CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.4
189 DReps voted · 71 with a rationale · 6 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.2M ₳Rationale
I’m abstaining since appears that this GA is destined to pass, but my thoughts/objections are illustrated below.
While I agree the Cardano Constitution needs to be treated as a living document that can be improved over time, and some of the proposed changes in this GA draft have a view toward that very concept, it’s this Drep’s opinion that approaching changing this critical document a year after its implementation may be premature. I also feel that this is a substantial list of amendments. It may be better to take what the proposer feels are the most critically needed items and submit them as their own governance actions instead of taking this “over haul” approach. I also disagree with the removal of budgetary safeguards. We risk re-creating the same legacy system of financial abuse that this ecosystem was designed to move away from.
- Abstain1.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.1M ₳Rationale
My perspective, forged through decades of navigating complex technical and management environments, compels me to look past the superficial promise of "simplification" and interrogate the structural integrity of the proposed changes. We are moving from a phase of aspirational governance to one of executable reality, and this proposal ostensibly aims to shed the dead weight of non-binding expectations that have previously clouded our constitutional framework.
The core value proposition here is the elimination of ambiguity and the removal of "governance theater." By stripping away the non-binding "expectations" and "encouragement" clauses (e.g., the codes of conduct for DReps and SPOs) the proposal admits a harsh but necessary truth: if a rule cannot be enforced on-chain or through strict legal frameworks, it does not belong in a Constitution. I applaud this ruthlessness. As a strategist, I view the clutter of unenforceable advice as a liability that dilutes the power of actual mandates. Furthermore, the removal of the Budget Info Action mechanism, absorbing its requirements directly into Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions, is a sound efficiency measure. It reduces bureaucratic drag without ostensibly sacrificing oversight, provided that the audit safeguards mentioned are indeed as robust as the rationale suggests.
Reverting "ADA Holder" back to "ADA Owner" and rolling back the audit provisions to the original wording protects the ecosystem from a constitutional gridlock. It is a business decision to ensure continuity. We are effectively trading semantic progress for political stability, but also transform the Constitution from a "living document" of vague aspirations into a tighter, more sterile contract.
While I remain vigilant regarding the reverted audit language, the immediate necessity of stabilizing the governance layer outweighs the desire for perfect, yet unpassable, legislation.** I strongly believe that we must secure the foundation before we can remodel the house.**
- YesRevoted1M ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes6mo agoSuperseded
- No971.5K ₳Rationale
We do not support this constitutional update at this time.
The proposal does not clearly identify an author or accountable steward, which is a concern given the foundational role of the Constitution. Changes to such a core document should have explicit ownership and responsibility.
Furthermore, the Cardano Constitution is still relatively new. In our view, it is premature to amend it so soon, before there has been sufficient time to observe how the existing version performs in practice under full on-chain governance.
While some of the proposed adjustments may be reasonable in isolation, we believe that changes to the Constitution should follow a broader and more deliberate process. A more inclusive approach—such as structured community deliberation and in-person workshops—would provide stronger legitimacy for a new constitutional version.
For these reasons, we vote No.
- Yes964.1K ₳No rationale
- AbstainChanged955.7K ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes6mo agoSuperseded
- Yes931.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes929.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes891.3K ₳No rationale
- Abstain881.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes861.5K ₳No rationale
- No825.2K ₳Rationale
We continue to vote no on this initiative due to it's lack of legitimacy. Community at large has not been systematically involved and large portions have been left out. Any constitutional amendment process should in our view build on top of the process of the original constintution in 2024.
- Yes798.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes798.4K ₳Rationale
No more budget info action! Yay!
- Yes794.5K ₳Rationale
I had voted previously in affirmation of the v2.3 changes. The change list here from v2.3 to v2.4 is relatively minor and I see no issues.
- No776.8K ₳Rationale
As with all previous versions of Constitution updates, the following does not satisfy the process to decide which changes the community believes need change, but a single and influential actor pushing for their beliefs. I greatly believe following a formal process that results in amendments is needed- not a single party defining this and then pushing for discussion of their ideas.
