Cardano Builder DAO
141 DReps voted · 56 with a rationale · 2 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Abstain575.3M ₳Rationale
"Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on Cardano Builder DAO. Yoroi recognises the importance of responsible governance during periods of ecosystem uncertainty.
- Ecosystem Situation: The trust our delegators place in Yoroi requires that we act only when we can do so with full confidence. In light of the current situation, Yoroi is choosing to withhold its vote on this proposal and will reassess our position once conditions allow for a considered decision."
- No381.3M ₳Rationale
Please check the following link for the reasons for the vote.（投票理由は次のページを参照してください。)
- AbstainRevoted334.4M ₳History
Earlier votes
Abstain11d agoSuperseded
- Abstain299.1M ₳Rationale
"EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on Cardano Builder DAO, with rationale outlined below.
Given the ongoing situation in the ecosystem, responsible governance requires us to act with full clarity and confidence. Until the current situation reaches resolution, EMURGO prefers to withhold judgment rather than vote without the certainty our mandate demands. We will revisit this proposal once the situation is resolved."
- No256.8M ₳No rationale
- Abstain174.6M ₳No rationale
- No166.6M ₳No rationale
- No123.5M ₳Rationale
This document includes the Cardano Foundation’s voting decisions and individual voting
rationales for 3 Treasury Withdrawal governance actions connected to the 2026 Intersect-facilitated budget process: Ticketing Platform, Daedalus Wallet Maintenance & Improvements and Cardano Builder DAO.A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
We apply a consistent evaluation framework (see "Cardano Foundation Voting Decisions for the 2026 Intersect Budget Process") and present our reasoning in a single document. Fund-administration clarity is a central consideration: our expectation is that treasury funds are held and released under diligent, transparent, independently-overseen administration with robust custody controls and milestone-based accountability.
For the Ticketing Platform and Daedalus withdrawals, no material change has emerged since our original budget assessment, and our YES votes reflect that assessment. For the Cardano Builder DAO, we are changing our vote from YES to NO due to a change in the proposal relating to the administration of the funds. The updated proposal discloses that the full 20,000,000 ada is paid upfront to a self-selected "independent council" and held under a three-person native multi-sig with only two of three signatories disclosed. This creates continuity and security risks which would usually mitigated by a setup such as the TRSC/PSSC framework with independent external oversight and milestone-gated disbursement.
Voting Record
Governance Action ID Title Vote Rationale gov_action1fdatlfcdnzzcw5x9pnt9r42v992nqw65zze57s8tyk0jll78eyusqccn9gc Cardano Builder DAO (2026) NO The proposal aligns with Cardano governance and ecosystem growth, and the team has a demonstrated record of delivering ecosystem grants, running on-chain governance rounds, and returning unused funds to the treasury. However, the disclosed fund administration, 20,000,000 ada withdrawn upfront to a self-selected council held under a partially-disclosed three-person native multi-sig, outside the independently-overseen TRSC/PSSC framework used for comparable withdrawals, does not provide adequate custody security, key-management assurance, or governance-risk controls at this scale. On this basis, CF changes its vote from Yes to No. gov_action1xk6yrz0tg72a2a63ytd99gapz46nlqlavckarleqt6nr8lyekd8qqp0ga3d Cardano Enterprise Adoption: Ticketing Platform YES This proposal by Anvil seems to credibly contribute to adoption and utility: the system uses CIP-68 metadata, native multi-asset issuance, and on-chain royalty enforcement to support a ticketing business already serving 200,000 users. The proposal is expected to generate meaningful on-chain activity through direct network usage with documented 12-month targets of NFT mints, on-chain interactions, new wallets, and in ticket revenue processed on-chain. Anvil team has a proven track record of Cardano delivery, and Sellout has operated a functioning ticketing platform since 2017. The budget is appropriately justifi ed given the clearly defi ned deliverables, milestone-gated disbursement, third-party security audit, and the equity provision to the Cardano treasury. However, Yellowstone Club anchor deployment and the relatively modest Sellout self-funding to date, compared to the requested amount, should be tracked through quarterly reporting. Based on this, CF votes Yes. gov_action1mr0qdz2jmagvsch6r08fhqvq6vu8jakt4c8m9s7ea7z0p740vntqq4yjd6j Se7en Labs: Daedalus Wallet Maintenance and Improvements 2026–2027 YES The Daedalus Wallet proposal credibly contributes to adoption, utility, and ecosystem growth because its deliverables provide essential maintenance and functional extensions to Cardano's foundational full-node wallet infrastructure. The proposal is expected to drive sustained protocol-level engagement by reactivating idle legacy user accounts and securing independent network access suffi cient to justify treasury investment. Furthermore, the team has demonstrated the necessary expertise to maintain the solution, and the budget is appropriately justifi ed given a fair balance between core upgrades and optional, refundable security audit allocations. However, the proposal would benefi t from clearer long-term fi nancial planning, with the understanding that approval should not imply a commitment to continued annual treasury support. Based on this, CF votes Yes. These three votes are the outcome of a review anchored in our publicly stated principles. The Ticketing Platform and Daedalus withdrawals carry forward our original YES assessments unchanged. For the Cardano Builder DAO we vote NO, due to security and continuity concerns related to the custody and administration arrangements.
NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - Abstain92.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes90.5M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I decided to vote YES on the proposal: Cardano Builder DAO.
My rationale:
My vote should not be perceived as an unconditional endorsement of the DAO as a perfect funding vehicle. It is a pragmatic decision based on the current state of Cardano treasury funding, the need for alternative funding mechanisms, and the improvements CB DAO has made since its previous round.
After the Intersect budget process, only a limited number of non-Intersect proposals reached the on-chain stage. Excluding Intersect-related proposals, only nine proposals were approved, and five of those are connected to one entity. These proposals are now on-chain and still do not have funding guaranteed.
Catalyst is expected to return in the fall with a budget of around ₳2M, which is small in the current market environment and especially limited given the low ADA price.
At the same time, several important teams and platforms in the Cardano ecosystem have struggled or gone out of business. Some of this is natural and even healthy market discipline, but from a user and ecosystem perspective, losing key tools, infrastructure, and applications can also become a serious problem.
I believe Cardano needs alternative funding vehicles. It is inefficient when large proposals from founding entities asking for tens of millions of ADA and smaller builder proposals asking for hundreds of thousands of ADA must compete in the same on-chain governance process.
This is especially problematic when many proposals are submitted at the beginning of an NCL period and DReps are expected to evaluate everything at once.
CB DAO is one of the few mechanisms currently capable of directing funding to ecosystem builders in a more focused way. The DAO targets existing Cardano applications, not random ideas. Cardano needs wallets, aggregators, bridges, dashboards, oracles, risk tools, DeFi products, and user-facing applications. If these products disappear, users feel the consequences directly.
Another important reason for my YES vote is the effort to introduce independent oversight through members of the DRep DAO. In my view, DReps should not only approve funding. They should also be involved in controlling milestones, reviewing deliverables, and stopping or delaying disbursements when conditions are not met.
If DReps carry responsibility for approving treasury withdrawals, they should also have a role in ensuring that treasury funds are used according to the approved mandate.
Last year, I voted NO on CB DAO. I shared many of the concerns raised by other DReps about the structure, rules, accountability, and possible conflicts of interest. I still have concerns today.
However, I also see a serious effort to improve the model, and that matters.
To be clear, CB DAO is not a perfect mechanism. Several commercial or tokenized projects have received funding even though, in my view, such projects should increasingly survive through revenue, private investment, token economics, or targeted performance-based funding rather than broad treasury subsidies. Treasury funding should not become a permanent runway for businesses that are unable or unwilling to commercialize.
Projects that fail to meet KPIs should not automatically receive further funding. In some cases, KPIs should be stricter, more objective, and more clearly connected to Cardano's strategic goals.
Accountability also needs to improve. The KPI dashboard is a useful step, but it is not enough by itself. If KPI data is self-reported, partially self-reported, or not independently verified, then DReps and the community should treat it with caution. Future funding rounds should move toward more verifiable, on-chain, independently auditable metrics wherever possible.
There is also a funding-need problem. Some CB DAO participants are commercial projects, tokenized projects, or teams that already had other funding routes. These projects should be assessed more strictly. Treasury funding should be used as a temporary runway toward sustainability, not as a replacement for a business model.
