Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect)
174 DReps voted · 68 with a rationale · 8 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Abstain13.3M ₳Rationale
RCADA recognises the significant effort and progress represented in this Budget Process Framework. Compared to the 2025 cycle, this proposal introduces meaningful improvements in structure, transparency, and accountability. The introduction of KPI-linked proposals, work-package-based budgeting, identity verification, and smart contract-based treasury execution are all strong advancements that align with the principles of responsible treasury governance and long-term ecosystem sustainability.
We particularly support the move toward measurable outcomes, clearer proposal comparability, and enhanced execution safeguards through escrow-style smart contracts and independent oversight mechanisms. These are important steps toward a more mature and accountable governance system.
However, despite these improvements, we have chosen to abstain due to several structural concerns that remain unresolved.
A central consideration in our assessment is the role of Ekklesia within this framework. While we recognise its value as a coordination and signal-gathering tool, its use as a gating mechanism—where proposals require a 67% threshold off-chain before progressing to on-chain governance—introduces a de facto pre-consensus layer. This creates a structural dependency on an off-chain system that is not fully verifiable, not protocol-enforced, and not subject to the same guarantees as on-chain governance.
Although this approach improves efficiency and reduces noise, it also shifts meaningful influence to a layer outside the protocol, where participation levels, stake distribution among active voters, and process visibility may materially affect outcomes. In practice, this means that proposals may be filtered before reaching formal on-chain governance, raising important questions around legitimacy, transparency, and long-term decentralisation.
Additionally, the role of Intersect within this framework remains broad and somewhat ambiguously defined. Intersect operates as framework facilitator, process coordinator, and potential administrator, which introduces a degree of role concentration that warrants clearer boundaries, accountability mechanisms, and dispute resolution pathways.
We also note potential unintended consequences in areas such as the minimum proposal threshold and Net Change Limit (NCL)-driven allocation logic, which may favour larger proposals and introduce distortions in prioritisation outcomes.
Our abstention should not be interpreted as opposition to the direction of travel. On the contrary, we believe this framework represents a strong and necessary evolution in Cardano’s governance maturity. However, as this process may become the de facto standard for treasury coordination, it is essential that its core mechanisms—particularly those influencing proposal selection—meet the highest standards of decentralisation, transparency, and verifiability.
We encourage future iterations of this framework to:
- Reduce reliance on off-chain gating mechanisms for critical decision pathways
- Strengthen on-chain traceability and verifiability across all stages
- Further decentralise coordination roles and clarify Intersect’s responsibilities
- Explore more inclusive pathways for smaller-scale proposals
- Continue refining accountability and oversight structures
RCADA remains supportive of continued iteration and will actively contribute to improving governance processes that strengthen Cardano’s long-term sustainability and decentralisation.
RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here: "https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/"
- Yes12.1M ₳Rationale
As Wada DRep, we vote yes on the Cardano Budget Process Framework proposal, recognising its importance in advancing a more structured, transparent, and scalable approach to treasury governance. The transition from ad hoc funding decisions to a coordinated, end-to-end budgeting process is both necessary and timely, particularly as the ecosystem continues to mature under CIP-1694. This framework introduces much-needed discipline in proposal standardisation, prioritisation, and execution, and represents a meaningful step toward institutionalising Cardano’s financial governance.
We appreciate the comprehensive design of the framework, including its integration with the Net Change Limit, the introduction of work package-based budgeting, and the use of structured review and prioritisation phases. These elements collectively improve the quality, comparability, and accountability of treasury-funded initiatives. Additionally, the emphasis on execution monitoring through smart contracts and reporting mechanisms strengthens confidence in how approved funds will be managed and tracked.
That said, our support is accompanied by important recommendations aimed at strengthening inclusiveness, decentralisation, and accountability within the framework.First, we encourage the establishment of a transparent and community-aligned process for Oversight Committee composition. This could include defined selection criteria, fixed terms, rotation mechanisms, and ideally a pathway for community ratification or election. Ensuring that this body evolves over time and reflects a broad spectrum of ecosystem stakeholders will be critical to maintaining trust and legitimacy.
Second, we recommend revisiting the minimum proposal threshold of 100,000 ADA. While we understand the intent to reduce spam and low-effort submissions, introducing a more flexible or tiered threshold system could preserve quality control while still enabling smaller, high-impact proposals to participate meaningfully in the process.