- Yes717.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes705.1K ₳Rationale
This update simplifies governance, improves clarity, and strengthens accountability without changing core principles. The immutability of proposals and unified treasury safeguards are clear improvements, and incorporating feedback adds legitimacy.
- No625.9K ₳Rationale
I'm voting no on v2.4. I expressed my concerns at each iteration. I have received no feedback. I am speaking into the void. How is this debate or discussion on matters as critical as the Cardano Constitution. There is no inclusion of sentiment by governance merit, but rather strictly a pandering to voting power. The proposer has opening coordinated with peer top % DReps to ensure coordination of their cooperative needs from the document. This was done I assume without malice, but that makes it no less concerning. The vote has nearly passed and most likely will before expiration, I hope we don't live to regret removing the info_action requirement from Treasury Withdrawal Actions. This Constitutional Amendment removes critical financial safeguards without adequate justification, creating exploitable governance vulnerabilities that could drain the treasury. The elimination of the Budget Info Action mechanism isn't efficiency, it's recklessness disguised as simplification. Under the current constitution, treasury withdrawals require a two-step process: first an info_action to establish budget parameters and community review, then withdrawal actions tied to that approved framework. This creates mandatory deliberation time and forces proposers to demonstrate strategic alignment before touching funds. Constitution v2.3 scraps this entirely, collapsing treasury withdrawals into single-step actions with no binding budget coordination. Here's the mathematical problem: with the info_action requirement removed and assuming no Constitutional Committee dissent, or a CC size set to minimum threshold, a treasury withdrawal could be enacted in as little as six days, at the epoch boundary following the first full epoch where the action remains active, provided the 67% DRep threshold is met. Today, that means only 23 individuals, who control the sufficient voting stake could authorize withdrawals without strategic review, public vetting, or ecosystem-wide budget discipline. With the majority of ADA still undelegated, governance becomes an exploitable attack surface during low participation periods or voting fatigue. The removal of budget requirements eliminates the forcing function that makes hard choices about technological priorities and resource allocation. Without holistic budgeting, governance devolves into disconnected withdrawal requests lacking coordination, accountability, or protection against waste and capture. A budget framework compels the ecosystem to prioritize competing demands, by removing it you invite chaotic financial management that accelerates treasury depletion. The original constitution emerged from transparent, line-by-line deliberations across continents with hundreds of elected representatives. Constitution v2.3 introduces extensive changes without undergoing comparable community engagement. Additionally the primary author holds significant voting power and voted for their own draft showing some amount of self-interested motivation, which can be a concentration of influence that sets a dangerous precedent. This is not an iterative improvement it's weakening institutional safeguards in a misguided desire to streamline a process. The budget info_action with a threshold requirement of 100% provides a necessary safeguard against expedited treasury withdrawals, by ensuring at least one full gov_action lifetime is required for any treasury withdrawal.
- Yes605.7K ₳Rationale
📜 CARDANO CONSTITUTION v2.4 — I VOTE YES ✅
🗳 The update to the Cardano Constitution (v2.4) is a strong step forward for transparent and reliable blockchain governance. As a DRep, I fully support this proposal:
🔹 Simplified Governance
Outdated and non-binding sections (like Budget Info Action and aspirational rules) are removed for clarity and efficiency.🔹 Security & Transparency
All proposal documents must now be immutable, protecting against manipulation after submission.🔹 Equal Accountability
Every Treasury withdrawal is now subject to the same audit and oversight safeguards — no more exceptions.🔹 Community Respect
The v2.4 version restores key wording based on EMURGO's feedback, showing maturity and unity across major governance players.
🟢 This strengthens trust, improves coordination, and pushes Cardano forward.
🖤 I vote YES.
🔗 Learn more:
📄 CARDANO v2.4 Constitution (PDF)
📂 Changes from v1.0 to v2.4
📂 Changes from v2.3 to v2.4
I’m registered as a DRep and ready to help shape the future of the ecosystem.
- Fully committed to building the world’s largest digital community.
🖤 My DRep ID: ➡️ drep1y269ehxj30k4vfzfc2z84v0xykd3amuy2xn0kv9zf8rhcec2fg2jr
Details: https://t.me/PROCENT666/338
- Fully committed to building the world’s largest digital community.
- Yes590.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes535.2K ₳Rationale
looks good to me.
- Yes533.9K ₳Rationale
Good constitutional change for budget.
- Yes499K ₳Rationale
- Yes478.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes466.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes442.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes383K ₳No rationale
- Yes381.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes370.3K ₳Rationale
Based on the content of v2.4, there’s nothing here that weakens governance or shifts power in a risky way. The changes mostly clean up the Constitution so that it behaves like an actual constitutional document, not a mix of law, guidance, and good intentions. By removing non-binding expectations, simplifying the governance flow, enforcing immutability of proposal documents, and carrying forward treasury audit and accountability safeguards into actual withdrawal actions, this version improves clarity, enforceability, and trust without reducing oversight. The revisions also reflect ecosystem feedback, including from EMURGO, which supports practical consensus. I vote Yes.
- Yes320.4K ₳Rationale
Once again Panda votes YES. However Panda prefers "Ada owners" to "ada owners" with a capital "A"
- Yes314.4K ₳Rationale
I'm voting YES on the updated Cardano Constitution v2.4.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
The Cardano Constitution is a living document (unlike State Constitutions that are set in stone and almost certainly never change)! With that in mind, improvements are welcome, but only when they have real substance. This last iteration with version (2.4) has a lot of substance, and hopefully has all of the stakeholders' feedback incorporated; thus it can keep us going for a good amount of time if it passes (this time).
Here's my take on the proposed changes:
- Removing the unnecessary Budget Info Action and consolidating its condition with the Treasury Withdrawal Action makes sense.
- Also, the code of conduct, although highly encouraged, is not enforceable, so removing it is good practice.
- The immutability requirement is an absolute necessity for a strong governance model so it's very well welcomed!
- With the changed definitions, terms, and wording, I am ok. The only thing I'd like to keep is the definition of the ada owner (changed from Ada Holder). I cannot understand the reasoning for this removal, but since I don't believe there would be ambiguity in this term, I'm ok with that.
Therefore, I vote YES.
- NoChanged313.4K ₳Rationale
Vote: NO
While I initially tried to be pragmatic in changing my vote to YES, further conversations today reinforced that my earlier concerns about the process needed more consideration than a simple “yes, but we should continue to develop a process going forward.”
Although I support the intent to simplify the Constitution, I am uncomfortable with repeated bulk amendments to a Constitution only a year old, and in the absence of an established and accessible Constitutional Amendment Process.
I also remain concerned by the limited visibility of collaborative input and attribution within this proposal, along with the concerns raised regarding the addition of unenforceable elements within a Constitution.
There are parts I like very much, so this has been a difficult decision.
For these reasons, on balance my vote reflects a procedural objection, and I look forward to supporting constitutional updates once there is a fully iterative, inclusive community-driven amendment process in place.
Earlier votes
Yes6mo agoSuperseded
I am voting yes for this proposal, pragmatically I now (previously voted no) feel it is a refinement that does improve efficiency and clarity by removing redundant steps (such as the Budget Info Action) while preserving and in some cases strengthening accountability through clearer definitions, immutability of proposal documents, and consistent treasury audit safeguards.
I do have reservations and am cautious about the inclusion of elements that are not enforceable at a constitutional level, and favour a general direction of stripping operational practices out of the Constitution itself.
Looking ahead should this pass, I strongly support and expect to continue the development of a clear, accessible Constitutional Amendment Process that enables the community to propose and iterate on incremental constitutional changes over time, rather than a whole replacement of, providing a more participatory and sustainable path for evolution and iterations of Cardano's Constitution.
- Yes300.6K ₳No rationale
- No298.9K ₳Rationale
Objection
- This draft contains grammatical changes as well as substantive changes. Making both types of changes in a single revision makes it difficult to identify and isolate the substantive changes.
- Changes to the markdown styles are unwarranted and make it difficult to identify the substantive changes in the diff document. Seriously, you've made the "list of changes" almost useless.
- I do not agree that we should remove the budget requirements. The current budget process grants us a much needed discovery period.
- Definitions are unwarranted.
- Minor grammatical changes are unwarranted
- Some of the supporting documents attached to this proposal are not available
- Removing the non-binding expectations is unwarrented.
Summary
I'm not going to approve this or any other constitutional revision with this many changes. 1770 additions is too much. That should be a single digit number.
- Yes294.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes271.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes270.1K ₳Rationale
Constitution v2.4 retains and strengthens the governance architecture introduced in earlier versions, particularly the clear definition of roles and thresholds, the standardized and immutable governance‑action document model, and the comprehensive guardrails around protocol changes and treasury withdrawals.
By formally removing non‑binding “expectation” and “encouragement” clauses and the mandated CC code of conduct from the constitutional text, this version focuses the Constitution on enforceable rules and on‑chain guardrails, while leaving codes of conduct and tooling expectations to be defined and evolved through community practice and separate processes. This is more consistent with a durable, technology‑aligned constitutional document.
The removal of the Budget Info Action mechanism, combined with the re‑assignment of its audit, administrator, and reporting safeguards directly to all Treasury Withdrawal actions, simplifies governance while materially improving accountability. Every withdrawal must now meet the same high standard for transparency, auditability, and administrator responsibility, which aligns with best practices for treasury risk management.
The targeted reversions from v2.3 to restore the original v1.0 wording on ada “owners”, custodians, and independent audits address EMURGO’s specific concerns without weakening the underlying constitutional requirements for custody and oversight. This adjustment supports broad stakeholder acceptance and practical ratifiability while preserving the substantive protections introduced in later versions.
Taken as a whole, v2.4 is a carefully scoped refinement rather than a structural redesign. It maintains the improvements I previously supported in v2.3, clarifies and simplifies where experience has shown friction, and strengthens the link between on‑chain governance actions and immutable, auditable documentation. For these reasons, it merits a YES vote as the most coherent and operationally sound version of the Cardano Constitution to date. - No261K ₳Rationale
GOVERNANCE ACTION REPORT [EN]
1. Introduction
This proposal submits Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4 as a constitutional amendment. It removes non-binding “expectations” and “encouragement” clauses, eliminates the Budget Info Action mechanism, and removes the constitutional obligation to create a CC Code of Conduct, with the stated goal of simplifying governance and removing redundant mechanisms. It also unifies terminology and adds definitions (e.g., Active Voting Stake, DRep, SPO, Net Change Limit, Treasury Withdrawal Recipient) to reduce ambiguity.
In addition, it strengthens formal requirements for governance actions by requiring that any document hosted via URL be immutable, ensuring proposals cannot be altered after submission. After the removal of the Budget Info Action, accountability requirements are shifted into Treasury Withdrawals, including audit and oversight safeguards. In the transition from v2.3 to v2.4, three specific wording changes are reverted back to the v1.0 wording following formal objections raised by EMURGO.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Positive aspects
There is no principled objection to several substantive elements, including the removal of the Budget Info Action. The position here is pragmatic: if budgeting via Info Action is primarily meant for signaling and coordination, that can be handled more efficiently off-chain (e.g., via Ekklesia), while accountability requirements should be concentrated where execution actually occurs, namely in Treasury Withdrawals. On this specific point, the direction is acceptable and desirable.
