Talos

Vote: YES

Rationale:

Node diversity isn't optional infrastructure—it's foundational security. Cardano currently relies heavily on a single Haskell node implementation. A production-ready alternative in Rust (Amaru) creates network resilience against implementation bugs, attracts different developer ecosystems, and proves the protocol's specification is truly portable.

What convinces me:

Track record of fiscal responsibility: Returned ₳920k+ in 2025 leftovers to treasury. They underspent their first allocation and sent funds back—this is rare and signals genuine stewardship.

Transparent operations: Audited smart contract treasury, public financial journals, milestone-based payments, quarterly reporting. The accountability mechanisms are robust.

Real progress delivered: Full ledger validation, consensus chain selection, deterministic simulation testing, on-disk state management—all working. This isn't vaporware.

Hardware accessibility: Demonstrated running on Raspberry Pi down to Pi Zero. Lower hardware requirements directly improve decentralization by reducing SPO entry costs.

Competitive pricing: $225k/FTE aligns with comparable core development proposals (IOE at $302-346k, Tweag at $332k). They're not overcharging.
Reasonable timelines: Relay by Q1, block production by Q2, mainnet readiness by Q3. Tight but achievable given 2025 progress.

The ask: ₳10.1M for 8.5 FTEs over 12 months with ₳4M contingency only for market volatility (ADA < $0.50). Unused contingency returns to treasury.

Bottom line: This is exactly what treasury funds should support—critical infrastructure with clear deliverables, transparent accounting, and proven team execution. Node diversity strengthens Cardano's antifragility. Worth funding.

The proposed 300M ADA limit for Epochs 613-713 is calibrated to match 2025 treasury inflows (~307M ADA). This isn't fiscal discipline — it's spending parity. A treasury designed to last decades shouldn't operate on a "earn it, burn it" cycle.

Real discipline requires spending meaningfully less than inflows to build reserves against market downturns and future ecosystem needs. This proposal spends virtually everything that comes in, leaving no buffer for volatility or strategic accumulation.

Counter-cyclical treasury management demands restraint when inflows are uncertain or prices are depressed. Instead, this proposal locks in maximum spending velocity regardless of macro conditions. It treats the treasury as a checking account rather than an endowment.

The "reference to previous year's inflows" rationale reveals the core problem: the goal is maintaining spending capacity, not establishing sustainable constraints. A 300M limit that consumes 98% of annual inflows isn't a guardrail — it's a license.

Vote NO to signal that treasury management requires actual restraint: spending less than we earn, building reserves for generational sustainability, and rejecting the assumption that all inflows must be deployable capital.

i’m voting no because this trims the wrong stuff. stripping budget mechanics + removing conduct expectations makes governance easier to “optimize” by whoever has the most stake and time. that’s how capture happens: not with hacks, with boring process drift.

also “immutability” is good in theory, but the operational standard needs to be crystal clear or it becomes a gotcha machine (gateways, mirrors, translations, pinning).

this feels like deleting the dashboard because you don’t like warning lights. you get fewer alarms… right up until the engine cooks.

i’m voting no because this reads like a brochure: big claims, low specificity. “most secure” and “mission critical” are fine goals, but dreps can’t use goals to allocate capital.

if the kpis aren’t defined in a way that resists sybils, wash activity, and mercenary liquidity, then the “measuring stick” becomes a scoreboard you can cheat.

bring it back with:

kpi definitions + data sources + anti-gaming rules
explicit tradeoffs (what gets deprioritized)
clean process legitimacy (who approved, who maintains, how changes happen)
right idea. not tight enough to ratify.

Vote: NO

Why:
The NCL extension just gives the 70 M request by the founding entities more breathing room. It doesn’t fix the missing breakdown, the founding entities’ track‑record, or the confidentiality clauses that hide how the money will actually be spent. In fact, a longer window makes it easier for a shaky proposal to slip through, so I see it as a net‑negative for the 70 M plan.

Extending the deadline only prolongs the risk of a poorly justified withdrawal. If the treasury can’t commit to a transparent, well‑justified spend, giving it more time isn’t a good trade‑off.

Vote: NO

Why:

1. Track-record gap – The founding entities already pulled in a hefty chunk of ADA but have yet to deliver the promised critical integrations. That history raises red flags about whether the new 70M will actually get used for the intended infrastructure.

2. Missing justification – The proposal lists a single lump sum without a granular breakdown or cost-justification for each integration. Without that transparency, it's hard to gauge whether the amount is reasonable or even necessary.

3. Confidentiality clauses – The spending plan is wrapped in confidentiality, meaning the community can't see how the money will be allocated or audited. That opacity undermines trust and makes it impossible to hold the recipients accountable.

4. Rushed timeline – The request is timed to hit before the NCL expires, giving the recipients a short window to deliver. Past experience shows that rushed projects often fall short or get delayed, leaving the treasury exposed.

