Withdraw ₳220,914 for Pallas: Sustaining Critical Rust Tooling for Cardano
191 DReps voted · 59 with a rationale · 1 changed their vote · 4 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 1 to yes, together voting with 9.4M ₳ of voting power.
- No7.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes7.6M ₳Rationale
I voted YES for this proposal in the Ekklesia temperature check. I have now come to a position where I think that this might not be the best way forward. Meaning that direct funding of smaller open source maintenance and enhancement proposals from the treasury might not be the best approach going forward.
As I have already indicated my support for this proposal in Ekklesia, I will not overcomplicate matters by changing my vote at this - the final treasury withdrawal stage. So my original vote indication remains in place and I vote YES. Note: if this were to be resubmitted in 2026, I would consider this carefully.
Why? I am more in favor of seeing proposals like this funded through an initiative such as the OSC Budget Proposal - Paid Open Source Model for Sustainable Development. I voted YES for the OSC Budget Proposal - Paid Open Source Model for Sustainable Development.
Such budgetary initiatives do not have to come from the OSC, it could be another umbrella group of open source advocates / body that will prioritize and correctly value certain critical packages of maintenance and enhancement work on open source tools that are important for the Cardano ecosystem.
This group or groups would ideally rank the importance / relevance of these open-source tools and software kits or platforms, as well as realistically estimate how much maintenance / enhancement is needed and when it is critical.
Multiple tiny contracts approved by the treasury complicate oversight, whereas larger open-source infrastructure umbrella programs can rank repos by impact and rotate funding annually. The more exceptions the Treasury grants, the harder it becomes to enforce future budget discipline.
I imagine the maintenance and improvement of open source tools or platforms as something that could be tentatively grouped. Of course, these larger maintenance and enhancement support groups (like the OSC) for open source tooling could start discriminating against certain tools. In those cases, if a proposer is dissatisfied with the ranking or grouping, they could always directly apply to the Treasury with a rationale why the proposal needs funding and why it cannot obtain it elsewhere - but only directly from the Treasury.
Note: some other similar open source maintenance and enhancement proposals might differ in their perceived importance - and my vote indication in Ekklesia. I am currently considering to mostly mirror my voting indications from Ekklesia - in order to not overcomplicate the process. Exceptions will be indicated. - Yes7.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain5.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.5M ₳Rationale
The TxPipe team has consistently demonstrated reliability over the years, and I trust them to deliver high-quality Rust tooling for the Cardano ecosystem.
- Yes5.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.3M ₳Rationale
Pallas is a critical Rust toolkit supporting top Cardano projects. Funding its maintenance directly strengthens developer infrastructure and aligns with STORM Partners’ goal to retain technical talent. TxPipe has a solid delivery history, and the tool’s impact is well established. Despite minor budget opacity, the need is clear and the benefits high.
- Yes5.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.8M ₳Rationale
Strong rust low-level building block for Cardano can impact so many areas including the frontend advancement through web assembly. This needs to be maintained properly.
Strong rust low-level building block for Cardano can impact so many areas including the frontend advancement through web assembly. This needs to be maintained properly.
- Yes4.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.2M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted4M ₳Rationale
Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals
The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.
⸻
Cardano: State of Play
The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.
The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.
Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.
However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.
⸻
Fiscal Philosophy
I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.
Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.
⸻
Approach to the Budget Process
This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.
Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.
I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.
However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.
⸻
Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source
Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.
Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.
⸻
Additional Beliefs and Disclosures
I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.
I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.
Earlier votes
Yes1y agoSuperseded
Voting Rationale for 2025-08 Treasury Withdrawals
The following outlines the general lenses and beliefs that guided my voting decisions on the 39 withdrawal proposals submitted under Cardano’s Voltaire governance. I am reusing this rationale for proposals that aligned with these principles and did not require additional explanation due to unique mitigating concerns.
⸻
Cardano: State of Play
The vision of the Cardano ecosystem—to create a fairer financial system, less subject to the whims of individuals, elites, nations, or cultures—remains worthy of support. In general, we are progressing toward that goal.
The bedrock tenet of any blockchain is trustworthiness. While Cardano’s base layer and transaction integrity are mature, the ecosystem has not yet reached the scale needed to fulfill its mission. Infrastructure that supports scaling—especially when open-sourced—should be prioritized for funding.
Because the ecosystem currently allows for anonymity and lacks effective mechanisms to penalize bad actors, it is vulnerable to abuse. Public funding is at risk from fraud, budget inflation, frivolous proposals, and well-intentioned but economically unviable ideas. Given that grift is currently viable, all funding requests must be critically reviewed—with a strong default bias toward skepticism.
However, in any new system, failure and error are expected. The many problems we’ve seen in this first funding cycle are normal and should be treated as feedback to help us improve, not as reasons to disengage.
⸻
Fiscal Philosophy
I view the Cardano treasury as a sovereign wealth fund—a public resource meant to grow over the long term. Spending should be closely aligned with income.
Most projects should ultimately sustain themselves by generating revenue commensurate with their value. But Cardano is still an immature economic system, and many valuable contributions will require public funding at this stage—analogous to early government support for foundational infrastructure.
⸻
Approach to the Budget Process
This first Voltaire budget cycle has experienced serious growing pains. I do not believe that builders should be asked to shoulder the full financial risk of an immature, unclear, and delayed funding process.
Many proposers have worked through most of 2025 without knowing whether their funding would come through. This has impaired their ability to allocate resources intelligently.
