Withdraw ₳12,000,000 for Cardano Builder DAO administered by Intersect
189 DReps voted · 65 with a rationale · 5 changed their vote · 3 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 4 to yes, 1 to abstain, together voting with 92.8M ₳ of voting power.
- Yes9.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain8.9M ₳Rationale
RCADA has chosen to** abstain at this time while reserving the option to review and update this vote prior to the voting deadline**. This approach allows RCADA to allocate focus where immediate evaluation is most impactful, particularly on proposals that are close to threshold or raise significant procedural or constitutional concerns. If this proposal reaches the approv-al threshold prior to our review, the abstention will stand as a neutral signal of deferral, not op-position. Should further analysis be warranted, RCADA will update this vote accordingly.
- No7.7M ₳No rationale
- NoRevoted7.6M ₳Rationale
I have voted NO for this proposal in Ekklesia and then voted over Tempo, however my rationale has not been added - not sure why. Alas, I didn't save the rationale, so this is a novel effort to write it up - as I try to accompany every vote with a rationale.
I maintain my NO vote on this proposal.I have voted NO for this proposal in Ekklesia and then voted over Tempo, however my rationale has not been added - not sure why. Alas, I didn't save the rationale, so this is a novel effort to write it up - as I try to accompany every vote with a rationale.
I maintain my NO vote on this proposal. Let me preface this rationale with information that I think that the Cardano Builder DAO (CB DAO) is a worthwile idea and that the members are many renounced builders.
One issue here is whether DReps divest their responsibility to disburse Treasury funds to a DAO that will then manage the treasury allocation based on principles that it sets. The DAO states it wants to "support the application-layer growth of the Cardano ecosystem". This is necessary, of course.
The DAo wants to provide sustainable financial backing and strategic oversight to high-impact projects. I agree with the oversight part.
I disagree with the conclusion that "there remains a substantial gap in ongoing support for live, user-facing products/services." The Treasury mechanism in now live and DReps are participating in minimal viable governance.
As DReps we already have accepted the idea of having middlemen in the form of Budget Administrators - which are needed. There is no need to devolve DRep powers to multiple DAOs - that will be allocated funding. DReps represent the wider interests of the entire ADA holding community, DAOs represent the interests of the DAO members.
For example this very Cardano Builder DAO proposal proves that it is already possible to apply for Treasury Funding directly - I think that direct applications are better especially in these early days of governance. Namely, DReps have a mandate to look at proposals holistically, from the point of view of ADA holders, SPOs, the ecosystem interests and the needs of the application-layer.
Cardano Builder DAO proposes to use a transparent governance framework, strict accountability mechanisms, and a metrics-first funding approach. However, I think that on-chain governance already provides us with new opportunities, as well as initatives such as Project Catalyst.
I would not be in favour of derogating DRep responsibilities to mutliple DAOs, as if I vote YES to this proposals I would find it difficult to say NO to a second and third DAO applying for a fruther ₳12,000,000 or ₳20,000,000.
I think that governance decisions relating to allocating Treasury Funds should in principle be performed by DReps primarily, unless there are other circumstances that warrant it.
The proposals states that it "seeks to address the lack of dedicated, sustainable financial support", however I would point towards the examples of Gov Tool that was not approved as part of the Intersect Ekllesia process, but still applied with a budget governance info action and if approved it will move to the Treasury Withdrawal stage.
I think that there is now a dedicated source of financial support for projects that are deemed to be worthy of it. Maybe Cardano Builder DAO should think of coming with a proposal for specific projects - individually or in small groupings.Still, I am not in favour of DReps - at this moment for sure - entrusting a DAO to choose what should be financed among their member projects with Treasury funding.
Many of CB DAO projects are stellar with exceptional devs and they have projects already live on mainnet. Having a CB DAO is a worthwile initiative - but I do not favour allocating ₳12,000,000 to create a new funding structure through CB DAO - that does not involve direct DRep approvals of such withdrawals / funding.Maybe rethink the approach. Finally, I would point out that there are many Devs and Dev teams that are active as DReps and I am sure that their endorsement for all and any projects supporting the application-layer growth of the Cardano ecosystem - would be widely heard by the entire DRep group.
There is opportunity to apply directly to the Treasury by such projects or a group of projects - for specific needs. I prefer that to a delegation of such decisions by DReps to one or multiple member-based DAOs.
Earlier votes
No1y agoSuperseded
- Yes7.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.5M ₳Rationale
The Builder DAO initiative is a promising endeavor to unite our ecosystem's brightest minds and streamline bureaucracy in the Voltaire era. The team's thoughtful response to Cardano Yoda's insightful and constructive criticism has convinced me of their dedication and aligned incentives, earning my support.
- Yes5.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain5.3M ₳Rationale
STORM Partners is abstaining on this proposal. We respect and appreciate the Builders DAO team, and we acknowledge the many members behind the initiative which have delivered real value to the ecosystem. However, our approach is to abstain on proposals that may have strong community backing but don’t yet present clear strategic value or sufficient delivery confidence for us. In this case, concerns remain around the lack of detailed budget breakdowns, internal-only governance structures, and an unproven execution model at this scale. We acknowledge the potential, but we prefer to abstain on this one.
- Yes5.2M ₳No rationale
- No5.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.1M ₳No rationale
- No4.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.8M ₳Rationale
Supporting killer apps in the ecosystem is crucial.
Supporting killer apps in the ecosystem is crucial.
- Yes4.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.5M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted4M ₳Rationale
First, I believe this proposal began with positive and meritocratic intentions. However, as someone trained in investigating fraud, I am skeptical of how this will evolve over time—particularly the risk of it devolving into an “old boys’ club” siphoning public funds for the benefit of insiders. Unfortunately, that is the historical pattern in similar systems outside of blockchain.
That said, this concern is tempered by a fundamental question: how do we expect teams building critical infrastructure for what should ultimately become a public utility to survive today? Especially in a context where the market is immature, the funding environment unstable, and governance still finding its footing.
I’ve decided to vote in favor of this proposal in order to give it a chance to fulfill its stated goals. It is a bet on the economic viability of building on Cardano—while the broader ecosystem works toward long-term sustainability through real adoption and meaningful fee revenue. In that light, I view this as a form of public funding for development-stage research and tooling.
At the same time, I remain skeptical. I will be looking for measurable success and demonstrable value before supporting future budget requests. I do not believe indefinite draws from the treasury are viable. If this becomes a long-term subsidy model, it will erode the very ecosystem it’s trying to build. I would far prefer a market-based mechanism: teams should raise capital in exchange for future expected returns, as is done in venture funding.
For me, this proposal would be considered successful if this budget serves as a short-term bridge—one that is gradually phased out within 1–2 years. Over that time, I would like to see it evolve into a publicly seeded investment vehicle: one that funds builders with an expectation of returns, not a welfare model of indefinite grants.
Earlier votes
Yes1y agoSuperseded
First, I believe this proposal began with positive and meritocratic intentions. However, as someone trained in investigating fraud, I am skeptical of how this will evolve over time—particularly the risk of it devolving into an “old boys’ club” siphoning public funds for the benefit of insiders. Unfortunately, that is the historical pattern in similar systems outside of blockchain.
That said, this concern is tempered by a fundamental question: how do we expect teams building critical infrastructure for what should ultimately become a public utility to survive today? Especially in a context where the market is immature, the funding environment unstable, and governance still finding its footing.
I’ve decided to vote in favor of this proposal in order to give it a chance to fulfill its stated goals. It is a bet on the economic viability of building on Cardano—while the broader ecosystem works toward long-term sustainability through real adoption and meaningful fee revenue. In that light, I view this as a form of public funding for development-stage research and tooling.
At the same time, I remain skeptical. I will be looking for measurable success and demonstrable value before supporting future budget requests. I do not believe indefinite draws from the treasury are viable. If this becomes a long-term subsidy model, it will erode the very ecosystem it’s trying to build. I would far prefer a market-based mechanism: teams should raise capital in exchange for future expected returns, as is done in venture funding.
For me, this proposal would be considered successful if this budget serves as a short-term bridge—one that is gradually phased out within 1–2 years. Over that time, I would like to see it evolve into a publicly seeded investment vehicle: one that funds builders with an expectation of returns, not a welfare model of indefinite grants.
- Yes4M ₳No rationale
- No3.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain3.6M ₳No rationale
- YesChanged3.5M ₳Rationale
After in-depth discussions during RareEvo and an analysis of the proposal, I have reconsiderend and decided to change my vote from 'abstain' to 'yes'.
Earlier votes
Abstain1y agoSuperseded
- Yes3.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes3M ₳Rationale
I initially voted no for this proposal during the Ekklesia voting process as I felt other proposals were more deserving of budget allocation.
Since not all of my selected proposals made it into the treasury withdrawal process, I have extra room in my personal NCL.
After further research and listening to the CBDAO Megaspace, I am convinced that this service will be a worthwhile contribution to the Cardano 2025 Budget:
https://x.com/atrium_lab/status/1950586973623599283
I have changed my vote to YES for this proposal, and it fits within my personal NCL of 250,000,000 ADA.
- No2.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳Rationale
TVLや実取引の増加に貢献する稼働中のdAppsに対し、スマートコントラクトベースで資金支援するDAOモデルは、アプリ層の定常的な成長に資する合理的な仕組みです。ガバナンス設計と財務運用が適切に機能し、既存の初期開発支援と補完関係にあることを確認のうえ、賛成します。
This proposal establishes a DAO-driven funding mechanism targeting active dApps contributing to Cardano’s adoption and TVL. It fills a critical gap between protocol development and sustained application-layer growth. Given its smart contract-based governance and complementarity to existing funding mechanisms, I vote in favor.
- Yes2.6M ₳No rationale
- No2.5M ₳Rationale
У нас уже есть Catalyst. У нас уже есть Withdrwal proposials. Я не думаю, что экосистеме нужен еще дополнительный "фонд" с непрозрачными правилами управления и распределения средств.
- Yes2.5M ₳No rationale
- No2.5M ₳Rationale
We have too many middle men on trying to support builders. We have dreps ready to vote at all times, I see no reason to prop up another DAO. Go to catalyst as well. This is just not needed for minimum viable governance.
- Yes2.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- No1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳Rationale
Voting Yes. This proposal establishes a DAO-based funding mechanism for live Cardano projects driving on-chain activity. It supports sustainable ecosystem growth by helping projects scale.
- Yes1.6M ₳Rationale
I decided to vote ✅ YES on 37 treasury withdrawals, ➖ ABSTAIN on none, and ❌ NO on 2 treasury withdrawals from the Intersect 2025 budget.
It’s obvious I consider all proposals I approved in the budget vote on Ekklesia beneficial for Cardano, so those all receive a ✅ YES vote.
I also vote ✅ YES for most proposals I initially abstained from or voted against in the Ekklesia vote. There are a few reasons for this:
- Some proposals gained strong community support after all, so I don’t want to be the one standing in the way, especially when the requested amount is negligible in the bigger picture.
- Some proposals I actually liked, but I found them more suitable for Catalyst. However, with all the delays, it now makes more sense to fund them as soon as possible.
- Some didn’t get my initial support because I thought the requested amount was too high. But I now believe it’s better for the ecosystem to fund them, despite the larger budget, than not fund them at all.
- I needed to vote for budget proposals with my own NCL in mind. Not all those I approved made it, however, so that leaves some room for other ones.
I won’t approve the treasury withdrawal for two proposals:
❌ Withdraw ₳3,000,000 for High-yield RWA Asset for Cardano: Tokenized Real Estate
This proposal won’t bring much value to our ecosystem, imho.❌ Withdraw ₳1,500,000 for Complement Catalyst: Extended Quadratic Funding---Zero Operational Costs
While the proposal includes some interesting ideas for a fairer voting mechanism, I now support Catalyst and don’t see the need for an additional funding system at this moment, especially considering total spending. The requested amount also seems too small to meaningfully fund multiple projects. While the model relies on donations, it’s unclear what the donor incentive is. Since voting power is tied to donation size, why wouldn’t donors just support specific fundraisers run directly by the projects they care about? That way, they can ensure their contribution goes straight to their preferred initiative without needing it to win a vote first.
I do appreciate the idea of a hybrid funding model where the treasury covers part of a project, but ideally, the remaining portion should come from investors rather than donations, imho.
Lastly, I don’t appreciate that the proposal’s title refers to Catalyst, even though it has no relationship to it. This seems intended to mislead people into thinking Catalyst would benefit from this proposal, which it doesn’t...I acknowledge there’s a metadata issue in the proposal “Withdraw ₳45,217 for MLabs Core Tool Maintenance & Enhancement: Cardano.nix”, but I approved it nonetheless, as the problem is minor and not worth obstructing the process.
- Yes1.5M ₳Rationale
To drive adoption is critical, specially if it's thanks to development o maintenance of the projects that already are in Cardano. Looks quite transparent proposal.
- No1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.3M ₳Rationale
A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.
Each of these proposals has already received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.
Each of these proposals has already undergone extensive scrutiny and received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision and the work these prospective developers have put in by voting yes on all the proposals from the Intersect Budget team.
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale