Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME

System2mo ago8 posts

208 DReps voted · 86 with a rationale · 7 changed their vote · 2 re-voted unchanged

Open a row to read the rationale.

Changed votes: 5 to yes, 1 to no, 1 to abstain, together voting with 182.8M ₳ of voting power.

  • Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.6M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.3M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.3M ₳Rationale

    There are certain hesitations, such as AlphaGrowth picking "winners" in the space and generating "fluffed" TVL numbers by counting the same funds several times as the funds are cycled through different protocols. With that said, our delegators are strong believers in Cardano DeFi and are eager to see new ways to earn yield across Cardano. This proposal does have legitimate potential for increasing usage of Cardano's DeFi circuit, so hesitations aside we have an obligation to our delegators to support this endeavor.

  • Yes1.2M ₳Rationale

    I came here as a DRep because I want to vote for businesses.

    I want Cardano´s Treasury to support companies; but the voting around PRIME is ... interesting.

    The Inconsistency

    Some of the same DReps who rejected of criticised proposals such as $Cash and Strike argued that the Treasury was constrained, that the NCL had to be respected and that there might not be enough room in the current budget period.

    Those were not unreasonable concerns.

    But it is difficult to take those concerns seriously when the same people are now prepared to approve a request of 120M ADA ($19.2M)

    Treating proposals with comparatively small ,clearly defined business proposal as an unacceptable Treasury risk and than support a program asking 12-24x the amount. That´s peak inconsistency.


    Why I Vote Yes

    I vote yes on AlphaGrowth´s Cardano PRIME, because it´s business and they have proven to invest in the right companys. I understand what they do and that work will be valuable for the Cardano Ecosystem.

    But I do not believe Cardano should automatically prefer funding an intermediary that decides where money should go over funding individual businesses that already know what they need the money for. Alpha gets a vote of confidence from me; still -

    I actually would like to know beforhand: Which businesses/protocols will receive it? How much will be spent on research, management, administration and incentives? How much capital is expected to remain on Cardano after the incentive period ends?


    The Infrastructure Problem

    Cardano has already invested enormous amounts of time, capital and intellectual energy into infrastructure. We have repeatedly been told that once the infrastructure exists, users, businesses and liquidity will follow.

    But they have not followed at the scale required. "If we build it, they wil come" has not worked. Building more of the same thing and expecting a different result is not a strat. It is institutional stubborness. (insert chicken trying to push its head through a fence analogy here)


    For the Future

    For the future: Fund companies with identifiable teams, defined budgets, commercial plans and measurable milestones. Welcome to Finance 101.

    Not every business proposal will succeed. Some will fail. Some DReps will dislike how a company intends to use the funds. That is part of investing in businesses.

    Many DReps come from technical backgrounds rather than a business background. That is not an insult, but it creates a blind spot. A technically elegant plan is not automatically a commercially successful one, and a business does not become unworthy of funding merely because a DRep would have implemented a product differently.

    In software development, there is almost never only one valid solution. The same applys in funding businesses.


    Bottom Line

    A Treasury that never invests is useless. I am voting yes because Cardano needs liquidity, distribution and economic growth.

  • YesChanged1.2M ₳Rationale

    I vote NO on "Withdraw 120M ADA for AlphaGrowth's Cardano PRIME". I support making Cardano DeFi more visible, liquid and competitive. After reviewing the proposal, debate and transcripts, I think AlphaGrowth has relevant experience and a serious growth thesis. However, NCL is dominant: NCL is Cardano's treasury spending cap. Protecting Cardano's long-term financial freedom means not expanding or consuming that cap for a very large program before the budget room and the biggest Phase 3 spending plan are concrete. The Operating Group adds oversight, but it is not a second on-chain DRep vote. So DReps would not approve the actual Phase 3 recipients, KPIs, attribution method and risk limits after the audit/gap analysis. I would support a cleaner phased version: fund the diagnostic work first, publish results, then submit Phase 3 separately with evidence, measurable deliverables and fresh NCL impact.

