Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit.
Discussed in the Governance Review for epochs 650 to 652.
125 DReps voted · 59 with a rationale · 2 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 2 to no, together voting with 40.2M ₳ of voting power.
Voting concentration
5 of 125 DReps cast half of the voted power.
Largest voter 14.4%, top 5 combined 53.4% of 3.2B ₳ voted.
The 26 largest voters together held as much voting power as the 67.0% threshold required in yes votes.
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳Rationale
私は本Treasury Withdrawalに賛成します。
本提案は、Cardanoのオンチェーンガバナンス導入初期に提出された「Cardanoの生きがい - Ikigai -」Info Actionにおいて、実装上の問題により回収不能となった100,000 ADAのdepositと、その間のstaking rewards相当額3,000 ADAを返還するものです。
これは通常の損失補償ではなく、制度自身が生じさせた明確な損失を、透明なガバナンス手続で修復する措置と考えます。このような是正能力は、成熟した分散型ガバナンスに必要と考えます。
I vote YES on this Treasury Withdrawal.
This proposal reimburses the 100,000 ADA deposit that became unrecoverable due to an implementation issue involving the “Cardano no Ikigai - Ikigai -” Info Action, submitted during the early stage of Cardano’s on-chain governance, along with 3,000 ADA in estimated staking rewards.
I see this not as ordinary compensation for a loss, but as a measure to correct a clear loss caused by the governance system itself through a transparent governance process. This ability to correct such problems is important for a mature decentralized governance system.
- Yes2.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.5M ₳Rationale
yes of course - it is a travesty that we have not done this yet
- Yes2.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.2M ₳Rationale
Give them their money back. This has drug on too long as it is.
- Yes2.1M ₳Rationale
I vote YES to reimburse the Ikigai Info Governance Action deposit.
This is not a conventional Treasury funding request. It is a narrow restitution for an exceptional issue that occurred during the earliest weeks of Cardano's on-chain governance.
The original Ikigai Info Action was submitted in September 2024 with the required 100,000 ADA governance deposit. The governance tooling at the time permitted an unregistered stake credential to be specified as the deposit return address, resulting in the otherwise refundable deposit becoming inaccessible when the action concluded.
I do not believe an early governance participant should permanently lose 100,000 ADA because the governance system accepted a return configuration that could not successfully return the deposit.
Importantly, the current withdrawal sends the funds directly to the same reward credential specified by the original Ikigai governance action. This provides an on-chain and cryptographically enforceable link to the original affected party and removes the need to trust an intermediary.
The additional 3,000 ADA intended to compensate for foregone staking rewards is more open to debate, but I consider it modest and proportionate given the period for which the original 100,000 ADA has remained inaccessible.
This should not establish a general precedent for using the Treasury to compensate ordinary user errors, investment losses, failed projects or third-party incidents.
The circumstances here are exceptional: this occurred during the earliest phase of Cardano governance, the system accepted the problematic credential, the loss is objectively identifiable on-chain, the recipient is verifiable, and the remedy is a single direct payment with no ongoing programme, execution or delivery risk.
This issue has remained unresolved for far too long.
Making the original participant whole is fair, proportionate and supportive of trust in Cardano's governance system.
I therefore vote YES.
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳Rationale
The loss of the deposit was due to a bug, it should be returned.
- No1.6M ₳Rationale
As I’ve stated before, I’ll only approve the reimbursement of the 100k ada, not the additional 3k ada for ‘lost staking rewards’.
Also, I would prefer the original deposit stake key to be added as a required signer, proving both that Ikigai stands behind this reimbursement and that they still have access to that key. This won’t be a requirement for me to approve, though.
- Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳Rationale
I vote yes, as I did last time, for the same reason.
"The 100k ADA repayment is of course a given. I gladly agree to the interest rate."
- Yes1.2M ₳Rationale
I vote YES on "Reimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit" because the 100,000 ADA deposit was lost in an early governance tooling failure rather than through ordinary proposal risk. The withdrawal credential matches the credential of the original Ikigai InfoAction, so the principal is technically traceable to the affected address. I consider the extra 3,000 ADA for estimated staking rewards a weak and opportunistic addition, since normal governance deposits do not earn staking rewards. Still, this small amount should not block a narrow correction; it must not create a precedent for interest, price-loss, or opportunity-cost claims.
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳Rationale
Compensation for unrecoverable deposit for an info action caused by teething problems with the early governance system. Previous efforts seeking a refund of the deposit did not receive enough support from the community. Lost staking rewards should be refunded as recompense for the shameful apathy of the community to this issue.
- Yes1.2M ₳Rationale
Yes, refund the glitch!
- Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.1M ₳Rationale
This is the third or fourth time I have assessed the same 100K ADA loss. The destination is legitimate, the original deposit is unrecoverable through the normal protocol path, and the loss resulted from an early node defect involving an unregistered stake key. Cardano’s governance design treats the deposit as refundable once an action leaves the live state. The submitter should not be sentenced indefinitely for the protocol’s childhood mistakes.
I remain unconvinced by the additional 3K ADA. Staking rewards vary, yet the proposal applies a tidy 2% annual assumption to funds that were never available for delegation. Compensating opportunity cost would create a precedent future claimants will quote with admirable persistence.
The choice is approving a modestly inflated reimbursement or prolonging a dispute whose governance cost already exceeds the disputed 3K ADA.
Cardano should repay the deposit, record the exception, and stop convening parliament over a rounding error.
- Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes1M ₳No rationale
- Yes951.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes927.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes926K ₳No rationale
- Yes877.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes866.3K ₳No rationale
- No829.9K ₳Rationale
We previously voted no on this same proposal and can't find any differences in the content so we will maintain our position. We do not support creating the precedent of paying for the rewards. The time passed since the original proposal is purely the proposer's responsibility.
Having said this we do support reimbursing the 100k deposit. - Yes796.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes742.7K ₳Rationale
Vote: YES
I support reimbursing the original 100,000 ADA deposit. The loss was caused by a node-level bug that allowed an unregistered stake key to submit a governance action — not by any error on the submitter's part. Reimbursing a loss caused by a protocol defect is a reasonable use of the treasury, and the submitter's status as an early participant in on-chain governance only strengthens the case.
I have reservations about the additional 3,000 ADA proposed as compensation for lost staking rewards. My concern isn't the amount, but the precedent: once the treasury begins compensating opportunity cost alongside principal, future proposals will have grounds to claim similar time-value losses from any bug-related delay, with no clear boundary on how far that logic extends.
I'd have preferred to vote on the principal and the opportunity-cost compensation separately. Since that option isn't available here, I'm voting YES on the strength of the principal reimbursement, while registering that I don't think opportunity-cost compensation should become a standing practice without a clearer, bounded policy for when it applies.
DRep Delegation Info
- CIP-1694 DRep ID:
drep1y28xhrjxe496rnle8ln3slpggnp8leu3mn244ujrhwet0cc2vmte4 - Legacy DRep ID (CIP-105):
drep13e4cu3kdfwsul7fluuv8c2zycfl70ywu64d0ysamk2m7xrv7rsv
- CIP-1694 DRep ID:
- Yes622K ₳Rationale
I am voting yes on this proposal because it’s fair to reimburse the depositor’s 100k $ADA that was lost due to some errors in the code during the early stages of Cardano’s onchain governance.
- Yes604.7K ₳Rationale
- Yes591.1K ₳Rationale
We have the ability to refund this early governance action, to support someone who was in the trenches in the early days.
- Yes579.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes568K ₳Rationale
Yes Remimburse Ikigai info governance Action Deposit
- No379.5K ₳Rationale
There was an unsuccessful governance action with the same goal just a few epochs ago. Please refrain from voting until you like the result.
The proposers of the silly symbolic Ikigai info action that glorified some really horrible people, Hoskinson among them, should have known the risks and researched what they have to do before putting their deposit up. Like everywhere in blockchain, it's their and only their responsibility.
- Yes379.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes356.1K ₳Rationale
This reimbursement is long overdue. Send the deposit plus its lost staking rewards back to the original address and let it be done.
- Yes342.8K ₳Rationale
As last time - this is a reimbursement of funds so it is an exception to my policy of treasury protection.
- Yes297K ₳Rationale
We should have done this a long time ago. I'm ashamed we have not resolved this situation.
- Yes288.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes285.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes275.2K ₳Rationale
This proposal reimburses the 100,000 ADA deposit lost by the submitter of the early Ikigai Info governance action because an early Cardano-node defect permitted an unregistered stake credential to be used as the deposit-return address, preventing normal recovery of the refundable deposit. The 103,000 ADA request consists of the lost principal plus a modest stated allowance for foregone staking rewards. The payment is immediate, direct, and publicly auditable on chain, with no continuing operational obligation or administrative custody. This is a proportionate resolution of a discrete loss caused by early governance-system behavior rather than proposer misconduct, and I therefore vote Yes.
- Yes260.8K ₳Rationale
Voting YES. Fair reimbursement for an early governance pioneer who lost their deposit due to a verified node bug.
- Abstain257K ₳No rationale
- Yes236.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes210.1K ₳Rationale
I voted YES on the proposal to reimburse the Ikigai governance action deposit.
I initially withheld my vote because I did not believe the proposal, on its own, provided enough evidence to justify reimbursement from the Cardano Treasury. When treasury funds are involved, especially in cases involving an individual loss or mistaken transaction, I believe DReps should require clear and independently verifiable evidence before approving reimbursement.
Following additional discussion, supporting information was provided that clarified the relationship between the original governance action, the deposit address, and the relevant withdrawal activity. After reviewing that information, I believe there is sufficient evidence to establish that the reimbursement request is legitimate.
It is also important to distinguish between a protocol failure and user error.
Based on the information provided, this does not appear to have been a Cardano protocol bug or a failure of the governance system itself. Rather, the loss appears to have resulted from user error within functionality that is operating according to the current CIP-1694 design and specification.
That distinction materially affected my decision.
I do not believe the Cardano Treasury should become an automatic insurance mechanism for mistakes made by users. Establishing such an expectation could create an unhealthy precedent in which ordinary operational errors are routinely transferred to the broader community.
However, governance also requires judgment. Not every situation can be reduced to a rigid rule without considering the specific facts involved.
In this instance, the circumstances have been documented sufficiently, the relevant transactions and addresses can be examined, and the amount being requested corresponds to the governance action deposit involved. I therefore believe reimbursement is reasonable and proportionate.
My support should not be interpreted as establishing a general policy that every lost governance deposit should be reimbursed. Future requests should continue to be evaluated individually and should meet a meaningful evidentiary standard.
At minimum, I believe reimbursement requests should demonstrate:
A clearly identifiable governance action and deposit.
Verifiable transaction history linking the funds to the claimant.
A credible explanation of how the funds became inaccessible or were lost.
Evidence sufficient for independent review by DReps and the community.
A reimbursement amount directly tied to the demonstrated loss.
No indication of fraud, manipulation, or an attempt to shift ordinary financial risk onto the Treasury.This proposal now satisfies those concerns sufficiently for me.
An important part of responsible governance is also being willing to change a preliminary position when new evidence becomes available. My initial concern was the absence of adequate supporting information. Once members of the community provided additional context and evidence, continuing to oppose the proposal simply because I had previously expressed skepticism would have served no useful governance principle.
DRep voting should be based on evidence, not attachment to an earlier position.
For those reasons, I believe approving this reimbursement is fair, reasonable, and consistent with responsible treasury governance.
Vote: YES
- Yes189.8K ₳No rationale