumes that the ADA spent to fund it would have an overall net positive outcome for our ecosystem, but I do not think this is the case. I believe the amount of ADA requested to spend on this proposal will only continue to lower the price of ADA.
Any future spending should prioritize on chain utility and transaction volume from real world users, and I don't think this proposal will meaningfully accomplish this.
- No2.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳Rationale
After reviewing the proposal, I am confident that this will be extremely beneficial to the Cardano Ecosystem.
Raise the NCL.
- No2.6M ₳Rationale
私は本Treasury Withdrawalに反対します。
Cardano DeFiの流動性、資本効率、risk toolingを改善しようとするPRIMEの方向性と、Intersectによる資金管理、独立監査、未使用資金返還の設計は評価します。
しかし、本提案では、最初の4か月間に現状監査とギャップ分析を行い、その結果を基にPhase 3の助成先、LP対象、資本展開方法を決定します。つまり、Phase 3の具体的な使途と必要額が確定していない段階で、120M ADA全額をTreasuryから引き出す構造です。
また、Phase 3資金の解放判断をOperating Groupの3-of-5承認に委ねており、DRepが診断結果や確定KPIを確認した上で、大部分の資金支出を再評価する機会がありません。
固定報酬とTVL連動の成果報酬が設定される一方、LP損失、protocol事故、インセンティブ終了後の資本流出などは、主としてTreasury側の負担となる可能性があります。このリスクと報酬の非対称性も慎重に評価すべきです。
まずPhase 1・2に必要な資金のみを承認し、診断後に助成先、LP対象、利益相反、確定KPI、成果算定方法、損失上限を公開した上で、Phase 3を別のTreasury Withdrawalとして再提出すべきです。
I oppose this Treasury Withdrawal.
I recognize the value of PRIME’s goal to improve Cardano DeFi liquidity, capital efficiency, and risk tooling. I also appreciate the use of Intersect for fund administration, independent audits, and the return of unused funds to the Treasury.
However, during the first four months, PRIME will conduct an ecosystem audit and gap analysis. The recipients of grants, LP targets, capital deployment plans, and the actual funding required for Phase 3 will be decided only after this work is completed. Despite this, the proposal requests the full 120M ADA in advance.
The release of most Phase 3 funding would then depend on a 3-of-5 approval by the Operating Group. DReps would not have another opportunity to review the audit results, final KPIs, and specific uses of the funds before this large deployment begins.
The proposal also includes fixed compensation and a TVL-based performance fee, while LP losses, protocol incidents, and liquidity leaving after incentives end may be mainly borne by the Treasury. This creates an imbalance between rewards and financial risk.
Only the funding required for Phases 1 and 2 should be approved first. After the audit, the proposal should disclose the grant recipients, LP targets, conflicts of interest, final KPIs, attribution methodology, and loss limits. Phase 3 should then be submitted as a separate Treasury Withdrawal for DRep review.
- Yes2.6M ₳No rationale
- YesChanged2.5M ₳History
Earlier votes
Abstain1mo agoSuperseded
- Yes2.5M ₳Rationale
It's a bold move but the team is incredibly solid. Let's see what the community says. I may be updating this vote on the fly as I learn more.
- Yes2.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.2M ₳No rationale
- No2.2M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME proposal.
I want to be clear that this is not a vote against AlphaGrowth, DeFi growth, business development, liquidity, institutional outreach, or the idea that Cardano should become more ambitious in how it grows its ecosystem.
I do believe Cardano needs a stronger business development function. I do believe Cardano needs deeper liquidity, better DeFi distribution, stronger integrations, and a more deliberate strategy for attracting capital and users. I also recognise that this proposal is more detailed and more structurally serious than many treasury asks.
However, I do not believe a 120,000,000 ADA withdrawal should be approved in the current treasury framework.
The proposal requests 120M ADA for a 12-month community-overseen programme to improve DeFi protocol readiness, activate incentives, and grow durable liquidity across Cardano markets. It includes phased delivery, oversight, reporting, audit/assurance funding, and return-to-treasury mechanisms. Those are positive features.
But the scale of the ask is simply too large to approve without prior treasury reform, significantly deeper scrutiny, and a valid NCL framework that can accommodate it.
My first concern is the Net Change Limit. The NCL is a constitutional treasury safeguard that caps ADA withdrawals from the treasury over a defined period to ensure financial sustainability. If there is only around 58M ADA of current NCL headroom available, then a 120M ADA treasury withdrawal should not be considered constitutional unless and until a valid NCL top-up or revised NCL framework is approved and recognised.
My second concern is sequencing. A proposal of this size should not be used to force the NCL discussion after the fact. If AlphaGrowth and the community believe Cardano needs this scale of DeFi growth funding, then the correct sequence should be: first reform or reset the NCL framework, then define the relevant growth/DeFi/treasury-investment budget bucket, then resubmit a proposal of this type inside that agreed framework.
My third concern is that PRIME is not simply critical infrastructure maintenance. It is a large DeFi growth, incentives, liquidity, business development, and treasury-capital deployment programme. That may be valuable, but it belongs in a different category from wallet security, self-custody, protocol maintenance, open-source infrastructure, and core developer tooling. Cardano has not yet agreed how much of the NCL should be allocated to DeFi growth or treasury-investment style programmes.
This is why I have been advocating NCL reform.
Before approving a 120M ADA programme of this nature, I believe Cardano should agree:
- shorter NCL windows, ideally around 3–6 months;
- category-level budget buckets;
- a defined DeFi/growth allocation;
- a strategy for strong and weak ADA markets;
- a plan for building sovereign reserves in stronger markets;
- rules for stablecoin and non-ADA reserve assets;
- risk limits for treasury-capital deployment;
- concentration limits;
- conflict controls;
- independent due diligence standards;
- public reporting requirements;
- accountability for returns and losses.
I am not opposed to the Cardano Treasury eventually developing a more sophisticated business development, sovereign reserve, or VC-style ecosystem investment function. In fact, I think that may become necessary. But it must be built slowly, deliberately, and inside an agreed constitutional and treasury framework.
A 120M ADA programme should not be the starting point.
The correct path, in my view, is for AlphaGrowth to work with DReps and the wider community on NCL reform and treasury architecture first, then resubmit PRIME once a revised NCL framework and, if necessary, constitutional update have been enacted.
That would allow the community to assess PRIME inside a proper category budget, with clear risk rules, market-aware treasury strategy, and an agreed mandate for this type of growth capital.
Until then, I cannot support this proposal.
For these reasons, I vote NO.
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- No2.1M ₳Rationale
This proposal has a convincing problem statement and contains some really strong ideas (like phase-gated funding and performance-based compensation). However, the scale, scope, and concentration of capital allocation authority make this proposal premature in my opinion. I would like to see this proposal as a scaled-down pilot (₳ 20 M – 40 M) initially. After demonstrating measurable success there can be a second proposal later.
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale