Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect)
174 DReps voted · 68 with a rationale · 8 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted1.1M ₳Rationale
The strongest part of the proposal is that it tries to impose order before money moves. It introduces a staged process, requires strategic context before submissions, imposes a minimum request threshold, uses templates and completeness checks, and creates a structured route from collection to review to consolidation to execution. I consider that **directionally necessary in an ecosystem that must protect the treasury from noise, fragmentation, and low-discipline requests.
**
If I were being asked whether Intersect has earned broad strategic trust in every future budget interaction, my answer would be "No." **If I am being asked whether this info action provides a constitutionally compatible and practically useful process framework that can be scrutinized again in every later spending decision, my answer is a resounding "Yes." **Earlier votes
Yes4mo agoSuperseded
Frankly, the proposal reads more like “please prevent a mess” than “here is a compelling, high-performance operating model.” I do not like being presented with that kind of asymmetry. It is a sign of truly weak governance craftsmanship.
I vote "Yes", because I judge this to be a necessary continuity action. I do not find the case elegant, complete, or particularly impressive; I find it under-argued and overly reliant on urgency. But I would rather approve an operationally necessary administrator transition than risk avoidable paralysis in Project Catalyst. My support is pragmatic, not enthusiastic: We are not rewarding excellence here; we are preventing governance failure.
- Yes964.1K ₳No rationale
- No931.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes881.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes861.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes841.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes825.2K ₳Rationale
The proposed process not only is a good evolution from the previous version but it has been in an open and participatory way that speaks to its legitimacy. We support this proposal.
- Yes798.4K ₳No rationale
- No756.5K ₳Rationale
I am voting NO because this framework creates an exclusionary 'pay-to-play' system. The 1,000 ADA entry fee and 100,000 ADA minimum request size protect the interests of large organizations while shutting out the grassroots developers who are the heartbeat of Cardano. Furthermore, I oppose the use of off-chain filters to decide on-chain outcomes. Governance should remain as direct and permissionless as possible, without institutional gatekeepers.
- Yes717.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes705.1K ₳Rationale
VOTE: Yes.
I support this proposal as it improves transparency and structure in the treasury budgeting process for the Cardano ecosystem. - Yes652.3K ₳Rationale
This is one thing that was needed from the start. Good to see this progress formally.
- No625.9K ₳Rationale
I'm voting no because this framework introduces structural vulnerabilities that amplify centralization risk and undermine governance precision, particularly through its reliance on "participating stake" thresholds in Ekklesia voting and bundled Treasury Withdrawal submissions. While the framework represents meaningful progress over 2025's ad hoc process, utilizing standardized templates, a strategic alignment with Vision 2030, KPI discipline, and improved feedback loops are all positive. The current design creates exploitable leverage points that concentrate power and reduce DRep decision-making quality.
The critical flaw is using "participating stake" in Ekklesia instead of live voting stake to determine which proposals advance to Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions. Given Cardano's current concentration of voting power, where a small number of large DReps control significant stake, low participation rates allow disproportionate influence. Several major DReps have already declared they will not actively participate in Ekklesia voting. Under the proposed 67% participating stake threshold, this means a handful of large voters can effectively shortlist proposals during low-turnout periods, bypassing broader DRep consensus. The framework must be resilient to big DRep dominance, and not quietly accept centralization of power as an operating assumption.
The bundling mechanism compounds this problem. The framework proposes consolidating approved proposals into Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions based on support tiers (67-75% and 75-100%), forcing DReps to approve or reject packages rather than individual proposals. Many DReps strongly opposed bundling during 2025's budget discussions, preferring individual proposal submissions to maintain voting precision. Bundling forces DReps into impossible choices: approve an entire package containing proposals they oppose, or reject the bundle and block proposals they support. This reduces governance decision quality and creates pressure to vote yes on suboptimal allocations to avoid blocking the entire package. Combined with participating stake thresholds, bundling means large DReps influence which proposals get packaged together, then all DReps face binary accept/reject decisions on those pre-curated bundles.
The framework also assumes DReps will perform "deep review" to validate accuracy, compliance, and strategic alignment during Phase 2. This assumption is unsustainable and unreliable. The 2025 cycle showed review quality varies widely across DReps, with workload spikes leading to shortcuts. Many DReps don't consistently publish detailed rationales, and only a small subset performs systematic analysis at scale. In 2025, 194 proposals were submitted on Ekklesia. Expecting a large share of DReps to engage deeply with a large share of proposals under time pressure isn't realistic, it incentivizes shallow, high-speed voting or fails to advance items consistently. The framework increases standardization and volume management but doesn't address the incentive and capacity constraints that determine whether deep review actually happens. Bundling doesn't fix review overload; it hides it by forcing batch approvals rather than individual scrutiny.
I recognize the framework's core purpose is positive and necessary. A coordination layer for ecosystem budgeting tied to strategic reference frameworks like Vision 2030 fills a long-standing institutional gap. Standardization through work package-based budgeting and KPI targeting improves baseline proposal quality and comparability. But these improvements don't justify adopting a process with exploitable structural flaws that concentrate power, reduce voting precision, and create opportunities for governance capture. A no vote isn't rejecting coordination, it's demanding the framework be made more robust before becoming the reference process for Treasury allocation. At minimum, participating stake thresholds should use live voting stake, bundling should be eliminated in favor of individual proposal submissions, and Ekklesia voting mechanics should be fully specified with procedural safeguards against interpretation discretion. - Yes619.5K ₳Rationale
Hey everyone, here's my thinking on this one, and why I'm voting yes.
A quick personal note first: this is only my second time voting as a DRep, and the first time I'm writing a public rationale. I want to be as transparent and useful to my delegators as possible, so I'll be doing this whenever I vote on any proposal going forward. Bear with me as I find my footing, and please, if you have thoughts or pushback, I genuinely want to hear it.
Now, on the proposal itself.
First, it's worth being clear about what this proposal actually is. This is not a spending decision. No ADA is being withdrawn from the treasury here. A yes vote simply means I support Intersect running a structured budget process for 2026. The actual spending decisions come later, through separate Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions, and I will try to review as well.WHY I AM SUPPORTING THIS
Cardano needs a proper budgeting process, and this proposal delivers one. The five-stage framework is well thought out. It sets clear expectations for vendors, requires proposals to be tied to real strategic goals and KPIs, and introduces sensible guardrails like the 1,000 ADA treasury donation and minimum 100,000 ADA request threshold to keep things serious and spam-free.
The smart contract-based execution with escrow-style fund disbursement is also a genuine step forward. Funds won't just be handed over, they'll be governed on-chain, with milestone tracking and multi-sig controls. We actually need that kind of accountability.WHAT I'LL BE WATCHING CLOSELY
That said, my yes vote comes with expectations. The Oversight Committee made up of NMKR, Dquadrant, SundaeLabs, Xerberus, and the Cardano Foundation plays a critical role as a check on Intersect's administrative powers. But right now, we don't have full visibility into how that committee operates: their terms, how conflicts of interest are handled, or what happens if a dispute arises. I would love to see that information to be made public as well.MY CONCERN ABOUT THE ENTRY THRESHOLDS
I want to be transparent about something that genuinely concerns me, the 1,000 ADA entry fee and the 100,000 ADA minimum request threshold.
In principle, both make sense. The entry fee discourages spam, and the minimum threshold keeps the process focused on meaningful, scalable work. But in practice, these thresholds quietly favour larger, well-resourced organisations. A small team of talented developers or a grassroots community initiative with a genuinely valuable idea, but a budget that naturally sits at 60,000 ADA simply cannot enter this process ( unless the team or proposer(s) add unnecessary extra 40k ADA just to meet up the requirement and that is armed robbery lol) . Not because their work isn't worth funding, but because their ask isn't big enough.
I'm voting yes on this framework because it's a pragmatic and necessary step forward for Cardano. But I want to put this question directly to Intersect and the community: is there a complementary pathway being considered for smaller, high-quality proposals? A two-tier system, one for larger ecosystem proposals and one for smaller community grants could serve Cardano far better in the long run than a single high entry floor.IN CONCLUSION
This is me saying yes to the framework. It's a meaningful step forward and I'm comfortable lending my support while staying engaged and holding Intersect accountable every step of the way.As always, feel free to reach out if you have questions about my reasoning.
- Yes605.7K ₳Rationale
📌 CARDANO TREASURY BUDGET FRAMEWORK 2026 — I VOTE YES
On March 5, 2026, a new governance action was submitted in Cardano: Budget Process Framework 2026, facilitated by Intersect.
This proposal defines how the Cardano Treasury will be managed and distributed in the future.
As a DRep, I support this framework and I vote YES.
👉 What changes
The Treasury budget process becomes structured and transparent.
Projects requesting funding must now:
• request at least 100,000 ADA
• make a 1,000 ADA Treasury donation
• define clear KPIs
• align with Cardano Vision 2030 strategic pillarsThis ensures funding decisions are based on measurable outcomes and strategic alignment, not just narratives.
📊 Why this matters
In the past, proposals could be fragmented and difficult to compare.
The new framework introduces financial discipline and comparability across proposals.
Each project must clearly define:
• strategic impact
• expected value and ROI
• execution plan
• measurable metricsThis effectively turns the Cardano Treasury into a strategic ecosystem investment engine rather than a simple grant system.
💰 Treasury protection
Approved funds are not released immediately.
Instead:
• funds are locked in on-chain smart contracts
• payments are released based on milestones
• execution is secured through multi-sig oversightOversight participants include:
• NMKR
• Dquadrant
• SundaeLabs
• Xerberus
• Cardano FoundationAll transactions remain fully transparent on-chain.
⚙️ Stronger role for DReps
DReps decide:
• which projects receive Treasury funding
• which initiatives are strategically important
• how ecosystem resources are allocatedDReps effectively function as the governance layer of the Cardano Treasury budget system.
🗣 My position
I support this framework and vote YES because:
• it introduces transparency in Treasury spending
• it improves accountability for funded projects
• it reduces low-quality or opportunistic proposals
• it strengthens community governanceThis is an important step toward a mature decentralized governance system for Cardano.
🖤 My DRep ID
➡️ drep1y269ehxj30k4vfzfc2z84v0xykd3amuy2xn0kv9zf8rhcec2fg2jr
You can find me in governance search as MREDGARCROSS.
More details
https://t.me/PROCENT666/338
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https://mredgarcross.com/📌 Note: This post is informational and analytical in nature. It does not contain calls for protests, unlawful actions, or violations of any laws. All views expressed are the author’s personal analysis.
- Yes590.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes589.7K ₳Rationale
Yes - to support improvements to the annual budget process.
- Yes533.9K ₳Rationale
Yes, to have a framework for the Cardano Budget
- Yes499K ₳Rationale
- Yes478.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes466.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes442.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes414.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes409.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes383K ₳No rationale
- No381.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes320.4K ₳No rationale
- No314.4K ₳Rationale
I have decided to vote NO.
While I recognize the immense effort that went into designing this framework, and I genuinely appreciate several of its components, my concerns regarding centralization, bureaucracy, and exclusivity ultimately outweigh the benefits of this specific implementation.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
After reviewing the proposed Cardano Budget Process Framework for 2026, I have decided to vote NO.
While I recognize the substantial effort that went into designing this framework, and I genuinely appreciate several of its components, my concerns regarding centralization, bureaucracy, and exclusivity ultimately outweigh the benefits of this specific implementation.
What I Support in This Proposal
To be clear, I am not opposed to structured coordination. In fact, there are several aspects of this framework that I find highly commendable:
Structured Stages & Strategic Alignment: I appreciate the logical progression of stages and the requirement for proposals to align with the Vision 2030 strategy and specific KPIs. This mirrors my own principle of demanding a clear ROI for treasury spending.
Anti-Spam Measures: The requirement of a 1,000 ADA deposit is a sensible guardrail to protect our treasury from spam and low-effort submissions.
Why I Am Voting NO
Despite the positive elements, I cannot support the framework in its current iteration due to the following critical concerns:
The "Brussels" Effect and Centralization Risks: I am deeply concerned that this process positions Intersect as the "Brussels" of Cardano: a centralized, bureaucratic hub that operates at a distance from the everyday citizens of our digital nation. As a DRep, my core mandate is to champion greater decentralization. Introducing heavy bureaucratic layers risks hindering grassroots innovation and alienating the wider community.
Insufficient Time for Review in Ekklesia: Drawing from our experience in the previous funding round, I am worried that the Ekklesia process will not provide DReps with adequate time to conduct proper due diligence. If we are forced to review complex, high-budget work packages under strict deadlines, we cannot responsibly safeguard the treasury.
The Risk of an Oligarchy: The reliance on "participating stake" within Ekklesia, especially when combined with tight voting windows, creates a significant vulnerability. It risks concentrating decision-making power in the hands of a few large DReps who have the resources to move quickly, inadvertently forming an oligarchy. This contradicts my guiding principle of making decisions that benefit the many rather than a select few.
Increasing Barriers to Entry: By making the governance and funding process highly demanding and corporate in its structure, we are making participation more exclusive. Instead of empowering average ADA holders to engage with the ecosystem, we are building a system that only seasoned professionals or well-funded entities can navigate.
Closing Thoughts
We have built the first digital country, and its governance should be accessible, decentralized, and transparent. While we definitely need a budget framework, it must not come at the cost of creating a centralized bureaucracy. I welcome a revised framework that ensures sufficient review time, mitigates the power of large stakeholders in off-chain polling, and keeps governance accessible to all Cardano citizens.
- Yes300.6K ₳No rationale
- No298.9K ₳Rationale
Voting against Cardano Budget Process Framework (facilitated by Intersect)
April 1st 2026
gov_action1a95na44kgedjk3k64ajpfp4p9d9jj3sgzc6tt9nmnkvgj7c9nraqq7g4d2u
Terminology
TWGA: Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action
Summary
From the abstract This Governance Information Action provides the formal description of the Intersect Budget Process Framework for the 2026 and future cycles, until modified, administered by Intersect. It outlines a structured, multi-step workflow used to collect, review, consolidate, and execute Treasury-funded activities, and records the improvements introduced for the 2026 budgeting year.
Quotes & Details From the Proposal
Quote 1
"Proposals will be ranked based on their level of DRep support, using the Ekklesia voting results. Proposals will then be allocated in rank order, up to the available Net Change Limit (NCL)."Quote 2
"Proposal consolidation converts individual, independently reviewed proposals into a coherent, ecosystem-wide Treasury Withdrawal/s. This ensures that treasury allocations are evaluated not only on their individual merits, but also on their collective impact on treasury sustainability and strategic alignment."Quote 3
instead of treating all approved proposals in one TWGA, on-chain approvals will now be divided as follows: Proposals approved with ≥67% – <75% support Proposals approved with ≥75% – 100% supportQuote 3 is particularly frustrating because it asserts that the alternative to this proposal would be a single TWGA, whereas in actual fact last year we had individual on-chain approvals for each proposal.
Thoughts
- I like that vendors are required to make a 1k ada treasury donation.
- I don't love using Ekklesia for off-chain voting. It removes power from the on-chain vote.
- Aims to saturate the NCL. This process does envision itself as the only way in which treasury funds are distributed.
- Proposal Consolidation means individual proposals will not be submitted as individual governance actions.
- Voting on so many budgets last year was a lot of work, but it allowed us to reject individual proposals easily and ON-CHAIN.
Conclusion
This process almost treats the on-chain votes as a formality. I am voting against this process because it reduces the fidelity of on-chain control dReps would have. As dReps, we need to preserve our on-chain right to reject individual proposals on the terms of that proposal alone. There is some degree of off-chain organization we need, but consolidating budgets like this is unwise and unnecessary. There may be some cases where it makes sense to bundle two or more proposals, such as when the funding of one proposal only makes sense in the case of the successful funding of another proposal. But this moves too much of the process to Ekklesia.
Signed,
William DoyleYour friendly neighbourhood DRep!
$computerman
drep1yfpgzfymq6tt9c684e7vzata8r5pl4w84fmrjqeztdqw0sgpzw3nt
https://x.com/william00000010 - Yes294.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes271.8K ₳No rationale
- No261K ₳Rationale
English
1. Introduction
This Governance Information Action formalizes the Intersect Budget Process Framework for 2026 and future cycles, until modified. It does not approve spending directly. Instead, it defines the process through which Treasury-funded activities may be prepared, reviewed, consolidated, and later advanced.
The framework establishes a five-stage annual cycle. Before the process can begin, three prerequisites must already be active on-chain: a strategic vision and strategy, an approved Budget Process Metadata Info Action, and an active Net Change Limit (NCL). It then sets rules for proposal submission, structured data requirements, off-chain review and polling through Ekklesia, consolidation into Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions, and execution and monitoring where Intersect acts as Administrator.
Its stated purpose is to improve consistency, transparency, predictability, and accountability in ecosystem budgeting, while aligning proposals with shared strategic priorities and providing a structured path from budget planning to Treasury execution.
2. Governance Action Review
Upsides
2.1) The framework provides a necessary coordination layer for ecosystem budgeting
One of my strongest criticisms of prior NCL-related Governance Actions was precisely the absence of a non-binding coordination mechanism capable of mapping ecosystem funding needs before a spending ceiling is set. In my view, establishing an NCL in isolation, without first coordinating expected budget demand, strategic priorities, and treasury posture, is backwards.
That is why I see the core purpose of this Info Action as genuinely positive and necessary.
Cardano should not rely exclusively on independent actors submitting Treasury funding requests in an uncoordinated way while expecting the community to somehow infer priorities and trade-offs in real time. The ecosystem does not currently have the decision-making capacity to prioritize spending coherently without some form of structured coordination. There are too many variables, too many competing demands, and too much asymmetry in information.
Now that Cardano Vision 2030 / Cardano 2030 has been approved as a community-endorsed strategic reference,[2] the ecosystem finally has a shared “north star.” That makes a coordination framework not just useful, but essential. Without a shared strategic reference and a process to map expected budget needs against it, discussions around Treasury spending, and Treasury-related governance actions more broadly, become far more arbitrary than they should be.
From that perspective, this framework fills a gap that has existed for too long. Even if it still needs important improvements, its core function is valuable: it creates a non-binding coordination layer through which projected funding needs, strategic alignment, and community priorities can be surfaced before Treasury allocations are finalized.
Given that Intersect is currently the only actor attempting to operationalize this role at ecosystem level, I consider this framework a crucial instrument for Cardano at this stage. My criticisms of the proposal are therefore not a rejection of its purpose, but a recognition that this coordination layer is important enough that it should be made more robust before becoming the reference process for Treasury allocation.
2.2) The framework also gets an important design choice right: standardization and comparability (“apples-to-apples”)
Beyond the need for a coordination layer itself, one of the strongest aspects of this framework is its attempt to make proposals more comparable. If the ecosystem wants to coordinate a serious budget cycle, standardization is not optional. Without a common structure, proposals become difficult to compare, reviewers fall back on narrative persuasion, and selection becomes inconsistent and political. Intersect’s own recap of the 2025 cycle explicitly identified these problems, including inconsistent formats, multiple tools, difficulty comparing initiatives objectively, heavy review workload, and weak linkage between proposals and strategy.
Why tying proposals to Cardano Vision 2030 / Cardano 2030 pillars + KPIs is a real upgrade
Requiring proposers to state which strategic pillar(s) they are targeting and to connect their proposal to measurable ecosystem KPIs is one of the few scalable ways to anchor selection to shared outcomes instead of vague intuition. The framework explicitly encourages alignment with the Cardano Vision 2030 / Cardano 2030 strategic framework and asks proposers to identify measurable outcomes through KPIs.
This is also consistent with the already endorsed Info Action “Cardano 2030: Vision, Mission, Strategy Framework and KPIs” being used as a shared reference point for long-term direction and measurement.
Why “work package-based budgeting” helps (when implemented with clear boundaries)
The requirement to structure budgets around work packages, including scope, objectives, metrics, and cost breakdown by category, improves comparability and makes it harder to hide vague scope behind a single headline number. It also supports benchmarking across proposals: reviewers can compare expected value and cost structure more directly when proposals use the same logic.
That said, this still needs tighter definitions elsewhere in the framework to avoid bundling ambiguity. But as a budget transparency tool, work-package budgeting is the correct direction.
Why this matters institutionally
The goal is not to force “alignment theater.” The goal is to create a shared evaluation grammar so DReps can ask more consistent questions:
- Which Cardano 2030 pillar does this advance?
- Which KPI does it claim to affect, and by what mechanism?
- Is the scope broken down into components that are reviewable and comparable?
That is a much healthier baseline than simply asking whether something “sounds good for Cardano.”
Downsides
2.3) Bundling risk remains unresolved, and the current “work package” framing may enable it
“Bundling” (what I mean here, and why it matters)
In this context, bundling is when multiple distinct workstreams, deliverables, or initiatives are packaged together and presented as a single unit for review or approval. The core risk is not necessarily bad intent. The risk is structural: when one package contains many different items, decision-makers are often pushed into an all-or-nothing choice.
A useful analogy is how unrelated or controversial provisions sometimes get inserted into large legislative bills as “riders” or hidden clauses. The bill may contain essential parts that most people support, but it can also carry additional items that receive less scrutiny because they are embedded inside a larger must-pass package. Even without malicious intent, the practical effect is reduced visibility and weaker item-by-item accountability.
The same dynamic applies to budget packages. When proposals are bundled, each sub-item may have been produced by different people, using different assumptions and methodologies, with varying levels of rigor and evidence. As a result, quality is uneven across the bundle: strong components can effectively carry weaker components, and reviewers cannot apply consistent scrutiny to every part under time constraints. This distorts merit-based evaluation, increases governance noise, and makes it harder to reject low-quality items without also blocking genuinely valuable work.
In the 2025 cycle, bundling repeatedly appeared as a practical failure mode: DReps were pressured into accepting “package deals” where rejecting weak components meant blocking higher-value components that happened to be bundled alongside them.
This framework does not clearly address that failure mode. More importantly, the way “work packages” are described can reasonably be read as enabling bundling within proposals, unless the framework explicitly restricts what a work package is and how it may be used.
The implied structure appears to allow multiple layers of aggregation:
work package → proposal → consolidation into TWGAs (and potentially into multiple on-chain brackets based on support levels)That creates a risk of “compound compromise”: bundling inside a proposal, and bundling again at the consolidation stage.
This may not be the intended design. However, the current text leaves enough ambiguity that it should be clarified. If work packages are meant to improve budget transparency and review granularity, the framework should explicitly define:
- What qualifies as a work package, including scope boundaries, dependency requirements, and separability
- What does not qualify, such as unrelated streams combined for convenience
- When proposals should be split into separate submissions rather than bundled
If bundling is not intended, the Info Action should be rewritten to make that unambiguous and to establish a clear anti-bundling posture as a process expectation.
2.4) The framework depends heavily on “deep review” by DReps, but that assumption is unsustainable and unreliable
A framework is only as strong as its operating assumptions. This one relies on DReps performing a “Deep Review” stage to validate accuracy, compliance, and strategic alignment, an approach that has proven unsustainable and unreliable in practice over the last two years.
In practice, the 2025 cycle showed that review quality varies widely across DReps and that workload spikes lead to shortcuts. Many DReps do not consistently publish detailed rationales, and only a small subset performs deep, systematic analysis at scale. Under higher volume, this gap becomes more significant.
The Cardano ecosystem is effectively asking DReps to evaluate a large volume of proposals within a short time span, and those proposals should be assessed with at least a minimum standard of rigor, individually, on their own merits.
No sampling, no skimming, no guesswork.
Anything less is unacceptable, in my view, for a framework coordinating the allocation of tens of millions of dollars from a Treasury that is not infinite.
It is already clear that DReps face serious review overload during these stages. Treating bundling as a solution to that overload is not acceptable in my view. Bundling does not fix the underlying capacity problem; it mostly hides it. In that context, bundling is likely to incentivize shortcuts: incomplete review, limited scrutiny, and decisions driven more by packaging convenience than by merit.
This is a structural risk: the framework increases standardization and volume management, but it does not address the incentive and capacity constraints that determine whether “deep review” is realistic.
If the process intends to rely on deep review, it should include credible mechanisms to support it, such as:
- Incentive and reputation mechanisms that reward diligent review, not necessarily “funding” alone, so that DReps who invest dozens of hours into serious analysis receive something in return, such as reputation signals and/or optional funding mechanisms. The goal here is incentive alignment, not necessarily “paying DReps,” so this should not be framed as compensation by default
- Clear, non-binding review standards and minimum expectations, explicitly framed as guidance rather than enforceable rules, so the process does not pretend “deep review” exists when it often doesn’t. At minimum, the framework should define what “review” means in practice and what is acceptable when time is constrained. Examples of minimum expectations that should be discussed and documented
- Default behavior when a DRep cannot review: should “NO” be treated as a default when a DRep had no time to assess a proposal, or should the default be ABSTAIN / explicit non-participation? If some DReps have been using “NO” as a workload coping mechanism, the framework should address whether that is considered valid practice, since it materially changes the meaning of “NO.”
- Rationale expectations: should votes be expected to include at least a short rationale, even if non-binding? If the framework depends on review quality, requiring some minimal justification is the only way to distinguish “reviewed NO” from “unreviewed NO.”
- Minimum scrutiny threshold: what is the minimum a proposal should pass before it is treated as “reviewed”? For example, confirming scope clarity, deliverable specificity, budget structure sanity, and KPI claims being measurable rather than decorative
- Adopting a lightweight review template: a standardized checklist-style review format, even if optional, would reduce variance and make it easier for the community to compare assessments. This also makes it harder for “deep review” to degrade into partial reading and guesswork while still looking legitimate
Workload reality check
In the prior cycle, 194 proposals were submitted on Ekklesia.[3] With an off-chain advancement threshold that requires ≥67% support from participating DRep stake, the implied operating assumption is not simply that “someone” will review the backlog, but that a large share of DReps must engage with a large share of proposals for the process to function as designed. If many DReps do not meaningfully review most proposals, achieving that level of support becomes harder, and the system either incentivizes shallow, high-speed voting or fails to advance items consistently.
