CARDANO BLOCKCHAIN ECOSYSTEM CONSTITUTION v2.3
207 DReps voted · 77 with a rationale · 9 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes2M ₳No rationale
- No1.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.8M ₳Rationale
Voting Yes. This update improves the Cardano Constitution by making it clearer and more consistent, removing redundant and non-binding provisions, and strengthening accountability for treasury spending. It also requires that proposal documents remain unchanged after submission and incorporates community feedback from earlier versions.
- No1.8M ₳Rationale
I’m voting NO on Constitution v2.3 because I have some serious concerns about how it affects governance and whether it’s still a fair and strong document. The fact that we’re taking away the Constitutional Committee code of conduct requirement (Article VII, Section 6) is concerning. It suggests that if governance bodies don’t follow the rules, we just get rid of the requirement instead of making sure they do. This kind of thinking means constitutional rules are just suggestions when things get tough, which is not good for the document’s authority. Instead of just taking away the requirement, we should have looked at how to make sure everyone is following the rules through better governance. Maybe we could have had CC members replaced, clearer rules, or even gotten the community involved. A constitution that lets people not follow the rules is like a constitution that doesn’t really matter anymore.
Also, the new definition of “Stake Pool Operator” as “the entity controlling cold keys” is a bit confusing. It could cause problems in multi-party SPO operations where the person in charge of cold keys might not actually be the person managing the pool. This could lead to confusion about who gets to vote and how they’re involved in the governance of collaborative SPO arrangements, which are becoming more and more common. I do agree that the improvements in how we handle treasury accountability with universal audit requirements are good, but they don’t make up for the fact that removing obligations instead of enforcing them weakens the constitution.
- Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
- YesRevoted1.6M ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes8mo agoSuperseded
- No1.6M ₳Rationale
I will also vote ❌ NO on this new proposal to replace the constitution, mainly because some important points raised in my rationale of the previous proposal are still unaccounted for.
I will briefly repeat them; see my previous rationale for more details.
1/ I thought the idea was to combine budget and treasury withdrawal, not to never speak of a budget again…
2/ This version still removes power from the CC. With the current constitution, they can deem a budget unconstitutional if they think the contents of it is unconstitutional. With this version, they have no way to do that anymore.
3/ I still think this version was constructed without enough community input like we had with the current constitution.I would also like to see the following points changed, but these are not blocking for me:
a/ Most definitions now present in the guardrails belong in the 'Defined Terms' section at the beginning.
b/ Add the term "permissionless" to the definition of the Cardano Blockchain.
c/ I still think the definition of the NCL is somewhat ambiguous, although it has been improved.
d/ Use the exact wording from the Shelley Design Specification for the definition of 'Active Block Production Stake'. Instead of "…that is actively delegated to Stake Pools…" it should say "…that is correctly delegated to non-retired Stake Pools…".To end on a positive note, I'm happy to see that TREASURY-04a (x) got removed.
- Yes1.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.4M ₳Rationale
Rationale for Voting YES
I am voting YES on the Cardano Constitution v2.3 because it represents a clear step forward in the legitimacy, clarity, and enforceability of Cardano’s governance foundation.This version reflects important lessons from earlier iterations (v2.0) by streamlining the document to focus on what is constitutionally essential and enforceable. It eliminates ambiguity, reduces procedural complexity, and better aligns the Constitution with the principles of a decentralized, scalable governance system.
Equally important, this update demonstrates responsiveness to community input. The high participation in the previous constitutional vote, and the incorporation of feedback into this version, reinforce that the process is evolving in the right direction: one that balances broad community engagement with governance realism.
Ultimately, I support this proposal because it strengthens Cardano’s ability to govern itself credibly and sustainably—both in principle and in practice.
My DRep ID: drep1y2jd3c4hgg0tdua58z6c64k9rf58lz3jlcjlxcjfeaspl6q2e9zm6
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳Rationale
I’ve reviewed the changes from Cardano Constitution v2.0 to v2.3, as detailed in the IPFS link (https://cardano.mypinata.cloud/ipfs/bafybeihjegoita5u67sr6q2cplb33zglytwdo7355u6f2wn4wayhq6uy4e). I’m voting YES because it simplifies governance, speeds up funding for developers and users, and aligns with Cardano’s decentralized vision, building on my support for v2.0. It clarifies terms like “Ada Holders,” defines “Net Change Limit” (the cap on treasury spending), and ensures proposals can’t be changed after submission (ARTICLE II, Section 6), boosting trust. Combining the Budget Info step into a single withdrawal action with a checklist makes funding faster, and requiring audits for all withdrawals ensures community safety, a key priority for me.
However, there are risks. The removal of the requirement to name recipients of treasury withdrawals (ARTICLE II, Section 7) could obscure who gets funds, reducing transparency and risking misuse, as noted in other DReps’ concerns about accountability. Not mandating funds for audits in withdrawal proposals might lead to weaker oversight, as audits could be underfunded, potentially allowing sloppy spending. Dropping the Constitutional Committee’s code of conduct mandate (ARTICLE VII, Section 6) means the CC, which approves governance actions, isn’t required to follow clear ethical rules. This could lead to inconsistent decisions, eroding community trust, as some DReps argue it makes the Constitution feel less authoritative. The new “Stake Pool Operator” definition as “the entity controlling cold keys” (ARTICLE II, Section 5) might confuse voting rights in multi-party pool setups, where the keyholder isn’t the main operator, potentially disrupting fair governance.
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳No rationale
- No1.1M ₳Rationale
At a first glance,** I got to say that I appreciate the editorial hygiene here: tighter definitions, consistent terminology, and the immutability requirement for proposal documents do raise the floor on clarity and integrity.** Without a doubt, applying audit, oversight, and segregation safeguards to all treasury withdrawals is a sturdier default than size-based carve‑outs.
But, and that's a big, big BUT: the heart of this proposal strips out, much like the previously proposed change to this document, strategic budget discipline and weakens basic transparency where we shouldn’t!
So let's repeat: Removing the Budget “Info” mechanism and the prior budget article eliminates the constitutional link between withdrawals and an approved ecosystem budget. Previously, withdrawals were only permitted pursuant to a budget then in effect; now we’re left with a global cap and per‑withdrawal checks. That’s a shift from strategic allocation to piecemeal spending. It invites governance noise and “death‑by‑a‑thousand‑cuts” treasury drift. And we've already too much noise, grifters, social welfare, liquidity drainers, and what not.
Deleting the requirement to approve a roadmap via “Info” further reduces upfront visibility. We lose the macro view that helps align spend with priorities and sequence work.
Granted, the new text generalizes audit/oversight to all withdrawals, but unfortunately removes two simple, high‑signal guardrails: naming the recipient and explicitly stating that funds shall be used for the stated purpose! This is important, kids! Those are not ornamental decorations. Identity disclosure and purpose constraints are baseline accountability for any fiduciary and diligently acting business!
Conveniently the constitution now mandates independent audits for every withdrawal yet no longer requires proposals to include funding for those audits. That’s an unfunded requirement by design and will either force hidden costs onto recipients or degrade audit quality in practice.
Dropping the obligation for the CC to adopt a code of conduct lowers the bar on governance hygiene significantly. Yes, transparency and reason‑giving remain, but a constitutional duty to adopt and publish a code is a minimum viable standard for a body that can halt enactment.
This version 2.3 is a step backward on strategic fiscal governance and a step sideways on transparency. Which, let's be honest, is convenient to certain large entities in the Cardano ecoystem.
I truly believe we can have both simplicity and discipline by keeping the definitional and immutability improvements; sticking to universal audit/segregation; restoring a lightweight budget framework that links withdrawals to an approved budget or program; reinstating recipient identity and explicit “use‑as‑stated” language; requiring that audit costs be provisioned; and keeping a constitutional requirement for the CC to adopt and publish a code of conduct (content at their discretion).
Simplification must not come at the expense of strategy, accountability, and treasury stewardship!
- Yes1M ₳No rationale
- No971.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes964.1K ₳No rationale
- Yes931.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes861.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes841.7K ₳No rationale
- No825.2K ₳Rationale
Changing Cardano's constitutions should be a very inclusive and participatory process. Although there are some good ideas and we appreciate Yuta's efforts we cannot support this initiative because we feel huge portions of the community has been ignored in it's conception.
- Yes798.6K ₳Rationale
Supporting a refined and simplified update.
- Yes798.4K ₳Rationale
We really need to make the info-withdrawal action more smooth
- Yes794.5K ₳Rationale
- Eliminates what I would consider to be a low-value, extraneous 'round' of info action voting prior to Treasury Withdrawals
- Maintains audit provisions for all withdrawals (vs the 2.0 version where this was only required if > 1M ADA).
- Improves clarity and consistency
- Takes into account multiple rounds of community feedback
- No776.8K ₳Rationale
For many of the same reasons I voted against the previous amendment submissions, nothing substantial has changed within the text.
As one of 3 individuals responsible for the inclusion of Article VIII, the intent in writing was for the amendment process to follow submission via a collective. We have conflated the fact that dReps are the Cardano community, but this is far from the current reality, where no true mechanisms to ensure such representation exists.
It was determined that the definitions should not be directly part of the Constitution, and a committee was tasked with defining terms in an external document. The committee, along with so defined "Subject Matter Experts" were unable to create satisfactory definitions, albeit at the failure of Intersect's supplanting of the committee it tasked to do so.
Any self-defined "clarifications" fail to regard the Constitution as an advisory document but instead assumes an authoritative role of the text. This couldn't be further from the truth, as this is the role of the CC. A living document relies on the fact that contradictions to the Constitution MUST be allowed in case the text itself would be too restrictive or ill-written in regard to amending it. It also fails to recognize one of the only defined terms within the text- MUST. The use of expected already suggests the Info Action clause is not a requirement, but not following it is welcoming scrutiny, which should already be the case with treasury withdrawals.
Even if passed, these changes offer no enforcement over its modifications, and while possibly well-intentioned, misses the mark on what changes are worth modifying the Constitution over.
- Yes759K ₳No rationale
- Yes731.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes717.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes705.1K ₳Rationale
I vote YES for Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.3. This update is exactly the kind of practical, thoughtful refinement our governance needs. It streamlines processes, removes non-binding clutter, and reinforces accountability for all treasury withdrawals — principles that are central to sustainable, community-led governance. I appreciate the clarity and consistency brought by unified terminology, clear definitions, and immutable proposal documents. These changes protect the integrity of the process and prevent ambiguity or manipulation. Most importantly, v2.3 builds on community feedback from v2.0, showing that the Constitution evolves responsibly while maintaining decentralization, transparency, and legitimacy. This is a solid, sensible update that strengthens Cardano’s governance framework without overcomplicating it. This aligns perfectly with my values: supporting clear rules, strong oversight, and a decentralized, community-driven ecosystem.
- Yes705.1K ₳No rationale
- No625.9K ₳Rationale
I'm voting no because Constitution v2.3 removes critical financial safeguards without adequate justification, creating exploitable governance vulnerabilities that could drain the treasury. The elimination of the Budget Info Action mechanism isn't efficiency, it's recklessness disguised as simplification. Under the current constitution, treasury withdrawals require a two-step process: first an info_action to establish budget parameters and community review, then withdrawal actions tied to that approved framework. This creates mandatory deliberation time and forces proposers to demonstrate strategic alignment before touching funds. Constitution v2.3 scraps this entirely, collapsing treasury withdrawals into single-step actions with no binding budget coordination. Here's the mathematical problem: with the info_action requirement removed and assuming no Constitutional Committee dissent, or a CC size set to minimum threshold, a treasury withdrawal could be enacted in as little as six days, at the epoch boundary following the first full epoch where the action remains active, provided the 67% DRep threshold is met. Today, that means only 23 individuals, who control the sufficient voting stake could authorize withdrawals without strategic review, public vetting, or ecosystem-wide budget discipline. With the majority of ADA still undelegated, governance becomes an exploitable attack surface during low participation periods or voting fatigue. The removal of budget requirements eliminates the forcing function that makes hard choices about technological priorities and resource allocation. Without holistic budgeting, governance devolves into disconnected withdrawal requests lacking coordination, accountability, or protection against waste and capture. A budget framework compels the ecosystem to prioritize competing demands, by removing it you invite chaotic financial management that accelerates treasury depletion. The original constitution emerged from transparent, line-by-line deliberations across continents with hundreds of elected representatives. Constitution v2.3 introduces extensive changes without undergoing comparable community engagement. Additionally the primary author holds significant voting power and voted for their own draft showing some amount of self-interested motivation, which can be a concentration of influence that sets a dangerous precedent. This is not an iterative improvement it's weakening institutional safeguards in a misguided desire to streamline a process. The budget info_action with a threshold requirement of 100% provides a necessary safeguard against expedited treasury withdrawals, by ensuring at least one full gov_action lifetime is required for any treasury withdrawal.
- Yes605.7K ₳Rationale
📢 Voting Report: CARDANO CONSTITUTION v2.3
As a DRep, I took part in the vote to update the Cardano Constitution to version v2.3.
✅ My Choice: “YES”
I voted YES because I believe this update is an important step to simplify and strengthen the governance system.
📌 Justification
Simplified rules
- Outdated “expectations” and “codes of conduct” for DReps and SPOs have been removed.
- The Budget Info Action mechanism was eliminated, reducing bureaucracy.
Clearer definitions
- Precise legal terms were added: Active Voting Stake, DRep, SPO, Net Change Limit, Treasury Withdrawal Recipient, etc.
- This removes ambiguity and ensures consistency.
Treasury transparency and accountability
- All treasury withdrawals now require audits and reporting.
- This boosts delegator trust and strengthens the DRep role.
Immutability of documents
- Proposals are now immutable once published.
- As a DRep, I can be sure I’m voting on exactly what the community sees.
Broad community support
- Constitution v2.0 saw 86.23% DRep participation.
- v2.3 incorporates their feedback and makes the framework even clearer and more practical.
⚖️ Conclusion
For me as a DRep, this update is beneficial — it streamlines processes, provides clarity, and strengthens trust in governance.
🖤 My DRep ID: ➡️ drep1y269ehxj30k4vfzfc2z84v0xykd3amuy2xn0kv9zf8rhcec2fg2jr
More details: link - Yes590.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes589.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes587.6K ₳No rationale
- Yes559.2K ₳Rationale
I’m voting YES because v2.3 tightens rules that matter (immutability of proposal documents; universal audit safeguards on treasury withdrawals), removes non-enforceable baggage (expectations/encouragements; the separate Budget Info Action), and clarifies terminology—making governance more predictable, auditable, and easier to implement. Community review of v2.0 achieved broad DRep participation, and v2.3 directly incorporates that feedback.
What improves materially
Security of governance records
- Immutability of proposal documents once submitted prevents post-hoc edits and protects trust in on-chain decision artifacts.
Accountability for all treasury withdrawals
- Audit/reporting safeguards now apply to every withdrawal, not only very large ones. This raises the accountability floor and simplifies reviewer expectations across proposals.
Clarity and implementability
- Unified definitions (e.g., Active Voting Stake, Ada Holders, DRep, SPO, Net Change Limit, Treasury Withdrawal Recipient) reduce ambiguity for proposers, reviewers, and tooling.
Lean constitution; policy moves off-chain
- Removing non-binding “expectations/encouragements” and the CC Code-of-Conduct mandate keeps the Constitution focused on enforceable rules, while leaving community norms and processes to policy where they can evolve faster.
Process legitimacy
- v2.3 is an iterative refinement of v2.0 with documented broad review and participation—appropriate for a living constitution under Voltaire.
Skeptical checks and why risks are acceptable
Concern: Dropping the standalone Budget Info Action could weaken budgeting discipline.
Mitigation: Its key safeguards are folded into Treasury Withdrawals themselves, making the controls unavoidable at the moment funds actually move.Concern: Removing some explicit fields (e.g., recipient identity details, explicit audit-cost budgeting) could reduce transparency.
Mitigation: Generalized audit/reporting now applies to all withdrawals. Tooling and policy can standardize minimal disclosure (recipient identifiers, reporting cadence, audit scope) without bloating constitutional text.Concern: Moving CC conduct rules out of the Constitution might weaken standards.
Mitigation: Codes of conduct belong in policy, which can iterate quickly; the Committee remains bound by constitutional duties and on-chain checks.
What I will monitor next (post-ratification)
- That immutable URLs in submissions are content-addressed (e.g., IPFS CIDs) and client/explorer tooling consistently verifies content.
- That audit reports and recipient/administrator identifiers are published in a standard, diff-friendly format for every withdrawal.
- That defined terms (e.g., Net Change Limit) remain consistent with treasury practice and are enforced by guardrails and monitoring.
Bottom line
v2.3 raises assurance (immutability + universal audits), reduces constitutional surface area, and clarifies semantics without undermining community oversight. It’s a pragmatic step toward a more testable, tool-friendly Cardano governance stack. I therefore vote YES. - Yes535.2K ₳Rationale
ADA-holder is the correct definition, ADA-owner is a legal term allowing governments to abuse our system
Cardano supersedes any legacy government or court, the new terminology defines this much more clearly.
We are not here to play nice and be subservient to the legacy systems! We are here to conquer them and offer all people of earth a system of true equality and opportunity, out of reach from any form of authority that would seek to manipulate it!
- Yes533.9K ₳Rationale
The updated Constitution v2.3 is a good step forward.
- Abstain520.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes499K ₳Rationale
- No467.8K ₳Rationale
[English rationale]
I am voting No on this governance action because I believe that updating the Constitution of Cardano requires a broader, more inclusive deliberation process than what has been followed so far. The original Constitutional Workshops were a foundational moment for decentralized governance in Cardano, enabling meaningful input from diverse community members worldwide.Before proceeding with constitutional amendments, we should re-engage the community through a structured consultation process, similar in scope and openness to the Constitutional Workshops. This would ensure the community has the opportunity to review, debate, and co-create significant changes to Cardano's founding governance document.
The Constitution is not just a technical component—it is a social contract. Changing it without broad consensus and deep deliberation risks weakening its legitimacy and shared ownership. Therefore, I urge a pause and a recommitment to transparent and participatory processes before moving forward with any updates.
[Motivación en Español]
He decidido votar No en esta acción de gobernanza porque considero que actualizar la Constitución de Cardano requiere un proceso de deliberación más amplio e inclusivo que el que se ha seguido hasta ahora. Los talleres constitucionales originales fueron un momento fundacional para la gobernanza descentralizada de Cardano y permitieron que miembros diversos de la comunidad mundial pudieran aportar sus ideas y puntos de vista.Antes de avanzar con cualquier enmienda a la Constitución, deberíamos volver a involucrar a la comunidad mediante un proceso estructurado y abierto, similar en alcance y transparencia a los talleres constitucionales. Esto aseguraría que toda la comunidad tuviera la oportunidad de revisar, debatir y cocrear cualquier cambio significativo en este documento fundacional.
La Constitución no es solo un componente técnico: es un contrato social. Modificarla sin un consenso amplio y una deliberación profunda puede debilitar su legitimidad y el sentido de pertenencia compartido. Por eso, considero necesario pausar este intento de actualización y volver a comprometernos con un proceso verdaderamente participativo antes de seguir adelante.
- Yes466.2K ₳No rationale