Blockfrost's transformation to not-for-profit

System1mo ago2 posts

146 DReps voted · 42 with a rationale · 11 changed their vote

Open a row to read the rationale.

  • Abstain584.2M ₳Rationale

    "Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on Blockfrost's transformation to not-for-profit. Yoroi recognises the importance of responsible governance during periods of ecosystem uncertainty.

    • Ecosystem Situation: The trust our delegators place in Yoroi requires that we act only when we can do so with full confidence. In light of the current situation, Yoroi is choosing to withhold its vote on this proposal and will reassess our position once conditions allow for a considered decision."
  • AbstainChanged435.8M ₳Rationale

    Please check the following link for the reasons for the vote.(投票理由は次のページを参照してください。)(Updated on July 22nd)

    https://adatool.net/treasury-votes

    Earlier votes

    No25d agoSuperseded

    Please check the following link for the reasons for the vote.(投票理由は次のページを参照してください。)

    https://adatool.net/treasury-votes

  • Abstain332.2M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain293M ₳Rationale

    "EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on Blockfrost's transformation to not-for-profit, with rationale outlined below.

    Given the ongoing situation in the ecosystem, responsible governance requires us to act with full clarity and confidence. Until the current situation reaches resolution, EMURGO prefers to withhold judgment rather than vote without the certainty our mandate demands. We will revisit this proposal once the situation is resolved."

  • Yes254.7M ₳No rationale
  • No222.9M ₳Rationale

    We appreciate the attempt to transform Blockfrost into a public good.

    But 13600 USD per month per employee in Europe? How much of a monthly income does Blockfrost currently generate, what does it currently cover?

  • Yes92.2M ₳No rationale
  • No91.5M ₳Rationale

    As a DRep, I decided to vote NO on the proposal: Blockfrost's transformation to not-for-profit.

    My rationale:

    I recognize that Blockfrost is a valuable infrastructure for Cardano developers. However, the core question for me is not whether Blockfrost is useful, but whether the Treasury should reinforce dependence on one dominant access provider or reduce that dependence.

    The proposal itself states that in most epochs, more than 50% of Cardano transactions are submitted through Blockfrost. I see this not only as evidence of importance, but also as evidence of an access-layer centralization problem.

    For this reason, I believe Treasury funding should be used to increase provider diversity, not to concentrate almost ₳10M into one dominant provider.

    Cardano does not depend only on Blockfrost. Developers can already use other access-layer solutions such as Koios, Ogmios/Kupo, Maestro, or self-hosted infrastructure.

    This matters because the Treasury should not make one dominant provider even more central to the ecosystem. If Blockfrost already handles a large share of Cardano transaction submission, then funding it alone may preserve the same dependency problem instead of solving it.

    In my view, Treasury funding should strengthen a diverse access layer: multiple providers, failover tooling, and easier ways for wallets and dApps to use multiple backends.

    We need to build a competitive and resilient infrastructure market where no single provider is indispensable.

    I also consider the history of prior community funding relevant. Blockfrost previously received Catalyst funding for “Open-sourcing Blockfrost API.” That Catalyst proposal is complete, with $119,000 distributed, and its stated goal was to open-source the Blockfrost backend under the Apache License 2.0.

    Much of Blockfrost already appears to be public and reusable today: the backend is under the Apache License 2.0, the OpenAPI specification is under the MIT License, and the decentralized platform is also under the Apache License 2.0.

    Because of this, the proposal should be much more precise about what the community is actually receiving that it does not already have.

    The proposal says that all Blockfrost intellectual property, including source code, trademarks, domain names, and associated assets, will be transferred to the governing not-for-profit. But if major parts of the code are already open-source, then the most valuable parts of the transfer are likely the brand, domains, operational infrastructure, dashboard systems, production know-how, user base, and any remaining private assets.

    I do not believe the community should pay a large premium mainly for trademarks and continuity if the better strategic goal is provider diversity.

    I am also concerned that nearly 80% of the requested budget goes to staffing.

    The proposal asks the Treasury to fund six people for 18 months: four developers, one project manager, and one community manager. I do not object to paying people for critical infrastructure work, but the proposal should better explain why this exact team size is needed for the full transition period, what each role will deliver, and how the work will be publicly verifiable.

    Based on visible public GitHub activity, I see ongoing maintenance and development, but not enough obvious evidence to justify four full-time developers for 18 months without a clearer roadmap and milestone-linked deliverables. Otherwise, the ask risks looking more like an 18-month payroll subsidy than a tightly scoped public-good transition.

    There is also ambiguity around DevOps costs. The proposal says the Ops & Infrastructure budget covers the infrastructure stack and also the DevOps personnel who monitor and operate it, while the staffing budget separately includes four developers.

    It should be clear whether DevOps labor is included in staffing, infrastructure, or both. I would expect a role-by-role allocation, expected public/open-source deliverables, and clear evidence that the staffing budget produces concrete public value.

    I could support a smaller, milestone-based transition proposal if the transition is shorter. But I do not think an 18-month, ₳9.83M operating subsidy for the dominant provider is the best way to build long-term resilience.

    Before allocating large funding of this type, DReps should coordinate on a broader access-layer strategy. We should first decide what kind of infrastructure market Cardano wants: one dominant public API funded by the Treasury, or a diverse ecosystem of providers. Without that strategy, each proposal is assessed in isolation, and the Treasury may unintentionally reinforce centralization.

    Treasury funding should buy decentralization, redundancy, and competition in the access layer. As written, this proposal risks preserving dependency instead of reducing it.

    If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.

    MANDA Pool ID:
    pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8

    My DRep ID:
    drep1y2m0g4r66pyaw3p7u454wc0p4f0ygm8ueaev0mgd3tvwm7sskqwqp

  • Yes88.6M ₳No rationale
  • No84.3M ₳Rationale

    Blockfrost is important infrastructure. But, as others have pointed out, it looks like the team is asking for an average of over $13k per month per team member? Way too rich for my blood.

  • Yes76.8M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain75.2M ₳No rationale
  • No74.5M ₳Rationale

    I recognize that Blockfrost is an important service within the Cardano ecosystem. However, I do not believe this proposal sufficiently demonstrates why nearly 9.8 million ADA of Treasury funding is necessary to sustain it.

    The proposal presents strong usage metrics, including developer adoption and API traffic, but it does not adequately demonstrate the actual impact on the ecosystem if the free Blockfrost service were no longer available. Usage alone is not sufficient justification for ongoing Treasury support.

    There is also limited evidence comparing Blockfrost with available alternatives or quantifying how many developers or projects would be unable to continue without a free hosted service. The proposal demonstrates popularity, but not necessity.

    Furthermore, the proposal states that approximately 90% of usage comes from the free tier. This suggests that the current business model is not financially sustainable. Rather than asking the Treasury to subsidize operating costs, I believe sustainable pricing models or market-based solutions should be explored first.

    The Cardano Treasury should prioritize funding public goods and core infrastructure that cannot reasonably be sustained through the market. While I acknowledge Blockfrost's value to the ecosystem, I do not believe this proposal has sufficiently justified why the Treasury should assume long-term operational responsibility at this scale.

    For these reasons, I vote No.

    BlockfrostがCardanoエコシステムにおいて重要なサービスであることは認識しています。しかし、本提案では、約983万ADAものTreasury資金を投入しなければならない必然性が十分に示されていないと考えます。

    提案では、利用者数やAPIリクエスト数などの実績は示されていますが、「Blockfrostが無料で提供されなくなった場合、Cardanoエコシステムにどの程度の実害が発生するのか」という需要分析や影響評価は十分ではありません。

    利用されていることと、Treasuryによる継続的な運営支援が必要であることは別問題です。代替手段との比較や、開発者・プロジェクトが実際にどの程度困るのかを客観的に示すデータが不足しています。

    また、本提案では90%の利用が無料ユーザーであることが説明されていますが、これは現在のビジネスモデルが十分に持続可能ではないことを示しているとも解釈できます。事業モデルの課題をTreasuryで補填するのではなく、まずは持続可能な料金体系や市場原理による解決を優先すべきではないでしょうか。

    Cardano Treasuryは、市場だけでは十分に供給されない公共財やコアインフラを優先的に支援すべきです。本提案はBlockfrostの価値を否定するものではありませんが、現時点ではTreasuryによる大規模な運営費負担を正当化する根拠が十分ではないと判断し、反対します。

  • Yes69.4M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain50M ₳Rationale

    Because of fundamental concerns with the current treasury process, I vote Abstain on all Treasury Withdrawal proposals until the treasury budgeting process undergoes fundamental reform.