CB DAO is asking for more funding than last year. Normally, I would treat this as a significant concern. However, given the lower ADA price, the larger nominal ADA request is partly understandable. Still, more ADA must come with stronger accountability, stricter eligibility, and clearer milestone control.
For future rounds, I recommend several improvements:
CB DAO should set stricter KPIs and make KPI achievement a stronger condition for future eligibility. It should put more emphasis on previous funding history, commercial viability, and whether a project has already received significant support from Catalyst, the treasury, or other ecosystem programs. It should also consider caps on how much one project can receive across multiple rounds.
I also recommend avoiding repeated funding for successful commercial projects unless there is a clear public-good justification, strong evidence of ecosystem impact, and a credible path to sustainability. For commercial projects, funding should ideally come with stronger treasury alignment, such as revenue-sharing, token allocation, service commitments, open-source commitments, or other mechanisms that ensure the ecosystem receives value in return.
Finally, I strongly recommend prioritizing open-source projects, especially when treasury funding is repeated. If a project receives public funding several times and later shuts down, the ecosystem should ideally be able to continue, fork, or maintain the service. Treasury-funded work should not disappear completely when a private business closes.
Despite these concerns, I am voting YES because I believe Cardano needs builder-focused funding mechanisms, and CB DAO has shown enough willingness to improve to justify another controlled round. My support depends on stronger oversight, stricter KPI discipline, and a clear expectation that funding can be delayed or stopped if milestones, deliverables, or accountability standards are not met.
Disclaimer: I am a member of the DRep DAO and have been named as a potential independent oversight participant for this proposal. If this role is formalized, I may be involved in milestone review and disbursement control. I am in contact with the Clarity / CB DAO team, but I am not a CB DAO requesting member and I am not applying for CB DAO project funding. Any compensation, role, or responsibility connected to oversight must be clearly disclosed. My YES vote should therefore be read together with this disclosure.
If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.
MANDA Pool ID:
pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8My DRep ID:
drep1y2m0g4r66pyaw3p7u454wc0p4f0ygm8ueaev0mgd3tvwm7sskqwqp - No88.3M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes NO, constructively, on the treasury withdrawal "Cardano Builder DAO" (20,000,000 ada).
This action requests 20,000,000 ada to operate the Cardano Builder DAO — a funding mechanism that re-allocates treasury capital to builders whose work is intended to advance the Vision 2030 KPIs of monthly active users, on-chain transactions, and total value locked, with a smart-contract-governed process and a KPI dashboard tied to on-chain data.
SIPO does not oppose the objective. Funding builders against measurable, on-chain KPIs is a direction SIPO supports, and the effort to move from self-reported metrics toward live on-chain KPI tracking is worthwhile. SIPO's No is a position on the structure of this withdrawal, not on the mission or the people behind it. SIPO also voted No on this proposal in the 2026 Intersect Budget Process Hydra Voting phase; the on-chain submission does not change the structural features that drove that position, so SIPO's No is consistent.
Three structural concerns drive the vote. First, fund control. The on-chain recipient is a single-key reward account (stake1uycp7wr...), not a script or on-chain multisig. Entrusting 20,000,000 ada of treasury capital to a single key, for an entity whose core function is to re-distribute that capital onward, is the weakest fund-control class SIPO recognizes — a marked contrast with the script-based, milestone-gated, independently-overseen Treasury Reserve Smart Contract used by the infrastructure withdrawals SIPO has supported. Second, this is an intermediary re-granting layer rather than a direct public good or a direct deliverable. A treasury-funded fund-of-funds adds a discretionary allocation body between the treasury and the builders, overlapping with mechanisms the ecosystem already has, and concentrates a large sum under one allocator's judgment. Third, the size relative to fiscal room: 20,000,000 ada is a substantial share of the remaining Net Change Limit headroom for this period, committed to an allocator rather than to delivered work.
Consistent with its duty of care over treasury capital, SIPO votes No. This is a constructive No, not a rejection of builder funding. SIPO would reconsider a structure that (1) routes the funds through a script-based, on-chain-enforced, milestone-gated contract with independent oversight rather than a single key; (2) defines objective, on-chain-verifiable allocation and clawback criteria fixed on-chain rather than left to discretion; and (3) is sized and staged against demonstrated allocation performance rather than committed up front. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep として、トレジャリー引き出し提案「Cardano Builder DAO」（20,000,000 ada）に、建設的な反対（Constructive NO）を投じます。
本件は、Cardano Builder DAO を運営するために 20,000,000 ada を求めるものです。これは、月間アクティブユーザー・オンチェーン取引・TVL という Vision 2030 の KPI を伸ばすことを意図した builder に、スマートコントラクト統治のプロセスとオンチェーンデータに紐づく KPI ダッシュボードを通じて、国庫資本を再配分する資金メカニズムです。
SIPO はその目的には反対しません。測定可能なオンチェーン KPI に対して builder を支援することは SIPO が支持する方向であり、自己申告の指標からライブのオンチェーン KPI 追跡へ移す取り組みには価値があります。SIPO の反対は、この引き出しの構造に対する立場であり、そのミッションや背後の人々に対するものではありません。SIPO は 2026 Intersect Budget Process の Hydra Voting phase でも本提案に反対を投じており、on-chain 提出はその立場を導いた構造的特徴を変えていないため、SIPO の反対は一貫しています。
3 つの構造的懸念が本投票を導きます。第一に資金統制。オンチェーン受領先は単一鍵の reward account（stake1uycp7wr…）であり、script でもオンチェーン multisig でもありません。20,000,000 ada の国庫資本を、その資本をさらに再配分することを中核機能とする体に対して単一鍵で託すことは、SIPO が認める最も弱い資金統制の類型であり、SIPO が支持してきたインフラ引き出しが用いる script ベース・milestone gate・独立監督付きの Treasury Reserve Smart Contract とは際立って対照的です。第二に、これは直接の公共財でも直接の成果物でもなく、中間の再配分レイヤーです。国庫資金のファンド・オブ・ファンズは、国庫と builder の間に裁量的な配分体を挟み、エコシステムが既に持つ機構と重複し、大きな金額を一つの配分者の判断の下に集中させます。第三に、財政的余地に対する規模です。20,000,000 ada は当期の Net Change Limit 残枠のかなりの割合であり、それが成果物ではなく配分者に対してコミットされます。
国庫資本への注意義務に忠実に、SIPO は反対を投じます。これは builder 支援そのものの否定ではなく、建設的な反対です。SIPO は、以下を満たす構造であれば再検討に開かれています。(1) 単一鍵ではなく、script ベースでオンチェーン強制・milestone gate・独立監督付きの契約を通す (2) 裁量に委ねるのではなく、客観的でオンチェーン検証可能な配分・クローバック基準をオンチェーンで固定する (3) 全額前払いではなく、実証された配分実績に対して規模と段階を定める。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- No85.4M ₳Rationale
As in my previous "NO" vote on funding for this entity, I do not believe the DReps should be abdicating the power of the purse in this way.
- No76.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain75M ₳No rationale
- No74.9M ₳Rationale
I cannot support this proposal because I believe the Cardano Treasury should remain directly accountable to DRep governance rather than delegating funding decisions to another governance layer.
Cardano's governance is still maturing. DRep processes, treasury oversight, and budget allocation mechanisms are continuing to evolve. Introducing an additional funding DAO at this stage adds another layer of governance, making accountability less clear and increasing unnecessary complexity.
While the proposal emphasizes KPI-driven funding, delegating treasury allocation to the Builder DAO weakens the direct responsibility of DReps for treasury decisions. It becomes less clear who is ultimately accountable for funding outcomes and ecosystem performance.
I recognize the Builder DAO's previous work and appreciate its efforts to improve funding processes. However, I do not believe this track record alone justifies transferring responsibility for allocating 20 million ADA through an intermediary governance body.
Cardano should first demonstrate that its core governance framework can operate effectively, transparently, and at scale before introducing additional delegated funding structures.
For these reasons, I vote No.
Cardano Treasuryは、DRepがコミュニティ全体を代表して資金配分を判断するために存在します。しかし、本提案はその意思決定をBuilder DAOへ再委任する構造となっており、ガバナンスの責任と権限をさらに多層化することに懸念を抱いています。
現時点のCardanoガバナンスはまだ成熟段階にあり、DRep制度や予算配分プロセス自体が改善を続けている状況です。その中で、さらにBuilder DAOという新たな資金配分主体を設けることは、責任の所在を曖昧にし、ガバナンスを不必要に複雑化するリスクがあります。
また、本提案はKPIを重視するとしていますが、Builder DAOを経由することによって、DRepが本来果たすべき資金配分の責任が弱まり、「誰が最終的な成果に責任を負うのか」が不明確になります。
Builder DAOの活動実績は評価しますが、それだけで2,000万ADA規模の資金配分権限を委ねることには賛成できません。
まずはCardano本体のガバナンスが十分に成熟し、DRepによる直接的で透明性の高い資金配分が安定して機能することを優先すべきです。その上で、将来的に専門DAOへの権限委譲を議論することが適切だと考えます。
以上の理由から、本提案には反対します。
- No72.3M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on the Cardano Builder DAO treasury withdrawal. I want to start by saying I do see genuine value in the Builder DAO; I have enjoyed chatting with the teams involved, I see the impact they can have, and I really like the active discussions on the governance portal.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting NO on the Cardano Builder DAO treasury withdrawal. I want to start by saying I do see genuine value in the Builder DAO; I have enjoyed chatting with the teams involved, I see the impact they can have, and I really like the active discussions on the governance portal.
However, the requested amount is simply too huge to justify in the current market conditions. Overall, Cardano's TVL has been dropping recently, yet our treasury investments and budget asks keep increasing. I feel this proposal would benefit greatly from a reduced ask.
Additionally, the KPIs are either too vague like "TVL Routed" or entirely unfit for purpose. Metrics like Active Users, API requests, and on chain transactions can be manipulated far too easily. For example, a funding request of $110k tied to a metric of 16,000 transactions could be artificially completed for roughly 0.20 ADA per transaction. That means for just around 3,200 ADA, a team could "buy" their metrics to unlock a $110k investment or use an investment to pass their KPI's. Until we have metrics that measure genuine economic value rather than easily gamed volume, and an ask that reflects current market realities, I cannot support this.
- No53.7M ₳Rationale
I'm voting No on the Cardano Builder DAO proposal.
This proposal creates a fund-of-funds structure that adds another discretionary allocation body between the treasury and builders. I don't believe Cardano needs this additional intermediary layer right now.
Multiple funding paths already exist. The Intersect budget process and Catalyst are structures where open governance, made up of people who are not the beneficiaries themselves, directly decides the final recipients without any intermediary body.
This proposal, by contrast, delegates allocation to a closed membership of builders who are themselves potential beneficiaries, reviewing each other. And if what's needed is discretionary, investment-style capital allocation, that is done more effectively by a professional management organization accountable for performance, like the recently launched Orion Fund. Either way, there is little room left for this intermediary re-granting body.
Also, while the DAO has distributed 11.1M ADA across two rounds, no verifiable project-level evidence has been presented on what that funding actually produced in terms of users, transactions, or TVL. Entrusting an even larger amount to a mechanism whose results remain unproven is inefficient.
A limited treasury should be deployed either through open governance deciding directly, or through capable professionals allocating against verified results. This proposal meets neither standard, so I'm voting No.
- Abstain50.9M ₳Rationale
Because of fundamental concerns with the current treasury process, I vote Abstain on all Treasury Withdrawal proposals until the treasury budgeting process undergoes fundamental reform.
More information: https://x.com/ada_stat/status/2068315882539921703
- Yes50.3M ₳Rationale
Same rationale as my vote on the Intersect Budget.
- No49.5M ₳No rationale
- No47.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes40.1M ₳No rationale
- No37.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes37.3M ₳No rationale
- No34.6M ₳No rationale
- Abstain34.4M ₳Rationale
Socious abstains on this GA because we are not sure of the proposal.
- Abstain31.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.9M ₳Rationale
I am not convinced that a DAO is necessarily the ideal structure for ecosystem funding. I would rather something is still voted on directly by DReps, but perhaps KPIs and metrics are collated by a third-party and/or administrator. .But given the current lack of other funding options and Catalyst taking a back seat, I think CB DAO is important to keep many projects afloat. However, my concern is that projects should not have to rely on a treasury subsidy at all in order to remain functional. This will be a YES for now, but I'd like to see something more accountable to DReps in the future.
- No27.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes26.3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain25.3M ₳Rationale
I am voting ABSTAIN on the Cardano Builder DOA. It's a great initiative and would likely be helpful to struggling projects, though I beleive the structure is fundamentally flawed. Private voting among self-interested parties enables projects to linger which otherwise should, for the greater health of the ecosystem, fail more quickly. The first pass of Builder DOA did not live up to an ROI promise in magnitude comparable to the size of funds requested, which I believe is reflected in the current voting sentiment.
- No23.5M ₳Rationale
No DAOs.
- Abstain21.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain21.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.3M ₳No rationale
- No20M ₳Rationale
We already have enough mechanisms for this as is.
- Yes17.5M ₳Rationale
Cardano Builder DAO
- Yes16.9M ₳Rationale
We support this proposal because not every smaller Cardano project or dApp should have to go through the full scrutiny of all DReps individually.
Many teams building on Cardano need a more practical funding path, where their needs can be assessed by people with relevant domain expertise, ecosystem context, and direct understanding of what it takes to build and maintain products on Cardano.
A dedicated council that includes both expert peers and DRep representation is better suited to evaluate smaller validated builders than a broad, proposal-by-proposal vote from the entire DRep set. This can reduce governance overhead, improve funding efficiency, and allow DReps to focus on larger strategic treasury decisions.
The key requirement is that such a body remains transparent, accountable, and subject to clear rules, reporting, conflict-of-interest protections, and measurable outcomes.
- No14.9M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on governance action 4b7abfa70d98858750c50cd651d54c2955303b5410b34f40eb259f2fffc7c939#0.
First, I see no conflicts of interest in voting on this proposal. I am a voting member of the Builder DAO, but Sundae Labs has not and does not intend to receive any funds from the BuilderDAO.
I am supportive of the spirit of this proposal, and the vision and competence of the people operating the DAO.
However, this proposal currently fails for me on two counts:
- It fails to articulate clearly the material benefits the first two rounds achieved; it mentions being KPI driven, but forgoes the opportunity to outline what those KPIs bought the Cardano ecosystem, and how that has materially improved the adoption and success of Cardano
- In my time reviewing proposals, my estimation is that nearly all proposals were a fraction of how ambitious they needed to be to justify the funding. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were allocated towards increasing user counts by a few hundred.
At this time, I don't think more of the same is the most effective way to grow the Cardano ecosystem.
You can find a larger writeup justifying my vote here.
- No14.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes13.3M ₳Rationale
RCADA votes YES on Cardano Builder DAO.
This is a cautious YES.
RCADA supports this proposal because Cardano needs effective ways to fund builders who can create measurable ecosystem growth. The Cardano Builder DAO is attempting to provide a focused, smart contract-governed funding pathway for projects that can improve meaningful Cardano metrics such as monthly active users, monthly on-chain transactions, and total value locked.
RCADA views this as a useful evolution in Treasury funding. Not every valuable builder initiative will fit neatly into large direct Treasury withdrawals, and not every DRep has the time or specialist context to evaluate every early-stage builder proposal in depth. A builder-led mechanism, if well governed, can help identify credible teams, coordinate feedback, distribute funds transparently, and track outcomes across multiple projects.
The Builder DAO also has an existing track record. It has already completed funding rounds, coordinated builder participation, distributed capital across multiple proposals, tracked KPIs, improved its process over time, and returned unused ADA to the Cardano Treasury. That history gives this proposal more credibility than an untested funding vehicle.
RCADA also supports the proposal’s focus on measurable outcomes. Linking Treasury allocation to adoption, transactions, TVL, and other ecosystem KPIs is the right direction for Cardano. Treasury spending should increasingly demonstrate visible value, not only in terms of work completed, but in terms of real usage and long-term ecosystem growth.
RCADA recognises the value of the DAO’s member-governed structure. A funding mechanism where builders participate in review and voting can bring practical knowledge into allocation decisions, especially when paired with smart contract-based releases and public governance processes. However, that same structure creates responsibility. The DAO should maintain clear eligibility rules, transparent participation records where appropriate, strong conflict-of-interest disclosures, and recusal expectations so builder-led funding does not become insider-led funding.