    Earlier votes

    No1mo agoSuperseded

    I vote NO on "Withdraw 120M ADA for AlphaGrowth's Cardano PRIME". I support making Cardano DeFi more visible, liquid and competitive. After reviewing the proposal, debate and transcripts, I think AlphaGrowth has relevant experience and a serious growth thesis. However, NCL is dominant: NCL is Cardano's treasury spending cap. Protecting Cardano's long-term financial freedom means not expanding or consuming that cap for a very large program before the budget room and the biggest Phase 3 spending plan are concrete. The Operating Group adds oversight, but it is not a second on-chain DRep vote. So DReps would not approve the actual Phase 3 recipients, KPIs, attribution method and risk limits after the audit/gap analysis. I would support a cleaner phased version: fund the diagnostic work first, publish results, then submit Phase 3 separately with evidence, measurable deliverables and fresh NCL impact.

  • Abstain1.2M ₳No rationale
  • No1.2M ₳No rationale
  • Abstain1.2M ₳No rationale
  • Yes1.2M ₳Rationale

    I'm voting YES on Cardano PRIME because this is the right way to actually grow Cardano's DeFi scene instead of just throwing money at it. We have paid for and built the infrastructure. Now we need growth. The fact that they can't access most of the ₳120M until month 4, and only after proving they have a solid plan, makes me feel way more comfortable about the risk involved. I like that there are different groups watching over things and because AlphaGrowth handles the research, an independent group can say no to bad ideas. Intersect holds the funds so nobody can just run off with the money. Plus, if anything goes wrong or money doesn't get used, there are six different ways it automatically goes back to the treasury. The people running it only get paid more if Cardano's DeFi actually grows, which seems fair. I think this could finally help Cardano catch up to other chains in terms of DeFi activity, but in a smart, careful way that protects the community.

  • Yes1.2M ₳Rationale

    required for cardano's growth.

  • No1.1M ₳No rationale
  • No1.1M ₳Rationale

    The ₳120M being requested here is more than double the remaining ₳50M in the current NCL budget, which makes this proposal a no-go. Cardano’s treasury isn't just an endless money machine; continuously raising the NCL is just bad financial sense and reminds me of failed government debt strategies. The proposal promises some kind of lasting liquidity growth, but it’s pretty vague and relies on incentives that usually attract quick cash rather than genuine growth.

    AlphaGrowth’s proposed maximum pay of $6.4M creates a risk of misaligned incentives when the market's return on investment is so uncertain. The complicated governance structure and the involvement of multiple parties just adds unnecessary layers instead of making things straightforward. Relying too much on Total Value Locked (TVL) for success misses the point about the quality and sustainability of liquidity, especially considering Cardano’s unique system!

    We need to prioritize financial discipline over ambition. With only 50M ADA left in the NCL, asking for anything above that is simply irresponsible. I’m voting No: there are no exceptions, no shortcuts, and no dilution of our treasury funds. I've been clear from the start about sticking to strict budget limits and wanting proposals that respect Cardano’s limited resources and tokenomics. I stand by that commitment, always. If you disagree with my stance, take it up with the DReps who have spent recklessly in the past six months and handed out "Yes" votes without thinking!

  • YesRevoted1M ₳History

    Earlier votes

    Yes1mo agoSuperseded

  • No984.8K ₳No rationale
  • Yes969.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes966.3K ₳No rationale
  • Yes951.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes929.9K ₳Rationale

    We vote YES on this proposal because Cardano urgently needs a stronger DeFi ecosystem. Over the past years, Cardano has made important progress on infrastructure, integrations, tooling and governance, but this has not yet translated into enough DeFi liquidity, stablecoin usage, institutional attention, or durable on-chain economic activity.

    If Cardano wants to compete as a serious financial ecosystem, we need to support initiatives that can activate liquidity, improve protocol readiness, attract LPs, and turn existing infrastructure into real usage. DeFi is not a side topic; it is one of the most important drivers of transactions, TVL, fee generation, and long-term treasury sustainability.

    We recognize that the requested amount is very large and that strong oversight, transparent reporting, clear release gates, and return-to-treasury mechanisms are essential. However, the proposal includes a structured operating model with phased execution, Operating Group oversight, Intersect administration, audit allocation, and return triggers for unused, unreleased, unearned, or excess funds.

    In our view, the strategic need is clear: Cardano cannot afford to underinvest in DeFi while competing ecosystems continue to attract liquidity and builders. For that reason, we support this proposal as a bold but necessary step toward building a more competitive and liquid Cardano DeFi ecosystem.

  • Yes927.7K ₳No rationale
  • Yes926K ₳No rationale
  • Yes924.3K ₳Rationale

    Company proved that they were able to increase in TVL on other blockchains, this is something that would be important to show that we are growing and going in the right direction. This is just the beginning but is really something that needs to be done.

  • Yes884.5K ₳No rationale
  • Yes877.5K ₳Rationale

    I am voting YES on Cardano PRIME. Cardano's DeFi TVL (~$90M) has not kept pace with its infrastructure maturity, and I find the proposal's core diagnosis credible: the bottleneck is no longer technical readiness but LP unit economics, application depth, and capital flow. Comparable ecosystems (Sui, Aptos, Sei) reached multiples of Cardano's TVL on similar timelines, and waiting for organic growth alone has a real opportunity cost to long-term treasury sustainability.

    What moved me to yes is the governance structure rather than the headline number. Roughly 75% of the requested ₳120M (~₳90M) is gated behind a Phase 3 release vote by an independent, unpaid, five-member Operating Group with no AlphaGrowth employees. In practical terms, this vote approves ~₳30M of audit and gap-analysis work — deliverables published as public goods — with an option, not an obligation, on the deployment phase. Additional protections I weighed: a capped, declining performance fee ($4.64M max) paid only against attribution-adjusted TVL growth that excludes ADA price effects; six return-to-treasury triggers including an ADA-price excess clause; a month-6 falsification trigger; mandatory recusal standards; an independent audit line; and an explicit preference for Cardano-native teams before external alternatives.

    AlphaGrowth has a verifiable track record as Compound DAO's growth team, including securing major ecosystem grants (1.8M ARB, 150K OP) and running incentive programs that attracted material TVL. Their experience is EVM-based, which is a real limitation, but the OG gate and native-team preference are reasonable hedges against that gap.

    My yes is conditional in spirit, and I want to note the risks I expect the Operating Group and community to police:

    1. Liquidity-incentive programs have a poor industry track record of producing durable TVL. The proposal's own comparison (Arbitrum STIP) saw significant decay after incentives ended. The 6-month rolling persistence metric and "organic APR" reporting must be scrutinized, not just the headline TVL number.

    2. The TVL attribution methodology — which determines up to $4.64M in performance fees — is finalized after enactment at the M2 gate. I expect the OG to negotiate this conservatively and publish it in full, and I will treat a weak methodology as grounds to oppose any future continuation.

    3. Counterfactual attribution ("TVL that would not have arrived absent PRIME") is inherently judgment-laden. Quarterly reports should show their work.

    4. AlphaGrowth has no prior Cardano/eUTxO experience. The Phase 1 audit quality will be the first real test; if it reads as generic rather than eUTxO-literate, the OG should not affirm Phase 3 release.

    A negative Phase 3 vote returning ₳90M to the treasury is a legitimate outcome, not a program failure. I am voting for the process, and I expect it to be enforced.

  • Yes870.3K ₳No rationale
  • Yes866.3K ₳No rationale
  • No829.9K ₳Rationale

    While Cardano DeFi urgently requires deeper liquidity and institutional attention, committing 120,000,000 ADA—nearly 10% of the active treasury balance—to a single external promotional entity is too high of a concentration risk for the network at this stage.

    While the use of TxPipe- and MLabs-audited smart contracts for milestone-based distribution is highly commendable, the structural costs of this proposal are overly weighted toward fixed administrative fees (11M ADA) and high-tier bonuses (29M ADA). Furthermore, a large portion of the initial timeline is spent on audits and analysis rather than immediate liquidity deployment. We believe that ecosystem growth funds of this magnitude should be distributed across a wider variety of regional initiatives, developers, and native builders rather than being concentrated under a single centralized mandate.

  • Yes796.1K ₳Rationale

    This is a strong opportunity to WIN

  • Yes792.3K ₳Rationale

    Cardano needs this to drive DeFi and grow the ecosystem

  • Yes742.7K ₳Rationale

    I support the proposal Withdraw 120,000,000 ADA for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME.

    In evaluating this proposal, the phased funding release mechanism was the key factor that ultimately influenced my decision to vote Yes.

    Approximately 75% of the funds remain locked behind the Phase 3 release gate in Month 4 and can only be released after review and approval by the Operating Group. For a treasury proposal of this scale, I believe this structure is particularly important: rather than releasing the funds all at once, it ties subsequent funding to actual execution progress while preserving an opportunity for the community to reassess the initiative at key milestones.

    At the same time, I believe Cardano now needs to progressively turn the technical foundation it has built over the years into real users, liquidity, and on-chain activity.

    We have come a long way in building infrastructure, but if the application layer continues to lack sufficient depth and activity, it will be difficult for those technical achievements to translate into lasting ecosystem value. For that reason, I am willing to support this initiative, which focuses on protocol readiness, incentives, and market expansion, as a market-driven experiment worth pursuing and evaluating.

    That said, voting Yes does not mean assuming in advance that the initiative will succeed.

    Going forward, I will continue to pay close attention to the quality of execution, whether the liquidity brought in proves sustainable, and whether the Operating Group genuinely fulfills its role as an independent layer of oversight.

    Overall, I am voting Yes.

    I support giving Cardano the opportunity to move more actively toward adoption and market growth, while retaining meaningful milestone-based review and oversight mechanisms.

    Ultimately, whether this funding creates real value will have to be demonstrated by the results that follow.

  • Yes737.8K ₳Rationale

    I'm backing this proposal because it addresses a real structural gap: Cardano has shipped solid infrastructure (USDCx, LayerZero, Pyth, Dune) but that hasn't translated into durable DeFi liquidity — TVL sits around $90M and stablecoin supply around $45M as of June 2026, well below where comparable ecosystems land with similar tooling. Fragmented and inefficient liquidity, thin advanced-product coverage, and low external distribution are the actual bottlenecks, not a lack of infrastructure.

  • Abstain622K ₳No rationale
  • Yes604.7K ₳Rationale

    Vote Yes. My rubric assessment remains unchanged. The proposal fails on economics but passes on strategic urgency. Cardano's infrastructure is ready and activation is the missing layer. The cost of inaction exceeds the cost of a structured, cancellable trial with strong oversight. This is a bet.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    After reviewing the detailed assessment and the rationales from DReps I respect who voted Yes, I am casting my vote as a Yes. My rubric assessment remains unchanged. The proposal still fails on instrument fit, commercial return structure, management fee proportionality, and subsidy loop risk. Those concerns are real and I do not dismiss them. I am voting Yes not because the economics are sound but because the strategic imperative outweighs them.

    Cardano has spent years building infrastructure that other chains take for granted. USDCx, LayerZero, Pyth, Dune, and the upcoming Leios and Peras upgrades give Cardano technical parity with Ethereum and Solana. But infrastructure without activation is a museum. Cardano DeFi TVL sits at roughly 90 million dollars against Solana's tens of billions. Stablecoin supply is 45 to 60 million dollars against Solana's 14.9 billion. These are not gaps. They are chasms. And they are widening while Cardano debates process.

    I have watched Ethereum and Solana deploy hundreds of millions in ecosystem incentives, not perfectly, not without waste, but with a clear theory of action. Spend to attract users, deepen liquidity, let network effects compound, then taper as organic activity replaces subsidies. None of these programs have proven sustainable hand-offs yet. Cardano may not either. But waiting for someone else to prove the model first is how you lose a market permanently. The cost of inaction is not neutral. It is compounding disadvantage.

    AlphaGrowth's track record on Compound V3 Arbitrum and Optimism shows better retention than typical emission programs. The 463 day half-life and 78 percent one year retention are not perfect but they are measurably better than Radiant's 74 day half-life and zero percent retention. The price per TVL grown at roughly 7 cents per dollar is competitive with Arbitrum STIP. These are marginal improvements, not guarantees. But in a market where most incentive programs fail completely, marginal improvement from a team with relationships and operational experience is worth funding.

