2025 Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 7.5M ₳ for community builders

System1y ago1 post

171 DReps voted · 52 with a rationale · 4 changed their vote · 3 re-voted unchanged

Open a row to read the rationale.

Changed votes: 3 to yes, 1 to no, together voting with 28.3M ₳ of voting power.

  • No4.6M ₳No rationale
  • Yes4.5M ₳No rationale
  • No4.2M ₳Rationale

    [Portuguese]
    Optamos por votar "Não" nesta ação de governança (gov_action1mma...lmepzl), pois não foram estabelecidas as métricas de controle de qualidade que o Intersect utilizaria para acompanhar a execução das propostas, bem como os condicionantes para liberação dos recursos solicitados.
    [English]
    We chose to vote "No" on this governance action (gov_action1mma...lmepzl) because the quality control metrics that Intersect would use to monitor the execution of the proposals were not established, nor were the conditions for the release of the requested funds.

  • Yes4M ₳No rationale
  • YesRevoted3.9M ₳History

    Earlier votes

    Yes1y agoSuperseded

  • Abstain3.6M ₳No rationale
  • Yes3M ₳Rationale

    I am voting yes based on the spirit of the proposal - this segment of the GA covers a key issue of the Intersect budget proposal that has been deliberately glossed over:

    A key issue in the initial budget process was the misapplication of the participation threshold. The 50% + 1 Lovelace threshold was calculated based on total ada participating in the vote, rather than the active voting stake—which significantly alters the democratic weight of participating DReps. This discrepancy risks enabling governance distortion through low-turnout manipulation, akin to gerrymandering.

    To safeguard against such vulnerabilities and uphold the integrity of Cardano’s governance process, this Info Action includes only those proposals submitted by community builders (that might not have 100k ADA deposit) and met the corrected threshold of 2.69B ada, equivalent to 50% + 1 Lovelace of the active registered voting stake. This ensures that community-driven proposals with broad support are prioritized.

    There is obvious overlap with Intersect, and a fund manager has not been chosen, but this is easily remedied. I would expect that this GA would take precedent over the Intersect budget, and a fund manager would be chosen prior to any distribution of ADA.

    Preserving the integrity of our voting process is essential, and Intersect has deliberately sidestepped this, which needs to be remedied.

  • Yes2.8M ₳No rationale
  • No2.7M ₳No rationale
  • Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
  • No2.7M ₳No rationale
  • Yes2.7M ₳Rationale

    私はこの提案にYES票を投じます。
    本提案は、草の根レベルで活動するCardanoコミュニティビルダーによるプロポーザルを、明確な支持基準(2.69B ADA以上の賛同)に基づいて厳選し、小規模かつ高インパクトな7件の提案に対して7.5M ADAを配分するものです。
     このアプローチは以下の観点から極めて評価できます:
    分散性の実現:大きな企業やCardanoを作った組織ではない、ふつうの参加者の声が、きちんと予算の支援を受けて実現に向かっている点。
    投票正当性の担保:すべての提案が、アクティブステークに基づいた過半数支持を明示的に得ており、Cardano憲法に準拠していること。
    持続可能な財政運営:7.5M ADAという極めて控えめな金額により、財政負担が最小限に抑えられていること。
     この提案は、CardanoのVoltaireフェーズにおける新しい市民主体ガバナンスの象徴としても機能するものです。私はこの方向性を強く支持します。


    I cast a YES vote on this proposal.

    This proposal allocates 7.5 million ADA to seven carefully selected proposals submitted by grassroots Cardano community builders. Each proposal met a clear support threshold—more than 2.69 billion ADA in voting stake—and represents small-scale but high-impact initiatives.

    This approach is highly commendable for the following reasons:

    Decentralization in action: It ensures that the voices of everyday participants—not large corporations or founding entities—can move forward with proper financial support.

    Legitimacy of the vote: All proposals explicitly secured majority support based on active stake and are in full compliance with the Cardano Constitution.

