Add Constitutional Committee Member - Christina

174 DReps voted · 71 with a rationale · 7 changed their vote

Open a row to read the rationale.

• Yoroi W₳llet

  No584.2M ₳Rationale

  Summary

  Yoroi DRep votes NO on the governance action titled “Add Constitutional Committee Member – Christina.” This decision reflects a cautious view on how risk mitigation measures should be shaped through broader ecosystem input.

  Rationale

  Election scope and mandate

  The Intersect snap election was held to select one replacement Constitutional Committee member. Cardano Curia was chosen through that process, and the outcome does not provide a mandate to appoint an additional member.

  Ecosystem alignment before structural change

  If the intention is to mitigate operational risk by operating above the minimum committee size, this should be treated as a governance design question that involves wider community perspectives. Rather than proceeding through an ad hoc addition following a narrowly scoped election, an Info action could be submitted first to gather ecosystem feedback, evaluate alternatives, and build shared expectations before any New Committee governance action is proposed.

  Conclusion

  Yoroi DRep votes NO on this proposal and encourages a community-informed, ecosystem-aligned approach before making structural changes to the Constitutional Committee.

• YUTA

  Yes435.8M ₳Rationale

  I am voting YES for "Add Constitutional Committee Member - Christina" for three reasons:

  1. This would simply add Christina to the seven CC members, bringing the total to eight, and would not have any significant drawbacks.

  2. The minimum CC size is set at seven seats, and the current CC membership is seven entities. In this situation, if even one of these seven entities resigns, governance would cease, and a re-election would be necessary. Governance cessation would not simply result in issues such as treasury withdrawal; it would also make parameter changes and hard fork initiation difficult, potentially posing a significant risk to the Cardano chain. Therefore, improvement is necessary.

  It is possible to reduce the CC minimum size, but this would require three months of off-chain consultation under the Constitution, and therefore cannot be changed until at least February 12th.
  https://forum.cardano.org/t/pcp-committeeminsize-yuta/151156/7

  Therefore, the current viable solution, at least in the short term, is to increase the number of CCs to eight or more.
  (We could consider amending the constitution to remove the three-month consultation requirement, but given that it's an important parameter and requires a three-month consultation, I doubt we'll be able to get community support easily.)

  1. I've reviewed Christina's background and believe she's an experienced and honest member.

  私は「Add Constitutional Committee Member - Christina」に次の３つの理由からYESを投票します。

  1. これは7名のCCメンバーにChristinaを追加して8名にするのみであり、重大なデメリットはありません。

  2. CC最小サイズは7席に設定されており、現在のCCメンバー数は７エンティティです。この状況では、この7エンティティのうち１つでも退任した場合、ガバナンスが停止し、再選挙などが必要になります。ガバナンスが停止するということは単にトレジャリーウィズドローなどの問題だけではなく、パラメータ変更やハードフォーク開始が困難になるため、チェーンに重大なリスクをもたらす可能性があります。そのため、改善が必要です。
     CC最小サイズを減らすことも可能ですが、これは憲法上、3ヶ月のオフチェーン協議が必要であるため、少なくとも2月12日まではこれを変更することができません。
     https://forum.cardano.org/t/pcp-committeeminsize-yuta/151156/7
     よって現状少なくとも短期的に可能な方法はCCの数を８以上にすることです。
     （3ヶ月の協議要件を削除するような憲法を変更する方法も考えられますが、当然ながら重要なパラメータでであるから3ヶ月の協議要件が要求されていることを考えると、コミュニティの指示が簡単に得られるとは思いません）

  3. Christinaの経歴を確認し、経験豊富かつ誠実なメンバーだと私は判断しました。

• Blockdaemon

  Abstain332.2M ₳No rationale
• EMURGO

  No293M ₳Rationale

  Summary

  EMURGO, as a DRep, votes NO on the governance action to add an additional Constitutional Committee member, with rationale below.

  Rationale

  While we acknowledge the qualifications of the proposed individual, Christina Gianelloni, and the good intentions behind the proposal, the Intersect snap election was explicitly conducted to elect one Constitutional Committee member, and Cardano Curia was the clear winner of that process. Adding the runner-up cannot be considered an outcome of that election.

  The Cardano Constitution does not clearly permit or prohibit expanding the committee beyond replacing a resigning member, placing this proposal in a procedurally ambiguous area. Expanding the committee from seven to eight members also carries concrete implications, including changes to decision thresholds and potential additional compensation costs, which should not be introduced without a clear basis.

  As DReps, we consider it reasonable to vote based on constitutional interpretation to avoid setting an unclear precedent. For these reasons, EMURGO votes NO.

• Eternl DRep Committee

  Yes222.9M ₳Rationale

  TL;DR: EDC voted YES on gov_action1aw809r9gpk7eemt02alszw7lceyf0505uvntavm62rakkckr3nxsqd54zm8;

  Christina was our choice for the additional seat and more people taking a role in the CC would be beneficial. Even if this proposal won't pass, we want to signal our support for Christina's candidacy.

• Sebastien Guillemot セバ

  Yes174.6M ₳No rationale
• Everstake

  Yes165.7M ₳No rationale
• Cardano Foundation

  Yes120.2M ₳Rationale

  The Cardano Foundation, as a DRep, votes YES on this NewCommittee governance action. We support this appointment in order to strengthen continuity and operational resilience of the Constitutional Committee.

  A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

  The Cardano Foundation recognises that the minimum required size for the Constitutional Committee (CC) is seven members, and that the appointment of Christina Gianelloni would increase the total membership to eight.

  We acknowledge that increasing the total CC size to eight members has implications for CC approval thresholds, as the two-thirds majority requirement increases the absolute number of aligned votes needed for CC decisions, from five aligned votes, to six aligned votes, thereby marginally increasing individual members' veto power and may introduce additional coordination challenges, especially in scenarios of lower participation.

  Notwithstanding these implications, the Cardano Foundation supports this governance action based on the qualifications of the proposed candidate. Christina Gianelloni brings a strong track record in stewardship, operational leadership, and open-source governance through her roles as COO of Blink Labs and Head of the Board at PRAGMA. Her experience in governance processes is well aligned with the demands of the CC member.

  Taking into account both the governance threshold implications and the candidate’s demonstrated qualifications, the Cardano Foundation votes YES on this governance action and supports the appointment of the eighth member of the Constitutional Committee.

  ---

  NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
  The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well.

• JAZZ

  Yes92.2M ₳No rationale
• CardanoYoda (MANDA Pool)

  Yes91.5M ₳Rationale

  As a DRep, I voted YES for the proposal: Add Constitutional Committee Member - Christina.

  In the Snap election, Cardano Curia won with a slight lead over Christina. Christina received a large support from the community. Both of these candidates had by far the most votes over the others.

  It is wise to increase the number of CC members above minCommitteeSize, as this will strengthen governance. In case a CC member suddenly retires, governance will remain operational.

  Christina would become the third among the eight CC members who handle this role individually. This balances the ratio between councils and individual CC members.

• BTBF_XSP

  Yes88.6M ₳Rationale

  This proposal is expected to avoid governance stagnation. I will instruct this proposal.

• SIPO

  Yes86M ₳Rationale

  SIPO DRep votes Yes on the proposal “Add Constitutional Committee Member – Christina.”

  This decision is not an endorsement or rejection of any individual candidate.
  It is based on a structural and institutional assessment of what best supports the long-term stability and functionality of Cardano’s on-chain governance.

  1. Governance Continuity and Operational Resilience

  Under the current protocol parameters, if the number of active Constitutional Committee (CC) members falls below minCommitteeSize (7), governance actions requiring CC ratification cannot proceed.

  With full on-chain governance activated under CIP-1694, a stalled governance process itself becomes a systemic risk.

  This proposal:
  • Does not remove or replace any existing CC member
  • Adds one member above the minimum threshold
  • Reduces the risk of governance paralysis due to resignation or inactivity

  From a DRep perspective, this is a practical and proportionate measure to strengthen governance resilience.

  1. Non-Conflict With Prior Governance Decisions

  SIPO places significant importance on the fact that this proposal:
  • Explicitly references the previously ratified Update Committee action that added Cardano Curia as its previousGovActionId
  • Cannot be ratified unless the Curia action has already been ratified
  • Does not override, invalidate, or negate any existing decision

  This is not a re-election nor a reversal.
  It is a structurally safe additive action that respects ledger ordering and governance consistency.

  1. A Healthy Example of Permissionless Governance in Practice

  The essence of CIP-1694 is not merely that “anyone may submit a proposal,”
  but that community members can do so correctly, transparently, and fully on-chain.

  This proposal:
  • Is independently submitted by community participants
  • Claims no institutional mandate
  • Demonstrates clear understanding of constitutional and ledger constraints

  SIPO views this as a concrete example of permissionless governance functioning as intended.

  1. Absorbing Narrow Electoral Outcomes Within the System

  The snap election facilitated by Intersect resulted in a very narrow margin between Christina and Cardano Curia.

  SIPO fully respects the fact that Curia was selected and ratified.
  At the same time, a governance system should consider whether narrowly expressed community support can be acknowledged without undermining prior outcomes.