RCADA also notes that some Builder DAO participants may be closely connected to other Treasury proposals or ecosystem funding requests. That is not automatically inappropriate, since active builders are often the people best positioned to evaluate ecosystem needs. However, it raises the importance of strong conflict-of-interest rules, public disclosures, voting transparency, and recusal procedures. Builder-led funding must be structured so that practical builder expertise improves allocation decisions without allowing insiders to favour themselves, close collaborators, or related projects.
That said, RCADA’s support is not unconditional. This proposal creates a funding layer that will influence which builders receive capital, and that carries governance responsibility. The DAO must maintain high standards around transparency, proposal review, milestone validation, KPI verification, and post-funding accountability.
RCADA is especially concerned that KPI-based funding must not become superficial metric chasing. Monthly active users, transactions, and TVL are useful indicators, but they can be incomplete or gamed if used without context. The DAO should continue improving its KPI methodology, increase use of verifiable on-chain data where possible, and explain how funded projects create durable value rather than short-term metric spikes.
On balance, RCADA believes this proposal meets the standard for support. The Builder DAO has shown enough operational proof to justify continued funding, and its focus on builders, measurable outcomes, and smart contract-governed allocation aligns with Cardano’s need for practical ecosystem growth.
RCADA votes YES while expecting the Cardano Builder DAO to hold itself to high standards of accountability, fairness, transparency, fiscal discipline, conflict-of-interest management, and measurable impact.
RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here:
https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/ - No12.1M ₳Rationale
While we recognize the Cardano Builder DAO's demonstrated governance experience, high participation rates, and previous distribution of treasury funds to ecosystem builders, we do not believe the current proposal provides sufficient evidence to justify a further ₳20 million allocation at this time.
Our primary concern is the lack of sufficiently quantified evidence demonstrating the measurable impact of the previous funding rounds. The proposal provides strong evidence of governance activity and funding distribution, but we require clearer project-level reporting on how previous allocations translated into additional users, transactions, TVL, sustainable products, revenue, or other verifiable ecosystem outcomes. Without this evidence, it is difficult to assess the actual return on treasury investment or determine whether the proposed scale of continued funding is justified.
We also have concerns regarding conflicts of interest. The DAO's members are themselves ecosystem builders and potential beneficiaries of the funding. Although governance safeguards are described, we require greater clarity on mandatory conflict disclosures, recusal requirements, voting restrictions involving direct competitors or related entities, and independent oversight of these processes. A builder-led funding mechanism must demonstrate that its decision-making cannot be materially influenced by the financial interests of its members.
The proposal also leaves important questions regarding the prevention of duplicate funding across the Cardano Treasury, Catalyst, other ecosystem funding programs, and private sources. Clear, independently verifiable mechanisms are needed to ensure that the same scope of work is not funded multiple times.
We further require greater clarity on KPI target-setting, attribution, and underperformance. It is not sufficient to measure ecosystem growth without establishing how targets are determined, how the impact of individual projects is assessed, and what consequences apply when funded projects fail to deliver their commitments.
Finally, the apparent discrepancy between the ₳20 million governance action and the ₳20.6 million budget presented in the supporting documentation requires clarification. The proposed administration and operating costs should also be justified in greater detail.
Our NO vote is therefore not a rejection of the Builder DAO model or of funding Cardano builders. Rather, it reflects the view that a further ₳20 million treasury commitment should be supported by stronger evidence of previous measurable impact, clearer conflict-of-interest controls, robust duplicate-funding safeguards, transparent KPI accountability, and a fully reconciled budget.
- No10.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes10.5M ₳Rationale
In order to bring more transactions on Cardano, it needs to support builders. Not enough has been invested into the biggest need in Cardano
- No8.7M ₳Rationale
本提案が目指す目的や、これまでのBuilder DAOの取り組みは評価しています。しかし、本提案で求められるTreasuryからの追加資金については、その必要性や費用対効果に十分な説得力があるとは判断できません。そのため、本提案には反対します。\n\nI vote No on this proposal. While I appreciate the goals of this proposal and the Builder DAO's work to date, I do not believe the requested additional Treasury funding is supported by sufficiently compelling justification regarding its necessity and cost-effectiveness.
- Abstain8.1M ₳No rationale
- NoRevoted7.4M ₳Rationale
Voting NO as it currently stands
I scored this proposal using my own public rulebook and scoring system: Cardano DRep Commercial Treasury Rule Book v11 – Intelligent Risk, Protected Infrastructure & Ecosystem Coordination Edition. The rulebook is still evolving, but it reflects how I assess commercial, hybrid, ecosystem-coordination, and strategic Treasury proposals.