    Financial sustainability: The total allocation of 7.5 million ADA is a very modest amount, keeping the financial burden on the Treasury to a minimum.

    This proposal also serves as a symbol of the new citizen-led governance envisioned in Cardano's Voltaire phase. I strongly support this direction.

  • Yes2.5M ₳No rationale
  • No2.5M ₳Rationale

    Yall are getting paid?

  • No2.3M ₳No rationale
  • Yes2.3M ₳No rationale
  • Yes2.2M ₳No rationale
  • No2.2M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain1.9M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
  • No1.6M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain1.6M ₳No rationale
  • No1.6M ₳Rationale

    My votes for the currently active budget governance actions are as follows:

    • ✅ YES on the 275M Intersect Budget
    • ✅ YES on the Amaru Node Development Budget
    • ❌ NO on the 7.5M Community Builders Budget

    The Intersect budget includes a broad set of proposals that are generally positive for the Cardano ecosystem. While I may have reservations about some individual proposals, approving the budget doesn't automatically release funds. I can re-evaluate specific items later when the associated treasury withdrawal actions are submitted on chain. I strongly recommend avoiding overly grouped treasury withdrawals, bundling too many proposals together can result in good initiatives being blocked due to a few contentious ones.

    As for the Amaru Node Development Budget, if it had been included in the recent Ekklesia vote, it likely would have passed, and I would have supported it then as well. That's why I will support it now too. For better clarity, I recommend including the requested budget amount in the governance action title next time.

    I would've preferred to vote on the Community Builders Budget after seeing the outcome of the Intersect budget. If that last one were to fail, I might have considered supporting the community one, but since it was submitted beforehand, that option is off the table now. More importantly, this budget doesn't include the proposals from founding entities and there are no separate gov actions for those. It doesn't make sense to fund only this subset of proposals in isolation imho. So for now I can only assume the Intersect one will pass, which renders this budget unnecessary. Additionally, this budget appoints Intersect as the administrator, yet includes the Starstream proposal, which will not use Intersect as an administrator. For these reasons, I cannot support the Community Builders Budget at this time.

    I'm aware that some of my reasons for voting NO on the community budget could also apply, to some extent, to the Amaru budget. However, the Amaru budget doesn't overlap with another Budget.

  • Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
  • No1.3M ₳Rationale

    DRep Voting Rationale — Vote: No

    This proposal reflects a strong commitment to expanding access to treasury funds for community builders, a goal that is central to Cardano’s decentralized future. It respects constitutional safeguards by applying the 2.69B ADA participation threshold and excludes founding entity proposals.

    However, I am voting No based on a key governance concern: the risk of duplication with the Intersect budget. Given that Intersect has been closely involved in assembling their own budget proposal which is currently live up for voting on chain and close to being ratified. My concern with approving this proposal is getting a proposal funded twice. Of course, for that to happen it would need a withdrawal action too.

    Additional Perspective on Treasury Withdrawal Structure

    • As a DRep, I also wish to express my broader view on the upcoming Treasury Withdrawals structure:

    • I am strongly in favor of greater granularity in funding decisions to allow more nuanced and accountable governance.

    • Although I value pragmatism in governance operations, I am most comfortable with Option D (five brackets from Ekklesia), which strikes a strong balance between decentralization and operational feasibility for Intersect. It might be argued that this discredits Intersect's budget process, but I prefer to be on the safe side and get additional results, especially this being Cardano's 1st budget.

    • I would also be willing to review 39 individual proposals (Option E) if necessary, despite the heavier governance load, because it offers the maximum clarity. Option C (two support brackets split across 2025 and 2026) is acceptable to me too. Sticking to D, though.

    VOTE0012

  • Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
  • No1.2M ₳Rationale

    I am voting NO because this request duplicates projects that are already scheduled to receive funding in the main 2025 Intersect budget, yet appoints Intersect as fund administrator without explicit consent from every team and without a shared framework for milestones, reporting, or claw-backs; approving it now would create overlapping custody arrangements, invite double payments, and add unnecessary complexity to a governance process that is already spread across GovTool, Ekklesia, and on-chain actions. I will support these same initiatives once they are presented through a single, coherent budget or as individual InfoActions with clear terms, but until then the prudent choice is to preserve treasury clarity and vote NO.

  • No1.2M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.2M ₳Rationale

    I vote YES on this governance action, which consolidates community-driven projects that enhance Cardano’s development and application ecosystem. The proposal’s focus on high-value projects distinguish it from the Intersect 275M ADA budget, which I oppose due to its inclusion of less compelling proposals. Ideally, the Intersect budget info action would have preceded this vote to avoid confusing voters.
    I commend the community builder's grass-roots approach.
    I will be looking for the proposal to foster individual treasury withdrawal actions, each subject to on-chain DRep voting for each project.

  • Yes1.2M ₳Rationale

    I vote YES because:

    1. All proposals in this budget surpassed the 2.69B ADA threshold on Ekklesia, reflecting broad consensus among DReps and the Community.

    2. Midgard, Starstream, and zkFold directly address scalability — Cardano’s top priority. The other projects strengthen infrastructure and developer tools.

    3. The total budget of 7.5M ₳ is within the 2025 spending cap (350M ₳) and complies with governance procedures.

    *Future treasury withdrawals should still be assessed individually per proposal, with clear milestones and verifiable deliverables.


    Japanese Translation

    私は賛成票(YES)を投じます。理由は以下の通りです:

    1. この予算に含まれるすべての提案は、Ekklesia上で2.69B ADAの閾値を超えており、コミュニティの広範な合意を示しています。

    2. Midgard、Starstream、zkFoldは、カルダノにとって最優先課題であるスケーラビリティに直接対応しています。他のプロジェクトもインフラや開発ツールの強化に貢献しています。

    3. 総予算7.5M ₳は、2025年の支出上限(350M ₳)内であり、ガバナンス手続きにも準拠しています。

    ※将来的な財務引き出しについては、各提案ごとにマイルストーンと検証可能な成果に基づいて個別に評価されるべきです。


    Vietnamese Translation

    Tôi bỏ phiếu YES vì:

    1. Tất cả các đề xuất trong ngân sách này đều vượt ngưỡng 2.69B ADA trên Ekklesia, thể hiện sự đồng thuận rộng rãi từ các DRep trong giai đoạn tham vấn ý kiến cộng đồng.

    2. Midgard, Starstream và zkFold giải quyết trực tiếp bài toán mở rộng – ưu tiên hàng đầu của Cardano. Các dự án còn lại củng cố hạ tầng và công cụ phát triển.

    3. Tổng ngân sách 7.5M ₳ nằm trong giới hạn chi tiêu năm 2025 (350M ₳) và tuân thủ quy trình quản trị.

    • Việc rút ADA từ kho bạc sau này vẫn cần được đánh giá riêng theo từng proposal, gắn với các mốc và kiểm chứng cụ thể.
  • Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain1.1M ₳No rationale
  • No1.1M ₳Rationale

    While the intent to facilitate community builders’ access to treasury funding without the burden of a 100k ADA deposit is well-meaning, it fundamentally undermines the rigor and security that the threshold was designed to uphold.

    The 100k ADA deposit is not an arbitrary barrier; it serves as a critical economic signal that aligns incentives, deters frivolous or low-quality proposals, and protects the treasury from dilution by projects lacking sufficient skin in the game. Removing or lowering this threshold risks opening the floodgates to a proliferation of proposals that may fragment community focus, dilute scarce resources, and ultimately erode public confidence in the governance process.

    Moreover, the constitutional safeguards embedded in the Cardano budget framework—including the 50% + 1 Lovelace threshold of active voting stake—are designed to ensure that only proposals with demonstrable, broad-based community support proceed. Relaxing the deposit requirement while relying solely on voting thresholds may expose the system to strategic manipulation, especially given the complexities and nuances of voter participation and stake delegation patterns.

    The long-term resilience and legitimacy of Cardano’s treasury governance depend on maintaining a disciplined, business-minded approach that prioritizes quality over quantity. While we must encourage innovation and community participation, this cannot come at the expense of the protocol’s foundational principles of decentralization, transparency, and accountability.

    I firmly believe that preserving the 100k ADA deposit threshold is essential to safeguarding the treasury, ensuring meaningful commitment from proposers, and upholding the integrity of our governance process. Therefore, I will vote No on this proposal, advocating instead for a governance model that balances accessibility with responsibility and strategic foresight.

  • No969.9K ₳No rationale
  • No951.2K ₳No rationale
  • No929.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes927.7K ₳No rationale
  • No884.5K ₳No rationale
  • Yes870.3K ₳No rationale
  • Abstain829.9K ₳Rationale

    We are voting ABSTAIN because we already voted yes to Intersect's budget proposal which includes all the proposals in this one (plus others)
    We do not think it is convenient to approve two budgets with some of the same proposals.

  • Yes827.8K ₳No rationale
  • Yes796.1K ₳Rationale

    I support these projects

  • AbstainRevoted792.3K ₳Rationale

    I voted Abstain on this proposal because, while I support the projects included, I don’t believe there’s a strong need to submit a separate Governance Action for proposals that were already included in the main Intersect-led budget.

    At this early stage in Cardano’s on-chain governance journey, it's important to keep the process simple and clear. Having multiple Governance Actions for the same set of projects — even if they’re well-supported — adds unnecessary complexity and could confuse voters, without offering clear added value.

    A single coordinated budget process, with transparent inclusion criteria and community signalling (like what Intersect facilitated), is the better path for now. This helps build trust, avoids fragmentation, and gives the ecosystem a cleaner, more unified way to manage treasury allocations.

    Please reduce my workload, don't increase it.

    Earlier votes

    Abstain1y agoSuperseded

  • Abstain765.6K ₳No rationale
  • Yes760.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes742.6K ₳No rationale
  • No663.8K ₳Rationale

    We, the Dutch DRep, vote No on this budget Info Action.

    While we support funding for community-driven initiatives, we have strong reservations about including proposals that introduce protocol-level changes—specifically zkFold and Starstream.

    Both propose ambitious technologies that would require significant modifications to Cardano’s ledger and core protocol. These kinds of changes demand deep coordination with the broader development community and should not be funded without clear technical alignment, ecosystem consensus, and process transparency. Yet, neither proposal provides sufficient clarity on integration challenges, dependencies, or risk factors—and neither team has meaningfully engaged in Cardano’s open CIP process.

    As a constructive path forward, we strongly encourage both teams to initiate a CIP (Cardano Improvement Proposal) and, where appropriate, a CPS (Cardano Problem Statement) that formally outlines their proposed changes. A clear example to follow would be the approach taken by the Leios and Alba proposals, which have demonstrated how protocol innovations can be transparently introduced and evaluated within the community.

    We would also recommend this path for proposals like Midgard, which touches on optimistic rollup design and may similarly intersect with future ledger evolution. Proposals of this scope should first be explored through the CIP/CPS process before treasury funding is considered.

    We also invite fellow DReps to demand greater technical rigor and transparency from high-impact proposals. When millions of dollars in treasury funds are at stake, big claims—especially those involving protocol changes—should not be taken at face value. They must be supported by clearly articulated implementation paths, risk analysis, and evidence of engagement with Cardano’s open governance and development processes.

    Our stance is not a rejection of the innovation of zkFold and Starstream. Rather, we believe treasury support for protocol-level initiatives should be contingent on demonstrated ecosystem alignment and technical diligence. In contrast, other proposals included in this budget—such as Blockfrost and the Ledger/hardware wallet initiatives—are narrower in scope, do not require consensus-layer changes, and are much better suited for direct funding at this stage.