Support is also given to the requirement that proposal documents hosted via URL must be immutable, as this protects proposal integrity, prevents post-submission tampering, and strengthens trust in the governance process.Negative aspects
For a constitutional amendment with high institutional impact, the minimum requirement is not “good intentions” or a well-written summary, but auditable comparability between versions. When attempting a manual verification of Constitution v1.0 against v2.4, a serious issue became evident in the supporting material: the v1.0 → v2.4 diff/check file is misaligned and confusing, with sections out of order and enough editorial noise to make identical passages appear as additions/removals. This defeats the primary purpose of a diff, which is to enable dReps to assess the real scope of changes quickly and accurately.
From Article 3 onward in the original text, the changes appear even more substantial: rewrites, deletions, and structural rearrangements, which would normally increase the need for a high-quality diff. However, the current materials do not support responsible due diligence.Risks and concerns
A clear institutional risk is created: erroneous decisions driven by poor auditability, and incentives for shortcuts (heuristics, reliance on third parties, voting by fatigue). This risk is amplified by a recurring accountability gap in the ecosystem, with many votes lacking rationale and rationales that are often superficial when present.
There is also a methodological problem: editorial changes (grammar/style/formatting) were bundled together with conceptual changes. In a constitutional text, this packaging dramatically increases review complexity, reduces scanability, and raises the likelihood that important changes slip through. The expected standard would be to clearly separate cosmetic edits from substantive amendments, with section-by-section documentation and explicit mapping of moved blocks.
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO.
A constitutional amendment cannot be endorsed under a process where the core comparability artifact (the v1.0 → v2.4 diff) fails. The vote is NO on methodology and auditability grounds.Reconsideration (a potential YES) would be conditional on a re-submission that meets minimum verification standards, including: (1) canonical text versions with stable structure, (2) a section-by-section diff with anchors and moved-block detection, (3) explicit separation of editorial vs conceptual changes, and (4) a granular, verifiable changelog. Without this, transparency, adequate scrutiny, and responsible decision-making cannot be assured.
4. Conclusion
The vote is NO due to methodology and auditability failure: comparability between v1.0 and v2.4 is not verifiable with the provided materials. The substance includes acceptable directions, but there is no operational basis to endorse a constitutional amendment without a reliable, verifiable diff.
RELATÓRIO DE AÇÃO DE GOVERNANÇA [PT]
1. Introdução
A proposta submete a Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4 como emenda constitucional. O texto remove cláusulas não vinculantes de “expectations” e “encouragements”, elimina o mecanismo de Budget Info Action e remove a obrigação constitucional de criação de um CC Code of Conduct, com a justificativa de simplificação de governança e redução de mecanismos redundantes. Também consolida terminologia e adiciona definições (ex.: Active Voting Stake, DRep, SPO, Net Change Limit, Treasury Withdrawal Recipient), buscando reduzir ambiguidades.
Além disso, reforça requisitos formais para ações de governança ao exigir que o documento hospedado via URL seja imutável, garantindo que propostas não possam ser alteradas após submissão. Após a remoção do Budget Info Action, requisitos de accountability são deslocados para o contexto de Treasury Withdrawals, incluindo salvaguardas de auditoria e supervisão. Na transição de v2.3 para v2.4, três mudanças específicas de redação são revertidas para o wording da v1.0 após objeções formais da EMURGO.
2. Análise da Ação de Governança
Aspectos positivos
Não há objeção de princípio a aspectos relevantes do conteúdo, incluindo a remoção do Budget Info Action. A posição aqui é pragmática: se o objetivo do budgeting via Info Action é principalmente sinalização e coordenação, isso pode ser tratado com maior eficiência off-chain (por exemplo, via Ekklesia), enquanto requisitos de accountability devem ficar concentrados onde a execução ocorre, isto é, em Treasury Withdrawals. Nesse ponto específico, a direção é aceitável e desejável.
Há também apoio ao requisito de que documentos de proposta hospedados via URL sejam imutáveis, pois isso protege a integridade das propostas, previne alterações após a submissão e fortalece a confiança no processo de governança.Aspectos negativos
Para uma emenda constitucional com alto impacto institucional, o requisito mínimo não é “boa intenção” ou um resumo bem escrito, mas comparabilidade auditável entre versões. Ao tentar uma verificação manual da Constituição v1.0 contra a v2.4, tornou-se evidente um problema sério no material de apoio: o arquivo de diff/check v1.0 → v2.4 está desalinhado e confuso, com seções fora de ordem e ruído editorial suficiente para fazer passagens idênticas parecerem adições/remoções. Isso frustra a finalidade do diff, que é permitir avaliação rápida e acurada do escopo real das mudanças.
A partir do Artigo 3 em diante no texto original, mudanças parecem ainda mais substanciais (reescritas, deleções e rearranjos estruturais), o que aumenta a necessidade de um diff de alta qualidade. Porém, os materiais atuais não sustentam due diligence responsável.Riscos e preocupações
Há um risco institucional claro: decisões errôneas motivadas por baixa auditabilidade e incentivos a atalhos (heurísticas, dependência de terceiros, voto por fadiga). Esse risco é amplificado por uma lacuna recorrente de accountability no ecossistema, com muitos votos sem justificativa e justificativas frequentemente superficiais quando existem.
Há também um problema metodológico: mudanças editoriais (gramática/estilo/formatação) foram empacotadas junto com mudanças conceituais. Em texto constitucional, isso aumenta dramaticamente a complexidade de revisão, reduz a scanability e eleva a probabilidade de que mudanças importantes passem despercebidas. O padrão esperado seria separar claramente ajustes cosméticos de emendas substantivas, com documentação seção a seção e mapeamento explícito de blocos movidos.
3. Voto e Justificativa
Voto: NO.
Uma emenda constitucional não pode ser endossada sob um processo em que o artefato central de comparabilidade (o diff v1.0 → v2.4) falha. O voto é NO por metodologia e auditabilidade.
Uma reconsideração (potencial YES) fica condicionada a uma re-submissão que atenda padrões mínimos de verificação, incluindo: (1) versões canônicas do texto com estrutura estável, (2) diff seção a seção com âncoras e detecção de blocos movidos, (3) separação explícita de mudanças editoriais versus conceituais, e (4) changelog granular e verificável. Sem isso, transparência, escrutínio adequado e decisão responsável não podem ser assegurados.
4. Conclusão
O voto é NO por falha de metodologia e auditabilidade: a comparabilidade entre v1.0 e v2.4 não é verificável com o material fornecido. A substância inclui direções aceitáveis, mas não há base operacional para endossar uma emenda constitucional sem um diff confiável e verificável.
- Yes260.2K ₳Rationale
I support Constitution v2.4 as it streamlines governance by removing non-enforceable provisions, strengthens treasury accountability, and protects proposal integrity through immutability. These changes improve clarity, trust, and operational efficiency while preserving decentralization and broad community legitimacy.
- Yes245.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes238.8K ₳Rationale
These changes represent sensible housekeeping and improvements that make the Constitution clearer, more consistent, and easier to interpret without altering its core principles or weakening protections. Removing redundant mechanisms like the Budget Info Action reduces complexity in governance workflows, while directly embedding audit and transparency requirements into treasury actions maintains (and arguably strengthens) accountability.
Reverting the three contested wordings to accommodate EMURGO's concerns is a pragmatic step toward unity. - No233.2K ₳Rationale
i’m voting no because this trims the wrong stuff. stripping budget mechanics + removing conduct expectations makes governance easier to “optimize” by whoever has the most stake and time. that’s how capture happens: not with hacks, with boring process drift.
also “immutability” is good in theory, but the operational standard needs to be crystal clear or it becomes a gotcha machine (gateways, mirrors, translations, pinning).
this feels like deleting the dashboard because you don’t like warning lights. you get fewer alarms… right up until the engine cooks.
- Yes232.7K ₳No rationale
- Abstain217.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes215.5K ₳No rationale