Pogun: Capital Without Compromise
220 DReps voted · 81 with a rationale · 17 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes17.3M ₳Rationale
Pogun: Capital Without Compromise
- Abstain16.7M ₳Rationale
This proposal is more structured than many commercial asks: four gated phases, explicit validation/audit steps, milestone-based disbursement via Intersect’s contract framework, and refund/termination conditions. It still asks the treasury to underwrite a commercial expansion initiative where downside risk is primarily socialized while upside relies on future execution and EBITDA-based repayments. The repayment structure (20% of EBITDA after an initial period, followed by a 5% perpetual return) is directionally better than a pure grant, but it depends on assumptions that cannot be verified at approval time and therefore needs particularly strong price discovery, competitive comparison, and enforcement detail to justify a multi-million-ADA allocation. In addition, the proposal does not disclose the actual staffed delivery team size/FTE allocation; the “seven people” listed are governance/advisory participants (4-person Product Committee, 3-person Advisory Board), with the Product Committee explicitly pro-bono, which is not a substitute for an auditable execution resourcing plan. Process penalty: bypassing the Intersect budget mechanism weakens comparability and eliminates a much-needed feedback loop; for a request of this size, this should be evaluated through a structured budget/RFP route or an investment-oriented vehicle designed for commercial risk. Happy to revisit this decision and vote yes if the above-mentioned points are implemented.
- No16.4M ₳Rationale
Vote: NO
Pogun addresses a genuine strategic need. A non-custodial Bitcoin credit market and trust-minimized bridge would give Cardano access to the largest pool of idle capital in crypto. The technical design is sound: an oracle-free bilateral lending protocol avoids the failure modes that have plagued conventional DeFi lending, and the 1-of-N BitVM bridge security model is theoretically robust. The repayment structure — 20% of earnings returned to the treasury until full repayment, then 5% in perpetuity — is the most treasury-positive funding structure we have seen from IO to date.
Despite these strengths, Vampyre Fund votes NO.
Our objection is structural, not technical. Vampyre Fund believes treasury funds must not be used as team operating budgets. The correct model is to separate features from budgets: DREPs vote on what to build, not who to pay. Funding should be released incrementally, gated on delivered work, with teams bidding competitively for each unit of work. Pogun, as submitted, asks the treasury to pre-fund IO's team roadmap for the year. There is no competitive bidding, no sprint-based accountability, and no on-chain enforcement of feature delivery before disbursement.
This is not a judgment on Pogun's merit as a project. Bitcoin DeFi infrastructure on Cardano is worth building. But the mechanism matters. Voting YES here reinforces a budget process that Vampyre Fund believes is fundamentally broken and that concentrates treasury disbursements in incumbent teams rather than creating an open, competitive, and accountable development ecosystem.
We encourage IO to resubmit Pogun as a feature prioritization request under a sprint-based funding model, and we commit to voting YES on such a resubmission if the delivery structure meets the standard described in our published governance blog.
- Abstain14.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes14.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes13.9M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on governance action 73e171a4c0730b4b59ecae271ab89f12a9d56360b02920e1f95107dbdc1d6762#8.
I am voting yes on this primarily because of the opportunity to generate perpetual returns for the Cardano treasury.
The 5% perpetual return is equivalent to a 5% unvoiced equity deal at ~60m valuation. Competitors in the space have raised at higher valuations, and I believe the technology described, the chance of success, and the benefit to Cardano to all be pulling in this proposals favor.
However, my Yes vote comes with Caveats after discussion with Omer Husain, the lead on this project.
I expressed concerns that the 20% post-EBITDA terms are highly manipulable by the team, and could be extended indefinitely with little return for the treasury. Omer's response was that there is little incentive to manipulate the EBITDA in that way. He argues that the 20% is high enough that the incentive is to pay back the loan as fast as possible; increasing OpEx to defer repayment would simply be burning their own cash rather than growing the business.
He suggested a structural backstop: if full repayment hasn't been reached within x years of first positive EBITDA, the repayment basis switches to 10% of net revenue, rather than post EBITDA. I also suggested a flat maximum term on this phase.
I expect the final contract drafted with Intersect to include such a term, or any revised proposal to explicitly state this.
My other concern is on liquidation terms. If the company is liquidated, I expect the Cardano treasury to have preferred repayment rights for any assets, ahead of, or at least pro-rata preferental compared to, any other investors or equity holders.
I think it is fair to demand that, if you're receiving public funds from the treasury, the treasury have first repayment rights.
I expect the final contract drafted with Intersect to reflect this as such, or any revised proposal the explicitly state this.
You can find a larger writeup justifying my vote here.
- Abstain13.3M ₳Rationale
RCADA Rationale
RCADA votes ABSTAIN on the Pogun: Capital Without Compromise Treasury Withdrawal proposal.
RCADA recognises the ambition and potential significance of this proposal. Bringing Bitcoin liquidity, credit markets, yield products, and trust-minimized bridging infrastructure to Cardano could be highly valuable for the ecosystem. Bitcoin remains the largest digital asset by market capitalization, and Cardano would benefit from credible infrastructure that allows BTC holders to access lending, borrowing, yield, and DeFi activity without relying on weak custodial or bridge assumptions.
Pogun’s core idea is compelling: a non-margin, peer-to-peer credit market; a yield layer; and a BitVM-based bridge that could allow Bitcoin liquidity to enter Cardano under stronger security assumptions than conventional multisig or wrapped-token models. If successful, this could increase Cardano TVL, transaction activity, DeFi relevance, and external capital inflow.
RCADA particularly appreciates that this proposal attempts to move beyond a simple grant model. The commitment to return 20% of EBITDA to the Cardano Treasury until the USD-equivalent funding amount is repaid, followed by a 5% perpetual EBITDA return, is a meaningful improvement over proposals where the Treasury funds commercial upside but receives no direct financial participation.
This repayment structure is important. If Cardano Treasury funding is ever to support commercial ventures, then clear upside-sharing, repayment, reporting, and public accountability mechanisms should become part of the expected standard. Pogun deserves credit for attempting to define such a model.
However, RCADA also views this as a high-risk, high-reward commercial ecosystem investment, not a conventional public infrastructure grant.
The proposal combines several complex components: a credit protocol, a yield application, institutional adoption strategy, Bitcoin bridging, BitVM-related cryptographic infrastructure, reporting obligations, revenue accounting, and long-term Treasury return mechanics. Each of these is challenging on its own. Delivering all of them together creates a significant execution, adoption, security, and commercial risk profile.
RCADA also recognises that some of the proposal’s strongest ecosystem benefits depend on future market adoption. The projected value to Cardano depends on users trusting the bridge, capital entering the credit market, liquidity providers using the yield layer, institutional participants engaging with the product, and the protocol eventually producing positive EBITDA. These outcomes may happen, but they are not guaranteed.
The phased disbursement model is a positive feature. Pogun proposes four delivery phases from Q2 2026 to Q1 2027, with later tranches released after milestone verification. The proposal also includes refund clauses for milestone failure, team dissolution, voluntary termination, partial delivery, and technical infeasibility of the bridge. These controls are welcome and help reduce downside risk.
That said, RCADA believes the enforcement and assurance framework should be stronger for a proposal of this kind.
The Treasury return commitment is attractive, but its practical value depends on enforceability. RCADA would like to see greater clarity around the legally bound entity, governing jurisdiction, enforcement rights, treatment of affiliated entities, reporting failures, sale or restructuring of the project, and whether the repayment obligation survives changes in ownership or corporate structure. Without that clarity, return commitments can look strong on paper while remaining difficult for the community to enforce in practice.
RCADA would also like stronger independent financial verification. EBITDA-based commitments depend heavily on accounting treatment, cost allocation, and related-party transactions. Future proposals of this type should define allowable expenses, reporting standards, independent review requirements, and safeguards against shifting revenue or costs in ways that weaken the Treasury’s return.
We also believe the first disbursement could be better protected. While the proposal includes milestone-gated funding, the first tranche is released upon ratification. For a venture-style proposal involving significant technical and commercial risk, stronger pre-disbursement conditions would improve confidence. These could include publication or summary of the signed legal agreement, confirmation of the Treasury-return enforcement mechanism, independent technical review of the bridge roadmap, confirmed audit engagement, and clear disclosure of the project entity responsible for delivery and repayment.
RCADA is not opposed to Treasury-funded commercial ecosystem bets in principle. Some commercial ventures can also be ecosystem improvements if they bring external capital, reusable infrastructure, open-source components, public documentation, protocol revenue, and long-term Treasury returns. Pogun may fit that category if successfully delivered.
However, that category requires a higher standard than ordinary grant funding. It needs stronger legal enforceability, clearer downside protection, independent financial verification, transparent reporting, and careful separation between private upside and public benefit.
For these reasons, RCADA votes ABSTAIN. We appreciate Pogun’s ambition, the Bitcoin DeFi opportunity, and especially the repayment and perpetual-return model. However, given the proposal’s execution complexity, bridge-security risk, commercial uncertainty, adoption dependency, and unresolved enforceability questions, RCADA cannot fully endorse the Treasury allocation at this stage.
We would welcome a refined or future proposal with stronger legal enforcement mechanics, clearer financial verification, more explicit public-good guarantees, and tighter pre-disbursement protections.
RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here: "https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/."
- No12.1M ₳Rationale
The BitVM-powered Bitcoin bridge outlined in this proposal represents a strategic want rather than an immediate operational need. While bringing Bitcoin liquidity to Cardano is a valuable objective, alternative infrastructure solutions are already actively addressing this cross-chain capability. For instance, EMURGO's integration of the BitcoinOS Grail Bridge provides a trust-minimized framework for BTC assets on Cardano, and existing platforms like FluidTokens are developing similar cross-chain mechanisms. Allocating 51% of the requested ₳12.29M budget strictly to product engineering and R&D for a highly similar bridge implementation represents a duplication of treasury resources that the ecosystem can survive without today.
The proposed non-margin credit market and automated yield applications also fall short of satisfying an urgent, unaddressed ecosystem need. The Cardano network already features functional, oracle-free, peer-to-peer lending options through established protocols like FluidTokens and Lenfi, which allow lenders and borrowers to manually coordinate bilateral terms. While Pogun introduces specific design refinements, such as contractual term softening and the preservation of exact Bitcoin UTXO identities for tax efficiency, these are incremental optimizations for institutional users rather than entirely new foundational utilities required for immediate grassroots developer empowerment.
Finally, the financial structure of the proposal introduces long-term capital exposure for the treasury without guaranteeing immediate active user growth. The repayment commitment specifies a grace period during which no returns are due while quarterly EBITDA remains negative, leaving public funds vulnerable if the protocol faces adoption hurdles in a competitive market. With the project's milestones extending through early 2027, the ecosystem would not see timely returns or measurable transaction volume increases. Because the core technical offerings are already being effectively delivered by existing network solutions, Wada votes NO on this proposal.
- Yes10.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes10.8M ₳No rationale
- No10.4M ₳Rationale
"without triggering a taxable disposal event" - is objectively one of the most concerning statements but there is more. It is probably a opportunity Cardano can pursue. The issue is structure. This proposal bundles three things together- a $BTC bridge, a credit market, a yield/RWA/private credit product
The bridge may be public infrastructure. The credit and yield products look like a commercial venture.
This is an IO Venture Studio style product - the Cardano treasury should not be used as non-dilutive startup capital without proper investment protections
The proposal does not clearly disclose -
- whether Pogun will have a token
- whether there will be future private raises
- whether IOG owns equity or Charles indirectly/direclty
- whether founders/advisors receive equity or token upside
- whether the treasury receives equity, tokens, warrants, or governance rights
- whether repayment obligations survive sale, spinout, rebrand or restructuring
The treasury is offered 20% of EBITDA until repayment and 5% EBITDA after that. But EBITDA is easy to reduce through costs, salaries, related-party fees, legal expenses, infrastructure charges or restructuring - I have not see ANY voters discuss this
That is not enough protection for public funds. There are also serious regulatory and legal risks - $BTC backed lending, transferable bond tokens, yield products, RWAs, private credit, institutional onboarding and tax claims around "same UTXO" recovery. These are NOT small issues.
The treasury should fund neutral public goods, not de-risk a commercial venture where private actors may capture most of the upside.
Split the proposal, remove IOG and disclose all parties on equity side.
Until then - NO.
- No9.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes9.2M ₳No rationale
- Abstain8.8M ₳Rationale
私はこの提案を棄権します。Bitcoinを活用した分散型金融の方向性には可能性を感じており、本提案のビジョンや挑戦的な内容についても興味深く見ています。また、Treasuryへの返還モデルなど、従来の提案とは異なる設計も評価しています。一方で、現時点の Cardanoエコシステム全体の状況やTreasuryの優先順位を踏まえると、慎重に判断したいと考えました。そのため、本提案については今回は棄権します。\n\nI abstain from this proposal. I see potential in the direction of Bitcoin-based decentralized finance, and I find the vision and ambition behind this proposal interesting. I also appreciate the different structure compared to traditional proposals, including the treasury return model. At the same time, considering the current state of the Cardano ecosystem and overall treasury priorities, I believe a cautious approach is appropriate at this stage, and for that reason I am abstaining from this proposal.
- Yes8.1M ₳No rationale
- No7.6M ₳Rationale
Pogun is ambitious, and I can see why BTC liquidity, credit and yield would be useful for Cardano. I also recognise that the proposal is not framed as a simple grant. It includes milestone-gated disbursement, refund clauses, quarterly reporting, a 20% EBITDA repayment mechanism until the USD funding amount is repaid, and then a 5% perpetual EBITDA return. That is more serious than a normal grant.
However, I am still not comfortable with the Treasury funding commercial products directly on these terms. This can tilt competition toward one team, distort the market, and create expectations that other commercial teams should also receive Treasury funding. In my view, the Treasury should be very careful about stepping into markets where private capital, users and product-market fit should normally decide winners.
There is also a negotiation imbalance. A commercial team can move quickly, negotiate clearly, and optimise terms for itself. The Treasury is a slower and more diffuse governance system. Once funding is approved, the Treasury may have limited ability to renegotiate terms later, so the protections need to be clear before approval, not worked out after the fact.
The proposal does include a Treasury return model, but I do not think the economic terms are tight enough for this type of commercial funding. If the return is based on EBITDA, the community needs a clearer definition of how EBITDA will be calculated, what costs can be deducted, how related-party costs are treated, and how the return is protected if the business later restructures, spins out products, changes ownership, or moves revenue into another entity. EBITDA can be shaped. Otherwise, the Treasury may have a headline return, but little real control over whether meaningful payments arrive.
I also think the open-source and infrastructure split needs to be clearer. The proposal says the credit market is open-source and composable, and later milestones mention documentation, open-source references and integration guides. That is positive. But for Treasury funding, I would still want a clearer separation between what becomes reusable Cardano infrastructure and what remains Pogun’s private commercial advantage. The bridge components, operator software, backend services, APIs, proof infrastructure, yield app and frontend should be treated explicitly.
The bridge operator model also needs more practical detail. The proposal describes a 1-of-N security model and says institutions can act as operators to protect their own assets. I want to understand who can realistically become an operator, what capital is required, what technical setup is required, what the bond or slashing rules are, and how operator onboarding works in practice. If the operator set is difficult for outsiders to join, then the bridge may be less open than the headline suggests.
The bridge is complex enough that I would also want independent technical review before later bridge funding is released, not only audits near launch or an infeasibility review after problems appear. The yield layer also needs more legal and compliance clarity, especially if it touches RWAs, private credit and structured fixed-income products.
So I am voting NO. The idea may be strong, and the proposal already has more guardrails than a normal grant. But I do not think the Treasury should fund a commercial product unless the terms, protections, public/private split, operator model and technical review process are much clearer. A path to a different vote would require a stronger explanation of why this should be funded by the Treasury rather than private capital and stronger protections if the Treasury is being asked to take commercial risk.
- Yes7.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes7.2M ₳No rationale
- No6.4M ₳No rationale
- No5.9M ₳Rationale
I am voting No.
I understand the potential upside of enabling Bitcoin-related DeFi activity on Cardano, and the appeal of creating new revenue streams for the treasury. However, this proposal still relies on demand that has not yet clearly materialized at scale.
Across the ecosystem, the primary constraint today is not access to new financial primitives, but users, activity, and sustained engagement. Introducing additional infrastructure and complexity ahead of that demand feels premature.
This is not a rejection of the idea itself, but a question of timing and prioritization. I would rather see stronger evidence of user pull and market fit before allocating treasury funds to expand into this direction.
- AbstainChanged5.8M ₳Rationale
- 금액 대비 price breakdown에 대한 상세 근거가 부족하다 판단됨
Earlier votes
No2mo agoSuperseded
- 금액 대비 price breakdown에 대한 상세 근거가 부족하다 판단됨
- Yes5.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.3M ₳Rationale
Voting YES. Pogun is the most structurally innovative treasury proposal in the IO 2026 batch and arguably the most consequential for the long-term shape of Cardano's treasury model. Three integrated components that compound: a non-margin peer-to-peer credit market modelled on real-world corporate credit rather than DeFi pool mechanics, a yield DApp that abstracts bilateral negotiation for passive capital, and a BitVM-powered trust-minimised bridge with 1-of-N security. EUTXO is genuinely the right execution environment for this stack: deterministic execution, no MEV, single-party fraud proofs, and native asset security at the ledger level. Bridging Bitcoin liquidity to Cardano without competing with ADA staking rewards is the structural insight that distinguishes this from yet another wrapped-BTC scheme.
The treasury return commitment is the single most important structural feature of this proposal. 20% of quarterly EBITDA returned until the $2.95M is fully repaid, followed by 5% perpetual return - this is direct implementation of Cardano 2030 Vision Pillar 5 Objective E.1, which calls for the treasury to evolve from a passive pool to a yield-generating, multi-asset position. The Cardano Foundation Governance Advisory Team flagged the question of how treasury-funded commercial ventures should be structured; Pogun answers it. Phase-gated milestone disbursement across four tranches, the most extensive refund clause in the batch including a specific "fundamental technical infeasibility" provision that returns bridge-specific funds if BitVM proves unworkable, formal audit by TxPipe in flight on the credit market contracts (completion expected 27 May 2026), and a product committee of Pi Lanningham, Philip DiSarro, Lucas Rosa, and Santiago Carmuega serving pro-bono.
This is the highest technical-risk proposal in the batch. The BitVM bridge is genuinely novel infrastructure rather than incremental work on a known protocol, and execution will be watched closely. The refund clause and milestone gating make the downside case manageable, while the treasury return model means the upside case rebuilds treasury reserves rather than depleting them. If Cardano is to demonstrate that treasury-funded ventures can pay back, this is the proposal that proves the model.
Peter Horsfall - Independent DRep, Oceania.
- Abstain5.3M ₳Rationale
STORM Partners abstains on Pogun: Capital Without Compromise.
We like parts of this proposal. The Bitcoin DeFi opportunity is real, and the proposed treasury return model is a better structure than a simple grant. Pogun proposes returning 20% of EBITDA until the initial funding is repaid, followed by an ongoing 5% return, which is directionally the kind of alignment treasury proposals should explore.
However, this is still a commercial DeFi venture, not core public infrastructure. The ₳12.29M ask is significant, the bridge component carries execution risk, and Cardano already has community-driven bridge and BTC-liquidity efforts emerging. This may be better suited for an Orion Fund proposal with similar terms for ecosystem benefit, given the current NCL pressure and the risk the proposal carries. - Yes4.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.8M ₳No rationale
- YesChanged4.7M ₳History
Earlier votes
No2mo agoSuperseded
- Yes4.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.4M ₳Rationale
I appreciate the design and security model proposed by Pogun. The experienced individuals named to the product committee and advisory board further increase my confidence in the project’s potential for success.
Most importantly, I am particularly encouraged by their commitment to consistently returning revenue to the treasury. - Yes4.1M ₳Rationale
[Portuguese]
Optamos por votar "SIM" nesta ação de governança "Pogun: Capital Without Compromise" (gov_action1w0shrfxqwv95kk0v4cn34wylz25a2cmqkq5jpc0e2yrahhqava3qsuae57l), pois entendemos que ela aborda uma oportunidade estratégica relevante para o ecossistema Cardano: transformar Bitcoin em capital produtivo dentro da rede, por meio de infraestrutura de crédito, yield e uma bridge com modelo de segurança mais robusto. A proposta tem potencial para ampliar o TVL, atrair liquidez externa e fortalecer a Cardano como um ambiente competitivo para DeFi institucional. Embora o valor solicitado, de ₳12,29 milhões, seja significativo, o orçamento nos parece proporcional à complexidade técnica e ao escopo do projeto. Também avaliamos positivamente o fato de a proposta apresentar entregáveis bem definidos por fase, critérios objetivos de verificação, desembolsos condicionados a marcos, auditorias, documentação pública, relatórios periódicos e KPIs mensuráveis. Somado ao compromisso de retorno financeiro à tesouraria — com 20% do EBITDA até a quitação do valor financiado e, posteriormente, 5% de forma perpétua — entendemos que há um bom equilíbrio entre custo, potencial benefício e mecanismos de controle e transparência.
[English]
We chose to vote "YES" on this governance action "Pogun: Capital Without Compromise" (gov_action1w0shrfxqwv95kk0v4cn34wylz25a2cmqkq5jpc0e2yrahhqava3qsuae57l), because we understand that it addresses a strategically relevant opportunity for the Cardano ecosystem: turning Bitcoin into productive capital within the network through credit infrastructure, yield mechanisms, and a bridge with a more robust security model. The proposal has the potential to increase TVL, attract external liquidity, and strengthen Cardano as a competitive environment for institutional DeFi. Although the requested amount of ₳12.29 million is significant, the budget appears proportional to the technical complexity and scope of the project. We also view positively that the proposal presents clearly defined deliverables by phase, objective verification criteria, milestone-based disbursements, audits, public documentation, periodic reporting, and measurable KPIs. Combined with the commitment to provide financial returns to the treasury — 20% of EBITDA until the funded amount is fully repaid, followed by 5% in perpetuity — we understand that there is a strong balance between cost, potential benefit, and mechanisms for control and transparency. - No4M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.8M ₳Rationale
The necessity and opportunity of pulling dormant BTC liquidity over to Cardano, as well as the value of moving the Treasury from only a issuer of grants toward a Sovereign Wealth Fund, overrides the structural and procurement problems I see with this proposal.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I support this proposal with significant reservations, primarily because I believe attracting sidelined Bitcoin liquidity into Cardano is one of the most strategically important near-term opportunities available to the ecosystem.
Cardano needs credible pathways for external capital inflow beyond internal recycling of existing ADA-native liquidity. Bitcoin remains the largest underutilized capital pool in the industry, and I believe building useful, secure, and economically compelling BTC interoperability and credit infrastructure is one of the highest-upside strategic plays currently available to Cardano.
Unlike many speculative ecosystem proposals, this at least targets a market that clearly already exists. The demand for productive BTC capital deployment is real, even if the specific implementation approach still carries substantial uncertainty and execution risk.
I also believe treasury governance should evolve beyond a purely depleting grant model over time. In principle, I would prefer Cardano treasury to increasingly operate more like long-horizon sovereign capital allocation, where the ecosystem can participate in upside from successful ecosystem expansion rather than only distributing irreversible grants.
For that reason, I view the proposal’s attempt to structure funding around milestone-gated deployment and future treasury repayment as directionally positive, even though the current implementation remains institutionally immature.
That said, I want to be very clear that my support is not without major concerns.
The proposal represents a meaningful governance precedent shift toward treasury-funded venture-style investment rather than pure public infrastructure funding. I do not believe Cardano governance yet has sufficiently mature procurement systems, audit infrastructure, enforcement mechanisms, or investment oversight processes for this category of capital allocation.
The proposed EBITDA repayment structure also depends heavily on off-chain operational transparency and good-faith reporting. Treasury currently lacks strong mechanisms for independently auditing or enforcing those obligations in a robust way.
I am also cautious about the complexity and historical risk profile of Bitcoin bridge infrastructure generally. Bridges remain one of the highest-risk categories in the industry, and governance should not minimize those risks simply because the strategic opportunity is attractive.
Additionally, the proposal involves substantial vertical integration across bridge infrastructure, lending systems, and liquidity architecture, which raises long-term questions around ecosystem dependency and concentration if successful.
Despite those concerns, I ultimately believe the asymmetric strategic upside justifies taking measured risk here. Cardano governance will not mature into sophisticated sovereign capital allocation by avoiding all investment-style proposals entirely. Some degree of controlled experimentation is necessary if treasury governance is ever going to evolve beyond simple grant distribution.
Overall, I believe the combination of:
- strategic relevance of BTC liquidity,
- potential ecosystem expansion,
- differentiated market positioning,
- and the proposal’s attempt to introduce repayment mechanics rather than pure subsidy
outweighs the current governance immaturity and execution risks, although those risks remain very real and should be monitored carefully.
- Abstain3.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.1M ₳No rationale
- No3.1M ₳Rationale
I have to vote NO on this proposal in its current form. I think the idea of Pogun is a great one, and something like it should be built out for Cardano to benefit from the potential income stream of the Bitcoin network. Here are my concerns:
As far as I can tell, this proposal is treasury funding for a for-profit company tool that will not be open-sourced. The rationale behind this is:
Most treasury-funded proposals are grants. They fund work, the work ships, and the treasury sees no financial return.
However, this is inaccurate as most current treasury-funded proposals are for open-source ecosystem tooling, maintenance, or advertising. These are all costs that have a social benefit for our ecosystem and are not primarily for-profit enterprises.
If Pogun is going to be so great, why doesn’t IOG just build it with their own funding and ship it as it is a for-profit product anyway?
Since this is a 100% treasury funded ask, I expect IOG to revise the 5% EBITDA yield back to the Cardano treasury to a worthwhile portion, at least 20%.
Also, this revenue return specifically states “5% of EBITDA on Cardano-related products in perpetuity. “ This revenue return should be on all POGUN products, not only Cardano-related products if Cardano is 100% funding POGUN.
Finally, is there going to be a token sold or used for interacting on Pogun? There are no details regarding this, and it is a major concern to take into consideration if so.
Also, in no way should any founding entity, like IOG or its founder Charles Hoskinson publicly attack and pressure Cardano community members and DReps into voting Yes for their proposals. This dishonorable and disrespectful behavior is unbecoming of any leader who wishes to be taken seriously and in turn granted respect.
If this behavior continues in the future, I will be downvoting every proposal by such entities who behave this way as a consequence. Please keep in mind that actions have repercussions.
I also do not appreciate IOG frontrunning the entire Intersect budget process with the intent of claiming the entire NCL for 2026 and leaving nothing for community builders.
- NoRevoted2.8M ₳Rationale
Bitcoin DeFi narrative has failed to produce on all fronts. We have been talking about it for over 2 years, funded multiple initiatives and yet it's still not here. I would like to see IO remain focused on engineering and critical dev work. This seems like an initiative best suited for a community business/project. Scattered focus will continue to lead us down a road of massive expenditure with little results.
I would be more inclined to vote on this if it was a standalone proposal, as I appreciate many details of the proposal.
Earlier votes
No3mo agoSuperseded
Bitcoin DeFi narrative has failed to produce on all fronts. We have been talking about it for over 2 years, funded multiple initiatives and yet it's still not here. I would like to see IO remain focused on engineering and critical dev work. This seems like an initiative best suited for a community business/project. Scattered focus will continue to lead us down a road of massive expenditure with little results.
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- No2.7M ₳No rationale
- Abstain2.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.6M ₳Rationale
Pogunは、BitcoinをCardano上の信用・利回り・流動性市場へ接続し、CardanoをBTC DeFiの有力な拠点にすることを目指す提案です。BTCは最大の暗号資産であり、Cardanoがその流動性の受け皿になれれば、TVL、取引量、外部資本流入へのインパクトは非常に大きいと考えます。非証拠金型の信用市場、Yield DApp、BitVMベースのBTCブリッジを組み合わせる構想は技術的・市場的リスクが高い一方、成功時の波及効果も大きいです。また、EBITDAの20%返済と、その後5%の継続還元というTreasury投資型モデルは、私が考える「Cardano自身がVC的・投資的役割を持つべき」という方向性にも合致します。実装難度と普及リスクはありますが、Cardanoが研究チェーンから市場チェーンへ進化するための挑戦として支持します。
I support Pogun because it aims to connect Bitcoin to Cardano’s credit, yield, and liquidity markets, positioning Cardano as a serious hub for BTC DeFi. BTC is the largest crypto asset, and if Cardano can become a destination for that liquidity, the impact on TVL, transaction activity, and external capital inflow could be significant. The proposal carries technical and market risks, especially around the non-margin credit market, Yield DApp, and BitVM-based BTC bridge. However, I value its treasury investment model, with 20% of EBITDA used for repayment and a 5% perpetual return afterward. This aligns with my view that Cardano should gradually develop a VC-like, investment-oriented role. Despite the risks, I support it as a challenge toward Cardano’s evolution from a research-focused chain into a stronger market-oriented financial ecosystem.
- Yes2.5M ₳No rationale
- No2.5M ₳Rationale
No pogun for you
- No2.3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳Rationale
- Abstain2.1M ₳Rationale
I am voting ABSTAIN on the Pogun proposal because I believe it raises genuinely important strategic questions for the future of Cardano, particularly around Bitcoin integration, BTCfi, liquidity growth and ecosystem capital formation.
I recognise the potential long-term value of bringing Bitcoin liquidity and economic activity into the Cardano ecosystem. I also appreciate that the proposal attempts to move beyond a simple grant model by exploring treasury-alignment concepts such as revenue sharing and repayment mechanisms. I believe this is a positive direction for governance maturity and ecosystem funding design.
However, I also believe this proposal sits in a more commercially oriented category than many of the protocol, infrastructure and public-goods-focused treasury requests currently under consideration.
As a DRep, I am increasingly focused on treasury stewardship, Net Change Limit constraints and the long-term sustainability of treasury allocation decisions. With approximately 13 months remaining in the current NCL window and many competing infrastructure, governance and ecosystem proposals still seeking funding, I am cautious about making strong affirmative allocations toward commercially speculative ecosystem growth initiatives at this stage.
My abstain vote therefore reflects both:
1 respect for the strategic ambition of the proposal,
2 and uncertainty around whether this type of ecosystem venture-style funding should currently be prioritised over more foundational public infrastructure and governance-critical ecosystem layers.I believe Cardano governance is still collectively evolving its framework for how treasury funding should interact with commercially monetisable ecosystem businesses, particularly around:
1 repayment structures,
2 revenue-sharing models,
3 treasury participation in upside,
4 and long-term ecosystem capital allocation strategy.I would welcome continued discussion and refinement in this area as Cardano governance matures further.
- Yes2M ₳No rationale