CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.4

System8mo ago1 post

189 DReps voted · 72 with a rationale · 3 changed their vote · 2 re-voted unchanged

Open a row to read the rationale.

Changed votes: 2 to no, 1 to abstain, together voting with 23.2M ₳ of voting power.

  • Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
  • AbstainChanged1.2M ₳History

    Earlier votes

    Yes8mo agoSuperseded

  • Abstain1.2M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.1M ₳Rationale

    My perspective, forged through decades of navigating complex technical and management environments, compels me to look past the superficial promise of "simplification" and interrogate the structural integrity of the proposed changes. We are moving from a phase of aspirational governance to one of executable reality, and this proposal ostensibly aims to shed the dead weight of non-binding expectations that have previously clouded our constitutional framework.

    The core value proposition here is the elimination of ambiguity and the removal of "governance theater." By stripping away the non-binding "expectations" and "encouragement" clauses (e.g., the codes of conduct for DReps and SPOs) the proposal admits a harsh but necessary truth: if a rule cannot be enforced on-chain or through strict legal frameworks, it does not belong in a Constitution. I applaud this ruthlessness. As a strategist, I view the clutter of unenforceable advice as a liability that dilutes the power of actual mandates. Furthermore, the removal of the Budget Info Action mechanism, absorbing its requirements directly into Treasury Withdrawal Governance Actions, is a sound efficiency measure. It reduces bureaucratic drag without ostensibly sacrificing oversight, provided that the audit safeguards mentioned are indeed as robust as the rationale suggests.

    Reverting "ADA Holder" back to "ADA Owner" and rolling back the audit provisions to the original wording protects the ecosystem from a constitutional gridlock. It is a business decision to ensure continuity. We are effectively trading semantic progress for political stability, but also transform the Constitution from a "living document" of vague aspirations into a tighter, more sterile contract.

    While I remain vigilant regarding the reverted audit language, the immediate necessity of stabilizing the governance layer outweighs the desire for perfect, yet unpassable, legislation.** I strongly believe that we must secure the foundation before we can remodel the house.**

  • YesRevoted1.1M ₳History

    Earlier votes

    Yes8mo agoSuperseded

  • Abstain969.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes966.3K ₳No rationale
  • Yes943.3K ₳No rationale
  • No929.9K ₳Rationale

    We do not support this constitutional update at this time.

    The proposal does not clearly identify an author or accountable steward, which is a concern given the foundational role of the Constitution. Changes to such a core document should have explicit ownership and responsibility.

    Furthermore, the Cardano Constitution is still relatively new. In our view, it is premature to amend it so soon, before there has been sufficient time to observe how the existing version performs in practice under full on-chain governance.

    While some of the proposed adjustments may be reasonable in isolation, we believe that changes to the Constitution should follow a broader and more deliberate process. A more inclusive approach—such as structured community deliberation and in-person workshops—would provide stronger legitimacy for a new constitutional version.

    For these reasons, we vote No.

  • Yes927.7K ₳No rationale
  • Yes884.5K ₳No rationale
  • Yes866.3K ₳No rationale
  • Yes861.5K ₳No rationale
  • No829.9K ₳Rationale

    We continue to vote no on this initiative due to it's lack of legitimacy. Community at large has not been systematically involved and large portions have been left out. Any constitutional amendment process should in our view build on top of the process of the original constintution in 2024.

  • Yes796.1K ₳Rationale

    I had voted previously in affirmation of the v2.3 changes. The change list here from v2.3 to v2.4 is relatively minor and I see no issues.

  • Yes792.3K ₳Rationale

    This version fixes the issues I had with earlier drafts.

    Non-binding expectations and the Budget Info Action are removed. That keeps the Constitution focused on rules that can actually be enforced.

    Proposal immutability is a solid step. Once submitted, documents cannot be changed. That protects trust.

    Treasury audit and accountability rules now apply to all withdrawals. No gaps.

    The EMURGO reversions are sensible. Broad DRep alignment matters for constitutional change.

    Clearer. Tighter. Ready to move forward.

  • Yes742.6K ₳Rationale

    This update simplifies governance, improves clarity, and strengthens accountability without changing core principles. The immutability of proposals and unified treasury safeguards are clear improvements, and incorporating feedback adds legitimacy.

  • No678.7K ₳Rationale

    As with all previous versions of Constitution updates, the following does not satisfy the process to decide which changes the community believes need change, but a single and influential actor pushing for their beliefs. I greatly believe following a formal process that results in amendments is needed- not a single party defining this and then pushing for discussion of their ideas.

  • Yes636.4K ₳No rationale
  • No604.7K ₳Rationale

    I'm voting no on v2.4. I expressed my concerns at each iteration. I have received no feedback. I am speaking into the void. How is this debate or discussion on matters as critical as the Cardano Constitution. There is no inclusion of sentiment by governance merit, but rather strictly a pandering to voting power. The proposer has opening coordinated with peer top % DReps to ensure coordination of their cooperative needs from the document. This was done I assume without malice, but that makes it no less concerning. The vote has nearly passed and most likely will before expiration, I hope we don't live to regret removing the info_action requirement from Treasury Withdrawal Actions. This Constitutional Amendment removes critical financial safeguards without adequate justification, creating exploitable governance vulnerabilities that could drain the treasury. The elimination of the Budget Info Action mechanism isn't efficiency, it's recklessness disguised as simplification. Under the current constitution, treasury withdrawals require a two-step process: first an info_action to establish budget parameters and community review, then withdrawal actions tied to that approved framework. This creates mandatory deliberation time and forces proposers to demonstrate strategic alignment before touching funds. Constitution v2.3 scraps this entirely, collapsing treasury withdrawals into single-step actions with no binding budget coordination. Here's the mathematical problem: with the info_action requirement removed and assuming no Constitutional Committee dissent, or a CC size set to minimum threshold, a treasury withdrawal could be enacted in as little as six days, at the epoch boundary following the first full epoch where the action remains active, provided the 67% DRep threshold is met. Today, that means only 23 individuals, who control the sufficient voting stake could authorize withdrawals without strategic review, public vetting, or ecosystem-wide budget discipline. With the majority of ADA still undelegated, governance becomes an exploitable attack surface during low participation periods or voting fatigue. The removal of budget requirements eliminates the forcing function that makes hard choices about technological priorities and resource allocation. Without holistic budgeting, governance devolves into disconnected withdrawal requests lacking coordination, accountability, or protection against waste and capture. A budget framework compels the ecosystem to prioritize competing demands, by removing it you invite chaotic financial management that accelerates treasury depletion. The original constitution emerged from transparent, line-by-line deliberations across continents with hundreds of elected representatives. Constitution v2.3 introduces extensive changes without undergoing comparable community engagement. Additionally the primary author holds significant voting power and voted for their own draft showing some amount of self-interested motivation, which can be a concentration of influence that sets a dangerous precedent. This is not an iterative improvement it's weakening institutional safeguards in a misguided desire to streamline a process. The budget info_action with a threshold requirement of 100% provides a necessary safeguard against expedited treasury withdrawals, by ensuring at least one full gov_action lifetime is required for any treasury withdrawal.

  • Yes582.9K ₳Rationale

    SIDAN Lab is voting YES on adopting Constitution v2.4 because it improves clarity, enforceability, and governance integrity.
    v2.4 removes non-binding aspirational clauses that are difficult to enforce, adds clearer defined terms, and strengthens trust by requiring proposal documents to be immutable after submission. It also consolidates accountability safeguards into Treasury Withdrawal standards, putting audit/oversight expectations where funds actually move. Finally, it incorporates major stakeholder feedback to preserve broad legitimacy while refining the Constitution based on early governance experience.

  • Yes579.1K ₳Rationale

    📜 CARDANO CONSTITUTION v2.4 — I VOTE YES ✅

    🗳 The update to the Cardano Constitution (v2.4) is a strong step forward for transparent and reliable blockchain governance. As a DRep, I fully support this proposal:


    🔹 Simplified Governance
    Outdated and non-binding sections (like Budget Info Action and aspirational rules) are removed for clarity and efficiency.

    🔹 Security & Transparency
    All proposal documents must now be immutable, protecting against manipulation after submission.

    🔹 Equal Accountability
    Every Treasury withdrawal is now subject to the same audit and oversight safeguards — no more exceptions.

    🔹 Community Respect
    The v2.4 version restores key wording based on EMURGO's feedback, showing maturity and unity across major governance players.


    🟢 This strengthens trust, improves coordination, and pushes Cardano forward.
    🖤 I vote YES.


    🔗 Learn more:
    📄 CARDANO v2.4 Constitution (PDF)
    📂 Changes from v1.0 to v2.4
    📂 Changes from v2.3 to v2.4


    I’m registered as a DRep and ready to help shape the future of the ecosystem.

  • Yes568K ₳Rationale

    Good constitutional change for budget.

  • Yes550.1K ₳No rationale
  • Yes506.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes501.6K ₳Rationale

    looks good to me.

  • Yes501.3K ₳Rationale

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

  • Yes466.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes393.6K ₳No rationale
  • Yes379.5K ₳No rationale
  • Yes371K ₳Rationale

    Based on the content of v2.4, there’s nothing here that weakens governance or shifts power in a risky way. The changes mostly clean up the Constitution so that it behaves like an actual constitutional document, not a mix of law, guidance, and good intentions. By removing non-binding expectations, simplifying the governance flow, enforcing immutability of proposal documents, and carrying forward treasury audit and accountability safeguards into actual withdrawal actions, this version improves clarity, enforceability, and trust without reducing oversight. The revisions also reflect ecosystem feedback, including from EMURGO, which supports practical consensus. I vote Yes.

  • Yes356.1K ₳Rationale

    This seems like a constructive maturation of the current version of the constitution. These changes add clarity and more formalized treasury management while maintaining the same ethos of the current version. The most impactful changes are:

    • Treasury governance becomes much more structured and auditable with mandatory disclosure, audit, and administrator requirements
    • Monetary policy expands from a simple supply cap to actively seeking to preserve Ada's utility
    • Anti-corruption measures prohibiting vote-buying by dReps
    • Enhanced transparency through immutability requirements and role overlap disclosures
    • Clarified rights for Ada owners in the governance process
  • Yes338.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes330.6K ₳No rationale
  • Yes321.6K ₳Rationale

    Once again Panda votes YES. However Panda prefers "Ada owners" to "ada owners" with a capital "A"

  • Yes314.4K ₳Rationale

    I'm voting YES on the updated Cardano Constitution v2.4.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    The Cardano Constitution is a living document (unlike State Constitutions that are set in stone and almost certainly never change)! With that in mind, improvements are welcome, but only when they have real substance. This last iteration with version (2.4) has a lot of substance, and hopefully has all of the stakeholders' feedback incorporated; thus it can keep us going for a good amount of time if it passes (this time).

    Here's my take on the proposed changes:

    • Removing the unnecessary Budget Info Action and consolidating its condition with the Treasury Withdrawal Action makes sense.
    • Also, the code of conduct, although highly encouraged, is not enforceable, so removing it is good practice.
    • The immutability requirement is an absolute necessity for a strong governance model so it's very well welcomed!
    • With the changed definitions, terms, and wording, I am ok. The only thing I'd like to keep is the definition of the ada owner (changed from Ada Holder). I cannot understand the reasoning for this removal, but since I don't believe there would be ambiguity in this term, I'm ok with that.

    Therefore, I vote YES.

  • NoChanged313.8K ₳Rationale

    Vote: NO

    While I initially tried to be pragmatic in changing my vote to YES, further conversations today reinforced that my earlier concerns about the process needed more consideration than a simple “yes, but we should continue to develop a process going forward.”

    Although I support the intent to simplify the Constitution, I am uncomfortable with repeated bulk amendments to a Constitution only a year old, and in the absence of an established and accessible Constitutional Amendment Process.

    I also remain concerned by the limited visibility of collaborative input and attribution within this proposal, along with the concerns raised regarding the addition of unenforceable elements within a Constitution.

    There are parts I like very much, so this has been a difficult decision.

    For these reasons, on balance my vote reflects a procedural objection, and I look forward to supporting constitutional updates once there is a fully iterative, inclusive community-driven amendment process in place.

    Earlier votes

    Yes7mo agoSuperseded

    I am voting yes for this proposal, pragmatically I now (previously voted no) feel it is a refinement that does improve efficiency and clarity by removing redundant steps (such as the Budget Info Action) while preserving and in some cases strengthening accountability through clearer definitions, immutability of proposal documents, and consistent treasury audit safeguards.

    I do have reservations and am cautious about the inclusion of elements that are not enforceable at a constitutional level, and favour a general direction of stripping operational practices out of the Constitution itself.