This tension should be addressed explicitly through workload-aware process design, such as structured division of review responsibilities by theme, SME recommendation layers, or staged triage, rather than assuming broad, deep engagement at scale under time pressure.
Suggestion (a workable precedent already exists)
A practical way to reduce overload without relying on bundling is to add a structured “subject-matter recommendation” layer inside the framework. A precedent already exists: in Fund 14, the Cardano Foundation introduced a pilot for an upcoming “Catalyst Representative” role, where subject-matter experts reviewed proposals within their domains and published recommendations to help voters navigate high proposal volume, while the Foundation explicitly did not vote on those recommendations.[4][5]
Pilot context:
Read the full article: https://cardanofoundation.org/blog/catalyst-f14
A similar mechanism could be adapted for the ecosystem budget process: create an opt-in “Representative / SME Review” track where qualified experts, from established organizations and from the wider community, publish standardized, evidence-based reviews and shortlists by theme, such as Infrastructure, Governance tooling, Developer Growth, DeFi, and Interoperability, etc. This would not replace DRep judgment, but it would provide a credible, workload-aware way to improve diligence, reduce shallow voting, and help DReps focus attention where it matters.
Without these supports, KPI-based strategic alignment risks turning into a shallow compliance exercise rather than meaningful evaluation.
2.5) The framework is underspecified on NCL usage, contingencies, and emergency capacity
The framework describes allocating proposals in rank order up to the available Net Change Limit (NCL), but it does not clearly state what happens if the annual process consumes the available NCL capacity.
That creates a basic governance and risk-management question: what is the intended pathway for genuinely emergent or unforeseen needs during the same fiscal window?
The current framing also implies an additional operating assumption: that any project or proposer seeking Treasury funding within the current NCL period will either:
- Participate through this Intersect-facilitated pipeline
- Submit independently in parallel before Intersect completes its consolidation and TWGA submissions
If the practical intent is to consume the available NCL through the annual cycle, then there is little or no remaining fiscal space for anything outside that pipeline, unless a new NCL is proposed later.
Is that deliberate? If so, why? If not, what is the intended buffer?
If the process implicitly aims to “fill the NCL” through the annual budget cycle, then, unless a reserve is explicitly planned, the system is left with a limited set of options when emergencies arise:
- Defer or reject emergent initiatives regardless of urgency
- Treat “submit a new NCL” as the default escape valve
The second outcome is particularly concerning because it risks normalizing repeated NCL expansions whenever the ceiling becomes inconvenient, which undermines the credibility of the NCL as a coordination and discipline instrument.
I’m not opposed to coordination. The issue is that the current text does not explain the rationale for this apparent design choice, nor does it clearly describe how non-planned spending, emergencies, or time-sensitive opportunities are meant to be handled.
If the intent is not to consume the full NCL, the framework should say so explicitly and document a minimal policy posture, even if non-binding, such as:
- Whether a contingency / reserve margin is expected
- What qualifies as “emergent” versus “annual-cycle” spending
- How exceptions should be handled without turning NCL revision into routine practice
2.6) Requiring an “active NCL” upfront risks separating the spending ceiling from real budget demand
The framework treats an active Net Change Limit (NCL) as a prerequisite for launching the annual budget process. Constitutionally, that may be necessary. Strategically, however, it creates a sequencing problem: the spending ceiling is effectively locked in before the ecosystem has produced a structured view of funding demand for that same period.
If the purpose of this framework is to coordinate budgeting, the process should make the relationship between demand and the ceiling more explicit. Otherwise, the ecosystem ends up operating under a cap that may be justified mainly by inflow heuristics, for example “how much entered the treasury last year,” rather than by a deliberate budgeting posture.
A more coherent approach would include an explicit step that:
- Maps expected ecosystem funding needs for the relevant fiscal window, using standardized submissions and comparable data
- Evaluates that demand against strategic priorities, such as Vision 2030, and an explicit treasury policy posture, for example preserve principal versus runway control versus controlled drawdown
- Uses that structured view to inform what an appropriate NCL should be for the period, even if the final NCL still requires a separate on-chain action
Without that linkage, the budget process risks becoming a “best effort within whatever cap already exists,” instead of a coordinated system where the cap is set with clear reference to both strategy and realistic demand.
