Tempo for Cardono Governance - Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025
203 DReps voted · 57 with a rationale · 13 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- YesChanged10.8M ₳History
Earlier votes
No1y agoSuperseded
- Abstain8.8M ₳Rationale
Tempo.Voteが取り組んできた、モバイルフレンドリーなUI/UXや独立インフラを通じてガバナンス参加の裾野を広げようとする方向性には共感します。ただし本提案においては、資金の管理方法、開発体制、成果に関する客観的な指標など、依然として不透明な点が多く、判断に必要な情報が十分とは言えません。今後の改善に期待しつつ、今回は棄権とさせていただきます。\n\nI appreciate the direction Tempo.Vote has taken in aiming to broaden participation in governance through mobile-friendly UI/UX and independent infrastructure. However, this proposal still lacks sufficient clarity regarding fund management, development structure, and objective indicators of outcomes, making it difficult to make a fully informed decision. While I hope to see improvements in the future, I will abstain from voting on this proposal at this time.
- Abstain8.1M ₳No rationale
- No7.6M ₳Rationale
English version. The Japanese translation is below the English version.
英語版。日本語訳は英語版の下にあります。
Let me prefact this vote with this comment: I like what Tempo.vote contributed to Cardano governance. They provided an alternative way of voting for DReps and were very proactive in improving their platform. I regularly pinged them with problems over their Telegram group and they would respond usually in 24 hours max and fix the issue. I have a profile on Tempo.vote - so I am appreciative of what they have contributed. I am even going to submit this vote over Tempo.vote.
Now that they built the product, they should probably consider the big picture future for Tempo. I was leaning to vote YES on a Tempo governance action - as Cardano governance (Minimum Viable - lets be truthful) is one of the key distinguishing features of Cardano. However, several problems in this budget are preventing me from doing this.
I want to be clear that this is not just about this proposal. We are setting precedents in Cardano governance with every vote. So, I would rather that we set positive precedents (better budgetary proposal actions now) - than make exceptions (weaker budgetary info actions) that may lead to more issues down the line as they proliferate.
I do not see any committment in this proposal to make it open source with a specific license and a definite date to do so. Not saying it is obligatory, but unless there are some extenuating circumstances - it makes it more difficult for me to vote YES - as governance is a key component of running Cardano. Locking governance into proprietary tools - requires a deeper explanation and rationale - especially if it is to be financed from the Treasury. Not saying that there is no argument to be made there, but the proposal lacks any argumentation on this topic. I want to see a future roadmap for Tempo - as we could see Tempo pack up and go after the 6 month period (1 Aug 2025 - 31 Jan 2026) that they are requesting funding for. And there would be no public good left after they leave.
The financial numbers should be disaggregated and could quote specific rates, identify roles and also look forward towards the financial future of Tempo and what are the plans downstream.
I find the entire proposal a bit light-weight - and it is much less comprehensive than a typical Project Catalyst proposal. This is a Treasury Budget proposal and should be more - rather than less detailed.
Tempo.Vote tackles a real usability gap. Overall, I'd say the proposal seems - with the current sparse information - over-budgeted and under-specified. Committing to open-source transparency - with a clear future strategy - will significantly raise its chance of a Yes in the on-chain vote, in my view. However, that is just personal feedback.
Some more background about the administrator Selfdriven would have been helpful, as I am not aware of this company - although I recognize one or two Cardano community names from their webpage.Japanese translation via Google Translate:
Google翻訳による日本語翻訳：
この投票の前に、一言付け加えさせてください。Tempo.voteがCardanoガバナンスに貢献してくれたことに感謝しています。彼らはDRepsへの投票方法を提供し、プラットフォームの改善にも積極的に取り組んでくれました。私はTelegramグループで定期的に問題を報告していましたが、通常24時間以内に返信があり、問題を解決してくれました。私はTempo.voteにプロフィールを登録しているので、彼らの貢献に感謝しています。この投票もTempo.voteから提出するつもりです。
製品を構築した今、彼らはTempoの将来像を大局的に検討すべきでしょう。Cardanoガバナンス（正直に言って、最小限の実行可能なもの）はCardanoの重要な特徴の一つであるため、Tempoのガバナンスアクションには賛成票を投じようと考えていました。しかし、この予算にはいくつかの問題があり、賛成を阻んでいます。
これはこの提案だけの問題ではないことを明確にしておきたいと思います。私たちは、すべての投票を通してCardanoガバナンスの先例を作っています。したがって、例外（予算情報に関する対応が弱まる）を設けて、将来的に問題が拡大するリスクを高めるよりも、前向きな前例（より良い予算提案）を作る方が良いと思います。この提案には、特定のライセンスと明確な日付でオープンソース化するという確約は見当たりません。義務だと言っているわけではありませんが、特別な事情がない限り、ガバナンスはCardano運営の重要な要素であるため、賛成票を投じることは難しくなります。ガバナンスを独自のツールに縛り付けるには、より深い説明と根拠が必要です。特に財務省からの資金提供となる場合はなおさらです。議論の余地がないと言っているわけではありませんが、この提案にはこの点に関する議論が欠けています。Tempoの将来のロードマップを見たいです。資金を要請している6ヶ月間（2025年8月1日から2026年1月31日）後にTempoが撤退する可能性もあるからです。そして、彼らが撤退した後には公共の利益は何も残らないでしょう。
財務数値は細分化され、具体的なレートを引用し、役割を特定し、Tempoの財務的な将来像と今後の計画について言及できる必要があります。
提案全体がやや軽薄で、典型的なProject Catalystの提案よりもはるかに包括的ではありません。これは財務予算案であり、詳細度が低いのではなく、より詳細であるべきです。
Tempo.Voteは、ユーザビリティのギャップを埋めるものです。全体として、現状の情報が乏しいため、この提案は予算超過で詳細度が不足しているように思われます。明確な将来戦略とともにオープンソースの透明性にコミットすることで、オンチェーン投票で賛成される可能性が大幅に高まると私は考えています。ただし、これはあくまで個人的な意見です。
管理者であるSelfdrivenについて、もう少し背景情報があれば助かります。この会社についてはよく知りませんが、ウェブサイトでCardanoコミュニティの名前をいくつか見覚えがあります。 - No7.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.9M ₳Rationale
I want to support Tempo for another year and see where they go with development. I think we're still in a crucial time to see these tools get built out and offer different takes on the overall UX. There's the added benefit that the total amount of ADA asked for is to support a fee-based lending pool for submitting future gov actions. The 2026 plan for Tempo is still ambitious at an estimated 400K (per their feedback), however that assumes further development of the portal. It would be half as much if it was just for maintenance. Some more time will tell us whether there's demand for conintued support as other APIs are developed, additional open-source tooling becomes available, and community feedback on what ultimately users want to see. I have found Tempo useful as a DRep, and am voting in favor of their budget.
- YesChanged5.8M ₳History
Earlier votes
No1y agoSuperseded
- Yes5.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.3M ₳No rationale
- No5.3M ₳Rationale
STORM Partners initially registered as a DRep via Tempo.vote, so we recognize the project’s importance and value to the ecosystem.
That said, despite our support for its mission, we are voting No on this proposal for the following reasons: it lacks detailed budget justification, defined milestones, and on-chain accountability mechanisms. The absence of transparency, delivery guarantees, and alignment with Cardano’s constitutional guardrails undermines its legitimacy.
As one of the first governance actions, we believe it is essential to set a strong precedent. We expect a higher level of transparency, depth, and justification in future governance actions, even for “temp check” info actions.
- Yes4.7M ₳No rationale
- No4.6M ₳No rationale
- No4.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.1M ₳Rationale
[Portuguese]
Optamos por votar "Sim" nesta ação de governança (gov_action1f9da8n2yaf4updxzmwc7fnw8ug2gwnpvqays5n3yw6nz0mu3z2qqq6ggge9), pois a plataforma Tempo.vote desempenha um papel relevante de fornecer uma ferramenta alternativa de governança, com funcionalidades únicas e diferenciais, contribuindo para o amadurecimento da participação da comunidade, e na proposta conseguiram expressar como o financiamento será utilizado. Financiar este tipo de iniciativa de construtores Cardano merece todo apoio e estímulo.
[English]
We chose to vote "Yes" on this governance action (gov_action1f9da8n2yaf4updxzmwc7fnw8ug2gwnpvqays5n3yw6nz0mu3z2qqq6ggge9), because the Tempo.vote platform plays an important role in providing an alternative governance tool, with unique and distinctive features, contributing to the maturation of community participation, and in the proposal they were able to clearly express how the funding will be used. Funding this type of initiative from Cardano builders deserves full support and encouragement. - Yes4M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted3.8M ₳Rationale
Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals
The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.
⸻
Cardano: State of Play
The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.
The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.
Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.
However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.
⸻
Fiscal Philosophy
I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.
Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.
⸻
Approach to the Budget Process
This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.
Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.
I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.
However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.
⸻
Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source
Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.
Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.
⸻
Additional Beliefs and Disclosures
I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.
I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.
Earlier votes
Yes11mo agoSuperseded
Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals
The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.
⸻
Cardano: State of Play
The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.
The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.
Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.
However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.
⸻
Fiscal Philosophy
I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.
Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.
⸻
Approach to the Budget Process
This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.
Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.
I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.
However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.
⸻
Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source
Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.
Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.
⸻
Additional Beliefs and Disclosures
I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.
I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.
- Yes3.8M ₳Rationale
Supporting decentralized infra and mobile governance aligns with my values as a DRep. The budget is reasonable and the roadmap includes meaningful features like a lending pool. I vote YES, while encouraging a clearer roadmap, more transparency, and strong safeguards to prevent misuse of the lending system.
- No3.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.1M ₳Rationale
The amount requested by Tempo is reasonable for the time frame and product/work to be delivered. Tempo.vote serves as a much better and more cost effective alternative to gov.tools, and the team has proven to be trustworthy. They will use community funds responsibly to deliver for Cardano.
This proposal also falls within my personal NCL of 250,000,000 ADA.
- No3M ₳No rationale
- No2.8M ₳Rationale
As a developer and DevOps specialist, I believe the requested amount is significantly overestimated and does not reflect the actual needs of a project of this type.
I also run an independent node and indexer. The Medusa cluster consists of 5 servers: one server running cardano-db-sync with 12 cores and 64 GB of RAM; three servers running cardano-node, providing redundancy and data to the db-sync, each with 8 cores and 24 GB of RAM; and a frontend server with 4 cores and 4 GB of RAM. Each server is connected to a reliable 2 Gbps channel.
The cluster operates stably and without interruption, serving around 600 unique users per day on average, with peaks reaching 1,000 at epoch boundaries. While that may not sound like a lot, wallet synchronization happens continuously, and in reality, the cluster processes tens or even hundreds of thousands of requests daily — even when users take no active actions after logging in.
I pay around $100 per month in total for this infrastructure.
You are requesting approximately $20,000 per month for infrastructure, based on the current exchange rate.
Even if all 948 DReps registered in the Cardano network — and we both know that’s objectively impossible — accessed your service and voted, it wouldn’t produce even 1% of the load my cluster handles. That’s assuming they all logged in and voted on the same day, which is also highly unrealistic. Voting events are infrequent and spread over time. Yes, nodes and db-sync do operate between voting periods as well — but so do mine, even when nobody is accessing them. Three nodes and one db-sync — all for $100 per month.
So my answer is “NO.”
- NoChanged2.8M ₳Rationale
Love the tool, hate the proposal. Would love to see a better defined output for us to digest as DReps.
Earlier votes
Abstain1y agoSuperseded
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- Abstain2.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.6M ₳Rationale
私はこの提案に賛成（Yes）します。
Tempo.Voteは、スマートフォンからのガバナンス参加を可能にする数少ないツールの一つであり、Cardanoのオンチェーンガバナンスをより身近なものにしています。ノードとインデクサーを独自運用し、中央集権的サービスに依存しない設計は、分散型ガバナンスの理念とも合致しています。
特に、モバイル端末からの提案提出・投票・結果確認の一貫対応は、広範なADAホルダーにとって非常に有用です。現時点で公式ウォレットであるLaceにモバイル版が存在しない中、Tempoはそのギャップを埋め、より多くのユーザーの参加を後押しする重要な存在となっています。
また、Lending Pool構想も、小規模保有者の声を政策に反映させるための仕組みとして期待できます。
Cardanoのガバナンスを真にグローバルで包摂的なものにしていくために、Tempoのようなユーザー起点のツールの進化は不可欠です。
I support (Yes) this proposal.
Tempo.Vote is one of the few tools enabling governance participation from mobile devices, bringing Cardano’s on-chain governance closer to everyday users. Its independent operation of nodes and indexers—without reliance on centralized infrastructure—aligns with the principles of decentralized governance.
In particular, its seamless mobile experience for submitting proposals, voting, and checking results is highly beneficial to the broader ADA holder base. Given that the official wallet, Lace, currently lacks a mobile version, Tempo plays a critical role in filling that gap and encouraging broader participation from the community.
Additionally, the Lending Pool concept holds promise as a mechanism to amplify the voices of smaller holders in the governance process.
To make Cardano governance truly global and inclusive, the evolution of user-driven tools like Tempo is essential. - Yes2.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.5M ₳Rationale
YES BUILD - THAT LOADING SCREEN IS AWFUL
- Abstain2.3M ₳No rationale
- No2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- Abstain2.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- No2M ₳No rationale
- Yes2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale
- AbstainRevoted1.8M ₳Rationale
Voting Abstain on this info action as while I support Tempo (currently using it to vote) there is very minimal detail on how the funds will be used.
A 380k ADA ask for 6 months is quite significant so there needs to be more detail on how the funds will be used to justify the expense. I would also be keen to see a commitment to open source products if Tempo wants to use the treasury to fund operations.
Earlier votes
Abstain1y agoSuperseded
- No1.8M ₳Rationale
I am voting No on the proposal to withdraw funds for “Tempo for Cardano Governance – Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025.” While governance tooling is important, this proposal presents an overly high operational budget without sufficient justification or demonstrated cost-efficiency. It raises a broader concern about whether ongoing operational expenses—like hosting, maintenance, and staffing—should be funded by the Treasury at all, rather than focusing Treasury resources on ecosystem development and innovation. Additionally, the proposal lacks a clear, enforceable commitment to open-source licensing and transparency, which are essential for community governance tools. Without strong guarantees around accessibility, reuse, and decentralization of the platform, I cannot support this request.
- Abstain1.7M ₳No rationale
- NoChanged1.7M ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes11mo agoSuperseded
- Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
- No1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- No1.6M ₳No rationale
- No1.5M ₳Rationale
For now, I understand we should focus in one Governance tool, focusing funds in one.
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale