Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5
180 DReps voted · 59 with a rationale · 3 changed their vote · 7 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 3 to yes, together voting with 26.2M ₳ of voting power.
- Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳Rationale
I vote YES on reducing committeeMinSize from 7 to 5 because Cardano governance should not be able to freeze just because one Constitutional Committee seat becomes temporarily vacant. The Constitutional Committee is the group that checks whether certain governance actions follow the Constitution; this change does not reduce its intended size or remove its role, it only creates a safety buffer so governance can keep working while vacancies are filled. I recognize the downside: if the committee were allowed to operate with only five members for too long, each member would have more blocking power and oversight would become narrower. For that reason, I support this as an operational minimum, not as the new normal: Cardano should still aim to keep seven active, qualified members and improve replacement, transparency, and succession processes.
- No1.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes984.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes969.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes951.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes929.9K ₳Rationale
We vote YES on this proposal because reducing the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5 is a sensible adjustment to improve the operational resilience of Cardano governance.
The current setup creates unnecessary fragility: if the Constitutional Committee has 7 members and the minimum is also set to 7, a single resignation, expiration, or temporary issue could prevent important governance actions from progressing. That is not a healthy failure mode for an on-chain governance system.
This proposal does not reduce the current size of the Constitutional Committee and does not prevent Cardano from maintaining a 7-member committee. It simply creates a buffer so governance can continue to function if one or two seats become temporarily vacant. In our view, this is a pragmatic and reasonable safeguard that improves continuity while keeping the constitutional checks in place.
- Yes927.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes926K ₳No rationale
- No884.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes870.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes866.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes829.9K ₳Rationale
It's a good idea to provide some buffer by keeping the CC size at 7 but having the minimum at 5. This provides the community the opportunity to react and elect any departing CC member without halting governance.
- Yes796.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes792.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes742.6K ₳Rationale
YES!
- Yes737.8K ₳No rationale
- No604.7K ₳Rationale
Voting NO. Lowering committeeMinSize from 7 to 5 reduces institutional pressure to maintain membership, introduces 6-member tie scenarios, and concentrates veto power. The fix belongs in CC succession planning and retention, not parameter adjustments.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I'm voting no on the committeeMinSize reduction, and the reasoning centers on a principle I raised in the proposal discussion at Dreptalk.com: governance resilience should come from structural constraints that make bad outcomes impossible, not from parameter adjustments that assume good outcomes from individual actors.
The proposal frames 7=7 (floor equals actual count) as a fragility. I'd frame it differently: it's a guarantee. When the floor equals the number of seated members, every individual's continued participation is load-bearing. That creates institutional pressure that no parameter tweak can replicate, it makes departure costly in a way that everyone involved understands before they accept the seat. Lowering the floor to 5 removes that pressure for any member serving on a 7-member committee, making marginal departures slightly more rational while simultaneously expanding the governance failure surface: 6-member tie scenarios become plausible where they weren't before, and the effective veto power of any two members on a 5-member committee increases meaningfully relative to the current 3-of-7 required to block.
I also don't think this proposal addresses the actual problem, which is that Cardano lacks a comprehensive CC succession mechanism, reserve seat program, or compensation model that makes long-term service sustainable. Those are process and resource problems. If the ecosystem can fund tens of millions of ADA toward nodes, tooling, and events in a single budget cycle, it can fund mechanisms to make CC membership viable and replace departing members promptly. That's the fix. Reducing the floor doesn't solve the recruitment problem, but rather it makes the consequences of the recruitment problem marginally less severe while introducing new governance pathways to impasse.
This governance action is reversible if the CC stays at 7 or above, and I note the reversion plan exists. But the appropriate time to address operational resilience in the CC is before a member departs and governance halts, through proactive elections, reserve memberships, and succession protocols, and not by adjusting the floor parameter after the fact.
Problem 1. The institutional pressure argument runs backward. Right now, the floor being set at 7 creates a powerful structural incentive to maintain full membership. Every CC member knows that their departure doesn't just reduce quorum, it breaks governance entirely. That's a feature, not a bug. It concentrates accountability. Lowering the floor to 5 doesn't just create a buffer; it reduces the institutional cost of resignation for any individual member, making departure marginally easier to rationalize.
Problem 2. The tie scenario is underweighted in the proposal. At 6 active CC members with a 2/3 threshold, a 3:3 split fails the threshold. No tiebreaker exists. A 6-member CC under this parameter regime would make 3:3 impasse a structurally plausible outcome for any governance action with genuine controversy.
Problem 3. The root cause is process, not parameters. Lowering the floor parameter papers over the recruitment and retention problem without solving it.
Problem 4. The precedent is real, not theoretical.
The guardrails allow committeeMinSize down to 3. Once 7→5 passes, the next "operational resilience" argument for 5→3 is structurally identical. The proposal says this isn't the intent, but intent and outcome diverge over time, especially as different governance participants cycle in. - Yes591.1K ₳Rationale
Reducing the committeeMinSize allows governance to continue. Ideally there will continue to be more than 5 positions, but this allows more room for governance to continue.
- No579.1K ₳Rationale
🚨 AS A CARDANO DREP, I AM VOTING AGAINST REDUCING THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE MINIMUM FROM 7 TO 5
A proposal has been submitted to reduce the
committeeMinSizeparameter from 7 to 5.This parameter defines the minimum number of Constitutional Committee members required for Cardano governance to function fully.
The current committee has 7 members, and the minimum threshold is also set at 7.
The authors argue that if one member resigns, becomes inactive, or reaches the end of their term, parts of Cardano governance could stop functioning.
This could affect:
• protocol parameter changes;
• Constitution updates;
• treasury withdrawals;
• hard forks;
• other governance actions requiring Constitutional Committee approval.However, I believe lowering the minimum threshold is the wrong solution.
📌 If 7 members were elected, they should perform their duties
Constitutional Committee members were not elected simply to occupy seats.
They accepted responsibility for protecting and maintaining Cardano governance.
If one member resigns, becomes inactive, or reaches the end of their term, the correct solution is to replace that member in time.
The rules of the entire system should not be weakened because someone may fail to perform their duties.
📌 The problem is not the number 7 — the problem is governance organization
The system should:
• prepare replacements in advance;
• hold elections before current terms expire;
• create a reserve mechanism;
• register replacement members on-chain quickly;
• monitor committee participation and activity.Reducing the threshold does not solve the real problem.
It simply allows the system to operate with fewer people.
📌 Today 7 becomes 5 — tomorrow 5 could become 3
The main danger is the precedent.
Today the argument is:
“We need to reduce the minimum from 7 to 5 for operational resilience.”
Tomorrow the same argument could be used again:
“We need to reduce it from 5 to 3 so governance does not stop.”
The current guardrails already allow the minimum committee size to be set between 3 and 10.
Therefore, reducing the threshold to 5 could become the first step toward further concentration of power.
📌 The smaller the committee, the greater the power of each individual member
With the current two-thirds threshold:
• 7 members require 5 Constitutional votes for approval;
• 6 members require 4 votes;
• 5 members require 4 votes.With only 5 members, just 2 unconstitutional votes can prevent a governance action from reaching the required threshold.
This makes the committee more vulnerable to internal vetoes and concentration of influence.
This is not only a technical resilience issue.
It is also a question of power distribution inside Cardano governance.
📌 This does not directly reduce DRep power, but the indirect effect matters
The number of DReps does not change.
DRep voting power does not change.
DRep responsibilities formally remain the same.
However, after DReps vote, many governance actions still depend on Constitutional Committee approval.
The smaller the committee becomes, the more power each individual committee member gains over the wider ecosystem.
A broad DRep vote could therefore be blocked by a much smaller group of people.
📌 There is also a technical problem with this governance action
This proposal depends on another protocol parameter change related to the Plutus Cost Model ahead of the van Rossem hard fork.
Both governance actions use the same parent governance hash.
If the Plutus Cost Model proposal is enacted first, this
committeeMinSizeaction may become invalid because the parent state will no longer be current.In that case, the proposal would need to be submitted again with a new parent governance action ID.
This means the current vote may only record the position of DReps rather than produce an actual parameter change.
📌 My position
I vote NO.
My reasons are:
• the 7 elected members should fulfill their responsibilities;
• one resignation should not be used as a reason to weaken the rules;
• the real issue should be solved through replacement procedures, not by lowering the threshold;
• a smaller committee increases the influence of each member;
• 2 members could block decisions in a 5-member committee;
• this creates a precedent for reducing the minimum further to 3;
• broad DRep governance becomes more dependent on a narrow group;
• the proposal may become technically invalid because of the parent hash conflict.Cardano is building decentralized governance.
Resilience should come from proper elections, timely replacement, accountability, and continuity — not from reducing the number of people responsible for constitutional oversight.
I have registered as a DRep and am ready to help shape the future of the ecosystem. I remain optimistic about building the largest digital community in the world. 🖤 My DRep ID: ➡️ drep1y269ehxj3...2fg2jr More details: https://t.me/PROCENT666/338
🚀 COURSE “LEDGER HARDWARE WALLET” | METAMASK
https://edgarbagdasarian.justclick.ru/order/LEDGERMETAMASK🔥 CLOSED VIP CHAT — PAID SUBSCRIPTION
https://t.me/MREDGARCROSS_BOT🌐 ALL COURSES AND LINKS
https://mredgarcross.com/📌 Disclaimer: This post is for informational and analytical purposes only. It does not contain calls for action, protest, or violations of the law. All statements reflect the author’s personal analysis.
- Yes573.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes568K ₳Rationale
Reduce to create less friction in the process.
- Abstain481.2K ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted466.2K ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes2mo agoSuperseded
- Yes435.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes433.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes393.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes379.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes371K ₳No rationale
- Yes366.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes356.1K ₳Rationale
While 7 is more ideal than 5, this is a volunteer position at the moment, so it will become increasingly difficult to find people willing to do the work. If we drop below the minimum size parameter, all governance freezes until enough members are added to fill the minimum seats. Lowering the minimum (even temporarily, until compensation is decided) reduces the risk of this happening in the near future.
- No342.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes330.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes321.6K ₳Rationale
Panda votes YES. From the past governance years it seemed that the voting decisions were pretty straightforwad. Min 5 + roles covered by the community seems fine
- Abstain318.1K ₳Rationale
Abstaining, as I’m part of the Cardano Constitution Committee Tingvard.
Reading proposals and staying updated, just like you.
Thanks to all fellow DReps who are also doing the hard work.
Follow and DM me on X: @kenerik if you have any questions. - Yes313.8K ₳Rationale
I am voting Yes on this proposal based on the operational resilience it provides to Cardano's governance system rather than any desire to reduce the size or importance of the Constitutional Committee.
The CC currently consists of seven members and I believe maintaining a seven-member committee should remain the objective. A diverse, capable, and fully populated Committee strengthens governance and ensures constitutionality is maintained, with CC oversight ensuring things are done in the way intended. Continued effort should, in my opinion be made to attract, support, and retain qualified Constitutional Committee members going forward.
The current situation creates unnecessary operational risk. With the committeeMinSize parameter also set to seven, a single resignation, vacancy, or period of unavailability could place governance processes at risk of disruption. This proposal introduces a buffer that allows governance to continue functioning while the community takes the necessary steps to restore the Committee to its intended size in the event of an unexpected loss of just one member.
Importantly, this proposal does not reduce the Constitutional Committee to five members, nor does it change its constitutional role. It simply reduces the minimum number of active members required for governance operations to continue. The expectation remains that the Committee should operate with seven members wherever possible.
In my view, reducing the risk of governance paralysis while preserving constitutional safeguards is a reasonable and proportionate change.
- No297K ₳Rationale
Voting NO on Reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5
Statement
I am voting against this action to reduce the committeeMinSize from 7 to 5. We should be looking to grow this committee. If we can't find 7 people to do this job we should probably take a moment as a community to figure out what we are getting wrong before we move forward with anything else.
It would not take much money to make the position desirable to a much wider group. Even $12k per year would be enough for someone in my position to justify that time investment to my family. I would love to do it but there's only so much time I can allocate to volunteer efforts.
We had an opportunity to expand the committee size back in December [1] but the community voted not to move forward with it. I don't know how we managed to screw that up.
Just today I saw Big Pey is leaving his position as a dRep. He said it's not worth his time because of constant stress and harassment[2]. We seem to be tolerating an unacceptable level of poor behaviour within our ecosystem. I encourage the community to consider putting together a legal fund to go after Cardano community members committing harassment.
Mark 9:47
References
Signed,
William DoyleYour friendly neighbourhood DRep!
$computerman
drep1yfpgzfymq...pzw3nt
@william00000010 on 𝕏
contact@williamdoyle.ca - No285.2K ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted280.5K ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes2mo agoSuperseded
Yes3mo agoSuperseded
- No275.2K ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on the proposal to reduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5. While I recognise the real liveness risk that a single resignation or term expiry can currently stall governance, this change does not address the underlying cause and instead shifts the balance of power and risk within the Constitutional Committee. The core issue is weak process design and timing around CC elections, replacement, and emergency coverage, not the numerical minimum itself. Whether the minimum is 7 or 5, poor preparation and coordination will still produce governance halts.
Reducing the minimum to 5 materially increases the relative power of each CC member and lowers the threshold for veto: with five members, one inactive and one opposing member can effectively block governance actions, whereas with seven members the same behaviour is less destabilising. This is not a neutral “technical tweak”; it makes our primary constitutional safeguard more fragile and more centralised at a time when Intersect‑aligned structures already exercise significant influence over governance processes and parameter changes. The proposal repeatedly normalises operating with fewer than seven members while asking us to trust that the CC will “intend” to stay at seven, yet it offers no binding mechanism to enforce that intent, no emergency guardrails, and no exploration of alternatives such as improved election scheduling, staggered terms, quorum adjustments, or temporary emergency procedures.
I am particularly concerned by the claim that “this change is reversible if needed, provided there are at least 7 CC members.” In practice, once committeeMinSize is lowered to 5 and a five‑member CC becomes normalised, there is no guarantee—and indeed little incentive—that the committee will ever expand back to seven members to satisfy the stated precondition for reversal. A smaller committee that benefits from higher relative power is unlikely to voluntarily constrain itself again, which makes the reversibility argument largely theoretical rather than a meaningful safety net. Taken together, these issues convince me that this proposal, while formally within guardrails, is not in the best long‑term interests of Cardano’s governance. I therefore vote NO.
- Yes272.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes268.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes260.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes233.3K ₳No rationale
- Yes216.4K ₳No rationale
- Abstain202.8K ₳No rationale