2.7) Submission contribution and minimum request thresholds reduce spam, but introduce access and incentive trade-offs
A submission contribution, a 1,000 ADA donation to the Treasury, can reduce low-effort submissions and spam. However, it may also exclude smaller or early-stage contributors who have credible ideas but limited capital. This becomes even more important in the current context: with Project Catalyst Funds 15 and 16 cancelled, community-level funding pathways are more constrained and many contributors are effectively “hungry” for viable routes to participate. In that environment, adding a fixed 1,000 ADA gate will predictably impose a cost on small contributors and reduce inclusivity.
If inclusion matters, the framework should clarify whether any support or alternative mechanism exists to cover this contribution for vetted cases. I’m not prescribing a specific design here, but even a basic pathway, such as some form of vetting or sponsorship model, would be better than treating the fee as an unavoidable barrier that smaller ecosystem contributors must simply absorb.
Similarly, a 100,00
- No238.8K ₳Rationale
While structured coordination has merits, it risks tilting power toward organized actors and reducing the natural friction that protects against capture in decentralized systems.
- No234.2K ₳Rationale
Voted no as I agree with some of CardanoYoda takes:
- Given the current concentration of voting power in Cardano governance, using participating stake may allow large DReps to have disproportionate influence if participation is low. Some DReps have already declared that they will not actively participate in Ekklesia voting.
- Submission fee should scale with the budget request, maybe 3-5%.
- No215.5K ₳No rationale
- No199K ₳No rationale
- Yes191.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes182.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes178.9K ₳No rationale
- No171.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes142.5K ₳Rationale
Voting Rationale: YES
The Intersect Budget Process Framework represents a substantial improvement over the previous year and deserves a positive vote for three main reasons.
A more mature and structured process
The framework introduces real standardization: unified templates that allow proposals to be compared with one another, mandatory alignment with Cardano’s Vision 2030 and ecosystem KPIs, and the organization of deliverables into Work Packages with clearly defined dependencies. This transforms proposal submission into a predictable process for both proposers and DReps. Quality filters (a minimum threshold of 100,000 ADA and a submission fee of 1,000 ADA) reduce noise without excluding legitimate proposals.
Real accountability, not promises
Milestone-based payments through smart contracts ensure that funds are released based on verifiable deliverables, not intentions. The combination of transparent on-chain disbursements, multi-party controls, and milestone tracking is precisely what responsible treasury management requires. The critical infrastructure the ecosystem needs (institutional stablecoins, custody, cross-chain bridges) deserves to be funded strategically, and this framework makes that possible.
Treasury Donation consideration
The 1,000 ADA Treasury Donation could be allocated to compensate DReps and Constitutional Committee members who bear the real burden of evaluating each proposal.
- Yes138.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes115.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes110.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes109.5K ₳Rationale
What I like:
• Standardized proposals - Everyone uses the same template, making comparison actually possible
• Strategic alignment - Proposals must connect to Cardano Vision 2030 and measurable outcomes
• Quality filters - 100K minimum proposal size and 1K submission fee to prevent spam
• Milestone payments - Smart contracts release funds based on delivery, not promises
• Constitutional compliance - Works within our approved spending limits and safeguardsThe bigger picture: We need critical infrastructure like institutional-grade stablecoins, custody solutions, and cross-chain bridges to compete with other ecosystems. A structured budget process helps us fund these strategically rather than reactively.
This framework preserves DRep decision-making power while making those decisions more informed. We still vote on every actual funding request - this just ensures those requests are well-prepared and comparable.
Bottom line: Better process = better outcomes. We protect the treasury through structure, not chaos.
- Yes108.3K ₳Rationale
I am voting to support this info action. My rationale for this is based on the following:
Without a budget process, treasury withdrawals risk becoming a game of social engineering. Projects currently rely on being a big-name to secure funding. This framework introduces a layer of sifting and analysis, with the idea that projects are evaluated based on their strategic merit and technical necessity rather than their ability to generate hype.
Voting "Yes" on the Intersect framework does not imply that I agree with every granular detail of its current development. However, the ecosystem cannot afford to wait for a perfect solution while treasury management remains unstructured. It is an iterative step and the process can and should be refined as we gather data on its effectiveness.
For anyone not intimately aware of how projects get funded, every specific treasury withdrawal will still require a formal vote by DReps. This framework simply organizes the information and prioritizes requests so that DReps can make more informed decisions.
While Intersect is facilitating this framework, my support is also a signal that Cardano needs structured budget proposals. In the future, I hope to see multiple entities, not just Intersect, putting forward competing or ideally complementary budget frameworks.