Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME
109 DReps voted · 35 with a rationale · 3 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- No2.1M ₳Rationale
This proposal has a convincing problem statement and contains some really strong ideas (like phase-gated funding and performance-based compensation). However, the scale, scope, and concentration of capital allocation authority make this proposal premature in my opinion. I would like to see this proposal as a scaled-down pilot (₳ 20 M – 40 M) initially. After demonstrating measurable success there can be a second proposal later.
- No2.1M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME proposal.
I want to be clear that this is not a vote against AlphaGrowth, DeFi growth, business development, liquidity, institutional outreach, or the idea that Cardano should become more ambitious in how it grows its ecosystem.
I do believe Cardano needs a stronger business development function. I do believe Cardano needs deeper liquidity, better DeFi distribution, stronger integrations, and a more deliberate strategy for attracting capital and users. I also recognise that this proposal is more detailed and more structurally serious than many treasury asks.
However, I do not believe a 120,000,000 ADA withdrawal should be approved in the current treasury framework.
The proposal requests 120M ADA for a 12-month community-overseen programme to improve DeFi protocol readiness, activate incentives, and grow durable liquidity across Cardano markets. It includes phased delivery, oversight, reporting, audit/assurance funding, and return-to-treasury mechanisms. Those are positive features.
But the scale of the ask is simply too large to approve without prior treasury reform, significantly deeper scrutiny, and a valid NCL framework that can accommodate it.
My first concern is the Net Change Limit. The NCL is a constitutional treasury safeguard that caps ADA withdrawals from the treasury over a defined period to ensure financial sustainability. If there is only around 58M ADA of current NCL headroom available, then a 120M ADA treasury withdrawal should not be considered constitutional unless and until a valid NCL top-up or revised NCL framework is approved and recognised.
My second concern is sequencing. A proposal of this size should not be used to force the NCL discussion after the fact. If AlphaGrowth and the community believe Cardano needs this scale of DeFi growth funding, then the correct sequence should be: first reform or reset the NCL framework, then define the relevant growth/DeFi/treasury-investment budget bucket, then resubmit a proposal of this type inside that agreed framework.
My third concern is that PRIME is not simply critical infrastructure maintenance. It is a large DeFi growth, incentives, liquidity, business development, and treasury-capital deployment programme. That may be valuable, but it belongs in a different category from wallet security, self-custody, protocol maintenance, open-source infrastructure, and core developer tooling. Cardano has not yet agreed how much of the NCL should be allocated to DeFi growth or treasury-investment style programmes.
This is why I have been advocating NCL reform.
Before approving a 120M ADA programme of this nature, I believe Cardano should agree:
- shorter NCL windows, ideally around 3–6 months;
- category-level budget buckets;
- a defined DeFi/growth allocation;
- a strategy for strong and weak ADA markets;
- a plan for building sovereign reserves in stronger markets;
- rules for stablecoin and non-ADA reserve assets;
- risk limits for treasury-capital deployment;
- concentration limits;
- conflict controls;
- independent due diligence standards;
- public reporting requirements;
- accountability for returns and losses.
I am not opposed to the Cardano Treasury eventually developing a more sophisticated business development, sovereign reserve, or VC-style ecosystem investment function. In fact, I think that may become necessary. But it must be built slowly, deliberately, and inside an agreed constitutional and treasury framework.
A 120M ADA programme should not be the starting point.
The correct path, in my view, is for AlphaGrowth to work with DReps and the wider community on NCL reform and treasury architecture first, then resubmit PRIME once a revised NCL framework and, if necessary, constitutional update have been enacted.
That would allow the community to assess PRIME inside a proper category budget, with clear risk rules, market-aware treasury strategy, and an agreed mandate for this type of growth capital.
Until then, I cannot support this proposal.
For these reasons, I vote NO.
- Yes2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.8M ₳No rationale
- No1.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳Rationale
There are certain hesitations, such as AlphaGrowth picking "winners" in the space and generating "fluffed" TVL numbers by counting the same funds several times as the funds are cycled through different protocols. With that said, our delegators are strong believers in Cardano DeFi and are eager to see new ways to earn yield across Cardano. This proposal does have legitimate potential for increasing usage of Cardano's DeFi circuit, so hesitations aside we have an obligation to our delegators to support this endeavor.
- Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
- YesChanged1.2M ₳Rationale
I vote NO on "Withdraw 120M ADA for AlphaGrowth's Cardano PRIME". I support making Cardano DeFi more visible, liquid and competitive. After reviewing the proposal, debate and transcripts, I think AlphaGrowth has relevant experience and a serious growth thesis. However, NCL is dominant: NCL is Cardano's treasury spending cap. Protecting Cardano's long-term financial freedom means not expanding or consuming that cap for a very large program before the budget room and the biggest Phase 3 spending plan are concrete. The Operating Group adds oversight, but it is not a second on-chain DRep vote. So DReps would not approve the actual Phase 3 recipients, KPIs, attribution method and risk limits after the audit/gap analysis. I would support a cleaner phased version: fund the diagnostic work first, publish results, then submit Phase 3 separately with evidence, measurable deliverables and fresh NCL impact.
Earlier votes
No10d agoSuperseded
I vote NO on "Withdraw 120M ADA for AlphaGrowth's Cardano PRIME". I support making Cardano DeFi more visible, liquid and competitive. After reviewing the proposal, debate and transcripts, I think AlphaGrowth has relevant experience and a serious growth thesis. However, NCL is dominant: NCL is Cardano's treasury spending cap. Protecting Cardano's long-term financial freedom means not expanding or consuming that cap for a very large program before the budget room and the biggest Phase 3 spending plan are concrete. The Operating Group adds oversight, but it is not a second on-chain DRep vote. So DReps would not approve the actual Phase 3 recipients, KPIs, attribution method and risk limits after the audit/gap analysis. I would support a cleaner phased version: fund the diagnostic work first, publish results, then submit Phase 3 separately with evidence, measurable deliverables and fresh NCL impact.
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- No1.1M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted1M ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes13d agoSuperseded
- No988.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes971.5K ₳Rationale
We vote YES on this proposal because Cardano urgently needs a stronger DeFi ecosystem. Over the past years, Cardano has made important progress on infrastructure, integrations, tooling and governance, but this has not yet translated into enough DeFi liquidity, stablecoin usage, institutional attention, or durable on-chain economic activity.
If Cardano wants to compete as a serious financial ecosystem, we need to support initiatives that can activate liquidity, improve protocol readiness, attract LPs, and turn existing infrastructure into real usage. DeFi is not a side topic; it is one of the most important drivers of transactions, TVL, fee generation, and long-term treasury sustainability.
We recognize that the requested amount is very large and that strong oversight, transparent reporting, clear release gates, and return-to-treasury mechanisms are essential. However, the proposal includes a structured operating model with phased execution, Operating Group oversight, Intersect administration, audit allocation, and return triggers for unused, unreleased, unearned, or excess funds.
In our view, the strategic need is clear: Cardano cannot afford to underinvest in DeFi while competing ecosystems continue to attract liquidity and builders. For that reason, we support this proposal as a bold but necessary step toward building a more competitive and liquid Cardano DeFi ecosystem.
- Yes931.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes881.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes875.7K ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on Cardano PRIME. Cardano's DeFi TVL (~$90M) has not kept pace with its infrastructure maturity, and I find the proposal's core diagnosis credible: the bottleneck is no longer technical readiness but LP unit economics, application depth, and capital flow. Comparable ecosystems (Sui, Aptos, Sei) reached multiples of Cardano's TVL on similar timelines, and waiting for organic growth alone has a real opportunity cost to long-term treasury sustainability.
What moved me to yes is the governance structure rather than the headline number. Roughly 75% of the requested ₳120M (~₳90M) is gated behind a Phase 3 release vote by an independent, unpaid, five-member Operating Group with no AlphaGrowth employees. In practical terms, this vote approves ~₳30M of audit and gap-analysis work — deliverables published as public goods — with an option, not an obligation, on the deployment phase. Additional protections I weighed: a capped, declining performance fee ($4.64M max) paid only against attribution-adjusted TVL growth that excludes ADA price effects; six return-to-treasury triggers including an ADA-price excess clause; a month-6 falsification trigger; mandatory recusal standards; an independent audit line; and an explicit preference for Cardano-native teams before external alternatives.
AlphaGrowth has a verifiable track record as Compound DAO's growth team, including securing major ecosystem grants (1.8M ARB, 150K OP) and running incentive programs that attracted material TVL. Their experience is EVM-based, which is a real limitation, but the OG gate and native-team preference are reasonable hedges against that gap.
My yes is conditional in spirit, and I want to note the risks I expect the Operating Group and community to police:
Liquidity-incentive programs have a poor industry track record of producing durable TVL. The proposal's own comparison (Arbitrum STIP) saw significant decay after incentives ended. The 6-month rolling persistence metric and "organic APR" reporting must be scrutinized, not just the headline TVL number.
The TVL attribution methodology — which determines up to $4.64M in performance fees — is finalized after enactment at the M2 gate. I expect the OG to negotiate this conservatively and publish it in full, and I will treat a weak methodology as grounds to oppose any future continuation.
Counterfactual attribution ("TVL that would not have arrived absent PRIME") is inherently judgment-laden. Quarterly reports should show their work.
AlphaGrowth has no prior Cardano/eUTxO experience. The Phase 1 audit quality will be the first real test; if it reads as generic rather than eUTxO-literate, the OG should not affirm Phase 3 release.
A negative Phase 3 vote returning ₳90M to the treasury is a legitimate outcome, not a program failure. I am voting for the process, and I expect it to be enforced.
- No825.2K ₳Rationale
While Cardano DeFi urgently requires deeper liquidity and institutional attention, committing 120,000,000 ADA—nearly 10% of the active treasury balance—to a single external promotional entity is too high of a concentration risk for the network at this stage.
While the use of TxPipe- and MLabs-audited smart contracts for milestone-based distribution is highly commendable, the structural costs of this proposal are overly weighted toward fixed administrative fees (11M ADA) and high-tier bonuses (29M ADA). Furthermore, a large portion of the initial timeline is spent on audits and analysis rather than immediate liquidity deployment. We believe that ecosystem growth funds of this magnitude should be distributed across a wider variety of regional initiatives, developers, and native builders rather than being concentrated under a single centralized mandate.
- No798.4K ₳Rationale
Reason: While improving Cardano's DeFi liquidity is a legitimate strategic objective, this proposal requests an exceptionally large ₳120 million allocation for a discretionary liquidity and incentive program whose outcomes are difficult to attribute and whose long-term durability is uncertain. The governance safeguards are thoughtful, but they do not sufficiently reduce the execution and capital allocation risks associated with a treasury commitment of this magnitude. A smaller, milestone-driven pilot would be substantially easier to support.
- Yes794.5K ₳Rationale
This is a strong opportunity to WIN
- Abstain619.5K ₳No rationale
- No605.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes589.7K ₳Rationale
This is the jump start that cardano needs to build on-chain usage. We're going to no.1
- Yes587.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes533.9K ₳Rationale
We need DEFI growth and we need it now. Alpha does have a proven track record and Cardano needs big DEFI wins. This will bring that to life. We want to have momentum before the bull comes back. Build secure systems and propel DEFI forward.
- No501K ₳Rationale
I love the ambition. Cardano DeFi absolutely needs to grow. But growth bought with treasury incentives tends to leave the moment the incentives do, and we would be poorer and no deeper for it.
- Yes479.9K ₳No rationale
- No431.7K ₳No rationale
- No381.1K ₳Rationale
Much too large. Too much focus on “numbers go up” which is – in my opinion – not what the treasury is for. The treasury is for basic infrastructure that can hardly be built and financed on the market.
- No360.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes341.4K ₳Rationale
I came here as a DRep because I want to vote for businesses.
I want Cardano´s Treasury to support companies; but the voting around PRIME is ... interesting.
The Inconsistency
Some of the same DReps who rejected of criticised proposals such as $Cash and Strike argued that the Treasury was constrained, that the NCL had to be respected and that there might not be enough room in the current budget period.
Those were not unreasonable concerns.
But it is difficult to take those concerns seriously when the same people are now prepared to approve a request of 120M ADA ($19.2M)
Treating proposals with comparatively small ,clearly defined business proposal as an unacceptable Treasury risk and than support a program asking 12-24x the amount. That´s peak inconsistency.
Why I Vote Yes
I vote yes on AlphaGrowth´s Cardano PRIME, because it´s business and they have proven to invest in the right companys. I understand what they do and that work will be valuable for the Cardano Ecosystem.
But I do not believe Cardano should automatically prefer funding an intermediary that decides where money should go over funding individual businesses that already know what they need the money for. Alpha gets a vote of confidence from me; still -
I actually would like to know beforhand: Which businesses/protocols will receive it? How much will be spent on research, management, administration and incentives? How much capital is expected to remain on Cardano after the incentive period ends?
The Infrastructure Problem
Cardano has already invested enormous amounts of time, capital and intellectual energy into infrastructure. We have repeatedly been told that once the infrastructure exists, users, businesses and liquidity will follow.
But they have not followed at the scale required. "If we build it, they wil come" has not worked. Building more of the same thing and expecting a different result is not a strat. It is institutional stubborness. (insert chicken trying to push its head through a fence analogy here)
For the Future
For the future: Fund companies with identifiable teams, defined budgets, commercial plans and measurable milestones. Welcome to Finance 101.
Not every business proposal will succeed. Some will fail. Some DReps will dislike how a company intends to use the funds. That is part of investing in businesses.
Many DReps come from technical backgrounds rather than a business background. That is not an insult, but it creates a blind spot. A technically elegant plan is not automatically a commercially successful one, and a business does not become unworthy of funding merely because a DRep would have implemented a product differently.
In software development, there is almost never only one valid solution. The same applys in funding businesses.
Bottom Line
A Treasury that never invests is useless. I am voting yes because Cardano needs liquidity, distribution and economic growth.
- No298.9K ₳Rationale
That's a lot of money. I'm not convinced this is what we need right now. No thank you.
- No294.4K ₳No rationale
- No270.1K ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on “Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME.” The proposal requests 120,000,000 ADA to fund a 12‑month, community‑overseen program designed and executed by AlphaGrowth to benchmark Cardano DeFi, identify gaps, deploy ecosystem grants and liquidity incentives, and run marketing and capital‑attraction campaigns aimed at growing “qualifying TVL” by at least $200M. Intersect serves as Constitutional Administrator and fund custodian, a five‑member Operating Group provides oversight and gating, and AlphaGrowth receives fixed advisory fees plus a TVL‑linked performance fee from a 29M ADA equivalent reserve.
While the proposal is thoughtfully structured on paper, with an Operating Group, advisory council, audited treasury‑management contracts, independent assurance allocation, and return‑to‑treasury triggers for unused or unearned funds, the underlying model is one I do not support. In practice, this creates a large, centralized allocator program focused on DeFi incentives and marketing, overseen by a small group and executed by a single vendor, with a very substantial fee opportunity tied to TVL outcomes. It asks the Treasury to commit over one‑third of the full 350M ADA Net Change Limit window to a single one‑year DeFi growth initiative, at a time when Cardano already faces multiple competing demands for core infrastructure, security, and continuity funding.
I also disagree with the underlying strategic emphasis. PRIME is explicitly modeled on large‑scale TVL incentive programs from other ecosystems and is heavily focused on DeFi liquidity, structured incentives, and growth metrics such as qualifying TVL, volume, and “organic APR.” Although DeFi activity and capital retention matter, this approach reflects a tunnel vision that treats Cardano primarily as a platform for liquidity mining and TVL competition. That is not where I believe Treasury resources should be concentrated in this budget cycle, particularly at this scale.
Finally, PRIME depends, by its own terms, on a Net Change Limit large enough to accommodate such a withdrawal within the current epoch window. I view mid‑period attempts to raise the NCL specifically to make room for very large spending proposals as a misuse of the guardrail mechanism, and I am not prepared to support a program whose enactment implicitly relies on that pattern. For these reasons, even acknowledging the effort put into the proposal, I do not consider PRIME an appropriate use of Treasury funds at this time, and I am voting NO.
- No245.5K ₳Rationale
I can't vote yes on this as it would severely exceed my 200M personal spend limit for the year, but let's break this down regardless:
This proposal would drain 120M Ada from the Treasury with no revenue share, no equity, no repayment obligation, and no retained ownership of anything deployed - only unspent funds ever come back but we should always assume that someone will find a way to spend unspent funds (our of caution of course). The proposal's own sustainability argument rests on fee generation, so let's test it:
At ~0.17 ADA average transaction fee and the Treasury's 20% share of the reward pot, that's ~0.034 ADA per transaction, meaning ~3.5 billion transactions to recover 120M. At Cardano's historical ~25M transactions per year, that's roughly 140 years - and even at the full Cardano 2030 target of 324M annual transactions, it takes over a decade of the entire network's fee income to repay this one withdrawal. Meanwhile the proposal itemizes only 2M Ada of the 120M, leaves the return triggers, attribution methodology, gate criteria, Operating Group and performance fee unspecified, and ties that fee to TVL growth the executing party purchases with our own money. This is optimism substituting for arithmetic. - NoChanged234.2K ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes13d agoSuperseded
No13d agoSuperseded
- Yes215.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes196.1K ₳No rationale
- No193.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes191.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes182.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes181.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes159.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes131.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes110.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes107.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes92.6K ₳No rationale