    The governance architecture is genuinely excellent. The Operating Group veto, Phase 3 release gate, six return triggers, Intersect custody separation, and abstain delegation on held funds set a standard I want to see in future large proposals. The Month 4 gate and the six month persistence reporting create real falsification points. If the program is not working, it can be stopped. That is not a blank check. It is a cancellable trial with meaningful downside protection.

    I acknowledge the risks I identified in my original assessment. The 33 percent management fee is too high for public funds. The Treasury receives no ownership, no revenue share, and no enforceable return. The subsidy loop risk is real. Ninety million dollars of Phase 3 capital flowing through a single vendor to Treasury dependent protocols is concentration, not diversification. The organic APR sustainability thesis is unproven. These concerns do not disappear because I vote Yes. They are the price of this bet.

    My rubric is designed to catch exactly these problems. It caught them. I am overriding it because this is the rare case where strategic urgency justifies imperfect economics. Cardano is at an inflection point. The protocol upgrades are coming. The infrastructure is in place. The native protocols are maturing. If Cardano does not make a serious attempt to convert those investments into usage now, the window may close. Other chains are not waiting. Users and capital are sticky. Liquidity begets liquidity. And Cardano's competitors are spending aggressively to ensure that begetting happens on their chains, not ours.

    I expect the Operating Group to apply the high standards DReps and others have demanded. Conservative attribution rules. Strong evidence requirements. Protection against temporary or externally caused TVL. Credible counterparties. If Phase 3 does not meet these standards, the OG should withhold approval. If the program fails to produce sustained activity, the return triggers should be exercised. My Yes is conditional on rigorous execution, not faith in good intentions.

    This vote is a bet. It may lose. But I believe the cost of not betting, of conserving Treasury while Cardano's relevance erodes, is higher than the cost of a structured, overseen, cancellable attempt at activation. I am voting Yes.

  • Yes591.1K ₳Rationale

    This is the jump start that cardano needs to build on-chain usage. We're going to no.1

  • No579.1K ₳No rationale
  • Yes573.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes568K ₳Rationale

    We need DEFI growth and we need it now. Alpha does have a proven track record and Cardano needs big DEFI wins. This will bring that to life. We want to have momentum before the bull comes back. Build secure systems and propel DEFI forward.

  • No503.6K ₳Rationale

    I love the ambition. Cardano DeFi absolutely needs to grow. But growth bought with treasury incentives tends to leave the moment the incentives do, and we would be poorer and no deeper for it.

  • No501.3K ₳Rationale

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

  • Yes488.9K ₳No rationale
  • Yes481.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes438.6K ₳No rationale
  • No433.2K ₳No rationale
  • Yes414.5K ₳No rationale
  • Yes393.6K ₳No rationale
  • No379.5K ₳Rationale

    Much too large. Too much focus on “numbers go up” which is – in my opinion – not what the treasury is for. The treasury is for basic infrastructure that can hardly be built and financed on the market.

  • No356.1K ₳Rationale

    I can't vote yes on this as it would severely exceed my 200M personal spend limit for the year, but let's break this down regardless:
    This proposal would drain 120M Ada from the Treasury with no revenue share, no equity, no repayment obligation, and no retained ownership of anything deployed - only unspent funds ever come back but we should always assume that someone will find a way to spend unspent funds (our of caution of course). The proposal's own sustainability argument rests on fee generation, so let's test it:
    At ~0.17 ADA average transaction fee and the Treasury's 20% share of the reward pot, that's ~0.034 ADA per transaction, meaning ~3.5 billion transactions to recover 120M. At Cardano's historical ~25M transactions per year, that's roughly 140 years - and even at the full Cardano 2030 target of 324M annual transactions, it takes over a decade of the entire network's fee income to repay this one withdrawal. Meanwhile the proposal itemizes only 2M Ada of the 120M, leaves the return triggers, attribution methodology, gate criteria, Operating Group and performance fee unspecified, and ties that fee to TVL growth the executing party purchases with our own money. This is optimism substituting for arithmetic.

  • Yes330.6K ₳No rationale