CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.0
219 DReps voted · 87 with a rationale · 8 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- No1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- No1.6M ₳Rationale
I’ve decided to vote ❌ NO on this proposal to replace the Cardano Constitution. While I strongly support eliminating the budget governance action because it is redundant and unnecessary, I have several concerns with this proposal.
Firstly, this version has simply been presented for a vote without broad community input and discussion to fine-tune it, which is necessary for such an important document. We just had the governance and budget workshop in Las Vegas, where many community members reviewed the current process and raised interesting points. These points could certainly be taken into account when drafting a new version of the constitution. This current proposal feels somewhat premature.
Secondly, this version seems to have merely removed the budget info action while leaving the rest largely unchanged ( except for one small point I will return to later). Rather than only removing the budget info action, I would have preferred to see the budget incorporated into the treasury withdrawal action. This way, we still have budgets, but without the need for separate governance actions to approve them. Since there would no longer be an on-chain budget vote in advance, I believe the constitution should at least mention that an off-chain process to gather DRep sentiment before posting treasury withdrawals on-chain is preferable (like the Ekklesia vote, though no need to name a specific tool, let’s keep it general).
Thirdly, the small point I mentioned earlier: the guardrail about the budget action has suddenly been replaced by the following:
TREASURY-04a (x) A roadmap that includes the applicable period of the treasury withdrawal must be approved by the DReps via an Info Action with a threshold of greater than 50% of the active voting stake.
This introduces a new step that was not required before. While I think gathering DRep sentiment on the roadmap through an info action can be valuable (we have done this before), it should not be made mandatory. If it is to be included in the constitution, the process should be described more clearly in the main text of the constitution, not only as a brief mention in the guardrails.Fourthly, I am concerned that the following text was removed from the constitution, as this essentially reduces the powers of the Constitutional Committee (perhaps unintentionally) compared to what they currently have:
In the case of "Info" actions that propose a Cardano Blockchain ecosystem budget, Constitutional Committee members shall record a vote on-chain that sets forth their opinion as to whether the proposed budget, if it were to be implemented in the form contained in the "Info" action, would violate this Constitution.
In the case of "Info" actions that propose a withdrawal from the Cardano Blockchain treasury pursuant to a previously approved budget, Constitutional Committee members shall record a vote on-chain that sets forth their opinion as to whether such proposed withdrawal, if made in accordance with such "Info" action, would violate this Constitution.
This text should of course be adapted to reflect a combined budget/treasury withdrawal action, but it’s an important part of the constitution imho.Fifthly, I have some remarks about the definitions added in this version:
- The definitions are divided between the main text and the guardrails, which appears somewhat chaotic and arbitrary. It would be better to bring them together in the main text (with exceptions for definitions that are specific to the guardrails).
- I would have liked to see, already in the first constitution, a clear statement that the Cardano Blockchain is public and permissionless (as in the Cardano Foundation’s proposal). Since "public" is already present in the definition, please add "permissionless" as well, and make this the first definition for clarity and logical structure.
- The definition of the NCL remains as ambiguous as it is now. This needs to be clarified so that all confusion about its meaning is eliminated and there can be no further debate.
- For the definition of Active Block Production Stake, I believe it is better to use the same wording as in the Shelley Design Specification. So instead of "…that is actively delegated to Stake Pools…" it should say "…that is correctly delegated to non-retired Stake Pools…".
Lastly, I would like to see the NCL implemented on-chain instead of being only an info action. However, since this requires code changes, it can be left for a later update to the constitution.
- Yes1.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted1.4M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES to adopt version 2 of the Cardano Constitution. While the changes are primarily stylistic and clarifying, not substantive, they improve the document’s readability, enforceability, and operational guidance—especially in the expanded Guardrails and the new Supporting Guidance appendices.
The core governance framework remains unchanged: the tenets, roles of DReps, SPOs, and the Constitutional Committee, budget oversight, and amendment thresholds are all preserved.
The document now offers clearer language around protocol parameters, treasury withdrawals, and hard fork criteria, improving transparency and technical safeguards without altering the Constitution's intent.
That said, I would like to see a more formalized, community-led process for future constitutional updates, including wider consultation, draft review periods, and clear change tracking. In this case, however, the scope of the revision was limited, and the substance remains faithful to version 1. For these reasons, I support this update and vote YES.
DREP ID: drep1y2jd3c4hgg0tdua58z6c64k9rf58lz3jlcjlxcjfeaspl6q2e9zm6
VOTE 0024
Earlier votes
Yes10mo agoSuperseded
I am voting YES to adopt version 2 of the Cardano Constitution. While the changes are primarily stylistic and clarifying, not substantive, they improve the document’s readability, enforceability, and operational guidance—especially in the expanded Guardrails and the new Supporting Guidance appendices.
The core governance framework remains unchanged: the tenets, roles of DReps, SPOs, and the Constitutional Committee, budget oversight, and amendment thresholds are all preserved.
The document now offers clearer language around protocol parameters, treasury withdrawals, and hard fork criteria, improving transparency and technical safeguards without altering the Constitution's intent.
That said, I would like to see a more formalized, community-led process for future constitutional updates, including wider consultation, draft review periods, and clear change tracking. In this case, however, the scope of the revision was limited, and the substance remains faithful to version 1. For these reasons, I support this update and vote YES.
DREP ID: drep1y2jd3c4hgg0tdua58z6c64k9rf58lz3jlcjlxcjfeaspl6q2e9zm6
VOTE 0025
- Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳Rationale
v2.0 is mostly a clean-up plus one meaningful process change. It fixes typos, tightens language, clarifies terms, and removes old, unused parts—so the Constitution is easier to read and use. The full text is here:
https://cardano.mypinata.cloud/ipfs/bafybeiezgj4gu6fyxfpnu7h7cgrhfyyvbn4ve72ytpxrv7cmatbok32e4mWhat actually changes (with simple examples)
Treasury withdrawals get simpler. Before, you had to post a separate “Budget Information” action before asking for funds. Now you can file one Withdrawal action, as long as you include a clear disclosure checklist (what you’re doing, how long it takes, who receives funds, costs, prior treasury withdrawals in the past 24 months, refund conditions, etc.).
Example: A team asking for 200k ADA doesn’t need an extra budget post; they include those details inside the Withdrawal itself.Small asks face less red tape. For under ~1M ADA across two years, some heavier requirements (like audits) are relaxed. Big asks still have stronger controls.
Example: A 300k ADA tooling grant won’t need the same audit burden as a multi-million ADA program, but large programs still must meet stricter rules.Old/outdated parts are removed, definitions made clearer. v2.0 trims unused sections (like old DRep/SPO “codes of conduct”) and cleans up defined terms so people use the same words the same way.
Example: Definitions in the appendices are tightened and aligned with the updated treasury-withdrawal flow, so readers aren’t bouncing between mismatched sections.Why I’m voting YES
This makes funding faster and clearer for builders while keeping guardrails (disclosure checklist, limits on how much can leave the Treasury). It reduces bureaucracy without removing accountability. Nothing is perfect on the first try, but this is a solid step forward we can iterate on—fix what’s rough in a quick v2.1 if needed, rather than blocking useful improvements today.Concerns to be aware of (raised by other DReps)
Some DReps asked for the bigger policy change (removing the Budget Info step) to be voted on separately from all the small edits. Others worry a few rules are hard to enforce in practice (e.g., public disclosure of overlapping roles or compensation when identities can be anonymous), nit-picked inconsistent capitalization (like “Ada Holders”), and questioned the “immutable URL” requirement because a content hash already proves the document didn’t change. I hear these points, and I’m open to a short community “temperature check” to capture feedback for a tidy v2.1 pass.Bottom line
I’m voting YES because v2.0 cleans up the Constitution and streamlines how we fund work—helping real builders move faster—while we continue polishing details together. - Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.1M ₳Rationale
Appears to provide minor technical corrections not requiring the convening of a Constitutional Convention.
- No1.1M ₳Rationale
At first glance, the proposed amendments appear modest, mostly wording refinements, clarifications, and removal of outdated or redundant clauses. This is not inherently problematic; streamlining documentation is beneficial. However, the devil is in the details, particularly regarding treasury withdrawals and the removal of the Budget Information Action (BIA) requirement.
The rationale to remove BIAs for treasury withdrawals under 1 million ADA within two years, accompanied by the relaxation of audit requirements, is deeply troubling. Audits are a fundamental control mechanism in any prudent financial governance framework. Labeling audits as “burdensome conditions” as DRep YUTA states, betrays a lack of appreciation for sound business management principles. This signals a potential weakening of financial oversight that will invite misuse or misallocation of funds, contrary to the fiduciary responsibilities we hold as DReps!
Moreover, the removal of BIAs and audit requirements will almost certainly incentivize proposers to fragment larger budgets into multiple sub-1-million ADA requests, circumventing meaningful scrutiny. This creates a loophole ripe for exploitation by less scrupulous actors, increasing the oversight burden on DReps and diluting treasury protection.
The proposal’s motivation to support builders more efficiently is understandable, efficiency cannot come at the cost of financial rigor. The constitution should reinforce, not erode, mechanisms that ensure transparency and accountability. The added disclosure requirements are insufficient substitutes for formal audits and structured budget reviews.
This proposal does not demonstrate the necessary strategic foresight or business acumen to safeguard Cardano’s treasury and governance framework. It underestimates the complexity and risk of financial management in a decentralized ecosystem. I do not see this as a step forward but rather a step sideways, potentially backward.
Vote: NO
- Yes1M ₳No rationale
- Yes1M ₳No rationale
- Yes964.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes955.7K ₳No rationale
- No949.1K ₳Rationale
While the proposed amendment does a good job of improving clarity and cleaning up definitions, I am voting No on this proposal.
My concern is that replacing budgets with roadmaps removes the detailed financial oversight we currently have. Roadmaps are too broad to judge funding requests on their own, which risks making treasury withdrawals being more fragmented and less disciplined. I do think there are opportunities to improve the process, but I don't feel this has been debated enough. Removing codes of conduct also weakens formal accountability, and shifting more weight onto the Constitutional Committee creates additional risk by concentrating too much discretion in the hands of a small group.
These are significant governance changes that haven’t been discussed enough by the community, and I don’t believe the current Constitution justifies such a quick amendment.
- Yes931.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes929.9K ₳No rationale
- No825.2K ₳Rationale
We are voting NO to this proposal due to a lack of a transparent inclusive community wide discussion. The proposal was pushed on X with short deadlines and tracked on google docs.
We need to keep the very high standards established by the first constitution ratification process aknowleding that we do not need to spend millions to do it right.
There are good ideas in the proposal, we invite the proposer to make them part of a wider more legitimate effort that leads to a widely supported amendment. - Yes820.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes798.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes798.4K ₳Rationale
These changes largely reinforce cypherpunk principles by embedding censorship resistance, user sovereignty, and transparency into the governance framework while codifying checks on power via on-chain rules and liquid democracy. While some changes introduce additional formalism (audits, codes of conduct, committee powers), they do not fundamentally undermine cypherpunk values so long as participation remains voluntary, rights of exit are preserved, and the system remains anchored in code and cryptography rather than politics. On balance, v2.0 is an evolutionary improvement toward a more resilient and decentralized governance model, even if it nudges the culture slightly closer to institutional accountability than radical minimalism.
- No794.5K ₳Rationale
I'm not comfortable with, at this juncture, the establishment of a 1M ADA threshold below which no budget info action is required and oversight requirements are reduced. Any changes in this regard I prefer to see come out of the "Beyond Minimum Viable Governance: Iteratively Improving on Cardano Voltaire" workstream that I voted for. It feels a bit early, and arbitrary, to get so specific about remediation around treasury withdrawals. I prefer the friction for now. I don't want to see projects just gaming the new rules to stack their requests below the 1M ADA limit to avoid audit and BIA scrutiny.
- No782.8K ₳Rationale
Cardano Ecosystem Constitution v2
I am voting NO to the proposed constitutional amendment labeled as version 2.0. The Cardano constitution was ratified less than one year ago through extensive community consultation, and amendments should not be rushed without clear justification.
My Decision Framework
My opposition to this proposal rests on three key concerns:
1. Inadequate Explanation of Changes
The governance action abstract, motivation, and rationale does not adequately or clearly explain the scope of actual changes being made to the constitution. The proposal lacks sufficient detail about what specific modifications are being proposed and why they are necessary. Constitutional amendments demand transparent communication that enables informed decision-making by the community.
2. Misleading Version Designation
Labeling this as "version 2.0" implies major architectural changes to our governance framework. The designation suggests fundamental restructuring rather than incremental improvements. This creates unnecessary confusion among stakeholders about the nature and scope of the proposed changes when clearer version numbering would better serve the community. Further, the major version designation may not connote adequate respect for the high community effort leading to 1.0. I encourage document or protocol versions to utilize semantic versioning where possible to ensure common understanding.
3. Insufficient Time Since Ratification
The current constitution was ratified less than one year ago following extensive community deliberation. Proposing amendments so soon after adoption prevents adequate time to assess how the current framework functions in practice. Constitutional stability requires allowing sufficient operational experience before considering modifications.
Conclusion
Constitutional amendments should be reserved for necessary improvements identified through practical experience, communicated with absolute clarity, and labeled appropriately to reflect their scope. While continuous improvement of our governance framework is valuable, and there are a lot of useful and well-intentioned updates in this proposal, I encourage future proposals to focus on smaller, more accurately named, and better-described governance actions that promote incremental and transparent change. Emphasizing transparency and a more conservative approach, especially when it pertains to the constitution, will better serve Cardano's long-term governance stability.
- No776.8K ₳Rationale
As one of the delegates that fought for the inclusion of Article VIII, the following amendment's effort is welcomed, yet fails to meet the intended pathway for such changes to occur:
"The Cardano Community is encouraged to periodically review and debate its
provisions, and when so desired, come together in such forums as the Cardano
Community may deem appropriate, to propose amendments to this Constitution.
Amendments may be made as provided in this Article VIII."At the time of writing, it was brought up that amendments issued by singular entities would, and probably should, experience a high level of scrutiny, making it very difficult to pass. This is why it was important, in my view, to make amendment proposals as a group, with as much engagement of the community as possible. The following being presented by a representative of high stake should not be taken lightly, particularly in the vulnerable stages of governance we currently reside.
The proposed changes are viewed highly inconsequential:
Perceived "typos" and "clarifications" add no further influence on the CC's interpretation of the Constitutional text
Definitions have no direct authority over the CC's determination and therefore should not be part of the text.
The perceived "requirement" of Info Actions within the Budget Process is the interpretation of the proposer that is already contrary to the terms declared within the Constitutional text. "Expected" is not a requirement, yet a strong suggestion that may welcome scrutiny when not followed.
The "Code of Conduct" is not something I ever wanted within the text, but this was already voted on the community to be included, despite pushback. I initially was concerned about the weaponization of such text by blocking dRep votes, but the CC is not afforded this capability, and this reveals the fact moderation happens at the delegator level- delegators will judge dReps/delegates based on their perceived "Code of Conduct" with or without this being included in the text, and therefore has no affect aside from the already existing social pressure delegators are subject to.
- Yes763.4K ₳No rationale
- Abstain763.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes759K ₳No rationale
- Yes756.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes731.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes717.5K ₳Rationale
The v2.0 update does not change Cardano’s core rules (the Tenets) or break any guardrails. It mostly cleans up wording, clarifies terms, and removes Governance Action "Info" step that is procedural, but not fundamental. Since the constitution can be updated through the normal ratification process, this proposal still constitutional and consistent with the current framework.
Feedback:
The edits improve readability and remove unused parts, which is great. To keep trust and transparency around treasury withdrawals after dropping the Governance Action "Info" step, I suggest adding a simple safeguard: require a short on-chain note and brief community review for any large treasury withdrawal. This keeps the process clear and fair while preserving the simpler v2.0 design. - No625.9K ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on this constitutional amendment. While I agree the info budget governance action may be redundant, I have serious concerns about this proposal's process and substance.
Most importantly, this version has been presented without broad community input and discussion that such an important document requires. The original Cardano Constitution included over 65 workshops with approximately 1,800 participants ensuring genuine community engagement. This proposed update has seen minimal community discussion and reflects only the voice of a few motivated DReps, not the ecosystem at large. The removal of the budget info action eliminates necessary accountability mechanisms. Treasury withdrawals require off-chain processes to gather DRep sentiment before posting on-chain actions. These negotiations need immutable records and nonrepudiation to ensure transparency. The budget info action, although redundant, provided essential accountability that this proposal strips away without adequate replacement. The proposed roadmap function introduces undefined requirements that create more problems than solutions. TREASURY-04a mandates DRep approval of roadmaps via info actions with greater than 50% active voting stake, but this process remains completely undefined. Making roadmap approval mandatory while limiting expenditure scope could degrade blockchain advancement and appears unconstitutional. If roadmap requirements belong in the constitution, the process must be clearly described in the main text, not buried in guardrails. This proposal asks us to vote on undefined processes and removes accountability mechanisms without proper community consultation. Constitutional changes require careful deliberation, broad consensus, and clear definitions. This amendment fails all three standards. The constitution governs our entire ecosystem. Rushing changes without community input sets dangerous precedent for future governance. We need transparency, accountability, and inclusive decision-making, not hasty amendments driven by small groups. I support constitutional improvements, but only through proper process with broad community engagement and clearly defined mechanisms. This proposal falls short of those essential standards. - Yes605.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes598.3K ₳No rationale
- No590.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes589.7K ₳Rationale
I understand this to be a net positive to the constitution, fixing some minor issues and streamlining.
- Yes587.6K ₳Rationale
I am voting **YES **on the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.0. While there is always room for improvement, this version introduces targeted changes that can support builders more effectively while maintaining and even strengthening the protection of Cardano’s financial soundness. The update primarily modifies the treasury withdrawal process by removing Budget Information Actions and replacing them with clearer disclosure requirements. These changes streamline governance without introducing excessive complexity for proposers. Additionally, by removing burdensome requirements such as mandatory audits for withdrawals under one million ADA within two years, the proposal helps smaller initiatives access funding more efficiently.
Although the text changes are relatively modest, their impact is meaningful in balancing oversight with agility. I believe constitutional updates should undergo more comprehensive off-chain community engagement before being formalized on-chain, ensuring they reflect the collective vision of the Cardano community. To address this, I am working on GovCircle, a project focused on enhancing the off-chain processes for constitutional updates and building the tools we need for better governance outcomes. This proposal, while not perfect, moves us toward a governance framework that is both practical and protective, and thus earns my support.
- No520.2K ₳Rationale
I’m voting NO because v2.0 as presented in this governance action goes beyond what I am comfortable changing in one go. I would prefer small iterative changes to the constitution. There are lots of good and valid changes but I am not yet convinced about the removal of budget info actions and other control mechanisms e.g. audits.
- Yes501K ₳Rationale
We’ve been operating under a document with typos, unclear definitions, and provisions for things that never actually got implemented like the DRep and SPO Codes of Conduct. It’s like trying to run a country with a constitution that still references telegraph regulations , technically functional, but embarrassingly outdated.
The most significant change is removing the budget info action requirement for treasury withdrawals, and honestly, this streamlines a process that was creating unnecessary friction. Having to pass a separate budget action before every treasury withdrawal was adding bureaucratic layers without adding meaningful oversight. The Constitutional Committee and DRep voting process already provide the checks and balances we need. Removing this requirement doesn’t eliminate accountability. Simply it just eliminates redundant procedural hurdles that were slowing down legitimate governance actions. - No499K ₳No rationale
- Yes478.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes478.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes466.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes442.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes414.2K ₳No rationale
- Abstain409.1K ₳No rationale
- No385.2K ₳Rationale
As a Cardano DRep, I vote NO on the proposed Constitution v2.0 update. While I appreciate Yuta’s efforts and recognize the need for an updated constitution, this proposal requires broader community engagement, including Stake Pool Operators (SPOs) from the outset, to achieve the high quorum needed for adoption. The changes, such as clarified definitions and simplified wording, provide a strong foundation, but consensus demands inclusive workshops, as held in 2024. All Intersect committees and SPOs must be involved to ensure legitimacy and alignment. I recommend using this proposal as the basis for such workshops to foster comprehensive community input.