    More information: https://x.com/ada_stat/status/2068315882539921703

  • No49.5M ₳No rationale
  • No47.6M ₳No rationale
  • Yes40.1M ₳No rationale
  • No37.8M ₳No rationale
  • Yes36.9M ₳No rationale
  • Yes34.6M ₳No rationale
  • No31.4M ₳Rationale

    Blockfrost is a valuable and widely used piece of developer infrastructure, and I appreciate the team’s long-standing contribution to the Cardano ecosystem. The transition toward a community‑governed, not‑for‑profit model is a positive direction, and the public‑good intent is clear. However, the requested amount of 9,832,979 ADA is difficult to justify under a financial‑prudence framework, especially given that Blockfrost is not part of Cardano’s life‑support infrastructure and multiple alternative API and indexing solutions exist. While I support the vision of strengthening community‑owned infrastructure, the scale of this withdrawal exceeds what I consider appropriate at this time.

  • Yes31.1M ₳No rationale
  • No27.9M ₳No rationale
  • Yes26.1M ₳No rationale
  • Yes23.5M ₳Rationale

    Non-profit, open source public good sounds great!

  • No21.5M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain21.4M ₳No rationale
  • Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
  • No20.3M ₳No rationale
  • Yes19.9M ₳Rationale

    Blockfrost is an essential API provider for Cardano. I support this transformation to non-for-profit and the path to sustainability to not depend on the treasury for the free tier for good.

  • Yes17.3M ₳Rationale

    Blockfrost's transformation to not-for-profit

  • No16.7M ₳Rationale

    We recognize Blockfrost as important developer infrastructure that has helped many Cardano builders.

    However, we do not support this proposal in its current form. The proposal itself shows how dependent the ecosystem already is on Blockfrost. Funding that dependency directly from the treasury may preserve a useful service, but it also risks reinforcing centralization around one access layer.

    We would prefer a broader infrastructure strategy that supports multiple providers, open standards, self-hostable tooling, and reduced dependency on any single service.

    We are also not fully convinced by the long-term sustainability model after the 18-month transition. For this size of request, the future cost structure and recurring funding risk should be clearer.

  • Yes16.4M ₳Rationale

    Vote: YES

    This proposal (governance action 5439b6141625436ccf600f910bb0b3301b6288933a2cdf7939758848ae8b9997#0) requests a one-time treasury grant of ₳9,832,979 (~$1.57M USD at the ~$0.16/ADA reference rate) to transition Blockfrost — today a private company's product — into a free, community-governed public good under an independent not-for-profit. The plan commits to a free, open public API across mainnet, preview, and preprod with no paid tier, a minimum 99% monthly uptime, a legal transfer of source code, trademarks, and domains into community stewardship, and an on-chain-elected community board, phased across Q3 2026 (architecture and public dashboard), Q4 2026 (board elected), and Q1 2027 (traffic migrated, IP legally transferred). Any unspent funds are returned to the Cardano Treasury.

    Dracula DAO votes YES. Blockfrost is not optional tooling — it is load-bearing infrastructure that a large share of Cardano wallets, dApps, and builders query every day. Its current status as a single private company's product is itself a systemic risk: the ecosystem's most widely used API is a single point of failure controlled by one commercial entity, and that entity has already returned to the treasury and to Catalyst for funding more than once. Converting that dependency into a neutral, openly governed public good — with the source, trademarks, and domains irreversibly transferred into community stewardship and a community-elected board directing it — durably removes that single point of failure. This is foundational, long-term infrastructure of exactly the kind the DREP exists to support, and a free, no-paid-tier API directly lowers the cost of building on Cardano for every team that follows.

    The value accrues to ADA holders, not to a private balance sheet. Rather than the ecosystem paying rent in perpetuity to a company it does not control, this transition puts a critical piece of Cardano's infrastructure into the hands of the people who depend on it and gives them governance over how it is run and funded. The commitment to a public usage dashboard, quarterly technical and budget reporting, a minimum 99% uptime SLA, and the return of unspent funds to the treasury reflects a level of transparency and accountability that a lump-sum request would not carry. The ₳9.8M is a one-time cost to acquire and open-source an asset the ecosystem will own outright — a fundamentally different proposition from an operating subsidy for a private venture.

    Dracula DAO registers its standard concerns and does not let them override the vote. The funding is structured as a one-time transition grant to the incumbent team without competitive bidding, and while deliverables are staged by quarter, staged reporting is weaker than per-milestone smart-contract release with independent sign-off of the kind that secured the IO Hydra withdrawal; we would have preferred escrowed, completion-gated disbursement. The free-forever, no-revenue model also leaves the long-term operating cost of the service unresolved, and the withdrawal is made at a depressed ADA price. These are real, and Dracula DAO expects the incoming community board to treat a sustainable funding path — an endowment, usage-based revenue, or a defined route off treasury dependence — as a first-order priority, and to make good on the transparency commitments in this proposal. On balance, the strategic value of moving Cardano's most critical API into permanent community ownership outweighs these structural gaps, and Dracula DAO votes YES.

    References:

  • No14.1M ₳No rationale
  • Yes13.3M ₳Rationale

    RCADA votes YES on Blockfrost’s transformation to not-for-profit.

    RCADA previously abstained on Blockfrost: Maintenance and Next Generation Indexing. That abstention was not opposition to Blockfrost. RCADA recognised Blockfrost as important Cardano infrastructure and saw merit in decentralised indexing, but the previous proposal combined public-good infrastructure development with an operational subsidy for a private provider’s free-tier infrastructure. RCADA also disclosed that it participated in Blockfrost API service provision and received income from that activity, making abstention the most appropriate position at that time.

    This new proposal materially changes the governance question. Rather than asking the Treasury to support Blockfrost as a private commercial service, it proposes transferring Blockfrost source code, trademarks, domains, and associated assets into community stewardship under an independent, community-governed not-for-profit. It also proposes maintaining a free public API for Cardano mainnet, preview, and preprod, with public dashboards, board oversight, quarterly reporting, and a path toward long-term sustainability.

    RCADA supports this direction because Blockfrost is widely used developer infrastructure. Reliable, low-friction access to Cardano data is a genuine ecosystem public good. Many developers, wallets, dApps, tools, and smaller projects rely on hosted infrastructure because they cannot reasonably operate their own full indexing and submission stack. Keeping a free, reliable public API available can lower barriers to entry, support developer experience, and help protect existing applications from disruption.

    RCADA also recognises that the previous commercial/public-good tension appears to be directly addressed here. The proposal states that Blockfrost considered either becoming fully commercial or fully public-good, and chose the public-good path because raising prices or removing the free tier would harm adoption. Moving Blockfrost into a not-for-profit structure with community governance, public reporting, and transferred intellectual property is a meaningful improvement over funding an ordinary private free-tier subsidy.

    That said, RCADA’s support is not unconditional. The request is large at 9,832,979 ADA over 18 months, and Blockfrost’s importance also reveals a centralisation risk. A large share of Cardano development and transaction submission flowing through one access layer is both evidence of value and a reason for caution. The transition should reduce dependency and strengthen decentralised operation, not merely preserve a single dominant hosted endpoint under a new legal wrapper.

    RCADA also continues to recognise conflict and perception risk because of our prior disclosed relationship with Blockfrost API service provision. This YES vote is based on the proposal’s structural change toward community ownership and not-for-profit stewardship. RCADA expects that any continued or future service-provider relationships, including Icebreaker participation, should be handled transparently under the not-for-profit’s governance, procurement, and conflict-of-interest rules.

    RCADA expects the transfer of Blockfrost source code, trademarks, domains, and associated assets to be legally completed and publicly verifiable. The board election process should be transparent, community-legible, and verifiable on-chain where applicable. The preliminary board should act only as a transition body and should not become a permanent unelected governance layer.

    RCADA also expects the not-for-profit to publish clear infrastructure-cost data, usage metrics, uptime performance, API request volume, budget summaries, and quarterly reports. Sustainability planning must be treated as a core deliverable, not deferred indefinitely. Any future commercial offering or vendor-backed model should protect the free public API, avoid unfair vendor capture, and return benefits to the Cardano community as described.

    RCADA views this as a transition mandate, not a permanent operating subsidy. The 18-month funding period should result in a legally completed community-stewardship structure, public accountability, decentralised operation, and a credible sustainability model that reduces the need for recurring Treasury support.

    On balance, RCADA believes this proposal meets the standard for support because it responds constructively to earlier concerns, protects critical developer access infrastructure, and attempts to move Blockfrost from a commercial dependency into a community-governed public good. RCADA votes YES while expecting rigorous transition governance, transparent accounting, independent assurance, open board processes, real decentralisation through operators, and a credible path away from recurring Treasury dependency.

    RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here:
    https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/

  • No10.9M ₳No rationale
  • No9.6M ₳No rationale
  • Yes8.1M ₳No rationale
  • Yes7.6M ₳Rationale

    Voting YES

    I scored this proposal using my own public rulebook and scoring system, which is available here: Cardano DRep Commercial Treasury Rule Book v11 – v11 Intelligent Risk, Protected Infrastructure & Ecosystem Coordination Edition (https://docs.google.com/document/d/1NzqqbqteMl_ZLta3_p-05nZfyyNvsuptCPzTZIsW1lc/edit?usp=sharing). The document is still evolving, but it reflects how I assess commercial and hybrid Treasury proposals.

    I use AI assistance in this process because I want a scoring method that I can apply as neutrally and consistently as possible across the large number of proposals requesting funding. AI does not make the decision for me. It helps me structure the review, test the proposal against the same criteria, and spot issues I may otherwise miss. When a proposal is borderline, I look at it even more closely.

    Vote: Yes. I started this assessment from zero and made the proposal earn every point. Blockfrost clears the bar because Cardano receives a real public asset, not just a promise of future ecosystem benefit. The proposal asks for ₳9,832,979 to move Blockfrost into a free, community-governed not-for-profit, with source code, trademarks, domains, and associated assets transferred into community stewardship. Blockfrost already matters to Cardano builders: the proposal reports heavy API usage, widespread developer adoption, more than 100 Icebreakers, and more than 50% of transactions submitted through Blockfrost in most epochs. The team also has strong public delivery evidence: its earlier Catalyst proposal to open-source Blockfrost is marked complete, IOG announced a strategic investment in Blockfrost in 2024 to support decentralization, and the Blockfrost GitHub organization shows active public repositories. The ask is large, and the sustainability model still depends on the future board choosing the right commercial or vendor-backed structure. That lowers the score. But the proposal still reaches a plain Yes because the main Treasury return is not speculative revenue. It is the transfer of critical access infrastructure into community-governed public ownership, supported by milestones, third-party assurance, public reporting, refund rules, and smart-contract-based fund administration.

    Category Weight Score from zero Assessment
    Public value, additionality, ecosystem gap, and market timing 12 12 Blockfrost is core developer access infrastructure. Keeping it free and moving it into community stewardship addresses a real ecosystem dependency.
    Team quality, traction, and adaptive execution 7 7 The team has shipped, operated, and open-sourced real infrastructure. The earlier Catalyst open-sourcing proposal is marked complete, and public repositories remain active.
    Price versus value 6 4 ₳9.83 million is expensive. The budget is understandable, but staff costs dominate the ask and the price only makes sense because the Treasury receives the infrastructure asset.
    Applicant integrity and past delivery 8 7 Prior delivery evidence is strong. The proposal also discloses prior Treasury receipts, including Blockfrost-related funds already received.
    Public asset, open-source, verifiability, and data rights 12 12 This is the strongest category. The proposal commits to transferring source code, trademarks, domains, and associated assets to a community-governed not-for-profit.
    Treasury upside, instrument fit, and risk sharing 14 10 The public asset is the main Treasury return. Future commercial revenue return is weaker because it depends on later board decisions, so I do not give full credit.
    Milestones, verification, and anti-gaming design 13 12 The proposal has staged milestones, third-party assurance, public dashboards, quarterly reporting, refund conditions, and smart-contract administration.
    Risk management, margin of safety, and obsolescence resilience 12 10 The main risks are governance transition, sustainability after 18 months, and central dependency during migration. The public transfer and open/forkable design reduce the downside.
    Sustainability and exit plan 8 6 The proposal gives plausible sustainability paths, including paid tiers or a vendor-backed model, but the final model is not locked yet.
    Strategic opportunity cost, competitive neutrality, and ecosystem coordination 8 8 Funding one provider is normally risky, but the proposal avoids a private tollbooth by transferring ownership, using community governance, and involving Icebreakers and ecosystem operators.
    Base score 100 88
    Ecosystem Coordination Premium +5 max +2 Real coordination exists through Icebreakers, SPO/node operators, and named ecosystem infrastructure participants, but not every future vendor role is fully specified yet.
    DRep Conviction Adjustment ±5 max 0 No extra subjective adjustment. The proposal must pass on earned points alone.
    Final score 100 90 Vote: Yes. This reaches the very-large-proposal bar because the Treasury receives exceptional public-asset value: critical infrastructure transferred into community-governed ownership.
  • YesChanged7.2M ₳History

    Earlier votes

    No14d agoSuperseded

  • YesChanged5.9M ₳Rationale

    Vote changed: NO → YES

    After revisiting the proposal, I’ve changed my vote to YES.

    While I’m generally conservative with treasury spending, Blockfrost stands out as one of the lower-risk proposals before us. It already provides critical infrastructure relied upon by a significant portion of the Cardano ecosystem, has an established track record of delivery, and this proposal supports transitioning that infrastructure into a community-governed public good rather than expanding a commercial business.

    My previous concerns have not disappeared. I still believe the nearly ₳10M cost is substantial, and I’d like to see a clearer long-term sustainability model beyond the initial 18-month transition so the nonprofit is not expected to rely on ongoing treasury support. Those remain important areas for improvement.

    Upon further reflection, I also don’t want to see other major ecosystem initiatives delayed, disrupted, or forced to solve infrastructure challenges because a foundational service like Blockfrost is not there to support them. Regardless of differing views on specific usage metrics, it has become deeply embedded across the Cardano developer ecosystem, and maintaining that continuity carries meaningful value.

    I agree that Blockfrost should not become a permanently protected single provider, and I still want a clearer path to sustainability, open operation, and provider diversity. But rejecting the transition does not itself create that diversified future. It may instead introduce significant disruption to infrastructure that many builders already rely on. Upon reflection, I believe maintaining continuity under community governance is the lower-risk decision today, while continuing to push for a more open and plural data-access layer afterward.

    Earlier votes

    No16d agoSuperseded

    I recognize Blockfrost’s importance within the Cardano ecosystem and appreciate the effort to transition it into a community-governed public good. However, at nearly ₳10M, I cannot justify this request against other competing priorities for treasury funding. This is not a judgment on Blockfrost’s utility or the team’s intentions; rather, it reflects my view that limited treasury resources require difficult prioritization, and this proposal does not rise high enough on that list to warrant support.

    Furthermore, while the proposal outlines potential paths toward long-term sustainability, the operating model beyond the 18-month transition remains largely to be determined by a future board. I would have preferred to see a more clearly defined path toward self-sufficiency before committing treasury funds.

  • Yes5.4M ₳No rationale
  • No5.3M ₳No rationale
  • Yes4.7M ₳No rationale
  • Yes4.6M ₳No rationale
  • Yes4.4M ₳No rationale
  • Yes4M ₳No rationale
  • Yes3.1M ₳No rationale
  • No3M ₳No rationale