IO: Cardano Upgrades
245 DReps voted · 87 with a rationale · 3 changed their vote · 7 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 3 to yes, together voting with 100M ₳ of voting power.
- Yes120.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes115.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes107.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes95.5K ₳No rationale
- No90.6K ₳Rationale
Review Methodology Disclaimer [EN]
Due not only to the unusually high volume of Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions and budget proposals submitted in April and May 2026, but also to the lack of meaningful incentives for DReps to perform proposal analysis work, it is not feasible to apply my full standard review framework and reporting template to every proposal.
My standard analysis process usually requires approximately four hours of work per Governance Action. During that process, I research the proposal, review supporting materials, compare different perspectives from DReps and other ecosystem participants, and weigh both positive and negative arguments before reaching a reasonably qualified decision. Even with the use of artificial intelligence to automate parts of the workflow and improve productivity, a responsible evaluation still requires substantial human review, judgment, and contextual understanding.
In addition, this work does not end with the vote itself. It also involves writing and publishing rationales, preparing reports or summaries, communicating the reasoning publicly, and socializing the analysis through public channels and social media. This creates a significant workload, especially when dozens of proposals must be reviewed in a short period.
At present, this work carries no clear financial incentive and only limited reputational incentive, despite requiring substantial time, attention, and accountability. In practice, it is not sustainable to dedicate near full-time effort over several weeks or months to this activity without any form of compensation or institutional support.
Since I have a clear standard for my work and do not want to lower the quality of my judgment, I will reduce the scope of my analysis where necessary rather than rush decisions or produce superficial rationales. This means prioritizing focused due diligence over exhaustive review.
Under these constraints, my methodology during this period will focus on identifying critical strategic, operational, governance, reputational, or execution-related risks that could materially compromise a proposal’s viability, accountability, or successful delivery. In practical terms, this means narrowing my research toward the most critical gaps that may make approval unjustifiable. Where such a serious risk is identified, I may use it as the basis for a rejection vote.
This approach also helps reduce review overload: proposals with clear and material gaps would likely require rework regardless, so voting against them when those gaps are significant can be a responsible way to preserve review capacity while maintaining minimum due diligence.
Examples of such high-priority concerns may include, but are not limited to:
- Serious delivery failures in previous funded proposals;
- Significant unresolved delays in ongoing work;
- Major reputational or accountability issues within the ecosystem;
- Lack of credible execution capacity;
- Structural governance or transparency concerns;
- Severe budgetary or coordination risks.
Where I do not have sufficient time for a deeper evaluation, and no significant red flags or imminent execution risks are identified, I may abstain rather than issue an underdeveloped approval or rejection rationale.
This does not mean that other dimensions of proposal quality are unimportant. It means that, under current constraints, I will prioritize a narrower but still responsible review scope that preserves minimum due diligence, avoids rushed decisions, and keeps the quality of my judgment at an acceptable standard.
Governance Action Review
1. Introduction
The proposal “Cardano Upgrades” requests ₳13,103,039 from the Cardano Treasury to fund three platform-level enhancements: CIP-159 Multi-Asset Micro Fees / Account Address Enhancement, CPS-23 Cardano Multi-Asset Treasury, and Babel Fees. The proposal states that these workstreams are technically independent but provide compounding benefits when combined. CIP-159 introduces ledger-level account primitives intended to support direct deposits, micro-fee collection, L2 reserve patterns, and future multi-asset account functionality. CPS-23 focuses on the design of a multi-asset Treasury, including the ability for the Cardano Treasury to hold assets beyond ADA. Babel Fees aims to allow users to pay transaction fees in native assets other than ADA, using Nested Transactions as its technical foundation.
The proposal allocates ₳7,069,985 to Workstream 1, ₳2,356,662 to Workstream 2, and ₳3,676,392 to Workstream 3. Its public funding distribution assigns ₳11,268,614, or 86% of the total budget, to Development, with several other categories assigned as high-level percentage allocations.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Positive aspects
The underlying direction has value. A multi-asset treasury could improve treasury resilience and reduce exposure to ADA volatility. Babel Fees could reduce onboarding friction by allowing users to transact without first acquiring ADA. CIP-159 may enable important improvements for micro-fees, wallets, DeFi infrastructure, and future account-based patterns. These are meaningful and potentially necessary improvements for Cardano.
Although the proposal states that the three workstreams are technically independent, there is a plausible conceptual and strategic interconnection between them. CIP-159, Multi-Asset Treasury design, and Babel Fees all relate to broader improvements in Cardano’s economic usability, asset flexibility, fee mechanics, and treasury resilience. If only one or two of these workstreams were approved separately, the broader concept presented by the proposal might lose part of its coherence and potential impact.
For that reason, the bundled structure is not treated as a decisive negative factor in this vote. At the same time, it is also not treated as a positive justification for approval. The bundle may be defensible in concept, but it does not resolve the proposal’s more serious accountability problem.
Negative aspects
As a general governance principle, proposals and workstreams should be submitted with the highest reasonable level of granularity. Bundled proposals reduce the ability of dReps to assess each component independently and can force an all-or-nothing decision where a more nuanced vote would be preferable. This has been a relevant concern in previous governance actions and remains part of the evaluation framework.
However, in this specific case, bundling is not considered a sufficient reason for rejection.
The primary reason for voting NO is the lack of adequate budget granularity.
The proposal requests ₳13,103,039 from the Cardano Treasury, with ₳11,268,614, or 86% of the total budget, allocated broadly to “Development.” Several other categories appear to be assigned as high-level percentage estimates, including 1% allocations for areas such as infrastructure, security and audits, legal and compliance, governance, and others. The proposal does not provide a sufficiently detailed methodology explaining how these figures were calculated.
For a funding request of this size, the public budget breakdown is not detailed enough to support a responsible assessment of treasury prudence. There is no clear breakdown of FTEs, headcount, seniority assumptions, hourly or monthly rates, time allocation per workstream, or the specific distribution of engineering resources between the different components. As a result, it is not possible to determine whether the proposal is overbudgeted, underbudgeted, appropriately priced, or financially disciplined.
Strategic importance does not remove the need for budget accountability. Technical credibility should not operate as a blank check. The fact that a founding entity is considered technically capable does not justify approving a poorly detailed budget, especially when the requested amount is this large.
Risks and concerns
There is a broader institutional concern. Some of these capabilities, particularly Babel Fees, have been discussed in the Cardano ecosystem for years and have often been associated with the expected evolution of the protocol. When historically anticipated roadmap-adjacent deliverables are later submitted as new treasury-funded work, dReps should be cautious about normalizing a pattern where the Treasury becomes the default funding source for items that may reasonably be perceived as part of earlier protocol development expectations.
This does not mean the work is unimportant. It means that the standard for funding it should be higher, not lower.
Across the Cardano ecosystem, many smaller proposals with five- or six-figure budgets have been criticized or rejected for insufficient budget detail. It would be inconsistent to apply strict scrutiny to smaller community proposals while lowering the standard for an eight-figure ADA request from a major founding entity. If anything, larger treasury requests should be subject to stronger transparency requirements, clearer cost models, and more auditable delivery assumptions.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO
The vote is NO due primarily to insufficient budget granularity and the inability to assess whether the requested treasury allocation is financially prudent.
The bundled structure is neutral in this specific case. As a general governance principle, proposals and workstreams should be submitted with the highest reasonable level of granularity, because bundled proposals reduce the ability of dReps to assess each component independently and can force an all-or-nothing decision. However, in this case, bundling is not a sufficient reason for rejection, since there is a plausible conceptual and strategic interconnection between CIP-159, Multi-Asset Treasury design, and Babel Fees.
The decisive issue is the budget. The proposal requests ₳13,103,039 from the Cardano Treasury, with ₳11,268,614, or 86% of the total budget, allocated broadly to “Development.” The proposal does not provide a sufficiently detailed methodology explaining how these figures were calculated. There is no clear breakdown of FTEs, headcount, seniority assumptions, hourly or monthly rates, time allocation per workstream, or the specific distribution of engineering resources between the different components.
Despite recognizing the technical relevance and strategic potential of the workstreams, the proposal cannot be supported in its current form.
4. Conclusion
The workstreams may be strategically relevant and technically meaningful for Cardano, but the funding request does not provide enough budget granularity to support a responsible treasury decision. The bundled structure is neutral in this case. The decisive factor is the inability to assess whether the requested allocation is financially prudent.
Nota sobre metodologia e escopo de análise [PT]
Devido não apenas ao volume excepcionalmente alto de Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions e propostas orçamentárias submetidas em abril e maio de 2026, mas também à falta de incentivos significativos para que DReps realizem o trabalho de análise de propostas, não é viável aplicar meu framework completo de revisão e meu template padrão de relatório a todas as propostas.
Meu processo padrão de análise normalmente exige aproximadamente quatro horas de trabalho por Governance Action. Durante esse processo, eu pesquiso a proposta, reviso materiais de suporte, comparo diferentes perspectivas de DReps e de outros participantes do ecossistema, e peso argumentos positivos e negativos antes de chegar a uma decisão razoavelmente qualificada. Mesmo com o uso de inteligência artificial para automatizar partes do fluxo de trabalho e aumentar a produtividade, uma avaliação responsável ainda exige revisão humana substancial, julgamento e entendimento contextual.
Além disso, esse trabalho não termina no voto em si. Ele também envolve escrever e publicar rationales, preparar relatórios ou resumos, comunicar publicamente a justificativa e socializar a análise por meio de canais públicos e mídias sociais. Isso cria uma carga de trabalho significativa, especialmente quando dezenas de propostas precisam ser avaliadas em um curto período.
Atualmente, esse trabalho não possui incentivo financeiro claro e oferece apenas incentivo reputacional limitado, apesar de exigir tempo, atenção e responsabilidade substanciais. Na prática, não é sustentável dedicar um esforço próximo de tempo integral durante várias semanas ou meses a essa atividade sem qualquer forma de compensação ou apoio institucional.
Como tenho um padrão claro para o meu trabalho e não quero reduzir a qualidade do meu julgamento, irei reduzir o escopo da minha análise quando necessário, em vez de tomar decisões apressadas ou produzir justificativas superficiais. Isso significa priorizar uma diligência focada em vez de uma revisão exaustiva.
Sob essas restrições, minha metodologia durante este período se concentrará em identificar riscos críticos estratégicos, operacionais, de governança, reputacionais ou relacionados à execução que possam comprometer materialmente a viabilidade, a accountability ou a entrega bem-sucedida de uma proposta. Na prática, isso significa concentrar minha pesquisa nos gaps mais críticos que possam tornar a aprovação injustificável. Quando um risco sério desse tipo for identificado, poderei usá-lo como base para um voto de rejeição.
Essa abordagem também ajuda a reduzir a sobrecarga de revisão: propostas com gaps claros e materiais provavelmente exigiriam retrabalho de qualquer forma, então votar contra elas quando esses gaps forem significativos pode ser uma forma responsável de preservar capacidade de análise enquanto se mantém uma diligência mínima.
Exemplos dessas preocupações de alta prioridade podem incluir, mas não se limitam a:
- Falhas graves de entrega em propostas anteriormente financiadas;
- Atrasos significativos e não resolvidos em trabalhos em andamento;
- Problemas graves de reputação ou accountability dentro do ecossistema;
- Falta de capacidade crível de execução;
- Preocupações estruturais de governança ou transparência;
- Riscos severos de orçamento ou coordenação.
Quando eu não tiver tempo suficiente para uma avaliação mais profunda, e nenhum alerta significativo ou risco iminente de execução for identificado, poderei me abster em vez de emitir uma justificativa de aprovação ou rejeição pouco desenvolvida.
Isso não significa que outras dimensões da qualidade de uma proposta não sejam importantes. Significa que, sob as restrições atuais, priorizarei um escopo de revisão mais estreito, mas ainda responsável, que preserve uma diligência mínima, evite decisões apressadas e mantenha a qualidade do meu julgamento em um padrão aceitável.
Revisão de Ação de Governança
1. Introdução
A proposta “Cardano Upgrades” solicita ₳13.103.039 do Tesouro da Cardano para financiar três melhorias de nível de plataforma: CIP-159 Multi-Asset Micro Fees / Account Address Enhancement, CPS-23 Cardano Multi-Asset Treasury e Babel Fees. A proposta afirma que esses workstreams são tecnicamente independentes, mas geram benefícios compostos quando combinados. A CIP-159 introduz primitivas de conta em nível de ledger destinadas a permitir depósitos diretos, cobrança de microtaxas, padrões de reserva para L2s e funcionalidade futura de contas multiativos. A CPS-23 foca no desenho de um Tesouro multiativo, incluindo a capacidade de o Tesouro da Cardano manter ativos além de ADA. Babel Fees busca permitir que usuários paguem taxas de transação em ativos nativos diferentes de ADA, usando Nested Transactions como sua base técnica. :contentReference[oaicite:3]{index=3}
A proposta aloca ₳7.069.985 ao Workstream 1, ₳2.356.662 ao Workstream 2 e ₳3.676.392 ao Workstream 3. Sua distribuição pública de recursos atribui ₳11.268.614, ou 86% do orçamento total, a Desenvolvimento, com várias outras categorias atribuídas como alocações percentuais de alto nível. :contentReference[oaicite:4]{index=4}
2. Análise da Ação de Governança
Aspectos positivos
A direção subjacente tem valor. Um tesouro multiativo poderia melhorar a resiliência do Tesouro e reduzir a exposição à volatilidade da ADA. Babel Fees poderia reduzir o atrito de onboarding ao permitir que usuários transacionem sem antes adquirir ADA. A CIP-159 pode permitir melhorias importantes para microtaxas, carteiras, infraestrutura DeFi e futuros padrões baseados em contas. Essas são melhorias significativas e potencialmente necessárias para a Cardano.
Embora a proposta afirme que os três workstreams são tecnicamente independentes, há uma interconexão conceitual e estratégica plausível entre eles. CIP-159, o desenho do Multi-Asset Treasury e Babel Fees estão todos relacionados a melhorias mais amplas na usabilidade econômica da Cardano, flexibilidade de ativos, mecânicas de taxas e resiliência do Tesouro. Se apenas um ou dois desses workstreams fossem aprovados separadamente, o conceito mais amplo apresentado pela proposta poderia perder parte de sua coerência e de seu impacto potencial.
Por esse motivo, a estrutura em bundle não é tratada como um fator negativo decisivo neste voto. Ao mesmo tempo, ela também não é tratada como uma justificativa positiva para aprovação. O bundle pode ser defensável em conceito, mas não resolve o problema mais sério de accountability da proposta.
Aspectos negativos
Como princípio geral de governança, propostas e workstreams devem ser submetidos com o maior nível razoável de granularidade. Propostas agrupadas reduzem a capacidade dos dReps de avaliar cada componente de forma independente e podem forçar uma decisão de tudo ou nada quando um voto mais nuançado seria preferível. Essa foi uma preocupação relevante em ações de governança anteriores e continua fazendo parte do framework de avaliação.
No entanto, neste caso específico, o agrupamento não é considerado uma razão suficiente para rejeição.
A principal razão para o voto NO é a falta de granularidade orçamentária adequada.
A proposta solicita ₳13.103.039 do Tesouro da Cardano, com ₳11.268.614, ou 86% do orçamento total, alocados amplamente para “Development”. Várias outras categorias parecem ser atribuídas como estimativas percentuais de alto nível, incluindo alocações de 1% para áreas como infraestrutura, segurança e auditorias, jurídico e compliance, governança, entre outras. A proposta não fornece uma metodologia suficientemente detalhada explicando como esses valores foram calculados.
Para uma solicitação de financiamento desse tamanho, a decomposição orçamentária pública não é detalhada o suficiente para sustentar uma avaliação responsável de prudência do Tesouro. Não há uma decomposição clara de FTEs, headcount, premissas de senioridade, taxas horárias ou mensais, alocação de tempo por workstream ou distribuição específica de recursos de engenharia entre os diferentes componentes. Como resultado, não é possível determinar se a proposta está superorçada, suborçada, adequadamente precificada ou financeiramente disciplinada.
A importância estratégica não remove a necessidade de accountability orçamentária. Credibilidade técnica não deve funcionar como um cheque em branco. O fato de uma entidade fundadora ser considerada tecnicamente capaz não justifica aprovar um orçamento pouco detalhado, especialmente quando o valor solicitado é tão alto.
Riscos e preocupações
Há uma preocupação institucional mais ampla. Algumas dessas capacidades, particularmente Babel Fees, foram discutidas no ecossistema Cardano por anos e muitas vezes foram associadas à evolução esperada do protocolo. Quando entregáveis historicamente antecipados e adjacentes ao roadmap são posteriormente submetidos como novo trabalho financiado pelo Tesouro, dReps devem ter cautela para não normalizar um padrão em que o Tesouro se torna a fonte padrão de financiamento para itens que podem ser razoavelmente percebidos como parte de expectativas anteriores de desenvolvimento
- Yes90.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes85.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes83.9K ₳Rationale
I am voting in favor of the Cardano Upgrades proposal. These upgrades represent essential technical advancements—including Babel Fees, Account Address Upgrades, and a Multi-asset Treasury—that are vital for Cardano's long-term viability.
Babel Fees will significantly reduces onboarding friction for new users and increases the utility of all tokens within the ecosystem. We are also doing a big push towards working well in a multi-chain environment and this will be a significant asset for that goal.
By modernizing account addresses and treasury mechanics, the network becomes better equipped to handle the increased transaction throughput expected from the upcoming Leios consensus upgrade.
Although the budget is large, it must be viewed in the context of the 50% total funding cut IO has already implemented for the 2026 cycle as it transitions toward a self-sustaining model. Funding these core upgrades now ensures the network remains robust as this transition continues. - Yes65.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes64.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes63.1K ₳Rationale
I support this proposal because it advances a core principle I believe Cardano needs for real-world adoption: convenience without dependency. Users should be able to interact with Cardano more easily, without unnecessary friction, while treasury funding should help move the ecosystem from service dependency toward durable ecosystem capacity.
As a Product Committee voting member and as a Cardano citizen invested in decentralization, my focus is not only whether a proposal is technically strong or strategically aligned, but whether it contributes measurably to the Cardano 2030 vision. In this case, account address enhancements, Babel Fees, and multi-asset treasury design can support important outcomes: better user onboarding, more transaction activity, improved DeFi accessibility, stronger treasury resilience, and new economic participation across the ecosystem.
This is a YES with accountability expectations, not a blank check that can simply be cashed out as proposers close one proposal and return with the next. Each funded proposal should become part of an organic accountability sensor for Cardano governance: what was promised, what was delivered, what became reusable, what measurable value was created, and what lessons should shape future funding.
I also believe Cardano governance can learn from the best parts of Project Catalyst’s iterative funding culture: early feedback, proposal refinement, milestone accountability, Proof of Achievement, close-out reporting, and continuity of learning. For sizable treasury withdrawals, this should become a governance norm. Large proposals need a warm-up, heads-up, and consultation period before final on-chain submission so the community can help improve scope, KPIs, risks, and delivery expectations. This is not about slowing progress; it is about improving collaboration, efficiency, efficacy, and trust.
IO and its group of collaborators also have an important opportunity here: not only to deliver the work, but to make the model of building Cardano infrastructure, products, and services more replicable. The goal should be that smaller developers, builders, and projects can increasingly participate in the Cardano economic machine, not simply depend on large entities to move the ecosystem forward.
My support comes with the expectation that the delivered work becomes open, measurable, and broadly usable across the ecosystem. Success should not only mean technical delivery. Success should mean lower friction for users, clearer KPI contribution, more wallet and provider participation, stronger infrastructure capacity, and less dependency on any single provider or service layer. Each funding cycle should make Cardano governance wiser, more transparent, and more capable of delivering the 2030 vision.
- Yes63.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes59.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes56.4K ₳Rationale
I shall continue to vote in favor of the Input Output Global (iOG formerly known as iOHK) proposals due to the fact that iOG has continuously year in and year out built, upgraded, innovated, and further strengthened the ecosystem through various market upheavals, negative press, and technological shifts. Through continuous efforts this cadre of developers, educators, various business persons, scientists, and experts in their fields have proven more than capable of the continued maintenance and innovation necessary to further the Cardano blackchain. I find value in all proposals from iOG until a suitable development group or lab can prove not only innovative, but evolutionary for the technology in which we all utilize and enjoy. The blockchain has survived based off of the creators of the protocol, we must continue the path set forth until we have a suitable substitute that can create viable upgrades and are capable of pushing the community and the blockchain into a realm of technological dominance I vote Yes for this proposal.
LourdeOuroborus Imperator Aeternalis - Yes55.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes51.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes50K ₳No rationale
- No48K ₳No rationale
- Abstain45.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes32K ₳No rationale
- Yes29.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes28.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes26.7K ₳Rationale
Big fan of babble fees and removing the minimum deposit. Yes.
- No19.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes15.7K ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted15.3K ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes4mo agoSuperseded
- Yes14.8K ₳Rationale
I believe that io has cardano's best interest at heart.
- Yes11.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes9K ₳No rationale
- No6.8K ₳No rationale
- Abstain4.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes3.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes2.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes1.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2K ₳Rationale
I’m voting yes because these upgrades improve some of Cardano’s most important long-term usability and infrastructure problems. CIP-159 enables cheaper DeFi interactions, micro-payments, better wallet revenue models, and stronger Layer 2 functionality. The Multi-Asset Treasury helps protect the treasury from ADA volatility by allowing stablecoins and other assets to eventually be held alongside ADA. Most importantly, Babel Fees could fundamentally improve crypto onboarding by letting users pay transaction fees in assets they already hold instead of requiring ADA first. That removes one of the biggest friction points in crypto. Over time, fee abstraction combined with technologies like Midnight could allow transactions to settle using tiny “dust” amounts in the background, making blockchain interactions feel effectively free and seamless to normal users. That kind of user experience is critical for mainstream adoption.
- Yes999.7 ₳No rationale
- Yes688.8 ₳No rationale
- Yes684.6 ₳No rationale
- Yes84.1 ₳No rationale
- Yes10.8 ₳No rationale
- Yes0 ₳No rationale
- Yes0 ₳No rationale
- Yes0 ₳No rationale
- Yes0 ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on the IO: Cardano Upgrades proposal.
This proposal introduces ideas that align perfectly with Midnight and future Layer 2 solutions. By enabling more predictable fees through Babel Fees and the Multi-Asset Treasury, it makes financial planning and decision-making much easier for users, DApps, and the Treasury itself.
Importantly, it directly addresses one of Cardano’s biggest current weaknesses: limited stablecoin adoption and usability. Babel Fees allows users to pay transaction fees in any native asset (such as USDC or bridged BTC) without needing to acquire ADA first. This removes a major onboarding barrier and opens the door to the massive stablecoin market, bringing new liquidity and real activity to the network.
These upgrades are essential for accelerating mainstream adoption and are fully aligned with Cardano 2030’s goals for Adoption & Utility (Pillar 2) and Ecosystem Sustainability & Resilience (Pillar 5). - Yes0 ₳No rationale