    Looking ahead should this pass, I strongly support and expect to continue the development of a clear, accessible Constitutional Amendment Process that enables the community to propose and iterate on incremental constitutional changes over time, rather than a whole replacement of, providing a more participatory and sustainable path for evolution and iterations of Cardano's Constitution.

  • Yes301.3K ₳No rationale
  • No297K ₳Rationale

    Objection

    1. This draft contains grammatical changes as well as substantive changes. Making both types of changes in a single revision makes it difficult to identify and isolate the substantive changes.
    2. Changes to the markdown styles are unwarranted and make it difficult to identify the substantive changes in the diff document. Seriously, you've made the "list of changes" almost useless.
    3. I do not agree that we should remove the budget requirements. The current budget process grants us a much needed discovery period.
    4. Definitions are unwarranted.
    5. Minor grammatical changes are unwarranted
    6. Some of the supporting documents attached to this proposal are not available
    7. Removing the non-binding expectations is unwarrented.

    Summary

    I'm not going to approve this or any other constitutional revision with this many changes. 1770 additions is too much. That should be a single digit number.

  • Abstain291.8K ₳Rationale

    I’m abstaining since appears that this GA is destined to pass, but my thoughts/objections are illustrated below.

    While I agree the Cardano Constitution needs to be treated as a living document that can be improved over time, and some of the proposed changes in this GA draft have a view toward that very concept, it’s this Drep’s opinion that approaching changing this critical document a year after its implementation may be premature. I also feel that this is a substantial list of amendments. It may be better to take what the proposer feels are the most critically needed items and submit them as their own governance actions instead of taking this “over haul” approach. I also disagree with the removal of budgetary safeguards. We risk re-creating the same legacy system of financial abuse that this ecosystem was designed to move away from.

  • Yes285.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes275.2K ₳Rationale

    Constitution v2.4 retains and strengthens the governance architecture introduced in earlier versions, particularly the clear definition of roles and thresholds, the standardized and immutable governance‑action document model, and the comprehensive guardrails around protocol changes and treasury withdrawals.

    By formally removing non‑binding “expectation” and “encouragement” clauses and the mandated CC code of conduct from the constitutional text, this version focuses the Constitution on enforceable rules and on‑chain guardrails, while leaving codes of conduct and tooling expectations to be defined and evolved through community practice and separate processes. This is more consistent with a durable, technology‑aligned constitutional document.

    The removal of the Budget Info Action mechanism, combined with the re‑assignment of its audit, administrator, and reporting safeguards directly to all Treasury Withdrawal actions, simplifies governance while materially improving accountability. Every withdrawal must now meet the same high standard for transparency, auditability, and administrator responsibility, which aligns with best practices for treasury risk management.

    The targeted reversions from v2.3 to restore the original v1.0 wording on ada “owners”, custodians, and independent audits address EMURGO’s specific concerns without weakening the underlying constitutional requirements for custody and oversight. This adjustment supports broad stakeholder acceptance and practical ratifiability while preserving the substantive protections introduced in later versions.

    Taken as a whole, v2.4 is a carefully scoped refinement rather than a structural redesign. It maintains the improvements I previously supported in v2.3, clarifies and simplifies where experience has shown friction, and strengthens the link between on‑chain governance actions and immutable, auditable documentation. For these reasons, it merits a YES vote as the most coherent and operationally sound version of the Cardano Constitution to date.

  • Yes272.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes268.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes260.8K ₳Rationale

    I support Constitution v2.4 as it streamlines governance by removing non-enforceable provisions, strengthens treasury accountability, and protects proposal integrity through immutability. These changes improve clarity, trust, and operational efficiency while preserving decentralization and broad community legitimacy.

  • Yes252.7K ₳No rationale
  • Yes233.3K ₳No rationale
  • No216.4K ₳Rationale

    i’m voting no because this trims the wrong stuff. stripping budget mechanics + removing conduct expectations makes governance easier to “optimize” by whoever has the most stake and time. that’s how capture happens: not with hacks, with boring process drift.

    also “immutability” is good in theory, but the operational standard needs to be crystal clear or it becomes a gotcha machine (gateways, mirrors, translations, pinning).

    this feels like deleting the dashboard because you don’t like warning lights. you get fewer alarms… right up until the engine cooks.

  • Yes189.8K ₳No rationale