Add Constitutional Committee Member - Christina
174 DReps voted · 72 with a rationale · 4 changed their vote · 3 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 2 to yes, 2 to no, together voting with 64.2M ₳ of voting power.
- YesChanged10.3M ₳Rationale
I voted for Christina prior to this. She deserves to be included
Earlier votes
No8mo agoSuperseded
Although I voted for Christina as a CC member - we already have very clear guidelines on how many constitution members there should be. Odd numbers are important to make sure governance is not in a limbo if there is ever a even vote.
- Yes9.5M ₳Rationale
I initially voted for Christina in the Ekklesia snap election process. I am also in support of having more than just the minimum required for CC quorum (7) - so voting in continued support of both initiatives to strength our overall governance.
- Abstain8.9M ₳Rationale
RCADA previously voted YES on the Update Committee action that added Cardano Curia to the Constitutional Committee. That decision was grounded in a clear and principled position: a sitting committee member had retired, the Committee had fallen below the
committeeMinSizeparameter, and the snap election facilitated by Intersect produced a single, auditable outcome. Although RCADA supported a different candidate during that election, we upheld the result because safeguarding process integrity and restoring constitutional functionality takes precedence over individual electoral preferences.Importantly, in that prior rationale RCADA also explicitly acknowledged a broader structural issue: a Constitutional Committee operating without buffer seats is fragile, and a single resignation should not temporarily impair the system’s ability to ratify governance actions. We stated then that governance resilience should be addressed through appropriate, constitutionally compliant channels, such as a deliberate review of committee sizing or the committeeMinSize parameter, rather than through ad-hoc or reactive measures.
It is against that same framework that we assess the present action.
This proposal is constitutionally valid and well-intentioned. It does not negate the Curia outcome, does not remove or replace any member, and correctly respects ledger ordering. RCADA also recognises the genuine governance risk it seeks to mitigate and does not question the qualifications or good faith of the proposed candidate.
However, this action introduces a different governance dynamic than the one RCADA previously supported. Rather than executing a single, final election outcome to restore minimum functionality, it expands committee membership in response to the narrowness of an earlier off-chain result. While understandable, this mechanism risks establishing a precedent where close electoral margins become grounds for post-hoc committee expansion. Over time, such a pattern could weaken election finality and blur the boundary between outcome execution and outcome revision.
RCADA’s abstention should therefore not be interpreted as opposition to the candidate, nor as a retreat from our prior vote. On the contrary, it reflects consistency with that earlier position. We supported the Curia action because it faithfully enacted a necessary and final outcome. We abstain here because we believe long-term committee resilience should be addressed through neutral, system-level design choices, not candidate-specific corrective actions tied to past elections.
For these reasons, RCADA abstains — affirming constitutional validity and governance intent, while signaling the need for a more principled, forward-looking approach to Constitutional Committee resilience.
- Yes7.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes7.6M ₳Rationale
One approach to blockchain governance will be to mimic the rigidity of constitutional systems seen in the legacy world. The word "constitution" itself is loaded - as it brings about images of constitutional courts, togas, and supreme authority. However, the Cardano constitution is essentially a rulebook. We want to make sure we are playing by a set of pre-agreed rules. That's it.
So, yes we can still experiment and show that our nascent governance system is fair but also flexible. Having an extra CC member - above the bare minimum - makes sense for a global decentralized system, especially as one CC member can easily be incapacitated for a certain period of time. Allowing a small buffer might be prudent.
Overall, having more individuals who want to dedicate their free time to governance is a net benefit for Cardano. Thank you for your service all former and current CC members. All of you received a lot of community support - and in this case the recent Ekklesia poll showed this to be true for this candidate as well.
Why stop an apparently committed candidate from helping the other 7 CC members? It's a thankless job as it is - and having a small buffer above the minimum CC number will probably help relieve some pressure from the other 7 members who are under a (thankless) spotlight with every word of their rationales being scrutinized around the globe. - Yes7.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.7M ₳No rationale
- No5.7M ₳Rationale
This is a completely opaque action that arbitrarily increases the number of members beyond the amount stipulated in the constitution. Furthermore, there are good reasons for having an odd number of members.
- Yes5.5M ₳Rationale
The rules for CC member voting did not specify a runner up position. However, I am always in favor of improvising, to safeguard against future delays and bureaucratic hurdles. Maintaining the minimum number of CC members means stalling all governance processes and repeated elections if another member retires. Additionally, Christina gathered more individual votes, despite lower overall voting power. After careful consideration, I support the initiative to add her to the Constitutional Committee.
- Yes5.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.3M ₳Rationale
STORM Partners votes YES on this Constitutional Committee update.