  This proposal:
  • Preserves the existing decision
  • Aligns term expiration epochs
  • Uses a limited and transparent mechanism to improve representation and continuity

  It reflects an attempt to resolve tension through structure rather than politics, which aligns with Cardano’s governance philosophy.

  1. Important Limitations and Clarifications

  SIPO’s Yes vote does not imply:
  • That runner-up candidates should generally be added to the CC
  • That CC expansion should become routine
  • That off-chain election outcomes should be casually modified on-chain

  This decision is specific to a narrow-margin, transitional governance context.

  SIPO strongly encourages future governance actions to address:
  • Formal rules for CC vacancies
  • Clear separation between off-chain elections and on-chain actions
  • Reassessment of minCommitteeSize design

  1. Conclusion

  For the reasons above, SIPO DRep votes Yes on this proposal.

  This vote reflects:
  • A structural, not personal, judgment
  • A commitment to governance continuity
  • A focus on long-term institutional integrity

  SIPO will continue to act as a DRep with an emphasis on durable governance design over short-term outcomes.

  ⸻

  SIPO DRep は、本提案「Add Constitutional Committee Member – Christina」に対して、Yes に投票します。

  本判断は、特定の個人への支持・不支持を表明するものではなく、Cardano のオンチェーン・ガバナンスが長期的に安定し、機能し続けるための制度的・構造的観点から行ったものです。

  1. ガバナンス継続性とレジリエンスの観点

  現在の Constitutional Committee（CC）は、protocol parameter である **minCommitteeSize（7）**を下回った場合、
  CC の承認を要するガバナンスアクションが事実上停止する構造になっています。

  Cardano はすでに CIP-1694 により「完全オンチェーン・ガバナンス」の段階に入っており、
  ガバナンスが停止すること自体が、ネットワークの制度的リスクとなります。

  本提案は、
  • 既存メンバーを削除・置換するものではなく
  • CC を最小人数より 1名多い構成にすることで
  • 予期せぬ辞任・不在があっても、ガバナンスが止まらない状態を確保する

  という、極めて実務的かつ合理的なレジリエンス強化策であると評価しています。

  1. 既存ガバナンス決定との非衝突設計

  SIPO は、本提案が以下の点を厳格に守っていることを重視しています。
  • Cardano Curia を CC に追加する既存の Update Committee Action を
  previousGovActionId として明示的に参照していること
  • そのため、Curia の決定を上書き・否定・無効化する構造になっていないこと
  • Ledger ordering とガバナンス一貫性を尊重していること

  本提案は「再選挙」でも「結果の覆し」でもなく、
  すでに確定した決定を前提条件として、その上に追加する設計です。

  このような構造的安全性は、DRep として評価すべき重要なポイントです。

  1. Permissionless Governance の健全な実践例である点

  CIP-1694 の本質は、

  「誰でも提案できる」ではなく
  「誰かが、ルールを理解したうえで、実際に提案し、オンチェーンで完結させられる」

  ことにあります。

  本提案は、
  • 特定組織の委任ではなく
  • コミュニティ個人による自発的提出であり
  • 憲法・CIP・台帳制約を踏まえた内容になっています

  SIPO は、この点において、本提案を permissionless governance が実際に機能している具体例として評価しています。

  1. 僅差だった民意を「制度内」で吸収する試み

  Intersect が実施したスナップ選挙において、
  Christina と Cardano Curia の得票差は非常に僅差でした。

  SIPO は、
  • 選挙結果として Curia が選出・承認された事実を尊重します
  • 同時に、僅差で示された支持が「完全に切り捨てられる」構造が、
  必ずしも分散型ガバナンスにとって最善とは限らない

  とも考えています。

  本提案は、
  • 既存結果を侵害せず
  • 任期を揃え
  • 人数追加という限定的手段で
  • 代表性と継続性を両立させようとするもの

  であり、対立を政治ではなく構造で処理しようとする試みとして、一定の合理性があると判断しました。

  1. 同時に明確にしておきたい留意点

  SIPO は、本提案への Yes が、以下を意味しないことを明確にします。
  • 選挙で次点だった候補を常に追加すべき、という一般原則
  • CC を無制限に拡張する前例
  • オフチェーン選挙結果をオンチェーンで容易に修正できる、という慣行

  本件は、
  • 僅差
  • 欠員リスク
  • 過渡期のガバナンス体制

  という限定的な文脈における判断です。

  SIPO は、将来的には、
  • CC 欠員時の明確な制度ルール
  • 選挙とオンチェーン修正の役割分担
  • minCommitteeSize 設計の再検討

  が、別途ガバナンスアクションとして整理されることを強く期待します。

  1. 結論

  以上の理由から、SIPO DRep は本提案に Yes を投じます。

  それは、
  • 個人への支持ではなく
  • 感情的判断でもなく
  • Cardano のガバナンスを止めないための
  構造的・制度的な選択

  です。

  SIPO は今後も、
  「誰が選ばれたか」よりも
  「どのようなルールと構造が残るか」
  を重視して、DRep としての判断を行っていきます。

• Army of Spies

  No84.3M ₳Rationale

  See video on Army of Spies youtube channel of the same date.

• Phil UPLC

  Yes76.8M ₳Rationale

  Christina is a great candidate.

  A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

  Christina is a great candidate.

• ranket

  Yes75.2M ₳No rationale
• SASA_nagamaru_ながまる

  Yes74.5M ₳Rationale

  I will vote YES on this proposal.

  The Constitutional Committee is designed in a way that its ability to ratify governance actions depends on maintaining a minimum number of active members. For this reason, operating slightly above the minimum required size is a reasonable and prudent approach to improving governance continuity and stability. This proposal increases resilience without changing the existing voting threshold or the current terms of committee members, making it a safe and well-scoped enhancement.

  During the snap election, Christina received strong support from the community, with the outcome being decided by a very narrow margin. This proposal acknowledges that reality and addresses it transparently on-chain. By doing so, it strengthens representation through a community-initiated process that aligns closely with Cardano’s permissionless governance model.

  For these reasons, I consider this proposal to be a sound measure that improves governance stability and long-term resilience, and I support it.

  僕は、本提案に YES で投票します。

  憲法委員会は、メンバー数が一定数を下回ると承認機能が止まってしまう仕組みになっています。そのため、最低人数を少し上回る体制を取ることは、ガバナンスの継続性と安定性を高めるうえで合理的です。今回の提案は、投票閾値や既存メンバーの任期を変更することなく、安全にレジリエンスを高める設計になっています。

  また、スナップ選挙では Christina に対しても非常に強いコミュニティ支持が示されました。本提案は、その事実をオンチェーンで透明に扱い、コミュニティ主導で代表性を補強しようとする、Cardanoのパーミッションレス・ガバナンスの精神に沿った取り組みだと評価しています。

  以上の理由から、本提案はガバナンスの安定性と将来耐性を高める健全な施策であり、僕はこれを支持します。

• Dave

  Yes73.1M ₳Rationale

  I am voting YES. Christina received significant support, and this strengthens resilience without overriding the election winner.

  A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

  I am voting YES.

  By adding an 8th member, we create a resilience buffer. If a member resigns in the future, governance can continue uninterrupted. Christina received substantial community support in the close election, and adding this seat improves decentralization and stability without overriding the official winner.

• Martin Lang

  Yes69.4M ₳No rationale
• Peter Bui

  Yes62.7M ₳Rationale

  add her

• Dori

  Yes53.8M ₳No rationale
• hix_coffeepool

  NoChanged50.4M ₳Rationale

  I am voting No on this Governance Action to add Christina as the 8th Constitutional Committee member. While I initially supported the idea, constitutional concerns have since emerged. Article 7 Section 3 of the Constitution clearly states that the Cardano Community shall "establish and make public a process" for the election of Constitutional Committee (CC) members. The Snap Election process was publicly announced and structured for the selection of one seat. Submitting a GA after the election to retroactively add a second seat appears inconsistent with that established and published process. Voters cast their votes under the assumption that only one seat was being filled. Retroactively modifying that outcome undermines procedural integrity and risks setting a precedent where off-chain elections can be overridden via Governance Actions. Such practices could lead to confusion and erosion of trust in governance mechanisms. While it's possible to interpret the addition as part of a new process, doing so without establishing and publicly communicating such a process raises questions about constitutional consistency. I support committee expansion in principle, but such a change must follow a clearly established and public process. I urge that any future expansion be preceded by an Info GA that sets expectations and allows the community to align. Based on these concerns, and recognizing that DReps are responsible for assessing the constitutionality of GAs, I am voting No. [Japanese version follows] 私は、Christina氏を8人目の憲法委員として追加する本ガバナンスアクションに対して反対票（No）を投じます。当初はこの提案に賛成していましたが、その後、憲法上の懸念が浮上しました。カルダノ憲法第7条3項には「コミュニティは憲法委員選出のためのプロセスを確立し、公開しなければならない」と明記されています。今回のSnap Electionは、1議席のみを選出するプロセスとして明確に構築・公開されていました。選挙後に2議席目を追加するガバナンスアクションを提出することは、既存のプロセスと整合していないように見えます。有権者は1議席を選ぶ前提で投票しており、事後的な変更は手続きの正当性を損ないます。このような例が前例化されれば、オフチェーン選挙の意味が形骸化しかねません。結果として、ガバナンス全体の混乱や信頼の低下につながる恐れがあります。今回の追加を「新しいプロセス」と解釈する見方もありますが、正式な確立と公開を経ていない点で、憲法との整合性に疑問が残ります。私は委員会の拡大には基本的に賛成ですが、それは確立された公開プロセスに基づいて行われるべきです。今後、Info GAを通じた事前共有を行い、コミュニティの合意形成を経たうえでのGA提出を望みます。こうした懸念を踏まえ、DRepが合憲性を判断すべき立場にあることを認識し、今回はNo票を投じます。

  Earlier votes

  Abstain7mo agoSuperseded

  Temporarily changing to Abstain. Revising previous votes. 再考すべき点があったため、一時的にAbstainに変更します。

  Yes7mo agoSuperseded

  I vote 'Yes' on the governance action 'Add Constitutional Committee Member - Christina'.\n\n In the 'CC snap vote' recently held at Intersect's Ekklesia, both Cardano Curia and Christina Gianelloni received over 40% of the votes, with Cardano Curia winning the 7th seat by a margin of 4.2%. However, this election has not fundamentally resolved the original problem of 'governance suspension due to one seat's retirement.'\n\n This proposal attempts to mitigate the risk of governance suspension caused by a single vacancy by appointing Christina, who also received over 40% of votes, as the 8th Constitutional Committee member. By expanding from the current minimum of 7 seats to 8, we can reduce the risk of governance suspension and establish a more stable governance foundation.\n\n However, there is a legitimate concern that should be considered: with 8 seats being an even number, how should decisions be made in the event of a 4-4 tie? I recommend the community that this should be addressed through: (a) resolution via deliberation among Constitutional Committee members, or (b) selection and appointment of an additional candidate to expand to 9 seats.\n\n Despite this concern, the benefits of improved governance resilience and the democratic legitimacy of Christina's strong electoral performance outweigh the potential drawbacks, making this proposal worthy of support. [Japanese version foloow] 私は、ガバナンスアクション「Add Constitutional Committee Member - Christina」に対して「Yes」を投票します。\n\n IntersectのEkklesiaにて行われた「CC snap vote」において、Cardano CuriaとChristina Gianelloni氏は、それぞれ40％以上の得票率を獲得し、4.2％の差によってCardano Curiaが7議席目として当選しました。しかし、この選挙の元となった「1議席の引退によるガバナンスの停止」という問題に対しては、根本的な解決がなされたとは言い難い状況でした。\n\n 本提案は、40％以上の得票を得たChristina氏を8議席目の憲法委員とすることで、1議席の欠員によるガバナンスの停止リスクを低減しよう、と試みるものです。本提案によって、現在、最低議席数である7議席から8議席に増えることで、ガバナンスの停止リスクが減少し、より安定的なガバナンス運営基盤を整えることができると考えます。\n\n一方で、8議席は偶数であるため、4対4に票が分かれた際の意思決定をどうするのか？という懸念は考慮すべきです。これに対しては、(a)憲法委員たちの議論により解決する、または(b)さらに9議席へ増加する候補を選出し増員する、などの対処を行う必要があることをコミュニティに対して提案します。\n\n こうした懸念があるものの、ガバナンスの強靭性向上とChristina氏の強力な選挙結果は潜在的なデメリットを上回るものと考えられるため、本提案を支持したいと思います。

• AdaStat

  Yes50M ₳Rationale

  Technically, although Christina came second after Cardano Curia in the preliminary vote, this does not mean that she would have taken first place if Cardano Curia had not been present. In reality, it is unknown how the votes would have been redistributed in that case (for example, those who voted for Cardano Curia might not have voted for Christina, in which case she still would not have come first).

  However, as I have said many times before, I aim to reduce bureaucracy in Cardano, and I generally believe that most of these preliminary votes make little sense and only add confusion, especially since the final vote still has to pass a certain threshold anyway. Therefore, it is completely irrelevant to me what happened in the preliminary vote (or whether it happened at all), as I believe that in the final vote everyone ultimately expresses their own opinion.

  Since I believe that adding an 8th member to the Constitutional Committee would be beneficial, and that Christina is a suitable candidate for this 8th member, I vote Yes.

• Tempo.Vote

  Yes48.6M ₳No rationale
• PoolTool

  Yes47.6M ₳No rationale
• HISAI

  Abstain42.9M ₳No rationale
• Patrick_Tobler

  Yes40.1M ₳Rationale

  Christina seems to be experienced and I trust she will be a good constitutional committee member.

• drep1yffcjs0njfe...

  No38.1M ₳Rationale

  If the community believes that the Constitutional Committee requires a redundancy seat, this should first be formalized through a constitutional or parameter change defining the CC structure as 7+1.
  Without such a prior structural change, proposals to expand the CC around a specific candidate lack a proper governance foundation.

• Linda - Cryptofly

  Yes37.8M ₳No rationale
• MUEN

  Yes34.6M ₳Rationale

  7名の最低メンバーでは欠員が出るたびに意思決定が遅れるし、さらに選挙には多くの方々の再投票が必要なため。今回の決定はシステムを守るためには有用である。

• Socious

  No34.3M ₳Rationale

  Socious DRep votes NO on the governance action: “Add Constitutional Committee Member – Christina.” While we hold the candidate in high regard and recognize her as exceptionally well-qualified for the Constitutional Committee (CC), we believe that structural changes to the committee must follow a legitimate and transparent process to maintain the integrity of Cardano’s governance.

  Rationale

  1. Candidate Merit vs. Procedural Integrity
  We wish to state clearly that Christina is well-qualified, and we would likely support her candidacy in a standard election or a specifically designed expansion process. However, a "NO" vote is necessary here because the process used to propose her appointment bypasses established community expectations.

  2. Adhering to the Election Mandate
  The Intersect snap election was held to fill one specific vacancy. Cardano Curia was selected by the community through that competitive process. To appoint a second member from the same election—without a pre-defined "runner-up" rule—sets a precedent where the scope of an election can be changed retroactively.

  3. Strategic Expansion Requires Consensus
  If there is a strategic need to increase the CC size to mitigate operational risk, that decision belongs to the ecosystem. We believe an Info Action should be the first step to:

  • Formally propose an increase in committee size.
  • Gather community feedback on the criteria for such an expansion.
  • Establish a fair and predictable process for filling those new seats.

  Conclusion

  Socious DRep remains supportive of qualified individuals like Christina joining the Constitutional Committee in the future. However, we cannot support a governance action that prioritizes expediency over a robust, community-aligned process. We encourage a return to a structured approach that ensures all structural changes are backed by a clear ecosystem mandate.

• HOSKY

  Yes33.5M ₳Rationale

  Voting YES.

  Expanding the Constitutional Committee above the minimum size improves continuity and resilience. If a member resigns or is unavailable, the CC can still function without delays, ensuring uninterrupted constitutional review and governance stability.

  A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

  Voting YES. Expanding the Constitutional Committee above the minimum size improves continuity and resilience. If a member resigns or is unavailable, the CC can still function without delays, ensuring uninterrupted constitutional review and governance stability.

• Aichi/Tokai_DRep

  Yes31.4M ₳Rationale

  The primary reason is that the vote margin between Cardano Curia and Christina in the snap election was extremely close. I believe this demonstrates that Christina is a trustworthy individual. Furthermore, maintaining a committee size above the baseline value ensures governance stability.

• FIMI

  Yes31.1M ₳No rationale
• Cerkoryn

  Yes27.9M ₳Rationale

  This is an easy YES for me. Christina is a valued member of the Cardano community and would make for an excellent CC member. In addition, the off-chain vote was extremely close and I believe that it will be a huge win for the whole community to have an extra seat on the CC.

• TERA DRep

  Yes27.9M ₳No rationale
• Florian Volery

  YesRevoted26.3M ₳History

  Earlier votes

  Yes7mo agoSuperseded

• Blockjock (James Meidinger)

  Yes26.1M ₳No rationale
• wolf31o2 (Chris Gianelloni)

  Yes23.5M ₳No rationale
• Duc Tiger

  No22M ₳Rationale

  While the underlying election and its subsequent audit appear to have been conducted with professionalism and transparency, this Governance Action asks the community to ratify the appointment of the second-place candidate, Christina Gianelloni, while completely disregarding the legitimate winner.
  According to the official audit results provided, the candidate "Cardano Curia" won the election with a final, validated voting power of 1.679 billion ADA. Christina Gianelloni finished in second place with 1.402 billion ADA.
  To ignore the clear outcome of a democratic election is an act that runs contrary to every core principle of Cardano and the Voltaire era. Our duty as dReps is to ratify the expressed will of the electorate, not to subvert it.
  If there were legitimate reasons to disqualify the winning candidate, those reasons would need to be presented transparently and debated publicly in their own separate Governance Action. Until such a process occurs, proposing the runner-up for ratification is procedurally unacceptable.
  This NO vote is cast to defend the integrity of the very governance process we are all charged with upholding.

• DINO

  Yes21.5M ₳No rationale
• Hephaestus Stake Pool [HEPHY]

  Yes21.5M ₳Rationale

  I am voting YES on the governance action to add an eighth Constitutional Committee (CC) member (eb8ef28ca80dbd9ced6f577f013bdfc64897d1f4e326beb37a50fb6b62c38ccd#0). This rationale is submitted as a combined DRep and SPO vote and will outline the reasons for a YES vote, as well as outlining some reservations/recommendations, before ending with a note of credit for the origin of the idea for submitting an update committee action prior to an existing one being ratified.

  I vote YES in support of this governance action as someone who has advocated for adding more members above the committeeMinSize parameter, both during discussions at the Cardano Summit in Berlin in November 2025 and as an elected member of the Civics Committee. Adding additional CC members above committeeMinSize is the easiest solution to improve resilience and prevent a repeat of governance stalling should another member step down or become unable to carry out their duties as a CC member. Yes, lowering the committeeMinSize parameter is another available measure but as the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution lists this parameter as “Critical to the Governance System” it requires a 3-month off-chain consultation period before an on-chain parameter update action can be submitted (PARAM-06a). I have confidence in the candidate put forth in this action, having met Christina Gianelloni in person at Cardano Summit events as well as having had a meeting during preliminary discussions around forming Adara Consortium in the previous CC election. These interactions demonstrated Christina’s belief in operating with the utmost transparency and integrity. In the absence of CC checks to this proposal I have also taken the measure of querying the on-chain action and the off-chain content. The hashes match, the action does indeed propose adding a single CC member until epoch 653 and leaves the threshold unchanged at 2/3.

  I also commend the community-initiated submission of this governance action as another demonstration that Cardano governance is open to all ada holders and that update committee actions are not just the purview of institutions and that the action ratification itself can provide the mandate, just as well as a formal off-chain election process prior to submission may do.

  I do however recognise some reservations and have some recommendations for future community-initiated proposals. First of all, the governance action rationale references the wrong parameter name, it references minCommitteeSize instead of committeeMinSize used both in the Constitution and output from a cardano-cli protocol-parameters query. Typos have been a constitutionality issue for CC members in the past, and it is worth noting in this instance as the CC does not have a vote in an update committee action, only DReps and SPOs. Secondly, the proposal is based on the candidate coming a close second in the recent CC Snap Election, which was single-choice only and not ranked-voting like the previous CC election. There is no knowing if the candidate put forth here would still have ranked second in the election, for example, if Curia was indeed voted top because of a preference for consortium candidates. Thirdly, the proposal assumes everyone knows who Christina is and would have benefitted greatly from providing some more background information for those DReps and SPOs that did not participate in the off-chain CC Snap Election facilitated by Intersect. If we consider that only about 10% of all registered DReps voted (or about 20% of ledger-recognised “active” DReps), not including more information for the remaining DReps and SPOs at the proposal stage could have a detrimental effect on the chances of ratification.

  Finally, I would like to acknowledge the inspiration behind the timing of this update committee action. It was submitted prior to the on-chain ratification of the previous update committee action to install CC Snap Election winners, Cardano Curia, on to the Constitutional Committee. This is a clever way to save time by referencing the previous governance action id ahead of time, assuming that it passes. Each update committee action is required to reference the previous successful governance action using its id at the action creation stage. By submitting this action before the Curia proposal passed, it ensures that it would not pass if the Curia proposal did not, and also saves an epoch as opposed to waiting for actual ratification of the previous action. This technique first appeared on SanchoNet recently when there existed two update committee actions on-chain at the same time. Phoenix Alliance, a candidate in the CC Snap Election, had submitted an update committee action during the election period as a way to demonstrate to voters that they had the capabilities to carry out the role of CC member. A member of Tingvard (TECH pool) also wanted to test out something and submitted another update committee action at the same time but this time referencing the previous, not-yet-ratified Phoenix Alliance action, in anticipation of its ultimate passing because SanchoNet is very much there for testing and actions can pass much more easily than on mainnet. So, credit where credit is due, to TECH pool and their flexible thinking when it comes to timing the submission of governance actions that require a reference to previously enacted governance actions. Additionally, it is worth noting that Phoenix Alliance were the only candidates in the CC Snap Election that undertook the step of proving their ability to carry out the role by submitting credentials to SanchoNet, a measure I hope becomes a standard requirement for applicants prior to receiving candidate status approval in future elections.

• Ha-Nguyen

  YesChanged21.4M ₳Rationale

  As a DRep, I vote YES on this governance action.

  I previously raised concerns regarding procedural clarity, as the recent snap election was publicly framed to fill a single Constitutional Committee seat. Those concerns remain valid. However, after further consideration, I believe the risk of governance disruption due to an insufficient number of active Constitutional Committee members is more immediate and significant.

  I also support Christina as a candidate. Christina has demonstrated strong commitment to Cardano’s decentralized governance and received meaningful community support during the election process. Supporting capable and motivated contributors is especially important given that this role is unpaid and responsibility-heavy.

  This YES vote should not be interpreted as endorsing the current process as ideal. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic decision to preserve governance continuity while acknowledging the need for improvement.

  I strongly encourage the community and relevant bodies to follow up with an Info Action to clearly define:

  • When and how the Constitutional Committee size may be expanded,
  • How off-chain election outcomes should be interpreted in such cases,
  • And how to avoid ambiguity or retroactive expectations in future appointments.

  Strengthening procedural clarity alongside operational resilience is essential to maintaining long-term trust in Cardano governance.

  Earlier votes

  No6mo agoSuperseded

  As a DRep, I vote NO on this proposal.

  The recent snap election was publicly framed to select one new Constitutional Committee member. Submitting a second appointment after that election undermines the legitimacy of the process and creates ambiguity about how future elections will be interpreted.

  If the goal is to expand the Committee for resilience, that change should begin with a clear, community-informed Info Action—not an ad hoc governance action that retroactively alters expectations.

  I support Committee expansion in principle, but it must follow transparent and consistent procedures that uphold trust in Cardano governance.

• Moonstake

  Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
• CTEC-Stake-Pool

  Yes20.3M ₳No rationale
• Chris [STR8] - Straightpool

  Yes19.9M ₳Rationale

  Christina and Cardano Curia were very close runner-ups, it makes sense to add both as Constitutional Committee Members, so we have a buffer.

• ADA Ocean

  No18.2M ₳No rationale
• Rodrigo-[CHIL]

  YesRevoted17.3M ₳Rationale

  Add Constitutional Committee Member - Christina

  Earlier votes

  Yes7mo agoSuperseded

  Add Constitutional Committee Member - Christina

• Cardanians

  Yes16.7M ₳Rationale

  We support this proposal because adding an additional Constitutional Committee member strengthens governance resilience and reduces the risk of future ratification deadlocks. With the 66.7% approval threshold now in place, a larger CC also raises the absolute bar for approval, improving checks and balances. This action has no treasury impact, does not change CC powers or rules, and helps ensure stable, continuous governance operations.

• drep1ytaunswwpyt...

  Yes14.2M ₳No rationale
• RCADA

  Abstain13.3M ₳Rationale

  RCADA previously voted YES on the Update Committee action that added Cardano Curia to the Constitutional Committee. That decision was grounded in a clear and principled position: a sitting committee member had retired, the Committee had fallen below the committeeMinSize parameter, and the snap election facilitated by Intersect produced a single, auditable outcome. Although RCADA supported a different candidate during that election, we upheld the result because safeguarding process integrity and restoring constitutional functionality takes precedence over individual electoral preferences.

  Importantly, in that prior rationale RCADA also explicitly acknowledged a broader structural issue: a Constitutional Committee operating without buffer seats is fragile, and a single resignation should not temporarily impair the system’s ability to ratify governance actions. We stated then that governance resilience should be addressed through appropriate, constitutionally compliant channels, such as a deliberate review of committee sizing or the committeeMinSize parameter, rather than through ad-hoc or reactive measures.

  It is against that same framework that we assess the present action.

  This proposal is constitutionally valid and well-intentioned. It does not negate the Curia outcome, does not remove or replace any member, and correctly respects ledger ordering. RCADA also recognises the genuine governance risk it seeks to mitigate and does not question the qualifications or good faith of the proposed candidate.

  However, this action introduces a different governance dynamic than the one RCADA previously supported. Rather than executing a single, final election outcome to restore minimum functionality, it expands committee membership in response to the narrowness of an earlier off-chain result. While understandable, this mechanism risks establishing a precedent where close electoral margins become grounds for post-hoc committee expansion. Over time, such a pattern could weaken election finality and blur the boundary between outcome execution and outcome revision.

  RCADA’s abstention should therefore not be interpreted as opposition to the candidate, nor as a retreat from our prior vote. On the contrary, it reflects consistency with that earlier position. We supported the Curia action because it faithfully enacted a necessary and final outcome. We abstain here because we believe long-term committee resilience should be addressed through neutral, system-level design choices, not candidate-specific corrective actions tied to past elections.

  For these reasons, RCADA abstains — affirming constitutional validity and governance intent, while signaling the need for a more principled, forward-looking approach to Constitutional Committee resilience.