I believe the greater ecosystem risk lies in failing to fund projects that were already approved by the community—under the reasonable assumption that funding would follow—than in inadvertently funding a few proposals that should have been rejected. Accordingly, I adopted a bias toward optimism and benefit of the doubt.
However, in cases where proposals appeared excessively extractive, failed to demonstrate economic value in line with their requests, or raised too many concern flags, I voted “no” despite that bias.
⸻
Bias Toward Core Infrastructure and Open-Source
Cardano is first and foremost an infrastructure system. Public funding is best directed toward foundational layers and tooling, rather than toward products that should be able to find product-market fit and attract users or investors.
Public money should come with public return—either in the form of open-sourced outputs or equity-like participation in future value creation.
⸻
Additional Beliefs and Disclosures
I believe in the wisdom of crowds. My votes are based on independent reading of the proposals, personal communications with teams, and my own biases and interpretations. I assume some of my conclusions are incorrect—but trust that the collective judgment of voters will yield a generally sound outcome despite individual errors.
I voted in good faith and without compensation. I have no proposals of my own and no financial interest in any proposal beyond that of any other ADA holder.
- Yes4M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.9M ₳Rationale
I vote YES as core engineering is a top priority of my DRep.
Strength and honor.
- Yes3.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes3.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes3M ₳Rationale
I am following through with my YES vote from the Cardano Budget 2025 Ekklesia process. This proposal falls within my personal NCL of 250,000,000 ADA.
- Yes2.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳Rationale
I trust the team to deliver here but i think this proposal is more fitting for Catalyst or a bundled effort. That said, this specific proposal will add immense value to builders on Cardano, so i voted yes.
- Yes2.7M ₳Rationale
Pallasは、Aiken・Lucid・Mithril・Amaruといった主要プロジェクトに採用されているRustベースの基盤ライブラリ群であり、CBOR処理や暗号プリミティブなどの低レイヤー処理を担う不可欠なOSSです。プロトコル進化に追随するための保守予算として₳220Kは妥当であり、賛成します。
Pallas underpins critical infrastructure in projects like Aiken, Lucid, and Mithril by providing core Rust components. Sustaining it ensures stable low-level tooling and developer efficiency. I vote in favor due to its ecosystem impact and proven utility.
- Yes2.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.5M ₳Rationale
We are focusing on rust support for node diversity and this is a reasonable spend to push this forward.
- Yes2.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳Rationale
Voting yes for the Pallas treasury withdrawal because it funds a critical Rust toolkit used by key Cardano projects.
- Yes1.6M ₳Rationale
I decided to vote ✅ YES on 37 treasury withdrawals, ➖ ABSTAIN on none, and ❌ NO on 2 treasury withdrawals from the Intersect 2025 budget.
It’s obvious I consider all proposals I approved in the budget vote on Ekklesia beneficial for Cardano, so those all receive a ✅ YES vote.
I also vote ✅ YES for most proposals I initially abstained from or voted against in the Ekklesia vote. There are a few reasons for this:
- Some proposals gained strong community support after all, so I don’t want to be the one standing in the way, especially when the requested amount is negligible in the bigger picture.
- Some proposals I actually liked, but I found them more suitable for Catalyst. However, with all the delays, it now makes more sense to fund them as soon as possible.
- Some didn’t get my initial support because I thought the requested amount was too high. But I now believe it’s better for the ecosystem to fund them, despite the larger budget, than not fund them at all.
- I needed to vote for budget proposals with my own NCL in mind. Not all those I approved made it, however, so that leaves some room for other ones.
I won’t approve the treasury withdrawal for two proposals:
❌ Withdraw ₳3,000,000 for High-yield RWA Asset for Cardano: Tokenized Real Estate
This proposal won’t bring much value to our ecosystem, imho.❌ Withdraw ₳1,500,000 for Complement Catalyst: Extended Quadratic Funding---Zero Operational Costs
While the proposal includes some interesting ideas for a fairer voting mechanism, I now support Catalyst and don’t see the need for an additional funding system at this moment, especially considering total spending. The requested amount also seems too small to meaningfully fund multiple projects. While the model relies on donations, it’s unclear what the donor incentive is. Since voting power is tied to donation size, why wouldn’t donors just support specific fundraisers run directly by the projects they care about? That way, they can ensure their contribution goes straight to their preferred initiative without needing it to win a vote first.
I do appreciate the idea of a hybrid funding model where the treasury covers part of a project, but ideally, the remaining portion should come from investors rather than donations, imho.
Lastly, I don’t appreciate that the proposal’s title refers to Catalyst, even though it has no relationship to it. This seems intended to mislead people into thinking Catalyst would benefit from this proposal, which it doesn’t...I acknowledge there’s a metadata issue in the proposal “Withdraw ₳45,217 for MLabs Core Tool Maintenance & Enhancement: Cardano.nix”, but I approved it nonetheless, as the problem is minor and not worth obstructing the process.
- Yes1.5M ₳Rationale
It is important to maintain critical Rust tooling and enhance developer productivity
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- No1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.3M ₳Rationale
A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.
Each of these proposals has already received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
A couple of months ago, I supported the resolution to bundle all of the Intersect Budget Proposals into 1 or 2 formal on-chain governance votes.
Each of these proposals has already undergone extensive scrutiny and received 50% or greater support from the active DReps in the ecosystem, and I will honor that prior decision and the work these prospective developers have put in by voting yes on all the proposals from the Intersect Budget team.
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale