Governance Incentives Framework 2026
82 DReps voted · 38 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Abstain480M ₳Rationale
Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on Governance Incentives Framework 2026. Yoroi recognises the importance of responsible governance during periods of ecosystem uncertainty.
- Ecosystem Situation: The trust our delegators place in Yoroi requires that we act only when we can do so with full confidence. In light of the current situation, Yoroi is choosing to withhold its vote on this proposal and will reassess our position once conditions allow for a considered decision.
- No395.6M ₳Rationale
I vote NO on the Governance Incentives Framework 2026.
I agree that governance incentives are needed. My main reason for voting NO is that this proposal does not build the real bottleneck — consensus formation — into its success conditions, and is therefore likely to end as the addition of a 50th research artifact.1.The bottleneck is not a lack of research. The proposal itself counts 49 existing studies and initiatives it would consolidate (CPS-0020, CIP-0149, reward-scheme research, and more). The reason that years of research have still not led to the adoption of any mechanism is not missing knowledge — it is the difficulty of reaching agreement.
2.No numerical consensus target — such as the 67% of DRep stake required for treasury withdrawals (or 51% of active DRep IDs) — is built into the milestone stages. The KPIs measure engagement volume only (10+ workshops, 50+ actors engaged); zero indicators measure the degree of agreement achieved. In other words, by design, the project can complete 100% of its milestones and receive the full ₳4.21M while ending with zero DRep consensus.
3.Having attempted this problem myself and abandoned it, I can say this is a political-coordination problem, not a research problem. Principled opposition to the very idea of incentives, disagreements over amounts, over whether penalties should be tied to voting metadata, over how to treat abstain — roughly 1,300 active DReps each hold their own different opinions on reward formulas and parameters. Researching and adding one more excellent formula simply turns 1,300 opinions into 1,301. The center of this work should be coordination requiring strong interpersonal negotiation skills — in practice, lobbying.
4.And the measured data has repeatedly argued against that consensus materializing. The same proposers' 2025 version (₳515k) was not funded. In the 2026 community budget vote, adjacent proposals that explicitly stated in their own texts that they would integrate with this team's research (submitted separately by Voltaire Swarm OÜ) were rejected by wide margins — 12.9% Yes share (rank 54 of 69) and 2.9% (rank 63), while the 13 approved proposals ranged from 70–95%. And this proposal itself is on the same trajectory: Yes 4 DReps / ₳4.3M vs No 12 DReps / ₳128.6M (a 3.2% Yes share) as of epoch 650.
Governance Incentives Framework 2026にNOを投票します。
ガバナンス・インセンティブの必要性には同意します。その上でNOとする主な理由は、この提案が真のボトルネックである「合意形成」を成功条件に組み込んでおらず、最終的に50個目の研究資料の追加に終わる可能性が高いと考えるためです。
1.ボトルネックは研究不足ではありません。提案自身が、統合対象として49の既存研究・取り組み（CPS-0020、CIP-0149、報酬設計研究など）を数え上げています。何年も研究されてきて、いまだどの仕組みも採用に至っていない理由は、知見の不足ではなく合意形成の困難さです。
2.国庫引き出しに必要なDRepステークの67%（あるいは有効DRep IDの51%）といった合意の数値目標はマイルストーンの段階に組み込まれておらず、KPIはワークショップ10回以上・関与アクター50名以上といったエンゲージメントの量のみで、合意の達成度を測る指標はゼロです。つまり、全マイルストーンを100%達成して全額₳4.21Mを受け取りながら、DRepの合意はゼロのまま終わることが設計上可能です。
3.私自身、以前この課題に取り組んで挫折した経験から言えば、これは研究の問題ではなく政治的調整の問題です。インセンティブという発想自体への原理的反対、金額の多寡、投票メタデータへのペナルティの是非、abstainの扱い——約1,300のアクティブDRepが、それぞれ異なる報酬式とパラメータの意見を持っています。優れた計算式をもう1つ研究して追加しても、1,300の意見が1,301になるだけです。この仕事の中心は高い対人交渉能力による調整（実質的なロビー活動）であるべきです。
4.そしてその合意の見通しを、実測データが繰り返し否定しています。同じ提案者による2025年版（₳515k）は資金化されず。2026年のコミュニティ予算投票では、本チームの研究との統合を提案文中で明記していた隣接提案（提出者は別のVoltaire Swarm OÜ）が、Yes率12.9%（69件中54位）と2.9%（63位）で大差の否決（承認13件は70〜95%）。そして本提案自体も、epoch 650時点でYes 4 DRep／₳4.3M対No 12 DRep／₳128.6M（Yes率3.2%）と、同じ軌道にあります。
- Abstain305.5M ₳Rationale
EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on Governance Incentives Framework 2026 with rationale outlined below.
Given the ongoing situation in the ecosystem, responsible governance requires us to act with full clarity and confidence. Until the current situation reaches resolution, EMURGO prefers to withhold judgment rather than vote without the certainty our mandate demands. We will revisit this proposal once the situation is resolved.
- No271.8M ₳No rationale
- No156.5M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes NO. We support evidence-led work on governance incentives, however this proposal's principal deliverable duplicates research the treasury has already funded, and its administration does not secure the 4,207,967 ada requested.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Governance incentive design is a public good, and the proposers' work on CPS-0020 and within the Governance Incentives Working Group has helped frame the problem for the ecosystem. Our decision is driven by the following factors:
- The terminal deliverable is already funded. Input Output Research's Cardano Vision 2026, ratified at Epoch 636 with 74.96 percent approval at 32,916,000 ada, carries WP6, "Governance Incentive Models & Mechanism [Report/Paper + CIP]", targeted for Q4 2026, ahead of this proposal's month-twelve CIP. The stated mitigation is coordination with IOR, but no specific work package, ada value, or trigger is attached to it, and the refund commitment it supports is therefore undefined.
- The funds are not secured. The withdrawal pays to a key-controlled account registered one day before submission and identical to the deposit return address. The proposal names no administrator, which Article II.7.5 requires. On enactment the full sum is released upfront and the seven milestones, monthly reports, unnamed auditor and refund conditions become voluntary undertakings.
- The motivating figures do not verify. Measured over active, non-expired DReps, we do not find the reported Gini rise from 0.92 to 0.94: the coefficient peaked at 0.9167 in Epoch 555 and stands at 0.8931. Nor do active DRep counts decline in every 12-epoch period. Neither claim states its DRep population — and on the top of the distribution the proposal understates the concern, with 9 DReps holding 51 percent of active voting power against the 11 to 16 cited.
- The budget is presented without justification. Workstream totals carry no headcount, FTE allocation, rates, or milestone-level split, including 472,000 ada of administration and coordination for three named contributors. The pilot, the one component IOR's work does not cover, is 333,333 ada.
The Cardano Foundation votes NO. We encourage the proposers to pursue this subject through the Working Group, the CIP process and coordination with the research already funded, rather than through a further treasury request.
---> **_NOTE on 'Internal Voting':_**> The fields _constitutional_ and _unconstitutional_ below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are _for_ or _against_ the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - No93.3M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I have decided to vote NO on the proposal: Governance Incentives Framework 2026.
My rationale:
I appreciate the team’s effort and agree that governance incentives are an important issue for Cardano. The proposal identifies real risks: burnout, declining participation, concentration of voting power, and the possibility that poorly designed rewards could create gaming or reinforce existing inequalities.
The Beyond Minimum Viable Governance proposal completed a broader governance-health diagnosis, identifying sustainability risks associated with uncompensated DRep and Constitutional Committee work. It also produced governance metrics, raw data, a State of Governance report, recommendations, and a technical manual.
These outputs do not tell us which DRep incentive mechanism should be adopted. Further compensation-specific analysis and testing may therefore be justified.
The proposal is intended to take this next step by reviewing existing work, defining incentive-specific questions, modelling candidate mechanisms, and testing one through a controlled pilot. I recognise this as a legitimate direction.
My concern is therefore not that further research should not be undertaken. It is whether the proposed ₳4.2M scope, budget, and delivery structure are proportionate and sufficiently detailed for the outcome promised.
The proposal covers a very broad range of activities over twelve months: research, community engagement, data engineering, public infrastructure, modelling, a pilot, and a future CIP. However, it provides only workstream-level budget categories. The detailed operational budget is not available to DReps, so we cannot properly assess staffing, rates, contractors, pilot-reward allocations, etc.
For a ₳4.2M request, this level of detail is insufficient. A project of this size should show a clear delivery plan, named responsibilities, and a realistic explanation of how the work will be resourced and governed.
I also believe that collaboration with existing governance contributors should have been mapped and agreed in advance. DReps, DRep groups, Intersect, the Cardano Foundation, and other organisations are already actively working on governance and incentive questions.
Before approving a treasury request of this size, the proposal should show how it will complement rather than duplicate those efforts. It should identify relevant contributors, agree a clear division of responsibilities, and define how meaningful participation will be recognised and compensated where appropriate. This does not require every interested group to manage the project, but it should ensure that existing expertise is integrated rather than sidelined, and that the project does not rely on the unpaid availability of contributors who already carry significant governance responsibilities.
The proposal could also define its advisory and oversight structure more clearly. DReps’ practical experience is essential to this work. At the same time, DReps as a class have a structural interest in the design of their own compensation. Any DRep who is eligible for pilot rewards or holds a paid project role may also have an actual or perceived financial conflict of interest.
This does not exclude DReps from contributing or from exercising their independent on-chain voting authority. It does require transparent role definitions, conflict-of-interest disclosures, and clear separation between advisory input, methodological oversight, operational control, and final governance approval.
I would expect a named, broader, independent, and representative oversight and peer-review structure with clear responsibilities, separate from the operational team. It should include appropriate DRep, CC, SPO, delegator, technical, and research representation.
The requested ₳4.2M budget is disproportionate for a research and pilot programme. The detailed operational costs are not public, and the final implementation decision remains a future governance matter.
I would be more willing to support a substantially smaller initial phase, funded through clear milestones, to complete the incentive-specific analysis and a tightly defined pilot. Any expansion should require independent review, public evidence, and a separate DRep decision.
I would reconsider a revised and phased proposal that:
- Publishes a complete operational budget and delivery plan before funds are approved.
- Defines the methodology, decision gates, and safeguards for the pilot before participant selection or payments.
- Secures and discloses the roles, authority, and fair compensation of participating governance organisations and representatives.
- Establishes an independent oversight structure with transparent conflict-of-interest safeguards.
- Requests a substantially smaller initial budget, with any expansion subject to independent review, public evidence, and a separate DRep decision.
I support the objective of designing sustainable and decentralisation-preserving governance incentives. However, I cannot support a ₳4.2M commitment until the scope, budget, delivery structure, and route to a concrete outcome are more clearly defined.
If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.
MANDA Pool ID:
pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8My DRep ID:
drep1y2m0g4r66...skqwqpBuy me a beer:
https://pay.cexplorer.io/pay/c0410d5b237b6ec0 - No87.5M ₳No rationale
- No84.3M ₳Rationale
Governance participant fatigue and attrition are not future risks; they are problems already unfolding. This proposal correctly recognises them. However, after twelve months, its final outputs will be a framework, a CIP, a dataset, a dashboard, and a pathway toward future implementation—not a permanent compensation mechanism. Introducing such a mechanism would still require a separate governance decision.
Meanwhile, experienced DReps and Constitutional Committee members will continue to burn out and leave. Rather than spending approximately ₳4.2 million on extensive research before considering implementation, I believe a small-scale interim compensation mechanism should be introduced promptly, with a strict budget cap, a defined duration, clear eligibility requirements, review criteria, and a sunset clause. It could then be improved incrementally using real-world behavioural data. This would be more appropriate given the urgency of the problem.
Research alone cannot fully predict how participants will respond to financial incentives or how they may attempt to game the system. That is precisely why Cardano should begin with a limited and reversible mechanism, evaluate the results, and use that evidence to inform the next governance decision.
ガバナンス参加者の疲弊と離脱は、将来のリスクではなく、すでに進行している問題です。本提案はその問題を正しく認識していますが、12か月後の最終成果はフレームワーク、CIP、データセット、ダッシュボードおよび将来の実装経路であり、恒久的な報酬制度の導入には、さらに別のガバナンス判断が必要です。
その間にも、経験あるDRepやCCメンバーの疲弊と離脱は続きます。私は、広範な研究に約420万ADAを投じてから制度化を検討するよりも、予算上限、実施期限、参加条件、見直し基準、サンセット条項を設けた小規模な暫定報酬制度を早期に導入し、実際の行動データを基に段階的に改善する方が、現在の問題の緊急性に適したアプローチだと考えます。
報酬制度は、研究だけで参加者の反応やゲーミングを完全に予測することはできません。だからこそ、まず限定的かつ可逆的な制度を実施し、その結果を次のガバナンス判断につなげるべきです。
- No82.9M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes NO on the treasury withdrawal of 4,207,967 ADA for the Governance Incentives Framework 2026.
Governance incentives are necessary. SIPO does not treat that as an open question. The proposal's own evidence is sound: the number of active DReps declined in every twelve-epoch period of Cardano's first year of on-chain governance, the DRep Gini coefficient rose from 0.92 to 0.94, between eleven and sixteen DReps now represent fifty-one percent of voting power, and one Constitutional Committee consortium retired for lack of compensation. Sustained governance participation cannot rest indefinitely on unpaid effort. The problem is real and it needs solving.
SIPO's objection is to the price of studying it.
This project does not deliver an incentive mechanism. Its terminal outputs are a Governance Incentives Framework CIP, research reports, a structured dataset, and a public dashboard. Designing, ratifying, and operating the mechanisms themselves would require separate future funding. Within the request, the one work package that actually tests a mechanism in the field — the controlled incentive pilot — is allocated 333,333 ADA, or 7.9 percent of the total. The remaining 92.1 percent funds the study around it. Asking the treasury for 4.21 million ADA to reach the point where a mechanism can be proposed, rather than adopted, is not proportionate while the Net Change Limit is binding. The proposal itself notes the request equals roughly 1.20 percent of the 350 million ADA limit.
Two further points compound this rather than stand alone.
The budget is not reviewable. The proposal presents workstream-level allocations only and states that the detailed operational budget is maintained separately. Article II.7.1 asks for the relevant costs and expenses to be set out, and the community is being asked to approve a figure it cannot examine line by line. Budget detail that exists but is not published before the vote is detail the electorate cannot weigh.
The overhead share is high. Administration and Coordination is allocated 472,000 ADA and the Contingency Reserve 437,328 ADA — together 909,328 ADA, or 21.6 percent of the total, before any research output is produced.
SIPO states its own position plainly. SIPO is a DRep with substantial delegated voting power and would be a direct beneficiary of any DRep compensation mechanism this project might recommend. A Yes vote would have aligned with SIPO's own financial interest. SIPO votes No. This is recorded so the vote is not mistaken for disinterested neutrality — it is a vote against a proposal from which SIPO stands to gain.
SIPO would support a smaller, sharper resubmission: one that publishes the full line-item budget before the vote, reduces the administration and contingency share, and is scoped to deliver at least one testable mechanism rather than a framework document alone. A reduced study leading to a live pilot would earn SIPO's Yes. This one does not.
This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep として、Governance Incentives Framework 2026 のトレジャリー引き出し 4,207,967 ADA に、反対（NO）を投じます。
ガバナンスのインセンティブは必要です。SIPO はこれを議論の余地がある問題とは考えていません。提案が示す根拠自体は妥当です ― Cardano のオンチェーンガバナンス初年度において、アクティブな DRep 数は 12 エポック期間ごとに毎回減少し、DRep の Gini 係数は 0.92 から 0.94 へ上昇、11〜16 の DRep が投票力の 51% を占めるに至り、憲法委員会のコンソーシアムが 1 つ、報酬不足を理由に撤退しました。継続的なガバナンス参加を、無償の努力にいつまでも依存させることはできません。課題は実在し、解かれる必要があります。
SIPO が反対するのは、それを「調べること」に付いた価格です。
本プロジェクトはインセンティブ機構を提供しません。最終的な成果物は Governance Incentives Framework の CIP、研究報告、構造化データセット、公開ダッシュボードです。機構そのものの設計・批准・運用には、さらに別の資金が必要になります。そして本要求のうち、実際に機構を現場で検証する唯一のワークパッケージ ― controlled incentive pilot ― への配分は 333,333 ADA、総額の 7.9% にとどまります。残る 92.1% は、その周辺の調査に充てられます。機構を「採用できる」段階ではなく「提案できる」段階に到達するために 4.21M ADA をトレジャリーに求めることは、Net Change Limit が実効的に効いている現状において釣り合いません。提案自身も、本要求が 3.5 億 ADA の上限の約 1.20% に相当すると記しています。
これを補強する点が 2 つあります。単独の理由ではなく、上記に重なるものです。
予算が検証できません。提示されているのは workstream レベルの配分のみで、詳細な運用予算は別途管理していると明記されています。憲法 Article II.7.1 は関連する費用と支出を示すことを求めていますが、コミュニティは項目ごとに精査できない金額の承認を求められています。存在していながら投票前に公開されない予算の詳細は、有権者が判断材料にできない詳細です。
間接費の比率が高いことです。Administration and Coordination に 472,000 ADA、Contingency Reserve に 437,328 ADA ― 合計 909,328 ADA、総額の 21.6% が、研究成果が 1 つも生まれる前の段階で配分されています。
SIPO は自らの立場を明示します。SIPO は相当量の投票力を委任された DRep であり、本プロジェクトが将来的に提言しうる DRep 報酬機構の直接の受益者になる立場です。賛成票は SIPO 自身の経済的利益と一致していました。その上で SIPO は反対を投じます。これを記録するのは、本投票が利害のない中立と誤読されないためです ― これは、SIPO が利益を得る側に立つ提案に対する反対票です。
より小さく、より鋭い再提出であれば SIPO は支持します ― 全項目の予算を投票前に公開し、管理費と予備費の比率を引き下げ、フレームワーク文書だけでなく検証可能な機構を少なくとも 1 つ成果物として定義したものです。調査を絞り込み、実地パイロットに至る設計であれば、SIPO は賛成します。本提案はそうなっていません。
本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- No56.2M ₳Rationale
Governance Incentives Framework 2026 -->> NO
I am voting NO on this Treasury Withdrawal of 4,207,967 ADA for a Governance Incentives Framework. The diagnosis in this proposal is accurate: DRep numbers are declining, the Gini coefficient has risen to 0.94, and 11 to 16 DReps hold 51% of voting power. But the response does not follow from the diagnosis. Concentration is a structural problem, and this proposal responds to it by studying how to pay the people who are concentrated. Zero-cost structural remedies already exist and have not been tried. CPS-0020, authored by the same proposers, itself lists periodic delegation resets for inactive DReps. CIP-163 would introduce time-bound delegation requiring periodic reconfirmation. These address sticky and dormant delegation directly, cost nothing from the Treasury, and would move concentration without introducing any new spending stream. Before funding a year of research into how to distribute rewards, the ecosystem should first exhaust the remedies that require no funding at all. The evidence that delegation is not currently an active choice is visible on chain. Delegation to the largest DReps has not shifted materially even following serious incidents affecting holders. That is a demand-side problem: delegators are not selecting. Paying the supply side does not fix it, and may worsen it by increasing the number of DReps among which disengaged delegators must choose. The pilot itself is the most serious objection. This proposal distributes real ADA to real DReps as part of the study, while the DReps deciding whether to approve it are the same population that would receive it. The mechanism to be tested, described as middle-out and attributed to a February 2026 draft, is not publicly available, and the proposal states that parameters, eligibility rules, and implementation details may still change before launch. DReps are therefore being asked to approve a live distribution whose design they cannot read and whose rules are not yet fixed. The foreseeable harms fall outside the experiment and cannot be undone by ending it: further ADA dilution at a time when Treasury withdrawals are already accelerating effective inflation, incentives to create duplicate DRep accounts that copy others' votes, and degradation of rationale quality as participants optimise for whatever the reward formula measures. Each of these would register as improved turnout in the pilot's own metrics. Finally, this is an entry cost, not a total cost. Whatever the framework concludes, its output is a pathway to a recurring compensation programme funded from the Treasury in perpetuity. The ecosystem should establish that no-cost structural fixes are insufficient before committing to that path. I vote NO. I would support a scoped, low-cost effort to consolidate the existing 49 mapped initiatives into a public dataset and literature review, with no live distribution of ADA and no pilot, alongside implementation of the delegation-side structural remedies already proposed." -[Japanese version follows]:「Governance Incentives Frameworkに対する4,207,967 ADAのTreasury Withdrawal」提案に対し、反対票を投じます。本提案の指摘する問題である、DRep数の減少や、Gini係数は0.94への上昇、11〜16のDRepが投票力の51%を占めていることについてはその通りです。しかし、この提案自体がその解決策とはならないと考えます。DRepの集中は構造的な問題であり、本提案はそれに対して、集中している側にどう報酬を払うかを研究するという応答をしています。コストをかけずに構造を変える手段は、すでに存在していて、まだ試されていません。同じ提案者が執筆したCPS-0020自身が、非アクティブなDRepに対する定期的な委任リセットを挙げています。CIP-163は、定期的な再確認を求める時限的委任を導入するものです。これらは固着した委任や休眠委任に直接作用し、Treasuryからの支出をまったく必要とせず、新たな支出の流れを生むことなく集中を動かします。報酬の配り方を1年かけて研究する資金を出す前に、資金を必要としない手段を先に尽くすべきです。委任が現在は能動的な選択になっていないことは、オンチェーンで確認できます。保有者に深刻な影響を与えた事案の後でさえ、最大手DRepへの委任は実質的に動いていません。つまり問題はDRep側ではなく、委任する側が選別していないことにあります。DRepに報酬を払ってもこの状況は変わりません。むしろDRepの数だけが増え、関心の低い委任者にとって選択はさらに難しくなります。加えて、実験の設計そのものにも問題があります。本提案は研究の一部として実際のADAを実際のDRepに配布しますが、承認を判断するDRepは、それを受け取る母集団と同一です。テスト対象とされるmiddle-out方式は2026年2月のドラフトに帰属されていますが公開されておらず、提案書自身がパラメータ、適格性ルール、実装詳細がlaunch前に変更されうると述べています。DRepは、設計文書を読むことができず、ルールも確定していない実配布を承認するよう求められていることになります。予見される害は実験の外側に及び、実験を終了しても取り消せません。Treasury引き出しがすでに実効インフレを加速させている時期にADAをさらに希薄化させること、他者の投票をコピーする重複DRepアカウントを作る誘因、そして報酬が絡むことで投票の質が低下する可能性が否定できないにもかかわらず、それを担保する仕組みが用意されていないことです。そしてこれらはいずれも、実験自身の指標上は投票率の改善として記録されます。最後に、これは総額ではなく入口の費用です。フレームワークがどのような結論を出そうと、その成果物はTreasuryから恒久的に資金供給される報酬制度への経路です。その道に踏み出す前に、無償の構造的解決策では不十分であることを確認すべきです。反対します。既存の49件の関連イニシアチブを公開データセットと文献レビューとして整理する、範囲を限定した低コストの取り組みであれば支持します。ただし実際のADA配布と実験を伴わず、すでに提案されている委任側の構造的解決策の実装と並行することが条件です。
- Abstain51M ₳Rationale
Because of fundamental concerns with the current treasury process, I vote Abstain on all Treasury Withdrawal proposals until the treasury budgeting process undergoes fundamental reform.
More information: https://x.com/ada_stat/status/2068315882539921703
- No42.1M ₳No rationale
- No41.9M ₳No rationale
- No35.1M ₳No rationale
- No28.8M ₳No rationale
- Abstain28M ₳Rationale
My name is mentioned in this proposal so I will be voting ABSTAIN.
- No26M ₳Rationale
Already being worked on internally, this isnt needed
- No23.6M ₳Rationale
This is not a governance incentive framework. This is asking for money to research paying people. Let me do it for you for free. People like money. TADA. 🎉
- No21.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.7M ₳No rationale
- No20.3M ₳No rationale
- No16.6M ₳Rationale
We agree that sustainable governance incentives deserve serious analysis, and we acknowledge that active DReps may potentially benefit from a future compensation mechanism.
However, 4.21M ADA is disproportionate for a research-heavy program whose detailed budget, rates, named execution responsibilities, auditor and enforceable disbursement controls are not public. The proposal can complete its output KPIs through workshops, dashboards, simulations and reports without demonstrating meaningful DRep consensus or adoption.
The controlled pilot is insufficiently specified at the point of approval, while the withdrawal lacks an escrowed, milestone-based release mechanism. With 49 related initiatives already identified, coordination and consensus formation should precede funding at this scale.
We would support a narrower first phase with a granular public budget, named partners, measurable consensus targets and milestone-controlled payments, followed by a separately approved pilot.
- Abstain15.5M ₳Rationale
Governance Incentives Framework 2026
Thanks for handling this, can you run it again with more detail?
- Yes13.2M ₳Rationale
RCADA votes YES on Governance Incentives Framework 2026.
RCADA supports this proposal because healthy governance is critical to the long-term security, decentralisation, and sustainability of Cardano. Governance is not a side issue; it underpins how Treasury funds are allocated, how protocol changes are reviewed, how representatives remain accountable, and how the ecosystem makes decisions over time.
RCADA recognises that governance participation is already showing signs of strain. DRep activity, voter fatigue, voting-power concentration, and the sustainability of unpaid governance work are real issues. RCADA has also experienced the workload and fatigue involved in reviewing complex governance actions responsibly. These problems should not be ignored or addressed only through informal debate.
At the same time, RCADA does not believe that governance incentives should be rushed or based on assumptions. Poorly designed incentives could reward shallow activity, increase concentration, encourage gaming, or create recurring Treasury costs without improving governance quality. The proposal correctly recognises that incentives can create risks as well as benefits.
RCADA supports this proposal because it takes a research-first approach. The project aims to build a public evidence base, structured datasets, dashboards, modelling, simulations, community feedback, and a controlled pilot before any permanent incentive mechanism is proposed. This is the right sequence: evidence first, governance decision later.
RCADA also sees value in the visibility this work could bring to wider governance discussions. A shared dataset and public dashboard could help DReps, delegators, SPOs, Constitutional Committee members, researchers, and ecosystem participants have more informed discussions about governance participation, contribution quality, voting concentration, workload, and incentive design. This could also support more mature marketplace discussions around delegation, representation, and accountability.
The proposal identifies significant existing work across Cardano, including governance compensation, participation, rationale incentives, voting-power concentration, reward distribution, and governance reward design. It also states that the Governance Incentives Working Group has mapped 49 relevant efforts, proposals, research papers, tools, and related initiatives, which should help reduce duplication and improve coordination.
RCADA’s support should not be interpreted as approval of any specific future DRep compensation model or permanent incentive scheme. This vote supports research, data infrastructure, modelling, controlled testing, public review, and a governance integration pathway. Any permanent incentive mechanism should return to governance for separate review and approval.
RCADA expects strong attention to anti-gaming design, concentration risk, transparency, auditability, budget discipline, and independence. Governance incentives must strengthen decentralisation and accountability, not reward participation for its own sake or entrench already-powerful actors.
On balance, RCADA supports this action because Cardano needs hard data and structured analysis to make meaningful decisions about governance incentives. Healthy governance is essential to Cardano’s future, and resolving voter fatigue, participation decline, and voting-power concentration requires evidence-based work rather than guesswork.
RCADA’s full vote assessment can be found here:
https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/ - No10.9M ₳No rationale
- No10.9M ₳No rationale
- No10.4M ₳No rationale
- No9.5M ₳Rationale
Vote: NO
Research can and should inform that process. It should not become the process.
I agree that governance incentives deserve attention. I strongly disagree that another ₳4.2M research-and-framework exercise is the right way to move them forward.
The proposal itself acknowledges 49 existing pieces of work already addressing governance compensation, participation, concentration, reward design and related issues. Yet the overwhelming majority of this request goes toward conceptualization, research, modeling, workshops, data infrastructure, dashboards, administration and contingency—with only about ₳333K of ₳4.21M allocated to actually testing an incentive mechanism. At the end, we receive a framework, papers, models, a CIP and a pathway for yet another governance decision about implementation.
At some point, more evidence about how we might incentivize governance has diminishing value. A framework has no authority simply because we paid millions of ADA to produce it, and future governance is under no obligation to implement its conclusions.
Looking outside of our own ecosystem:
Other ecosystems have learned by deploying bounded incentive programs, measuring actual behavior, and iterating. Arbitrum has repeatedly adjusted delegate compensation, eligibility and scoring based on observed participation and gaming behavior; Optimism has similarly experimented with delegate rewards, compensated governance bodies and delegation mechanisms. They have produced evidence by doing, measuring and correcting—not by waiting for a comprehensive theoretical framework before acting.Cardano is well past the point where the primary constraint is a shortage of governance research. If existing research supports a promising mechanism, propose a small, controlled implementation with clear objectives, limited duration, measurable outcomes and an explicit stop/iterate decision. Try it. Measure it. Learn from actual behavior. Then spend more if the evidence warrants it.
I cannot justify spending more than ₳4M primarily creating another evidence-based framework that governance may or may not ever use when we could be putting a fraction of that capital toward real-world experiments today. We do not need another expensive description of the problem nearly as much as we need disciplined attempts at solving it.
- No7.5M ₳Rationale
Thanks to the proposers for offering this. Today we have almost two years of live on-chain governance. We have real data now. The proposal itself identifies 49 existing efforts and research initiatives. It asks for ₳4.21 million and another twelve months of research, workshops, reports, dashboards, simulations, and framework building. Only one controlled pilot is planned, and even that starts halfway through the project.
This feels overly bureaucratic. We already had workshops. We already had reports. We had a Constitutional Convention. We already studied many of these questions. It is time to make a move. Maybe smaller experiments. Maybe test real incentive models. Measure what happens. Learn quickly. Adjust. Repeat.
We should not spend another year studying how governance incentives might work. We should start testing how they actually work. I also question whether ₳4.21 million is a wise use of Treasury funds here. There are many deliverables, but I do not see enough confidence that they will produce a materially better incentive system.
We might all agree in dozens of workshops that a system looks good. It might still fail in the real world. That is exactly why I would rather fund smaller, faster experiments first. At this price, producing another consensus is not enough.
- Abstain5.6M ₳Rationale
Ironically, this is above my pay grade.
If DReps begin receiving compensation, the entire governance process risks becoming gamified. Why would a large ADA holder continue to delegate to a DRep rather than simply become a DRep themselves, focusing primarily on the compensation their votes generate instead of the actual substance of the proposals?
This is a very dangerous path and must be approached with extreme caution. I fully acknowledge that many DReps (myself included) invest significant time reading and evaluating proposals. However, the solution cannot simply be “pay them so they keep working,” as this introduces serious risks and perverse incentives.
I will abstain for now until it is clear that thorough research has been conducted on this matter.
- No5.5M ₳No rationale
- No5M ₳No rationale
- Yes4M ₳No rationale
- No3.5M ₳No rationale
- No2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳No rationale
- No2.6M ₳Rationale
私は本Treasury Withdrawalに反対します。
Cardanoの持続可能なガバナンスのために、DRepやCCなどのインセンティブ設計を検討する必要性には同意します。しかし、すでに多くの研究や報酬モデルが存在する中で、まず必要なのは、各DRepがどのような制度を望み、どこまでなら合意できるのかを把握することだと考えます。
この点では、CIP-0179のような考え方が参考になります。複数選択、順位付け、数値レンジ、ポイント配分などを用いて、まずDRepの選好と妥協可能な範囲を測定すべきです。その上で議論と調整を進め、最終的なGovernance Actionへつなげる方が、実際の合意形成への近道だと考えます。
研究をさらに積み重ねる前に、すでにある知見を使って合意形成へ進むべきです。また遠回りをするべきではないと考えます。
I vote NO on this Treasury Withdrawal.
I agree that Cardano needs to consider sustainable incentives for DReps, CC members, and other governance participants. However, with many studies and reward models already available, I believe the first priority should be to understand what DReps actually prefer and where meaningful compromise is possible.
The approach behind CIP-0179 is useful here. Methods such as multiple choice, ranking, numeric ranges, and points allocation should first be used to measure DRep preferences and the range of acceptable compromise. From there, discussion and coordination can move toward a final Governance Action.
Rather than adding more research before understanding where consensus can actually form, I believe Cardano should use the knowledge already available and move more directly toward agreement. I do not think Cardano should take another long detour on this issue.
- Abstain2.5M ₳No rationale
- No2.5M ₳Rationale
aint no way this passes
- No2.3M ₳Rationale
Get Real
- No2.1M ₳Rationale
The issue addressed ist relevant. However, in our view the project is focused too much on adding additional pieces to an already existing body of information but not on outcomes or a coherent roadmap leading to a productive incentive system.
- No1.9M ₳No rationale
- No1.6M ₳No rationale
- No1.6M ₳Rationale
We’ve already spent too much on governance.
- No1.3M ₳No rationale
- No1.2M ₳Rationale
Translated:
I have thought about this for a long time.First, in Cardano’s current situation, research spending should face a very high bar. Treasury capital should primarily be allocated where we can expect direct and measurable benefits for adoption and the Cardano economy.
Second, my role as a DRep is a democratic one: to decide whether and how collective capital should be used in Cardano’s best interest. I do not believe Treasury funds should be used simply to financially incentivize more people to vote more often.
If money becomes the incentive for governance participation, the system will increasingly attract people for whom the payment itself is part of the motivation. In my view, monetizing democratic participation in this way does not strengthen democracy; it weakens it.
We can revisit DRep compensation in the future, when Cardano’s financial situation and the actual need for such a mechanism justify it more clearly.
Original:
Ich habe lange darüber nachgedacht. 1st haben Research-Ausgaben für mich in Cardanos aktueller Situation eine sehr hohe Hürde: Kapital sollte derzeit primär dort eingesetzt werden, wo ein direkter und messbarer Nutzen für Adoption und die Cardano zu erwarten ist. Zweitens ist meine Rolle als DRep eine demokratische: darüber zu entscheiden, ob und wie gemeinschaftliches Kapital im Interesse Cardanos eingesetzt wird. Ich halte es für falsch, Treasury-Geld dafür einzusetzen, mehr Menschen finanziell zum Abstimmen zu bewegen. Wenn Geld zum Incentive für Governance wird, zieht Governance Menschen an, für die das Geld selbst Teil der Motivation ist. Meiner Ansicht nach stärkt das Demokratie nicht, sondern schwächt sie. Über DRep Kompensation können wir zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt erneut entscheiden, wenn Cardanos finanzielle Situation und der tatsächliche Bedarf einen solchen Mechanismus klarer rechtfertigen. - No1.2M ₳Rationale
I vote NO on "Governance Incentives Framework 2026" because Cardano should address governance burnout and voting-power concentration, but this 4.2M ADA treasury withdrawal is too broad and under-specified while about 457.4M ADA of the 500M ADA NCL is already ratified. Only a small portion funds the pilot, while the detailed budget, named administrator, and independent controls are missing. I would support a revised, phased proposal with public operational costs, a defined anti-gaming pilot, named independent oversight, milestone-based or escrowed releases, clear success and stop criteria, and a separate DRep vote before expansion.
- No1.2M ₳Rationale
The proposal lacks mechanisms for building consensus and is likely to result in another research paper with no clear path to implementation.
- No1.1M ₳No rationale
- No1.1M ₳Rationale
I have been raising this issue since governance went live, so I understand and accept the underlying problem. What I reject is the cheque being presented as the solution.
There is credible evidence of an incentive deficit. Active DRep participation is declining, voting power remains heavily concentrated, and unpaid governance predictably favors wealthy, institutionally supported, or commercially interested participants. A remarkable discovery, if one has somehow avoided observing how incentives work in real life.
Cardano needs compensated governance. That part is not controversial.
What is difficult to justify is ₳4.2 million for a package consisting of research, modelling, engagement, data infrastructure, dashboards, administration, another paper, one controlled pilot, and a future CIP. Apparently, after all these years, the ecosystem still requires a multimillion-ADA expedition to determine that people participate more consistently when participation is not entirely unpaid.The proposal itself acknowledges 49 related initiatives, alongside separately funded IOR work. Yet coordination is offered after approval, rather than a clear division of labour being agreed before the Treasury is asked to fund the programme. That is a very convenient sequence. It protects the scope of the proposal, while leaving the Treasury to discover later whether the work overlaps with anything already funded.
The commercial case is equally difficult to assess. Workstream totals tell us almost nothing about staffing levels and roles, day rates and contractor costs, pilot rewards, infrastructure expenditure, ownership of resulting assets and intellectual property, decision-making authority, measurable delivery milestones, and conditions for stopping or reducing expenditure. This ain't trivial and it's already sloppy not to address these items.
Lastly, there is the 12% contingency, worth ₳437k, added before the basic cost structure is visible. Contingency is sensible when the underlying budget is transparent and the risks are defined. Here, it risks functioning as a fee for uncertainty, paid in advance by the Treasury. How convenient.
Cardano needs compensated governance; it does not need ₳4.2 million to rediscover payroll and construct dashboards explaining why unpaid work is unpopular.