This action strengthens governance continuity by adding a buffer above the minimum committee size, reducing the risk of disruption if a member steps down or becomes inactive. While expanding the committee from seven to eight members increases the absolute two-thirds approval threshold, we consider this a reasonable tradeoff in light of past governance precedents, with the Atlantic Council CC stepping down and temporarily stalling decision-making.
We had the honour to meet Christina in person during the Cardano Summit in Berlin, and we are confident in her expertise, judgment, and ability to contribute constructively to the Constitutional Committee’s work. Her experience aligns well with the responsibilities of the role, and we thank her, as well as Cardano Curia and all candidates, for stepping forward during the recent Constitutional Committee elections.Overall, this is a low-risk action that improves institutional resilience and helps ensure Cardano’s governance remains functional and credible throughout the current mandate.
- Yes5.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.1M ₳Rationale
I'm voting yes however noting that this will cause another future issue of having an even number of members on the CC.
- Yes4.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain4.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.2M ₳Rationale
[Portuguese]
Optamos por votar "SIM" nesta ação de governança (gov_action1aw8...d54zm8), pois concordamos que a inclusão de um membro adicional no Comitê Constitucional traz maior segurança e maturidade ao processo de governança, reduzindo o risco de interrupções causadas pela eventual desistência de um membro em momentos críticos ou urgentes de votação. A indicação da Christina Gianelloni Gianelloni para o cargo se justifica pelo fato de seu nome ter sido previamente referendado em uma consulta off-chain aos DReps, realizada recentemente na plataforma Ekklesia. Entendemos, portanto, que o voto on-chain representa a instância final e decisória desse processo, conferindo legitimidade e fechamento institucional à escolha.
[English]
We chose to vote "YES" on this governance action (gov_action1aw8...d54zm8), because we agree that adding an extra member to the Constitutional Committee brings greater security and maturity to the governance process, reducing the risk of disruptions caused by a member stepping down during critical or urgent voting periods. The nomination of Christina Gianelloni for the role is justified by the fact that her name was previously endorsed through an off-chain consultation with DReps, recently conducted on the Ekklesia platform. We therefore understand that the on-chain vote serves as the final and decisive instance of this process, providing legitimacy and institutional closure to the decision. - Abstain3.9M ₳No rationale
- NoChanged3M ₳Rationale
There is already a process in place to add Constitutional Committee members, and that process should be followed. We already had an election and a successful candidate was selected. If there is a desire to add more CC seats, then this should be socialized and submitted as a change request to the CC size instead.
Earlier votes
Abstain8mo agoSuperseded
As I have not had time yet to properly review this proposal, I am voting Abstain for now.
- Yes2.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳Rationale
スナップ選挙の結果、Cardano Curiaが当選し、Christinaは僅差で次点となりました。本提案は、この選挙結果を尊重しつつ、憲法委員会のメンバーを1名追加し、最低人数を下回ることによるガバナンス停止リスクを低減するための措置です。
既存の当選結果や委員構成を覆すものではなく、憲法委員会の安全性と継続性を高めることを目的としています。委員が1人辞任した場合でもガバナンスが停止しないよう、運用上の現実を踏まえて設計されています。
Cardanoのガバナンスが理想論から実運用へ一歩進んだ提案として、私はYesを支持します。
Following the snap election, Cardano Curia was elected, with Christina finishing a very close second.
This proposal respects that outcome and adds one additional member to the Constitutional Committee to reduce the risk of governance disruption if the committee falls below its minimum size.
It does not override or replace any existing election result or committee member, but strengthens the committee’s safety and continuity in practical operation.
As a step that moves Cardano governance from idealized design toward real-world operation, I support this proposal with a Yes vote. - No2.5M ₳Rationale
Currently, I think the expectation is that there is a reasonable process first to decide about the increase of the number seats and then choose a new member(s). The previous election was about one member.
- Yes2.5M ₳Rationale
I voteth Yes simply as a political favor to Christina. I shall hold this over her head until the moment of capitalization.
Having worked with her on Cardano Over Coffee, I'm positive she would be a great addition to the CC. But 8 is a weird number and I would prefer 9 or 11 or 13 or 15 or 17.
However, I must re-iterate, this is a political favor. This has nothing to do with qualifications.
- Yes2.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.3M ₳No rationale
- No2.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on the proposal to add Christina as an additional Constitutional Committee member.
This action is fully compliant with CIP-1694 and the Cardano Constitution. Constitutional Committee size is not fixed, the proposal remains within existing guardrails, preserves the 67% voting threshold, and correctly references the prior Update Committee action that added Cardano Curia, ensuring proper ledger ordering and non-conflict.
The snap election to fill the vacant Constitutional Committee seat was implemented on-chain, and this proposal does not override, replace, or invalidate that outcome. Cardano Curia remains duly selected and ratified.
From a governance-resilience perspective, adding an additional member above the current minCommitteeSize of 7 reduces operational fragility and lowers the risk of governance stalling due to resignation, inactivity, or term expiry during the current mandate.
The exceptionally close snap-election result provides reasonable justification for broader representation without undermining the original on-chain decision.
Caveat: going forward, the community should clearly define whether snap-election processes are intended to be strictly single-seat outcomes, or whether close results may justify additional on-chain committee appointments. Expectations should be set in advance so that committee expansion remains principled rather than ad-hoc.
On balance, this proposal strengthens governance continuity while remaining aligned with both the letter and spirit of the Cardano Constitution.
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳Rationale
As I stated in my rationale for my vote on the gov action to add Cardano Curia, that I would rather have seen both them and Christina added to the CC, it is a given that I vote ✅ YES on this one too.
- No1.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- No1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted1.2M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Constitution sets a minimum of seven members for the Constitutional Committee, but no maximum, so adding Christina after her close tie with Curia in the snap election fits the rules and boosts resilience—if someone quits, the committee stays above seven and avoids delays in approving actions. Christina adds enthusiasm and fresh ideas, helping users and developers on Cardano, and this follows the permissionless system where anyone can propose changes for more freedom and decentralization. On the downside, with eight members (an even number), decisions need 67% approval, meaning at least six yes votes out of eight; a 4-4 split or close votes could block actions more often, leading to slower governance, and while there's no pay for members now, a bigger group might cost the treasury more later if compensation starts, making it less efficient. Still, I vote yes because the gains in stability and inclusion outweigh the risks.
Earlier votes
Yes8mo agoSuperseded
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- YesChanged1.2M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I vote YES on this governance action.
I previously raised concerns regarding procedural clarity, as the recent snap election was publicly framed to fill a single Constitutional Committee seat. Those concerns remain valid. However, after further consideration, I believe the risk of governance disruption due to an insufficient number of active Constitutional Committee members is more immediate and significant.
I also support Christina as a candidate. Christina has demonstrated strong commitment to Cardano’s decentralized governance and received meaningful community support during the election process. Supporting capable and motivated contributors is especially important given that this role is unpaid and responsibility-heavy.
This YES vote should not be interpreted as endorsing the current process as ideal. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic decision to preserve governance continuity while acknowledging the need for improvement.
I strongly encourage the community and relevant bodies to follow up with an Info Action to clearly define:
- When and how the Constitutional Committee size may be expanded,
- How off-chain election outcomes should be interpreted in such cases,
- And how to avoid ambiguity or retroactive expectations in future appointments.
Strengthening procedural clarity alongside operational resilience is essential to maintaining long-term trust in Cardano governance.
Earlier votes
No8mo agoSuperseded
As a DRep, I vote NO on this proposal.
The recent snap election was publicly framed to select one new Constitutional Committee member. Submitting a second appointment after that election undermines the legitimacy of the process and creates ambiguity about how future elections will be interpreted.
If the goal is to expand the Committee for resilience, that change should begin with a clear, community-informed Info Action—not an ad hoc governance action that retroactively alters expectations.
I support Committee expansion in principle, but it must follow transparent and consistent procedures that uphold trust in Cardano governance.
- Yes1.2M ₳Rationale
Congrats Christina!
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
- No1.1M ₳Rationale
This is a classic case of outcome engineering masquerading as safety. We held an election. The community established a process (Article IV, Section 40 of the Constitution requires a public process). That process yielded a binary result: one seat, one winner. Attempting to install the runner-up via a separate governance action immediately after the fact treats the election results as a "suggestion" rather than a mandate.
The proposal claims to "strengthen governance continuity." I argue it weakens social consensus. If every close election results in the loser being proposed for a seat anyway under the guise of "resilience," why hold elections at all? We are establishing a precedent where on-chain governance is used to litigate off-chain disappointments.
Indeed, if we drop below 7 members, the CC enters a state of dysfunction where it cannot ratify actions. This is a real risk. However, the solution to a brittle parameter is to fix the parameter or hold a new, dedicated election for an expanded seat — not to arbitrarily appoint a specific individual who failed to secure the mandate in the designated contest.
If we want 8 members, we should have run an election for 8 members! We cannot "patch" election outcomes on-chain because we feel the margin was too tight. That is not resilience; that is instability.
- Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes969.9K ₳No rationale