CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.0
219 DReps voted · 87 with a rationale · 8 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes383K ₳No rationale
- Yes381.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes370.3K ₳Rationale
I am voting yes.
The changes make the Constitution clearer.
Outdated rules are removed.
Safeguards are stronger for treasury funds. Treasury use will be more transparent.
It will be easier to follow and trust. - Yes365.7K ₳No rationale
- No328.9K ₳No rationale
- No320.4K ₳Rationale
Panda voted NO solely for this piece:
Treasury withdrawal governance actions must. [...] , the location and the identity of the recipient.
Panda is not sure what it means and entails " location and the identity of the recipient.". Might be too broad and general and force unwanted consequences
- No314.4K ₳Rationale
I have decided to vote "NO" on this governance action after much thought and going back and forth between “Yes,” “No,” and “Abstain.” Detailed rationale is below.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I have decided to vote No on this governance action.
Firstly, this was one of my toughest governance decisions to date. I found myself swinging between “yes”, “no”, and “abstain” multiple times.
Secondly, I want to express my admiration for Yuta’s effort in drafting this new version of the Constitution. I understand this is a huge undertaking, and his commitment is truly remarkable and inspiring.
I appreciate the addition of much-needed definitions (which were missing in the first version), the correction of typos and errors, and the overall improvement in wording.
I also welcome the effort to streamline the budget process by removing the extra step of the budget info action prior to treasury withdrawals.
However, there is one point I strongly oppose: the requirement to disclose the location and identity of treasury withdrawal recipients. While I understand concerns about accountability, my experience shows that fraud or mismanagement can still occur even when real identities are exposed. On the contrary, forcing disclosure of real location and identity - beyond raising privacy concerns and being antithetical to Blockchain ethos - could expose individuals to serious, even life-threatening risks in some parts of the world. I encourage voluntary disclosure but oppose making it mandatory, as this could exclude pseudonymous participants or put some at grave risk.
I strongly encourage a further iteration based on version 2.0, incorporating more community input and a more thorough review. I envision the discussion proceeding in three parts:
- Typos and errors: The quickest to confirm
- Removal of the budget Info Action: A relatively fast decision with a simple yes/no option
- Examination of the new simplified wording and text changes: A slower process requiring careful review to avoid important omissions, ambiguity, and to ensure that all changes are thoroughly examined and well understood.
- No313.4K ₳Rationale
I’m voting NO on this proposal. While I recognize the effort and intent behind Constitution 2.0, I believe that any update to the Cardano Constitution should emerge through a broad, inclusive process with deep community input and not be authored and advanced by a small group alone.
The Constitution is foundational to Cardano’s governance future. Even if the proposed changes are well-meaning and appear minor, this process must set a precedent for legitimacy, transparency, and participation. Rushing this step could undermine trust in the very framework we're trying to strengthen.
I fully respect the time and care put into this draft, and I’m confident a more participatory path will be taken moving forward, but for now, I believe we must pause and develop a process that truly reflects the decentralized values of the ecosystem.
- No298.9K ₳Rationale
This revision to the constitution changes too many things at once.
- Yes271.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes270.1K ₳Rationale
After a thorough and detailed review of the proposed Constitution Version 2.00, I find this iteration to be a sound and acceptable foundation for the ongoing governance of the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem. This Constitution reflects significant evolution in establishing a robust, decentralized governance framework that balances community participation, technical security, transparency, and long-term sustainability. While I have identified various questions and considerations regarding specific language, definitions, and procedural clarifications, these points do not constitute objections substantial enough to warrant a NO vote. Instead, they represent constructive feedback intended to promote iterative refinement and clarity in future amendments.
The Constitution 2.00 presents a comprehensive governance architecture encompassing the roles and responsibilities of Ada Holders, Delegated Representatives (DReps), Stake Pool Operators (SPOs), and the Constitutional Committee (CC). It establishes guiding tenets, defines essential guardrails for protocol parameter changes and treasury withdrawals, and introduces meaningful processes for community participation and oversight. Its design to promote self-governance, impartiality, and financial stability aligns well with Cardano’s vision to empower individuals and communities globally.
I support the adoption of Constitution 2.00 because it satisfactorily captures these core principles and practical mechanisms necessary for the Cardano ecosystem to mature its decentralized governance in a secure and transparent manner. It does so while acknowledging governance as a living process, open to future amendments driven by community consensus.
Summary of Questions, Considerations, and Recommendations for Future Committee Review
These points reflect areas where additional specificity, clearer definitions, and procedural detail may enhance the constitutional framework in subsequent iterations or guidance documents. They will be formally submitted to the Constitutional Committee for consideration:
Preamble Language and Clarity
The phrase “we hereby establish this Cardano Constitution to govern the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem” could be refined to clarify that the Constitution establishes governing rules rather than governing directly.
Suggest adding “and vision” to “share our values” to emphasize the shared aspirations behind the Constitution.Definition of “Persons” and Inclusion Language
In the definition of Ada Holders as “Persons,” clarification is needed whether this refers exclusively to individual natural persons or includes corporate entities. Using language consistent with the Cardano Community definition (“individuals and organizations”) might reduce ambiguity.
Question the use of “including the CC” in the Cardano Community member definition, as including a specific entity can imply exclusion of others, which was likely unintended.Terms and Role Clarifications
Clarify that DReps vote not only on on-chain governance actions but also on “Info” actions that indicate community sentiment, to avoid confusion from casual use of “on-chain” and “off-chain” terminology.
Recommend expanding Ada Holders’ participation rights to explicitly include direct voting without registering as DReps or delegating, reflecting functionality described in existing governance tools.Net Change Limit and Treasury Mechanics
Suggest defining the Net Change Limit formula more explicitly, including how the Treasury value baseline is established and its relationship to withdrawal limits over time-frames for greater clarity.Privileges and Protections of Community Members
Request more explicit detailing of the rights, privileges, and protections referenced in Article II Section 1 to reduce reliance on literary generalities and improve definitional precision.Compensation Disclosure and Governance Communication Channels
Inquire about the practical mechanisms and designated governance communication channels for DReps and CC members to disclose compensation transparently, along with responsibilities for managing these channels.Proposal Content and Supporting Materials
The immutability requirement for proposal documents is understood to safeguard integrity, but suggest exploration of mechanisms that allow updating, adding, or withdrawing supporting information related to proposals during their active period to facilitate innovation and responsiveness.Oversight and Administration of Treasury Withdrawals
Recommend explicitly stating in the Constitution that treasury withdrawal proposals must specify the designated process and responsible agent(s) for oversight.
Questions why the requirement to designate administrators for monitoring treasury withdrawal funds is reiterated only in large requests, recommending it be universal.Constitutional Committee Process Enhancements
Propose that the constitutionality determination of governance actions by the Constitutional Committee be completed prior to DRep voting to avoid wasted efforts on unconstitutional proposals.
Calls for more precise language on the CC’s composition, term-setting authority, and election timelines to avoid ambiguity and governance paralysis.
Request safeguards and timelines around no-confidence motions and related governance to mitigate risks of stalemate or misuse.Transparency and Conduct of Constitutional Committee
Suggest clearer and more concise language for CC members voting against constitutionality requiring written rationale linked to specific constitutional provisions.
Question the differential approach to compensation disclosure between CC members and other contributing participants, advocating for equitable treatment.Guardrails and Amendment Procedures
Recommend replacing vague phrases like “from time to time” with fixed timelines or defined processes, especially for guardrail amendments and CC elections, to enhance predictability and accountability.Terminology Refinement
Propose abandoning or minimizing ambiguous terms like “on-chain” and “off-chain” in favor of more precise designations linked to the specific governance or technical processes they describe.Definition of “Info” Actions
Request clearer definition of “Info” actions in the Constitution as tools primarily for gauging community sentiment rather than only an on-chain record, avoiding circular definitions.
In conclusion, while these questions and recommendations highlight important areas for future refinement, they do not detract from the overall quality and readiness of Constitution Version 2.00 to serve as the foundational governance framework for the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem. Accordingly, I cast my YES vote in support of Constitution 2.00 and respectfully submit the above points to the Constitutional Committee for ongoing consideration and improvement.
- Yes260.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes252.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes245.5K ₳No rationale
- No238.8K ₳Rationale
The removal of the Budget Info Action Requirement reduces a layer of transparency and strategic alignment, raising valid concerns about potential misuse, favoritism, and governance overload. While safeguards like voting and smart contracts remain, the change shifts more responsibility to the community to vet each withdrawal, which could be challenging given current participation levels. Because I'm concerned about these risks, take my "nay" vote as a push for more consultation or alternative safeguards.
- Yes238.6K ₳No rationale
- Abstain233.2K ₳No rationale
- No200.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes199K ₳Rationale
The constitution must go forward. Changes are necessary.
- Yes191.1K ₳No rationale
- No185.6K ₳Rationale
I firmly disagree with the removal of the Budget Info Action.
I do agree that we need to streamline many processes for our governance.
I do not believe that we should modify the Constitution so soon after the initial ratification. We should continue to use it and learn from it. Within another year or so, we will have enough data to start proposing new Constitution changes.
- Yes182.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes178.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes159.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes150.7K ₳No rationale
- NoRevoted147.5K ₳History
Earlier votes
No10mo agoSuperseded
- Yes145.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes138.4K ₳Rationale
Pursuant to ARTICLE VIII of the Cardano Constitution, the amendment process is clearly outlined; therefore, this GA is in line with the constitutional provisions, and I support it as an opportunity for the community to review the constitution. More importantly, the process leading toward Constitution 2.0 has been transparent and community-oriented, although limited effort was made to reach other members beyond the usual channels. Participation was mainly driven through posts on X and the Cardano Forum.
- Yes137.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes134.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes132.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes129.1K ₳Rationale
I am voting to approve Constitution v2.00.
This update strengthens Cardano governance by:
Reaffirming ada’s hard cap and role as currency
Adding transparency requirements for treasury spending, compensation, and governance actions
Clarifying responsibilities for DReps, SPOs, and the Constitutional Committee
Introducing audits, oversight, and immutable documentation for proposals
While the changes introduce more process overhead, they are essential safeguards to protect the treasury and ensure decentralization, sustainability, and trust in Cardano’s governance.
For these reasons, I support ratification of Constitution v2.00.
— DanShipps_HarborStakePool
- Abstain110.9K ₳No rationale
- No108.3K ₳Rationale
After careful review of this governance action, I have decided to vote no on this proposal.
I will start by saying that I like almost the entirety of this proposal, and there are many excellent changes. I would like to commend the work that was done to clean up the constitution, add definitions etc. While most issues are positive, there remains some issues around enforceability of some clauses. Requirements to disclose compensation and SPO/DREP overlap are simply not enforceable and should not be in the constitution. It's one thing if people would like to make it part of the social contract and simply advise against delegation to people who fail to provide these things but enshrining this in the constitution is fundamentally foolish without enforcement and against principles of freedom and inclusivity that I would hope are core to any blockchain community. That said I recognize that this is already an issue of the constitution in it's current form and if it was only this then I could look past it.
The main red line for me as to why I cannot vote for this proposal is the removal of the budget info actions. I believe the community made a fundamental error in how we handled our very first budget, which caused us to make the budget info action redundant. The budget info action was meant to separate funding into tranches, and then those tranches would be administered by groups chosen by the voters through that same budget info action. We failed to utilize it as intended and instead crammed proposals into the budget info action then voted again for the same proposals. We also voted to increase granular control of DReps in approving individual proposals which was ill-advised. The fact that we failed to utilize the budget info action properly does not mean it should be removed. Without a budget info action we will simply be conducting a "catalyst version" project run on funds as soon as a net change limit is approved. For various reasons, this is not an outcome that I feel will improve the ecosystem at all.
I would very much recommend that this proposal be resubmitted with the important but less contentious improvements only and that more contentious elements like removing the budget info action done individually for a full and fair discussion on each. - Yes105.8K ₳No rationale
- No89.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes82.6K ₳Rationale
The changes proposed are reasonable, and add clarity to the constitution. I especially appreciate the requirement for an audit for any treasury withdrawals exceeding 1M ADA. What exactly constitutes an audit report, and how the provisioned auditors are defined to be independent are details that might deserve more detail in a future iteration.
- Yes67.1K ₳No rationale
- No58.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes55.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes52.4K ₳Rationale
I concur with Philip DiSarro's vote and rationale on this proposal:
To be honest, this isn't ideal from my perspective. The scope of changes proposed is too large. In the future I would prefer constitutional amendments to be extremely focused, ie. to change a single item. It's very hard to get community consensus on a bundle of proposed changes (ie. some voters might like one change, but dislike another and thus choose not to vote for it). The only way we can get rapid iteration is via many proposals that have small scope (if the change proposed is about a single item, and the majority of stake agrees with the single item change then it will be accepted).
Future amendments must be made considerably smaller and must focus on specific parts and sections of the constitution:- To avoid the situation Phil mentions where people will vote against the proposal even though they agree with some of the proposed changes due to other proposed changes they do not support
- And to minimize the content to review in one single proposal, enabling DReps to focus and formulate more complete opinions on the material being voted on.
That said, redundancy in the current situation is so unbelievably bad (budget & withdrawals being separate proposals) and is wasting an immense amount of money & time for the ecosystem, that I am compelled to vote for this proposal simply because it removes the concept of budget info actions from the constitution.
Once more I agree with Phil here. The current budget process is overly complicated. Yes, separate information and withdrawal proposals should be a tool in our arsenal; No, they should not be forced on proposers. This causes considerably friction and delay in an otherwise already complex and bureaucratic process. - Abstain50.9K ₳No rationale
- Abstain49.7K ₳Rationale
I am abstaining because, while the substance of the proposed changes is welcome, the process raises constitutional concerns.
Article VIII, Section 2 tasks the Constitutional Committee with evaluating amendments, yet the scope of this proposal resembles a wholesale rewrite rather than a standard amendment.
Supporting it as-is would risk setting a precedent where future, more complex constitutional changes could bypass the proper safeguards.
My abstention signals the need for greater process clarity and community consultation, while acknowledging that the changes themselves may have merit.
- Abstain49.6K ₳Rationale
Extensive definitions of the proposed changes to include the positives / negatives would aid in making an informed vote.
- Yes48.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes45.2K ₳No rationale
- Abstain36.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes36.3K ₳Rationale
✅ Voting YES – Cardano Constitution v2.0
This update isn’t about rewriting our principles — it’s about making them clearer, cleaner, and easier to use.
Key reasons for my YES:
• Fixes typos, inconsistencies, and vague language.
• Simplifies structure so the Constitution is easier to reference and understand.
• Adds and refines key definitions for clarity.
• Removes outdated or unused provisions like the DRep/SPO Codes of Conduct.
• Aligns appendices with the main articles for consistency.A well-written Constitution is a stronger Constitution. This version keeps the spirit of v1.0 while making it more practical for everyone who uses it.
#CardanoGovernance #DRep #VoteYES
- No33.9K ₳Rationale
We have decided to vote no because, although the proposal seeks to simplify and update the Constitution of the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem, it removes important controls that ensure transparency and accountability in the management of the treasury resources by eliminating the requirement for budgetary approval for withdrawals. This change may weaken financial oversight and increase the risk of misuse of community funds. Additionally, the removal of codes of conduct for DReps and SPOs may create gaps in the definition of ethical and behavioral standards essential for trust and integrity within the ecosystem. Excessive simplification may also obscure crucial details for governance, compromising the legal and operational security of the system. For these reasons, we believe the proposal does not provide sufficient guarantees to ensure the protection and proper functioning of the Cardano ecosystem, and it is preferable to maintain the current structure until there is clear consensus on the changes.
- Yes31.5K ₳No rationale