Third, we suggest refining the proposal aggregation model used in treasury withdrawal actions. Where possible, mechanisms should be explored to allow more granular voting or clearer separation of bundled proposals, ensuring that DReps can evaluate and support initiatives on their individual merits without being constrained by package-level decisions.
Fourth, the framework would benefit from a more explicit failure and underperformance management structure. This should include clearly defined expectations for milestone delivery, escalation procedures for delays or non-performance, and enforceable mechanisms for fund recovery or reallocation where appropriate.
Finally, with respect to the Ekklesia participation model, we believe further thought should be given to how effective and representative engagement is achieved. While stake-weighted thresholds are consistent with broader governance principles, current participation dynamics suggest the risk of disproportionate influence by a subset of large DReps. To address this, we recommend exploring a “one DRep wallet = one vote” mechanism, at least within the off-chain prioritisation phase, as a complementary approach to encourage broader participation and balance influence across the ecosystem.
In conclusion, we view this framework as a strong foundation for Cardano’s evolving treasury governance emanating from last year's funding cycle. Our support reflects confidence in its direction and potential impact, while our recommendations aim to ensure that its implementation remains inclusive, accountable, and aligned with the decentralised ethos of the ecosystem.
- Yes10.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes10.8M ₳No rationale
- No10.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes8.8M ₳Rationale
本提案は、Cardanoのトレジャリー予算プロセスを整理し、提案提出・レビュー・投票・実行までの流れを明確化するInfo Actionです。ガバナンス参加者が共通の手続きと基準を共有することで、予算プロセスの透明性と予測可能性が向上すると判断し、本提案を支持します。\n\nI vote Yes on this proposal. This Info Action organizes the Cardano treasury budget process and clarifies the workflow from proposal submission and review to voting and execution. By enabling governance participants to share common procedures and standards, it is expected to improve transparency and predictability in the budgeting process.
- Yes8.1M ₳No rationale
- No7.6M ₳Rationale
Intersect submitted the largest budget last year. There were a lot of improvisations and uncertainties with the Ekklsia voting stage, especially with how short it lasted, how much advance warning was given, how the thresholds were calculated, how Intersect interpreted what the vote meant - and how many DReps did not participate. I would argue that large institutional DReps that are more present in Intersect bodies are always more aware of the deadlines and will have an advantage over small DReps - in terms of participation. Also, will this last 6 epochs on Ekklesia or just a weekend or a few days? The new governance action does not explain how long will the Ekklesia polling last, how will the 67% of participating stake in the Ekklesia poll be calculated exactly (per proposal, per entire voting session, what is the minimum participating threshold for DRep participation if any, will there be YES NO and ABSTAIN, How is active Abstain used to calculate the results, what does a passive Abstain mean (a DRep not taking part in the voting), what if a DRep votes on one proposal but does not vote on another, etc.. ). Too much power to interpret the results is left to Intersect.
Overall, the language is vague, the Ekkelsia voting process and interpretation of results is not sufficiently fleshed out, I vote No. I want to understand the entire pre-voting, voting and post-voting process on Ekklesia beforehand in full and glorious detail. This is no joke, it is likely to be the biggest request in 2026. Insufficient. - Yes5.9M ₳Rationale
I support this as a useful coordination, transparency, and planning framework for the 2026 budget process. My support should not be read as treating this action as a constitutionally operative budget approval or treasury-spending authorization or process. Under the Constitution update effective January 24, 2026, Budget Info Actions may remain on-chain as records of sentiment and guidance, but Treasury Withdrawals must stand on their own and satisfy the constitutional requirements directly. So I really view this action as a helpful reference point rather than a constitutional prerequisite for future Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions.
- Yes5.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.3M ₳Rationale
Voting yes as it improves on 2025 with clearer templates, KPI alignment, anti-spam measures, structured feedback, Ekklesia polling at >67%, tiered TWGAs, and transparent execution via escrow contracts and independent oversight – making the 2026 treasury process more strategic, predictable, and accountable while keeping full control with DReps.
- Yes4.7M ₳No rationale
- Abstain4.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.4M ₳Rationale
I appreciate this info action, as it signals the maturation of our ecosystem and the evolution of Intersect as its administrative arm, now streamlining governance processes more effectively. The proposed budget framework and staging approach, as outlined, are logical and well considered. I will support it.
While its true effectiveness will only become clear once implemented in practice, this represents a meaningful step forward in reducing spam and achieving more professional, structured execution of our governance processes. - Yes4M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.1M ₳No rationale
- YesChanged3.1M ₳Rationale
I fully support using the Cardano Budget Process Framework by Intersect. They have effectively proven to be capable administrators that can facilitate a well run budget process.
You can view the entire current and previous Intersect treasury distribution process here:
https://treasury.sundae.fi/instances/9e65e4ed7d6fd86fc4827d2b45da6d2c601fb920e8bfd794b8ecc619?projectState=ActiveWhat I am most happy to see:
- Ekklesia voting process for DReps (this worked well last time).
- 1000 ADA donation to the treasury for Vendors. This is a great way to weed out spam and treasury drain attacks.
What I would like to see:
A multiple choice NCL submitted for DReps to vote on instead of only 1 set number.
For myself, I'd like to see these 4 NCL numbers represented:
50 Million ADA, 100 Million ADA, 150 Million ADA, 200 Million ADASignificant voting time allocated for Ekklesia voting. I would like a minimum 3 week period for DReps to be allowed to review and vote. Also, a 1 week viewing period on Ekklesia prior to being able to vote would be great to give extra time for DReps to properly review. This entire process should be advertised well in advance (starting 2 weeks to 1 month prior).
A newsletter and regular polls that can be signed up for by DReps and administered by Intersect for the entire budget process. This way DReps can stay informed and we are guaranteeing DRep opinions are being considered by Intersect for the budget process.
Earlier votes
Abstain4mo agoSuperseded
I have currently not had time to review this proposal, so I will cast my vote as abstain for now.
- Yes3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.8M ₳No rationale
- No2.8M ₳Rationale
No, no, no - once again, no. Monopolizing the budget is a terrible idea. It was a bad idea last time, and it is a bad idea now. No. We know where this leads - 90% of the funds will go to 9,000 promises from IOG (with a very low completion rate), and the remaining 10% will go to “Raid the Treasury”-style proposals, which are largely useless for the network. No.
- Yes2.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.6M ₳Rationale
本Info Actionは、Intersectが管理する2026年以降のBudget Process Frameworkをオンチェーンで明示し、Cardanoトレジャリーの予算プロセスを透明化することを目的としています。トレジャリー資金の管理において、明確な手続きと共通の参照枠組みを公開することは、提案者・DRep・開発チーム・コミュニティの間で予測可能性を高め、ガバナンスの成熟に寄与すると考えます。
特に、予算提案の収集・レビュー・統合・執行という一連のプロセスを明文化することは、過去の予算サイクルで見られた手続きの不明確さや評価基準のばらつきを改善し、提案の質や資金配分の一貫性を高める可能性があります。また、このような予算フレームワークは、今後のTreasury運用やエコシステム資金配分だけでなく、Catalystのフレームワークや将来的な資金分配モデルにも影響を与える可能性があり、Cardanoのガバナンスにおける重要な基盤となり得るものです。
同時に、この提案は単なる手続き整理以上の意味を持つ可能性があります。Intersectが予算プロセス管理の中心的役割を担う場合、このプロセス自体がCardanoトレジャリーの実質的な「財務ルール」として機能することになります。一般に財政制度の世界では「予算プロセスを制する者が財政を制する」と言われるように、誰が予算プロセスを設計するかは、資金配分の構造に大きな影響を与えます。そのため、予算プロセスの設計主体が特定組織に過度に集中しないよう注意が必要です。特に、proposal filtering や事前レビューの仕組みが強くなりすぎる場合、DRepが最終的に判断すべき提案の範囲が過度に制限され、DRepの裁量や役割が相対的に縮小する可能性があります。CardanoのガバナンスはCIP-1694に基づく分散型意思決定を前提としているため、この点は今後も慎重に監視されるべき重要な論点だと考えます。
以上を踏まえ、本フレームワークを前向きな一歩として評価しつつ、以下の点が今後の運用において重要であると考えます。- 本プロセスは将来的にコミュニティとDRepの議論を通じて柔軟に変更可能であること
- proposal filtering や手続き設計によってDRepの意思決定権限が制限されないこと
- Intersectによる運用プロセスの透明性と説明責任が十分に確保されること
これらの条件が満たされる限り、本提案はCardanoのトレジャリーガバナンスにおける透明性・予測可能性・制度的安定性を高める建設的な取り組みであると考え、支持します。
This Info Action records the Budget Process Framework for the 2026 and future cycles, administered by Intersect, and publishes it on-chain. Establishing a clear and shared framework for treasury budgeting can improve transparency and predictability for proposers, DReps, operational teams, and the wider community.
Formalizing the process for collecting, reviewing, consolidating, and executing budget proposals may help address procedural ambiguity seen in previous funding cycles and improve the consistency and quality of proposals. This framework could also influence how treasury funds are allocated in the future and may have implications for other funding mechanisms such as Catalyst.
At the same time, this proposal carries broader governance implications. If Intersect becomes the central coordinator of the budgeting process, the process itself effectively becomes the operational “financial rulebook” of the Cardano treasury. In public finance, it is often said that those who control the budget process shape the allocation of resources. Therefore, the design of this process deserves careful attention.
It is important to ensure that the budgeting framework does not concentrate excessive procedural influence in any single organization. In particular, if proposal filtering or pre-review mechanisms become too strong, the range of proposals that DReps can evaluate may be reduced, potentially limiting the discretion and role of DReps within the governance system established under CIP-1694.
For these reasons, I view this framework as a constructive step toward a more structured treasury governance model, while highlighting several important principles for its future operation:
- The process should remain adaptable and open to future revisions through community and DRep discussions.
- Procedural mechanisms such as proposal filtering should not restrict the decision-making authority of DReps.
- Intersect’s role in operating the process should remain transparent and accountable.
With these considerations in mind, I support this proposal as a positive step toward improving transparency, predictability, and institutional stability in Cardano treasury governance.
- Yes2.5M ₳No rationale
- No2.5M ₳Rationale
sounds stressful
- Yes2.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes2M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted2M ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes4mo agoSuperseded
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale
- No1.8M ₳Rationale
We vote NO on this proposal. While acknowledging efforts to standardize KPIs and feedback processes, we find the framework still has significant shortcomings:
Unrealistic workload: With approximately 200 proposals per year (e.g., 2025), requiring DRep to conduct thorough reviews (an average of 4 hours per project) free of charge is not feasible. Without limiting the number or extending the review time, governance quality will suffer due to hasty decisions.
Risk of power consolidation: Using a "participating stake" instead of a "live voting stake" in a context of low participation rates will create opportunities for large DReps to manipulate results. The process needs mechanisms to counter this concentration of power to protect the Treasury.
The drawback of proposal bundling: Combining multiple projects into a single withdrawal puts DRep in a dilemma: they are forced to accept low-quality projects to save the good ones. Proposals should be separated or a cap (e.g., 15M ADA) should be set to increase accuracy during voting.
- Yes1.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.8M ₳Rationale
I am voting Yes on the Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect) because establishing a clear, structured, and repeatable budgeting process is essential for effective and transparent Treasury governance. This framework provides the coordination, timelines, and accountability needed to evaluate and prioritize funding decisions at scale, reducing fragmentation and improving overall decision quality. While it can continue to evolve, adopting a formal process now is a necessary step toward more disciplined, predictable, and credible governance.
- Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- YesChanged1.6M ₳Rationale
Changing my vote from ABSTAIN to YES now, as my questions were answered. Not necessarily agree with all aspects and details, but the overall framework is good enough to go through with it, and blocking or delaying the budget process will do more harm.
Earlier votes
Abstain4mo agoSuperseded
I asked Intersect a few questions about this proposal on X in the post located at https://x.com/nimuepool/status/2029968791271096592.
As Intersect failed to answer them to this date, I’m going to ABSTAIN from this gov action for now. - Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳Rationale
I vote YES on this Info Action because it provides a clear and structured framework for how Cardano budget proposals are collected, reviewed, prioritized, and monitored before treasury withdrawals are executed. I support this direction because stronger coordination and process discipline are currently more valuable than fragmented budgeting approaches. The framework improves comparability between proposals through explicit data requirements, KPI alignment, work-package budgeting, and defined review stages. It does not itself authorize direct treasury spending, but it creates a predictable governance pipeline that can reduce ambiguity and improve execution quality. In this phase of ecosystem growth, I consider this level of structured coordination through Intersect a pragmatic and beneficial choice.