Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect)
174 DReps voted · 68 with a rationale · 8 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes584.2M ₳Rationale
Summary
Yoroi DRep votes YES on the governance action describing the Intersect Budget Process Framework for the 2026 budget cycle and future iterations.
Rationale
• Clear reference for the ecosystem budgeting process
Recording the framework on-chain provides a shared reference for how the ecosystem budgeting cycle is expected to operate. This helps participants navigate the process with clearer expectations and reduces uncertainty around procedural steps.
• Stronger proposal structure and evaluation
The framework introduces structured proposal requirements such as strategic alignment with the Cardano 2030 pillars, defined KPIs, and work package based budgeting. These elements make it easier for DReps and the community to evaluate initiatives based on measurable outcomes and comparable data.
• Transparency in execution and oversight
The outlined execution model, including milestone based payments and oversight through multi party smart contract controls, supports transparent and accountable use of treasury funds once proposals are approved.
Conclusion
Yoroi supports documenting this process so that ecosystem budgeting can operate with clearer structure, transparency, and accountability. For these reasons, Yoroi votes YES.
- Yes435.8M ₳Rationale
I vote YES to the [Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect)].
The biggest problem with the previous Budget process was that the threshold was simply calculated far too low.
This time, the threshold is 67%, and all DRep who voted YES/NO on any particular proposal are included in the participating stake (unless they abstained from that proposal).
This is a stricter approach than the previous Budget process. The Intersect Budget Committee is truly listening to the community.
There are several other improvements, but this is my favorite.
https://www.intersectmbo.org/news/intersect-update-report-102-march-13-2026
私は[Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect)]にYESを投票します。
前回のBudgetプロセスはシンプルに閾値が非常に低く計算されてしまうことが最大の問題でした。
今回の閾値は67%であり、1つでもYES/NOを特定の提案書に投票した全てのDRepが参加ステークに含まれます。（その特定の提案書に棄権投票をしない限り）
これは前回のBudgetプロセスとは全く別物と言っても良い厳格さです。Intersect予算委員会はコミュニティの声を本当に聞いています。
その他にもいくつかの改善がありますが、私はこの点が最も気に入っています。
https://www.intersectmbo.org/news/intersect-update-report-102-march-13-2026
- Yes293M ₳Rationale
Summary
EMURGO, as a DRep, votes YES on Info Action titled Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect), with rationale outlined below.
Rationale
EMURGO supports initiatives that strengthen transparency and operational clarity in Cardano’s governance processes. Publishing the Intersect Budget Process Framework as an on-chain reference helps ensure that all governance participants operate from a shared understanding of how ecosystem budgeting is conducted.
The framework outlines a structured, multi-stage process covering strategic planning, proposal preparation, review, consolidation, and execution. Formalizing this workflow improves predictability for proposers and DReps, while also helping to raise proposal quality through standardized templates, strategic alignment requirements, and structured feedback cycles.
In addition, the inclusion of clear proposal data requirements, work package based budgeting, and milestone tracking mechanisms contributes to stronger accountability for treasury funded activities. The framework also introduces safeguards such as identity verification, proposal thresholds, and review phases that help reduce spam and improve the overall signal quality of submissions.
Finally, defining the administrative and oversight mechanisms for execution provides important clarity on how approved proposals will be delivered and monitored. The described use of transparent smart contract based disbursement, multi party checks and balances, and milestone tracking aligns with the goals of responsible treasury stewardship.
For these reasons, EMURGO supports recording this framework as a governance reference and therefore votes YES.
- Yes254.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes222.9M ₳Rationale
TL;DR: EDC votes YES on gov_action1a95na44kgedjk3k64ajpfp4p9d9jj3sgzc6tt9nmnkvgj7c9nraqq7g4d2u;
The new process is going in the right direction. 1000 ADA fee to participate as a vendor in today's market conditions is a lot, especially for smaller teams. We acknowledge that this is one of multiple processes and that teams can still submit TWGA's individually and present their projects. FYI: Eternl benefited from last year's process and received funding through Intersect’s budget process. It's likely that we will submit a new proposal this year. We will also vote in all stages of this process (including Ekklesia and the TWGA).
- Abstain174.6M ₳No rationale
- YesChanged165.7M ₳History
Earlier votes
Abstain4mo agoSuperseded
- Yes120.2M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes YES. This framework improves treasury management via strategic alignment, work package-based budgeting, and anti-spam measures, though we note areas for future refinement like dynamic fees.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Our support for this proposal is driven by the following key factors:
Strategic Alignment & ROI Focus: We support the requirement for vendors to anchor their proposals to the Cardano 2030 Strategic Pillars and ecosystem KPIs. Moving to work package-based budgeting allows DReps to compare expected outcomes directly, establishing a much-needed foundation for assessing the actual ROI of treasury expenditures.
Process Mechanics & Spam Prevention: Establishing a 1,000 ada donation and a 100,000 ada minimum threshold are positive steps to deter low-effort submissions. The Cardano Treasury is not a generalized grant vehicle for small-scale projects, and these measures help focus the process on strategically meaningful initiatives. However, we caution that a static minimum threshold risks artificially inflating project costs, as teams may pad proposals to reach the 100k mark. In future iterations, we advocate for a dynamic fee structure which scales fees in proportion to the withdrawal request (e.g., scaling from 1,000 ada up to 100,000 ada or 1% of the total ask) to ensure larger entities also bear a proportionate burden.
