Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program
161 DReps voted · 63 with a rationale · 6 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- No10.8M ₳No rationale
- No10.4M ₳Rationale
So far this year Cardano governance is approved
137 million ADA expenditure + 116 million ADA IOG proposals, so far
That is already 253 million ADA expenditure. I will be voting NO/ABSTAIN on all other proposals because imo the yearly spend should be between maximum 200-250 million.
- NoRevoted9.2M ₳History
Earlier votes
No1mo agoSuperseded
No2mo agoSuperseded
No2mo agoSuperseded
- No8.1M ₳No rationale
- No7.6M ₳Rationale
Sorry NO, too much requested, too long of a timeline, still unproven.
This asks for too much money too early. The proposed structure is still unproven. Cardano should not commit ₳12 million over three years before all key components have been validated. Maybe start much smaller. I want to see support for this exact scope and structure and plan from independent maintainers, affected projects, other ecosystem stakeholders
- Abstain7.2M ₳No rationale
- Abstain5.9M ₳Rationale
I am voting Abstain.
I think this proposal identifies a very real problem around open source sustainability, maintainer burnout, dependency risk, and long-term ecosystem resilience. The overall structure is thoughtful, governance-aware, and significantly more mature than many proposals in this cycle.
My hesitation is less about the intent and more about prioritization and ecosystem timing. This introduces a fairly large operational and governance framework around OSS sustainment, and I’m not fully convinced Cardano is yet at the stage where this level of institutionalization should be a top treasury priority relative to current adoption and growth constraints.
That said, I do think the underlying problem being addressed here is legitimate and increasingly important long term.
- No5.8M ₳No rationale
- Abstain5.4M ₳No rationale
- Abstain5.3M ₳Rationale
STORM Partners abstains on the Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program.
We respect Christian Taylor and recognize the significant effort behind this proposal. The problem it addresses is real: Cardano depends on open-source infrastructure, and long-term maintainer support remains underdeveloped across the ecosystem.
That said, the proposal asks for ₳12M over 36 months at a time when the NCL is highly constrained and many infrastructure-related proposals are already competing for treasury capacity (e.g. Tooling DAO, Open Source Committee, IO Maintenance proposals, etc.).
Our abstain is not a rejection of the mission or the proposer. It reflects prioritization. In this funding round, we believe the treasury must preserve room for adoption-led proposals that can more directly support usage, transactions, users, and ecosystem growth.
- No4.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.7M ₳Rationale
Does not seem very popular in the votes so far, but I think this does address a valid need.
- No4.6M ₳No rationale
- No4.4M ₳Rationale
Given the network’s current priorities, I will vote no on further additions to our governance structures, as I believe we already have sufficient mechanisms in place.
This proposal falls squarely into that category, requesting a commitment of 4 million ADA per year for the next three years. - No4.2M ₳No rationale
- No4.1M ₳Rationale
[Portuguese]
Optamos por votar "NÃO" nesta ação de governança "Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program" (gov_action1pv7g8d0x9f3kqw2gcfrmgl8aqy38jat05wx0wwcvdsvuuclss6xqqhpzemv), pois, embora reconheçamos a importância da sustentabilidade do software livre para o ecossistema Cardano e concordemos que a proposta aborda riscos reais — como a dependência de poucos mantenedores, a ausência de planos de sucessão e a necessidade de maior coordenação operacional — avaliamos que o escopo apresentado é excessivamente amplo para uma iniciativa inicial. A proposta concentra diversos programas, estruturas organizacionais e processos que ainda precisariam ser criados, validados e amadurecidos ao longo da própria execução, incluindo conselhos, entidades jurídicas, mecanismos de governança e metodologias operacionais. Em nossa avaliação, essa combinação aumenta os riscos de complexidade administrativa, reduz a previsibilidade das entregas e dificulta a mensuração objetiva do impacto em relação ao montante solicitado. Também entendemos que a proposta transfere responsabilidades significativas para uma estrutura que ainda não está plenamente constituída, bem como para um operador de transição que precisaria demonstrar, na prática, capacidade de governança independente, eficiência orçamentária e execução em escala. Embora apoiemos iniciativas voltadas à manutenção de infraestrutura crítica e à formação de novos contribuidores, acreditamos que um programa dessa natureza deveria começar com um escopo mais enxuto, metas mais objetivas, orçamento progressivo e validação prévia dos mecanismos de seleção, auditoria e prestação de contas. Por esses motivos, entendemos que a proposta ainda não atingiu o nível de maturidade necessário para justificar o financiamento solicitado neste momento.
[English]
We chose to vote "NO" on this governance action "Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program" (gov_action1pv7g8d0x9f3kqw2gcfrmgl8aqy38jat05wx0wwcvdsvuuclss6xqqhpzemv), because although we recognize the importance of open-source sustainability for the Cardano ecosystem and agree that the proposal addresses real risks — such as dependence on a small number of maintainers, the lack of succession planning, and the need for stronger operational coordination — we believe the proposed scope is overly broad for an initial initiative. The proposal combines multiple programs, organizational structures, and processes that would still need to be created, validated, and matured during execution, including governance bodies, legal entities, operational methodologies, and oversight mechanisms. In our view, this significantly increases administrative complexity, reduces delivery predictability, and makes it more difficult to objectively measure impact relative to the requested funding. We also believe the proposal places substantial operational responsibility on a structure that has not yet been fully established, as well as on a transition operator that would still need to demonstrate independent governance, budget efficiency, and large-scale execution capability. While we support initiatives aimed at maintaining critical infrastructure and cultivating new contributors, we believe a program of this nature should begin with a narrower scope, more objective goals, a progressive budget, and prior validation of its selection, auditing, and accountability mechanisms. For these reasons, we believe the proposal has not yet reached the level of maturity necessary to justify the requested funding at this time. - No4M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.8M ₳Rationale
Vote: Lean Approve
This proposal addresses a real and persistent problem: critical Cardano infrastructure is often maintained by a small number of individuals with limited succession planning and inconsistent funding. While the ecosystem benefits enormously from this work, market incentives alone frequently underfund maintenance compared to new development.
The strongest aspect of the proposal is treasury suitability. Open-source maintenance is a classic public-good problem where ecosystem-wide benefits exceed the ability of individual maintainers to capture value. This is one of the more defensible uses of treasury resources.
My primary concern is execution. The proposal is attempting to create a governance and operational structure that does not yet have a delivery history. The quality of maintainer selection, reporting, oversight, and budget discipline will determine whether this becomes durable ecosystem infrastructure or simply another funding program. More importantly this proposal is submitted by the person who makes himself the largest single beneficiary of the funding. The administration costs of the funding as a percentage of the ask are too high, and frankly this was almost a decision point for me. It is a worthwhile endeavour which looks to be treated as a cash-cow by the admin choice. To be blunt I don't want to see administration eating such a significant portion of any budget.
On balance, I believe the problem is real, the treasury rationale is strong, and the potential ecosystem benefits outweigh the risks. However, continued scrutiny of administrative costs, measurable outcomes, and treasury dependency will be necessary, and if it doesn't reduce as a percentage of budget I'll likely not approve on the next round.
This is not the highest-priority proposal competing for treasury capital, but it is a credible investment in ecosystem resilience and long-term sustainability.
- No3M ₳No rationale
- No2.8M ₳Rationale
Love the initiative and reasoning but the team needs to start smaller and build up. Can't wait to see the revised vision!
- No2.7M ₳No rationale
- Abstain2.6M ₳Rationale
本提案は、CardanoのOSS保守制度における一種のガバナンス上の分岐点に見えます。既存のIntersect/POSM構造に限界があるなら、新しい仕組みへ移行する意義はあります。しかし、それがハードフォークであれソフトフォークであれ、既存制度との役割分担、成果検証、移行範囲、重複防止、段階的拡張の設計が必要です。
OSS保守の必要性には強く賛同します。一方で、12M ADA・36か月の新制度として始めるには、現時点では制度の乗り換え設計がまだ十分に見えません。そのため、今回はAbstainとします。
This proposal appears to be a governance-level branching point in Cardano’s open-source maintenance model. If the existing Intersect/POSM structure is insufficient, moving toward a new model may be justified. However, whether this is a hard fork or a soft fork, Cardano needs a clear transition design: role separation from existing structures, review of prior outcomes, defined transition scope, prevention of duplication, and staged expansion.
I strongly agree with the need to support OSS maintenance. However, for a new 12M ADA, 36-month institutional structure, the transition design is not yet clear enough.
For this reason, I abstain on this proposal.
- Abstain2.5M ₳No rationale
- No2.5M ₳Rationale
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- No2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- No2.1M ₳Rationale
This proposal suggests a parallel bureaucratic vehicle in which funds simply evaporate.
- No2.1M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on the Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program.
I strongly support the underlying problem this proposal is trying to address. Cardano depends on open-source infrastructure, tooling, maintainers, SDKs, libraries and ecosystem contributors, and I do believe long-term open-source maintenance needs a serious and sustainable funding model.
However, I do not believe this proposal is the right structure for a ₳12m, 36-month treasury commitment.
My concern is not with the intent, but with the governance and funding model. This proposal appears to create a broad ecosystem funding institution that would itself allocate treasury resources to other parties. That is a much higher-risk model than funding a clearly scoped technical delivery with direct milestones, direct accountability, and stronger treasury controls.
For an ask of this size and duration, I would expect a more mature structure before funds are committed: clearer escrow mechanics, stronger on-chain enforcement, fully established independent governance before funding begins, tighter milestone-based release controls, and better coordination with existing Cardano open-source funding mechanisms such as Intersect’s open-source maintenance work.
I am also concerned about overlap and fragmentation. Cardano should absolutely fund critical open-source maintenance, but we should avoid creating parallel funding structures that duplicate or compete with existing ecosystem processes unless the need, scope and governance model are extremely clear.
In my view, this proposal is trying to solve an important problem, but it asks the treasury to take too much structural and governance risk up front.
I would be open to supporting a revised version that starts smaller, operates as a pilot, has stronger escrow and refund protections, is better integrated with existing ecosystem maintenance frameworks, and provides clearer accountability for how funds are selected, released, measured and audited.
For those reasons, I am voting NO.
- No2M ₳No rationale
- No1.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.8M ₳Rationale
I am not against the proposal but do not see an urgent need for it to be funded now. There are other funding needs that are higher priorities for this budget cycle. However, the cost is reasonable over 36 months, so I would consider voting yes if it were resubmitted in future.
- No1.7M ₳Rationale
The maintenance work is a real public good, but the proposal authorizes the full sum before the dependency audit identifies which projects are funded. This should be two phases: first fund the audit, target selection, and entity formation; then return for the maintenance budget against named, scored projects. Authorizing the spend ahead of the information that justifies it is backwards. NO.
- No1.7M ₳No rationale
- No1.7M ₳No rationale
- No1.6M ₳No rationale
- No1.6M ₳Rationale
Open-source sustainability is important, but this type of initiative should be managed by a broader group of established Cardano ecosystem participants from the start, not primarily centered around a single operator and structures that still need to be created.
Additionally, given the available NCL and the large number of competing treasury proposals, I do not believe there is room for a multi-year commitment. - No1.6M ₳No rationale
- No1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- No1.4M ₳No rationale
- No1.3M ₳No rationale
- No1.2M ₳No rationale
- No1.1M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.1M ₳No rationale
- No1.1M ₳Rationale
Cardano is built on a delicate open-source software foundation, and its current governance can approve funds but struggles to maintain consistent operations. I get the point, and I understand the problem.
What concerns me is that this proposal subtly shifts the focus from “governance funding outcomes” to “governance funding an operator that decides outcomes.” That's not acceptable! We’re talking about two councils, dashboards, rubrics, attestations, and audits. Each of these ideas makes sense on its own, but together they create a separate institutional setup that relies on the treasury and has a lasting influence. Whether you can change the operator or not, this could become a permanent layer of coordination unless governance steps in to stop it. And history shows that governance doesn’t usually take that step.
There's also a** risk of duplication.** Initiatives from Intersect, IOG, the CF, and SPO tooling efforts, as well as existing support programs, already cover some of this territory. This proposal assumes those frameworks can’t adapt. That’s just an assumption, not a proven fact.
I would back a smaller, more focused pilot that only looks at mapping dependencies and retaining key maintainers… not a complete OSPO-in-a-box funded for 3 years upfront. The treasury should prioritize funding code and minimizing risks, not creating a new management layer that governance will find hard to dismantle.
- No971.5K ₳Rationale
Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program
Rationale
We are voting against this proposal because we do not believe Cardano currently needs another large, multi-year governance and administration structure for open-source funding. While we agree that maintaining critical open-source infrastructure is important, the proposal requests a significant amount of treasury funding over a 36-month period and introduces multiple new programs, councils, committees, reporting structures, and operational layers.
We are not convinced that the additional complexity and overhead are justified relative to the expected ecosystem impact. Cardano already has multiple funding mechanisms and organizations supporting open-source development, and we would prefer to see more focused, targeted funding requests for specific infrastructure needs rather than creating another long-term institution. Given the size of the treasury ask, the long duration, and the uncertain return on investment, we do not believe this proposal represents an efficient use of treasury funds at this time.
- No964.1K ₳No rationale
- No949.1K ₳No rationale
- No931.8K ₳No rationale
- Abstain923.6K ₳No rationale