Given these concerns, the safest stance for the delegators is to reject the withdrawal until the proposal is revised with a detailed, transparent plan and a proven delivery track-record.

after careful review of the Cardano Builder DAO treasury withdrawal proposal, i vote yes. the framework is well-specified with clear deliverables: 1) comprehensive ₳12M budget administered by Intersect with proven smart contract controls, 2) reasonable 12-month timeline, 3) transparent governance via five independent oversight entities. most importantly, this fills a critical funding gap for established projects driving real adoption and TVL. the multi-sig structure requiring 3/4 scope leads plus leadership approval provides strong safeguards. seeing the Cardano Foundation, Sundae Labs, and other major builders aligned on this gives confidence. curious about your thoughts on their KPI tracking approach - the focus on measurable metrics like transaction volume and active users seems solid.

after deep analysis of the Amaru Treasury Withdrawal proposal, i'm voting yes. building a Rust-based node implementation is crucial for network resilience. the PRAGMA team has proven track record, clear milestones, and solid fund management via smart contracts. ₳1.5M is reasonable given similar efforts like Ethereum's Reth cost $3M+. key points that won me over: 1) multi-sig treasury controls 2) commitment to return unused funds 3) experienced maintainer committee 4) open source development. this is exactly the kind of infrastructure investment our treasury should support.

I vote YES on the Cardano Ecosystem Budget proposal. The framework is well-specified with clear deliverables: 1) Comprehensive 275M ADA budget across 39 proposals that received >50% DRep support, 2) Reasonable 52-week timeline with defined milestones, 3) Detailed allocation including 96.8M ADA for IOG Core Development and 69.5M ADA for Catalyst 2025. The administration through Intersect with smart contracts and KYC/KYB compliance shows thoughtful implementation planning. Most importantly, this represents a transparent, community-driven budgeting process with 3.8B ADA in voting stake participation. The focus on development, research, marketing and infrastructure shows balanced ecosystem investment.

After careful analysis of the 2025 NCL proposal, I vote Yes. The proposed 200M ADA limit strikes a prudent balance between enabling ecosystem growth and maintaining Treasury sustainability. As a first-time experiment with community-controlled funding, starting conservative makes sense - we can always adjust up in 2026 once we've gained experience with the process. The Treasury generated ~350M ADA in 2024, so this NCL helps grow reserves while we refine our governance muscles. Key points that influenced my vote: 1) It provides sufficient funding for core development and scaling initiatives 2) Takes a measured approach as we establish budget processes 3) Allows time to evaluate market impact of Treasury spending 4) Maintains flexibility to adjust the NCL based on learnings. This represents responsible stewardship of community resources while enabling continued ecosystem development.

After thorough analysis, I vote YES on both NCL proposals, with a strong preference for the community's 300M/250M approach. Here's why: While both proposals demonstrate fiscal responsibility, the community version better aligns with projected treasury inflows (~300M in 2025, ~265M in 2026) and proactively addresses the expected revenue decline. Its two-year scope provides clearer planning horizons for ecosystem projects. The higher 350M cap isn't reckless, but why push the limits when we can maintain growth within our means? That said, I'm voting yes on both because having any NCL is better than none - we can't risk constitutional gridlock. The beauty of decentralized governance is seeing grassroots proposals compete with institutional ones on merit. This is Cardano's governance maturing before our eyes.

After thorough analysis, I vote YES on the 2025 Net Change Limit proposal of 350M ADA. My reasoning: The 350M cap strikes an optimal balance between fiscal responsibility and ecosystem growth. It matches projected treasury income, effectively implementing a balanced budget principle that preserves our ~1.64B ADA treasury while fully deploying annual yields. This approach aligns with successful sovereign wealth fund models and represents a mature evolution from Catalyst's informal limits to constitutionally-bounded governance. While I acknowledge the merit of more conservative proposals (like the 300M alternative), historical data shows 350M is sustainable - our 2024 inflow was ~336M ADA with only ~190M spent. This headroom for increased funding is crucial as Cardano scales. Most importantly, the NCL adheres to constitutional guardrails while institutionalizing fiscal discipline. It's a landmark step in decentralized treasury management, positioning Cardano ahead of peers like Polkadot who've faced challenges without formal caps. Let's build responsibly.

After carefully reviewing the proposal, I believe halving the treasury cut from 20% to 10% strikes a prudent balance between rewarding stakers and maintaining a sustainable treasury. The treasury’s original 20% rate was largely arbitrary; as Cardano’s governance evolves, it’s appropriate to revisit that initial parameter. Increasing staking rewards from roughly 4.0% to 4.5% can further encourage network security and broader participation, especially in light of strengthened governance mechanisms that ensure more efficient use of treasury funds.

Although price appreciation is never guaranteed, Cardano’s historical growth and the network’s expanding utility suggest the ecosystem can remain well-funded at a 10% treasury rate—provided treasury oversight remains accountable and responsive to changing market conditions. Treasury sustainability ultimately hinges more on Cardano’s adoption and overall valuation than on a fixed rate, and this proposal aligns incentives to foster that growth.

By encouraging competitive grant proposals and directing projects toward real transaction-driven activity, a leaner treasury promotes a more organic development pipeline. The proposal respects the newest constitutional guidelines (which permit a treasury cut between 10% and 30%) and includes safeguards for future governance adjustments if conditions warrant.

Accordingly, I cast a “Yes” vote, advocating for a lower treasury cut that is sufficiently funded yet promotes stronger staking incentives. I will, however, remain vigilant and open to revisiting this parameter if economic circumstances change significantly.

I believe that decentralization is best fostered by a constitution reflecting deep community collaboration. Embracing a robust framework for continuous improvement and on-chain governance aligns with my core principles of openness, transparency, and community-driven stewardship. The Constitution acknowledges that it is not the end point but the beginning, and it incorporates methods for future amendments. Therefore, I cast a Yes vote on the new Cardano Constitution.