Pragmatic NCL Management: The framework introduces a pragmatic approach to managing the Net Change Limit (NCL) by allowing lower-ranked proposals to proceed when a higher-ranked proposal exceeds the Cardano Treasury's remaining spending limit. While we support this practical approach, we urge Intersect to define clear procedures for evaluating when and how the overall NCL should be increased to capture exceptional ecosystem opportunities that arise throughout the year.
Administration & Decentralization: While the use of milestone-based smart contracts and Ekklesia polling improves transparency, we remain cautious about the centralization of administrative duties. We do not want to imply that this framework is the only way the community can request funding from the treasury. By now, it has been very much established that anyone can propose a direct treasury withdrawal independently of Intersect. A comprehensive post-mortem of the 2025 cycle remains necessary to fully evaluate Intersect’s administrative effectiveness.
Recommended Improvements for Future Iterations
To further improve this process in 2027 and beyond, our team recommends the following:
- "RFP-ication" of the Budget: Instead of open-ended proposals, the ecosystem should move toward defining clear yearly goals via Info Actions and issue Requests for Proposals (RFPs), along with predefined categorical allocations (e.g., specific budget percentages for infrastructure, dApps, or marketing). This will drive market competition and maximize treasury efficiency.
- SME Support for DReps: Evaluating highly technical proposals can overwhelm DReps. Future processes must incorporate neutral Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) to provide objective feasibility and cost assessments based on industry standards, ensuring DReps have a strong support structure when voting. DReps are the decision-makers for Cardano, but they require support in making informed decisions.
- Opening the Budget Cycle Earlier: The budget cycle should begin earlier, to allow for subsequent years to be planned with sufficient advance.
Disclosure of Oversight Role
The Cardano Foundation is one of the five members of the Oversight Committee (OC) for this budget process. We wish to highlight our exact mandate: The Oversight Committee is narrowly responsible for specific data assurance tasks as described below. All other permissions regarding any smart contracts and their functions are and will continue to be held by Intersect at all times.
The Cardano Foundation votes YES. This framework is a coherent evolution from the previous cycle that builds upon existing governance infrastructure to bring greater accountability and predictability to the Cardano ecosystem. The Cardano Foundation is proud to have contributed directly to the design of this framework alongside the budget committee, and we look forward to seeing it implemented, and to seeing it evolve further in years to come.
NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - Yes92.2M ₳No rationale
- No91.5M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I have decided to vote NO for the proposal: Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect).
My rationale:
With this vote, I signal a request for changes to the framework.
The framework contains several positive elements. I appreciate the effort to coordinate the decision-making process and to align proposals with the Cardano Vision document. It is necessary to push proposers to define KPIs. A unified template will make it easier to compare proposals in the same category.
I also appreciate that DReps can provide feedback and that teams can adjust their proposals before the final vote.
However, in its current form, the framework has several weaknesses.
The framework sets unrealistic expectations regarding the workload of DReps. Last year, around 200 proposals were submitted. It is naive to expect that DReps are ready to process such a large number in a limited time and for free.
If a typical DRep spends about two hours a day on governance and needs roughly four hours per proposal for review, analysis, research, comparison with others, and voting, they can process only about ten proposals per month.
For the context: In on-chain governance, about five proposals are submitted per month, and DReps often vote at the last minute.
The Intersect process must respect the time capabilities of DReps. Otherwise, it forces them to perform shallow reviews, make hasty decisions, and ultimately produce poor-quality governance outcomes.
The document states that a timeline will be published, but it does not define minimum review durations or workload limits. The review process should scale with the number of submitted proposals.
Another weakness of the framework is the use of "participating stake" in Ekklesia instead of live voting stake.
Given the current concentration of voting power in Cardano governance, using participating stake may allow large DReps to have disproportionate influence if participation is low. Some DReps have already declared that they will not actively participate in Ekklesia voting.
Low participation could therefore significantly affect which proposals advance to the Treasury Withdrawal stage.
The process must be resilient to the dominance of big DReps. Otherwise, it quietly accepts centralization of power and allows for uncontrolled treasury spending.
The framework also proposes bundling proposals into Treasury Withdrawals. Many DReps expressed strong opposition to bundling proposals during last year's budget discussions and preferred the submission of individual proposals.
Bundling forces DReps to approve Treasury Withdrawals containing proposals they do not want to support, simply because those withdrawals also include proposals they do support.
For example, a Treasury Withdrawal could contain proposals A, B, C and D. A DRep might want to support B, C, and D but not A. With bundled voting the DRep must either reject the entire package or approve a proposal they do not support.
This reduces the precision of governance decisions.
In addition to the minimum required amount, a maximum should also be defined. For example, 15M ADA. If a team requests more than the maximum, it would be forced to divide a large proposal into several smaller ones.
This would avoid situations where a single entity requests 100M ADA for many different activities in one proposal. DReps could then decide which activities they support and which they do not. It would also force teams to be more fiscally responsible.
A submission fee of 1000 ADA to serve as a spam filter is a good idea. On the other hand, at the current price of ADA it is only about $250. This seems low considering that the minimum request can be 100,000 ADA.
The submission fee could scale with the request size. For example:
- 1000 ADA for a request up to 500K ADA (small)
- 5000 ADA for a request over 500K ADA (medium)
- 10K ADA for a request over 10M ADA (big)
Putting submission fees into the Treasury is a good idea, but it might also be fair to consider using them to reward DReps who actively review and vote on proposals. Incentives could motivate DReps to participate more actively in the process.
I propose considering a process where, once a proposal crosses the threshold in Ekklesia, a Treasury Withdrawal is submitted individually. Limiting the number of Treasury Withdrawals per month (for example, to five) would give DReps enough time to review proposals properly.
Submitting dozens of Treasury Withdrawals at once forces DReps to make rushed decisions.
The framework in its current form risks creating a situation where:
- Large DReps may have disproportionate influence on proposal prioritization if participation in Ekklesia is low
- Treasury Withdrawals may contain bundled proposals, forcing DReps to approve proposals they would otherwise reject
For these reasons, I believe the framework should be revised before it is adopted.
ORIGINAL
As a DRep, I have decided to vote NO for the proposal: Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect)
With this vote, I signal a request for changes to the framework.
The framework has unrealistic expectations from DReps. Framewok proposes bundling proposals, which DReps clearly rejected last year.
In the proposed framework, I appreciate the effort to coordinate the decision-making process and alignment with the Cardano Vision document. It is necessary to push proposers to define KPIs. A unified template will make it easier to compare proposals in the same category.
I appreciate that DReps can provide feedback and the team can adjust the proposal before the final vote.
In addition to the minimum required amount, a maximum should also be defined. Let's say 15M ADA. If the team requests more than the maximum, it will be forced to granularize a huge proposal into several sub-proposals. This will avoid a situation where one entity requests 100M ADA for different activities. DReps can decide which team activities they will support and which they will not. Moreover, it will force teams to be more responsible in terms of budget.
A submission fee of 1000 ADA to serve as a spam filter is a good idea. On the other hand, at the current price of ADA it is only $250. This seems low to me considering that the minimum request can be 100,000 ADA ($500,000). Let's scale the submission fee with the request size. For example:
- 1000 ADA for a request up to 500K ADA (small)
- 5000 ADA for a request over 500K ADA (medium)
- 10K ADA for a request over 10M ADA (big)
Putting submission fees to the Treasury is a good idea, but it might be fairer to use it to reward DReps who will actively vote on proposals. This can motivate DReps to participate in the process.
Incentives are necessary. Last year, 200 proposals were submitted. It is naive to expect that DReps are ready to process such a large number in a limited time and for free.
If a typical DRep spends 2 hours a day and needs 4 hours per proposal for review, analysis, research, comparison with others and voting, they can process only about 10 proposals per month.
In on-chain governance, about 5 proposals are submitted per month and DReps vote at the last minute.
The Intersect process must respect the time capabilities of DReps, otherwise it forces them to shallow review, hasty voting and basically make poor quality decisions.
The biggest weakness of the framework is the use of "participating stake" in Ekklesia instead of live voting stake, in combination with bundling of proposals.
Given the centralization of voting power in Cardano governance, it is unacceptable to use participating stake, as it allows Whale DRep to push proposals through Ekklesia. Moreover, if the participation of DReps is low. Some have already declared that they will ignore Ekklesia voting.
If I understand the framework correctly, Treasury Withdrawals will contain bundled proposals based on the results in Ekklesia.
Bundling of proposals last year DReps clearly rejected and demanded submission of individual proposals.
Bundling of proposals forces DReps to approve Treasury Withdrawal containing proposal A, which they do not want to support, just because in the same bundle there are also proposals B, C and D, which they want to support.
I propose this process. As soon as a proposal crosses the threshold in Ekklesia, Treasury Withdrawal will be submitted. Maximum 5 proposals per month, so that DRepo has enough time to review.
Submitting 40 Treasury Withdrawals at once forces DReps to make poor decisions.
The framework essentially proposes the following:
- Big DReps can easily push proposals through Ekklesia
- Treasury Withdrawal will contain bundled proposals, so DReps will be forced to accept unwanted proposals
Last year, 200 proposals were submitted. The document must specify how much time DReps will be given to review. The process time must scale with the number of proposals.
The document only says that a timeline will be published, but it does not define minimum review durations or workload limits.
- Yes86M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes YES on the Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect).
This Info Action formalizes the structured, multi-stage budget process for the 2026 ecosystem budget cycle and beyond. SIPO supports this framework as a necessary institutional evolution of Cardano's treasury governance.
Why SIPO votes YES
Process approval, not spending approval
This is an Info Action that defines how the budget process operates. It does not authorize any Treasury withdrawals. Individual proposals will be evaluated and voted on separately. Approving the framework enables the process to begin; it does not predetermine outcomes.Concrete improvements over the 2025 cycle
Having participated as a DRep throughout the 2025 budget cycle, SIPO experienced firsthand the challenges of reviewing 194 proposals in inconsistent formats. The 2026 framework directly addresses these pain points: standardized templates with mandatory strategic alignment to Vision 2030 and measurable KPIs, Work Package-based budgeting enabling apples-to-apples comparison, structured multi-phase review, and clear pre-published timelines.Robust institutional guardrails
The framework embeds multiple layers of accountability: Ekklesia off-chain polling with a 67% approval threshold, two-tier TWGA classification (67-75% and 75-100% support), NCL-based rank-order allocation, smart contract escrow with milestone-based disbursements, and an independent Oversight Committee (NMKR, Dquadrant, SundaeLabs, Xerberus, Cardano Foundation) with multi-sig authority.Spam filtering and commitment signaling
The 1,000 ADA treasury donation and 100,000 ADA minimum request threshold create meaningful barriers against low-effort submissions while keeping the process accessible.Leading position in blockchain treasury governance
Compared to Polkadot OpenGov facing treasury sustainability concerns and Cosmos still transitioning from simple community pool spending, Cardano's multi-role governance (DRep + SPO + CC) combined with smart-contract-enforced milestone disbursements represents one of the most mature treasury governance frameworks in the industry.
Expectations
- Ekklesia voting methodology: Transparent documentation of the final counting methodology before the polling phase begins.
- DRep workload reduction: Monitor and report on DRep engagement metrics throughout the cycle.
- Intersect's administrative role: A visible roadmap toward reducing single-entity dependency in future cycles.
- Minimum threshold impact: Monitor whether strategically important small-scale initiatives are being filtered out.
- Oversight Committee independence: Ongoing transparency regarding potential conflicts of interest.
SIPO views this Info Action as essential infrastructure for responsible, transparent, and accountable treasury governance.
SIPODRepとして、本提案「Cardano Budget Process Framework（Intersect運営）」に賛成（YES）を投じます。
本Info Actionは、2026年以降のCardanoエコシステム予算サイクルのための構造化された多段階予算プロセスを正式に定義するものです。SIPOは、このフレームワークをCardanoトレジャリーガバナンスに不可欠な制度的進化として支持します。
SIPOがYESと判断する理由
「プロセスの承認」であり「支出の承認」ではない
本提案は予算プロセスの運用方法を定義するInfo Actionであり、Treasuryからの出金を伴いません。個別提案の賛否は別途判断されます。フレームワークの承認はプロセスの開始を可能にするものであり、結果を先決するものではありません。2025年サイクルからの具体的改善
SIPOは2025年予算サイクルをDRepとして全行程に参加し、194提案を不統一なフォーマットで審査する困難を実体験しています。2026年フレームワークはこれらの課題に直接対応します：Vision 2030への戦略的整合と測定可能なKPIを必須とした標準テンプレート、Work Package単位の予算構造による同一基準での比較、段階的な多フェーズレビュー、そして事前公開された明確なタイムラインです。堅牢な制度的ガードレール
本フレームワークには複数層の説明責任が組み込まれています：Ekklesiaオフチェーン投票における67%承認閾値、支持率による2段階TWGA分類（67-75%と75-100%）、NCLに基づくランク順配分、Smart Contractエスクローによるマイルストーン連動支払い、そして独立Oversight Committee（NMKR、Dquadrant、SundaeLabs、Xerberus、Cardano Foundation）による多重署名権限です。スパムフィルタリングとコミットメント証明
1,000 ADAのTreasury寄付金と100,000 ADAの最低申請閾値は、低品質提案に対する実効的な障壁を設けつつ、プロセスへのアクセス性を維持しています。ブロックチェーントレジャリーガバナンスにおけるリーディングポジション
Treasury持続可能性の課題に直面するPolkadot OpenGovや、単純なCommunity Pool支出からの移行途上にあるCosmosと比較して、Cardanoの多層ガバナンス（DRep + SPO + CC）とSmart Contract連動のマイルストーン支払いの組み合わせは、業界で最も成熟したトレジャリーガバナンスフレームワークの一つです。
期待事項
- Ekklesia投票集計方法：投票フェーズ開始前に、最終的な集計方法の透明な文書化を求めます。
- DRep負荷の軽減：サイクルを通じたDRepエンゲージメント指標のモニタリングと報告を求めます。
- Intersectの管理者役割：将来のサイクルに向けた単一組織依存の低減ロードマップの可視化を期待します。
- 最低申請額の影響：戦略的に重要な小規模提案が排除されていないかモニタリングを求めます。
- Oversight Committeeの独立性：潜在的な利益相反に関する継続的な透明性確保を期待します。
SIPOは本Info Actionを、責任ある・透明な・説明可能なトレジャリーガバナンスのための不可欠なインフラと位置づけます。
- No84.3M ₳Rationale
While I largely appreciate the efforts of Intersect and the voluminous work that goes into the budget process, I hate the bundling of proposals. I don't want to have to vote yes to a Treasury Withdrawal for a bundle when I strongly disfavor some components and favor others. Intersect can serve a valuable role in the budget process. But, the bundling overly burdens our ability to vote on-chain for one component and not for another. I don't want to be forced to vote (on-chain) for someone else's pork barrel proposal in order to vote yes (on-chain) for the valuable endeavors. As mentioned by at least one other dRep in their voting rationale, I also see the potential for problems with the participating stake metric over live stake in terms of centralization of voting power while I understand there are also voter turnout issues at play if live stake were adopted instead. I wouldn't mind seeing additional quantitative analysis of this issue.
- Yes77.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes75.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes74.5M ₳Rationale
I support this proposal.
This proposal is an Information Action that records the Intersect Budget Process Framework for the 2026 and future budgeting cycles. It does not authorize any direct treasury expenditure. Rather, it documents the process through which budget proposals are submitted, reviewed, prioritized, and eventually translated into Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions (TWGAs). I believe establishing a clearly defined process can help governance participants operate from a shared reference point and improve the predictability of the ecosystem budgeting cycle.
In particular, elements such as KPI-based strategic alignment, work-package-based budgeting, proposer identity verification, and budget consolidation within the Net Change Limit (NCL) appear to be designed to improve transparency and comparability between proposals. These mechanisms may help both DReps and the broader community evaluate proposals more objectively and raise the overall quality of submissions.
It is also important to note that proposals selected through this process would still require separate on-chain Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions in order to actually release funds. Therefore, this Information Action itself does not approve treasury spending, but instead establishes the framework under which such proposals may later be considered.
For these reasons, I view this framework as a reasonable step toward improving the transparency and structure of the ecosystem budgeting process, and I support this proposal. At the same time, each future Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action should still be evaluated individually, taking into account factors such as cost-effectiveness, feasibility, and long-term value to the Cardano ecosystem.
僕は本提案を支持します。
本提案は、Intersectが運用する2026年以降のエコシステム予算プロセスの枠組みを記録するInformation Actionであり、トレジャリー資金の直接的な支出を承認するものではありません。予算提案の提出、レビュー、優先順位付け、そして最終的なTreasury Withdrawal Governance Action（TWGA）に至るまでのプロセスを整理し、ガバナンス参加者が共通の基準のもとで意思決定できるようにする点に意義があると考えます。
特に、KPIに基づく戦略的整合性の確認、Work Package単位での予算構造、提案者の身元確認、そしてNet Change Limit（NCL）を前提とした予算統合などの設計は、提案の比較可能性や透明性を高める仕組みとして合理性があると感じています。これらは、提案の質を向上させるとともに、DRepやコミュニティがより客観的に提案を評価する助けになると考えます。
また、このプロセスを通じて選定された提案であっても、実際の資金支出は別途オンチェーンのTreasury Withdrawal Governance Actionとして審議される必要があります。そのため、本Info Action自体がトレジャリー資金の支出を決定するものではなく、あくまで予算プロセスの枠組みを明確化するためのものと理解しています。
以上の理由から、予算管理の透明性と予測可能性を高めるための一つのステップとして本提案には賛成します。
同時に、今後提出される個別のTreasury Withdrawal Governance Actionについては、それぞれの費用対効果、実現可能性、そしてCardanoエコシステムにとっての長期的価値を個別に慎重に評価していく必要があると考えています。 - No73.1M ₳Rationale
I vote NO. I oppose off-chain polling via Ekklesia. Moving governance off-chain invites collusion. It also adds heavy, unfunded voting burdens onto DReps, ironically worsening the exact lack of DRep participation the ecosystem complains about. Governance must be transparently on-chain.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting NO on the 2026 Budget Process Framework.
While I strongly support the goals of fiscal discipline, anti-spam measures, and strict adherence to the Net Change Limit (NCL), I fundamentally oppose the framework's reliance on off-chain polling and third-party platforms like Ekklesia to determine treasury allocations.
If we have to move critical decision-making, prioritization, and voting off-chain, then we have failed in delivering true decentralized governance. Off-chain activities and "sandbox" environments act as gatekeepers; they are prime targets for exploitation, gaming the system, and backroom collusion. They lack the immutable transparency and cryptographic guarantees that the Cardano blockchain was built to provide.
Furthermore, mandating an entirely separate off-chain review and polling process places an unacceptable burden on DReps. We are already dedicating significant time and effort to on-chain governance in what is currently a highly demanding, unfunded role. It is incredibly ironic that the system constantly questions the lack of DRep voting activity and contributions, yet proposes frameworks that drastically increase our workload by forcing us to duplicate efforts across third-party platforms. This is a direct recipe for voter fatigue.
We are a blockchain ecosystem. Our governance infrastructure must be robust enough to handle the entire lifecycle of a proposal on-chain. I will not support a framework that obscures the most critical phase of treasury management the selection and prioritization of multi-million ADA budgets behind off-chain systems.
- Yes69.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes62.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes53.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes50.4M ₳Rationale
I am voting Yes on the Info Action "Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect)". The 2026 Budget Process Framework represents a useful improvement proposal over the current unstructured approach to treasury proposals. Key improvements include: standardization of proposal quality, template-based submissions, Work Package structure (a framework requiring clear budget, objectives, and outcome metrics for each discrete work scope), and mandatory KPI requirements, enabling DReps to compare proposals based on objective criteria rather than solely on proposers' narratives. The ₳1,000 treasury donation requirement and ₳100,000 minimum request threshold filter spam and low-effort submissions, focusing DRep votes on strategically meaningful proposals. The three-phase review process—private draft, public feedback, and deep review—enables quality improvement and community input incorporation before governance action submission. Accountability mechanisms include smart contract escrow, milestone-based releases, and an independent Oversight Committee (NMKR, Dquadrant, SundaeLabs, Xerberus, Cardano Foundation), providing transparent execution and checks on administrator power. Importantly, this framework remains one option among budget processes, maintaining permissionless proposal submission. Intersect provides one method for budget processing, but direct treasury proposals remain possible, mitigating centralization risk. Treasury proposals have exhibited varying quality, budget opacity, and incomparable formats, creating significant DRep burden and transparency concerns for the community. Overall, this framework is sound, addresses real problems, and aims for necessary governance evolution. [Japanese version follows] 私は、Info Action「Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect)」に賛成票を投じます。2026年予算プロセスフレームワークは、現在の非構造的なトレジャリー提案手法に対する有用な改善案を表しています。主な改善点として、提案品質の標準化、テンプレートベースの提案提出、Work Package構造（個別の作業範囲ごとに予算・目標・成果指標を明示する構造）、KPI要件の義務化により、DRepは提案者の文章だけでなく、客観的な基準によって提案を比較できるようになるでしょう。また、₳1,000のトレジャリーへの寄付要件と、₳100,000の最低請求額を設けることで、スパムや低労力の提出をフィルタリングし、戦略的に意味のある提案に絞ったDRep投票が期待できます。レビュープロセスにおいては、非公開草案、公開フィードバック、詳細レビューという3段階を設けることにより、ガバナンスアクション提出前に、品質の向上とコミュニティ意見の反映が可能になります。説明責任メカニズムとしては、スマートコントラクトエスクロー、マイルストーンベースのリリース、独立監視委員会（NMKR、Dquadrant、SundaeLabs、Xerberus、Cardano Foundation）が、透明な実行と管理者権力の抑制を提供できると考えます。その一方で、このフレームワークはあくまでバジェットプロセスの選択肢の１つであり、パーミッションレスな提案提出も維持します。Intersectはバジェットプロセスの１つの方法を提供しますが、直接のトレジャリー提案も引き続き可能であるため、中央集権化のリスクは低いと考えます。トレジャリー提案はこれまで、品質のばらつき、予算の不透明性、比較不可能な形式が散見され、DRepへの負担とコミュニティに対する透明性の問題が大きいものでした。このフレームワークは全体として健全で、実際の問題に対処し、必要なガバナンスの進化を目指すものと考えます。
- Yes50M ₳Rationale
Voting YES.
I fully support this proposal, since I believe that without a structured process that allows DReps to evaluate proposals in context, it is challenging to make well-informed decisions.
- No48.6M ₳Rationale
This process is too centralized and dependent on Intersect, with too much beaucracy which actually deters builders from getting access to funding but rather favour paper pushers to get funding to grift the Treasury.
- Yes47.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes42.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes38.1M ₳Rationale
I’m generally supportive. The proposed budgeting framework for the Treasury looks reasonable and seems like a practical way to run the process.
- Yes37.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes34.6M ₳Rationale
具体的なハードルを設けていて、本当に価値のあるプロジェクトだけが残るように設計されているのが良いと思う。
- Yes34.3M ₳Rationale
The 2025 budget cycle, while successful as Cardano’s first full-scale decentralized budget process, revealed significant pain points. DReps experienced “voting fatigue” due to inconsistent proposal formats, multiple submission tools, and a lack of structured review periods. The 2026 framework directly addresses each of these issues with standardized templates, clear timelines, and staged review processes.
Without a coordinated budget process, treasury spending risks becoming fragmented and ad hoc. Individual Treasury Withdrawal governance actions submitted without coordination can lead to duplicative funding, misaligned priorities, and inefficient use of limited treasury resources. The framework ensures proposals are evaluated in the context of each other and ranked by DRep support before proceeding to on-chain votes.
The framework explicitly ties proposals to the Cardano 2030 Vision strategic framework and measurable ecosystem KPIs. This is a significant improvement that ensures treasury spending is guided by shared long-term strategy rather than individual narratives. DReps can compare proposals on expected contribution to measurable ecosystem outcomes, not just qualitative pitch quality.
Critically, the framework is opt-in. Proposers may still submit Treasury Withdrawals independently through standard governance channels. This preserves permissionless access to the treasury while offering a structured path that reduces friction and improves quality for those who choose to participate.
Multiple Intersect committees, community members in Tokyo and beyond, and governance stakeholders have contributed to the framework’s design through several rounds of consultation. Voting YES signals that the community supports an organized, transparent, and strategic approach to managing Cardano’s most important shared resource. - Yes31.4M ₳Rationale
I am voting Yes on this proposal.
Requiring more detailed and structured documentation at the submission stage makes it easier for DReps to evaluate proposals. It also allows various community groups to review drafts in advance, enabling proposers to incorporate feedback and improve the quality of their submissions.
By clarifying the process and reducing inconsistencies between proposals, this framework enhances comparability and transparency. These improvements are essential for a healthy and accountable budget process, and therefore I support this Info Action.
- Yes30.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.9M ₳Rationale
This Intersect Budget Process is a substantial improvement from last year. Using the product committee Vision and Strategy as a guideline for selecting those budget items that align with community goals is great (though I have separate concerns with the Vision/Strategy which I have communicated to them). Using the Strategic Pillars (deliverables) and aligning them to Ecosystem KPIs (outcomes) is something I've been hoping to see, so I'm glad to see it mentioned. Furthermore, structuring bundles as clearly-scoped Work Packages is a great way of bundling together budget items that share dependencies.
Regarding the Treasury Donation, I wonder if that 1000 ADA would be better served compensating the dReps/CC members who do the work reading through each of these proposals. Additionally it seems strange to me that vendors would prefer this donation, as the opportunity cost of paying a 100k ADA deposit for a standalone withdrawal is only about 200-300 ADA. I'm a big fan of the 67% Ekklesia threshold (necessary improvement from last year's 50% threshold), though I am a bit unsure about the consequences of using participating stake off-chain vs. active stake on-chain.
Ultimately I think this budget process is a huge improvement and I am happy to vote YES on this proposal.
- Yes27.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes26.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes26.1M ₳Rationale
Houston we have clear and common sense clearance for lift off:-) The current info action is meant to help everyone make a educated decision when it comes to onchain governance, whats working, what isnt and what needs help.
Quoting here from the info action "To ensure fair comparison and rigorous due diligence, the Budget Template requires vendors to submit structured data in three key areas. This structure allows DReps and the Community to compare "apples to apples" rather than relying on persuasive writing"
Love this part Under "Budget Template" for all proposers
- Strategic Alignment & KPI Targeting
Vendor Requirement: Vendors cannot simply state they are "good for Cardano." Anchored to a strategic framework
- Work Package-Based Budgeting
Vendor Requirement: Budgets must be structured around Work Packages, with each Work Package clearly describing the scope of work, and key objectives, Expected Value (ROI) with associated Metrics, and a budget breakdown by cost category.
3.Identity & Commitment Verification
Vendor Requirement: Vendors must provide verifiable individual or legal entity details (Registration Number, Country of Incorporation) and a Transaction Hash proving the payment of the 1,000 ada treasury donation.
- Yes25.3M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect). While not entirely perfect, this new process a fantastic improvement over the last budget process. I would like to the newly introduced treasury donation scale in proportion (possibly linearly) with the amount of funding asked
- NoChanged23.5M ₳Rationale
The continued path towards a centralized bureaucracy and decision making apparatus is antithetical to the decentralized and cyberpunk nature of blockchains. Wanting to control the entire NCL is why we don't participate in the process. No to bureaucratic layers. Yes to directly funding initiatives.
Earlier votes
Abstain4mo agoSuperseded
The continued path towards a centralized buraucracy and decision making apparatus is antithetical to the decentralized and cyberpunk nature of blockchains. However, since this process is entirely opt-in by participating parties, I see no reason to deny it.
- Yes22M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on the implementation of the Cardano Budget Process Framework for 2026 facilitated by Intersect. Moving towards a more structured, data-driven, and milestone-based procurement model is a necessary step in the maturation of our ecosystem’s treasury management. I strongly support the integration of clear KPIs, standardized templates, and smart contract-based administration to ensure accountability.
However, while I fully support this framework as a primary vehicle for ecosystem funding, I vote YES with the explicit understanding that this process does not, and constitutionally cannot, supersede the fundamental right of any ada holder to submit a direct Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action.
The Intersect budget process is an excellent tool for consolidating broad ecosystem initiatives. Yet, we must acknowledge that innovation is often asymmetric and time-sensitive. High-impact, specialized projects—particularly those bridging Cardano to Real-World Assets (RWAs) or deploying critical physical infrastructure (DePIN)—may require agile funding timelines or customized administrative structures that a generalized, once-a-year consolidated budget cycle cannot easily accommodate.
Therefore, my support for this framework is coupled with the firm belief that the Cardano Constitution guarantees multiple, parallel pathways for treasury withdrawals. The community must remain open to evaluating direct, standalone Treasury Withdrawal GAs on their individual merits, independently of this consolidated process, provided they meet all rigorous constitutional guardrails and transparency requirements.
A healthy decentralized treasury requires both a structured annual budget process and the flexibility to seize immediate, high-value opportunities as they arise. - Yes21.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes21.5M ₳Rationale
I vote YES on the Info Action titled “Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect)” (e9693ed6b6465b2b46daaf641486a12b4b2946081634b5967b9d98897b0598fa#0).
It is an Info Action that seeks to outline a formal description of the Intersect Budget Process Framework for 2026 and future cycles until otherwise amended, administered by Intersect. As the rationale section states, this proposed framework is offered “to facilitate an ecosystem budget process for 2026”. The operative word here being “an” and not “the”. A singular process and not the definitive process. This leaves room for other governance actors to operate outside of the process outlined in this proposal, as should be their prerogative in a truly open and decentralised system.
While I understand concerns expressed regarding the phrasing of the NCL utilisation in Stage 3 of the proposal, namely that “Proposals will then be allocated in rank order, up to the available Net Change Limit (NCL)” I feel that there is a level of misunderstanding here. At first glance it does sound as though this particular Framework outlined here intends to hoover up the entirety of the remaining NCL, I think it is more of a case of unfortunate wording. It outlines the limit but fails to explain the likelihood of that much funding being approved. It could very well be the case that only 50% of the NCL gets utilised, in which case, this entire statement is redundant. I feel it has been pre-emptively included to avoid “what if more than the NCL gets approved” questions rather than offering the likelihood of that actually happening as a counterpoint.
I think this process is an improvement upon the process executed by Intersect in 2025 and does honestly seek to reduce procedural ambiguity and increase accountability, both of the proposers and of Intersect as an administrator. With a number of Treasury Withdrawal actions having been submitted in 2026 already, it does demonstrate that projects are not tied to only applying through the proposed Intersect Budget Framework.
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.3M ₳No rationale
- No19.9M ₳Rationale
Too much centralization risk in my view. Plus, I prefer to vote on individual proposals and don't want to be forced to accept something just because I want something else to pass.
- No17.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes17.3M ₳Rationale
Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect)
- No16.7M ₳Rationale
We decided to vote NO on the Cardano Budget Process Framework - not to reject the progress it brings, but to request targeted changes before adoption.
The framework is a meaningful step forward versus the current state: clearer structure, stronger alignment with the Cardano Vision, KPI discipline, and a better feedback loop for proposers. Big thumbs up for putting forward much-needed improvements.
However, there is a critical trade-off in the current design: proposals are shortlisted in Ekklesia using participating stake, and the process then moves toward bundling proposals into Treasury Withdrawals. In combination, these two choices can amplify the influence of a small set of large voters under low participation and reduce voting precision.
For Cardanians, either of the following compromises would make the framework acceptable:
If bundling remains: Ekklesia shortlisting should use total (live) voting stake, not participating stake, so results reflect actual governance power and are not skewed by low participation.
OR
If the participating stake remains: proposals should not be bundled into Treasury Withdrawals. Each shortlisted proposal should proceed as an individual Treasury Withdrawal to avoid “package deal” voting and preserve decision granularity.Additional changes we strongly recommend implementing within this proposal:
Maximum request size: the framework already sets a minimum request of 100,000 ADA. Add a maximum as well (e.g., 20M ADA or 10% of the yearly NCL) to prevent oversized “mega-proposals” and force work to be split into reviewable, votable components.
Scaled submission fee: The current 1,000 ADA non-refundable submission donation is a good start, but it should scale with request size. Example brackets (1% of each lower bound):
100k–1M ADA: 1,000 ADA
1,000,001–5M ADA: 10,000 ADA
5M–20M ADA: 50,000 ADA
DRep review incentives: submission fees should explicitly fund a DRep review participation budget to reward active review and voting. The exact mechanism can be finalized later, but earmarking the budget should be part of the framework from day one.Until these changes are incorporated, we cannot support the framework as written. The goal is not to block progress, but to ensure the process is resilient to low participation, avoids forced bundle voting, and scales to real-world reviewer capacity while protecting treasury decision quality.
- Yes16.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes14.2M ₳No rationale
- No14.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes13.9M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on governance action e9693ed6b6465b2b46daaf641486a12b4b2946081634b5967b9d98897b0598fa#0.
I believe the proposed budget process is well thought out and will result in net positive benefit to the Cardano ecosystem.
However, I maintain several reservations. I would hope that Intersect incorporates the following pieces of feedback, provided they judge these suggestions as not sufficiently deviant from the spirit of their proposal to require a separate vote.
First, I agree with KtorZ's analysis that the framing of this proposal subconciously views this as "the" budget process for Cardano, even while leaving room for "other" budget proposals. The language repeatedly frames it this way (the title of the proposal, references to "the" budgeting cycle, etc., and even structurally assuming that Intersect is entitled to "the rest" of the NCL). After several conversations with members of Intersect, I do believe this is unintentional, but it's an unconcious bias that I believe Intersect should control for in their implementation of the proposed budget process.
Second, I believe Intersects budget process should not seek to define a net change limit for the Cardano Treasury, I believe that is the remit of the DReps entirely. Instead, they should define their budgetary limit, justify it based on the impact they want to effectuate, and then relate that to the global network NCL.
Third, I believe the intention of the "work package" based budgeting is to push back against omnibus proposals, but the proposal does not use clear enough language to this effect. I believe Intersect administrators should reserve the right to make judgement on the "cohesive value" of a work package, and work with vendors to break unrelated and independent projects into separate proposals that can be voted on independently by DReps during the Ekklesia voting stage.
Fourth, I believe the waterfall funding mechanism, borrowed from Catalyst, will prove just as damaging as it has been in Catalyst. It is damaging in both directions: projects that can expect a high degree of popularity are incentivized to inflate their ask, because there is plenty of room for them to crowd out other projects; and smaller, lessk known projects are forced to race to the bottom on price in the hopes that they'll be able to "fill in the gaps". It may be too large a deviation to change this, but I would encourage you to rethink this structure for future years.
Overall, I believe the proposal is a good one, and I'm excited to see it's impact, specifically with a new focus on KPIs and Impact, and I hope the above reservations will be carefully considered.
You can find a larger writeup justifying my vote here.