I use AI assistance in this process because I want a scoring method that I can apply as neutrally and consistently as possible across the large number of proposals requesting funding. AI does not make the decision for me. It helps me structure the review, test the proposal against the same criteria, and spot issues I may otherwise miss. When a proposal is borderline, I look at it even more closely.
I would vote No / Revise and Resubmit. Cardano Builder DAO has delivered real work. It ran two funding rounds, funded 34 companies with roughly 11 million ADA, used smart-contract-governed treasury execution, improved its governance documents, and returned 354,790 ADA of unused funds after Round 2. The Cardano developer portal also lists Builder DAO as a smart-contract-governed funding path with KPI reporting expectations. But v11 sets a much higher bar for a very large repeat allocation, and says such proposals should need exceptional terms, strong treasury return, independent review, and very low upfront risk. This proposal asks the Treasury to fund another allocator, not to approve the final recipient projects directly. It gives Cardano public governance records, dashboards, reports, and possible KPI growth, but it does not give the Treasury repayment, revenue share, warrants, treasury-owned assets, matched capital, or enforceable upside from the commercial value created. v11 treats weak or unenforceable upside as a serious defect, especially where public money may fund private upside. The Code of Conduct also says a member’s vote on its own treasury withdrawal application is not treated as a conflict, which may fit the DAO’s internal design but still creates structural self-allocation risk for public funds. The milestones verify process more than retained ecosystem outcomes. The KPI system is improving, but the proposal still lacks strong causal attribution, hard anti-gaming rules, recipient-level DRep review, clawbacks, and a credible sustainability path after Treasury funding. Cardano’s Treasury is finite. At 20 million ADA, this is useful but not yet a good enough deal.
v11 scoring category Max Score Assessment Public value, additionality, ecosystem gap, and market timing 12 8 Real public value. Cardano needs mature-builder funding, and CB DAO targets MAU, transactions, and TVL. The weakness is additionality: the proposal does not prove that another 20M ADA indirect allocator is better than direct DRep review, open RFPs, milestone grants, or narrower funding pools. Team quality, traction, and adaptive execution 7 6 Strong delivery record. The DAO has run two rounds, coordinated builders, executed smart-contract-governed funding, improved governance, and moved KPI tracking toward on-chain data. Price versus value 6 2 The request is very large. The proposal gives some budget structure, but DReps do not see final recipient pricing, recipient-level value-for-money tests, or why 20M ADA is the right amount rather than a smaller staged renewal. Applicant integrity and past delivery 8 6 Prior delivery, public retrospectives, unused-fund return, KYC/KYB rules, and governance documentation are positive. Concerns remain around related-party service-provider roles, member self-voting, and the indirect allocation structure. Public asset, open-source, verifiability, and data rights 12 7 Public governance records, on-chain execution, KPI dashboards, and reports are useful. But the downstream commercial outputs are not guaranteed to become public assets, open infrastructure, reusable data rights, or forkable tools. This falls short of the v11 public-asset bar for a large hybrid proposal. Treasury upside, instrument fit, and risk sharing 14 4 This is the core failure. Unused funds may return, but funded companies keep most commercial upside. There is no binding repayment, revenue share, warrants, treasury-owned asset position, matched capital requirement, first-loss protection, or direct Cardano Treasury upside. Milestones, verification, and anti-gaming design 13 8 The milestones are staged and include third-party checks, public links, governance records, and dashboards. The weakness is that the largest tranches unlock through governance-process completion, not independently verified retained MAU, transaction growth, TVL growth, or non-gamed adoption outcomes. Risk management, margin of safety, and obsolescence resilience 12 6 Independent administration, multisig custody, separate accounts, abstain delegation, KYC/KYB, and smart-contract execution reduce risk. The proposal still lacks a full risk register, hard cancellation gates, clawbacks, recipient-level risk pricing, and a strong plan for KPI manipulation or failed downstream delivery. Sustainability and exit plan 8 4 The proposal says funded builders should become self-sustaining, but the DAO itself appears built around repeat Treasury cycles. There is no strong non-Treasury operating model for the allocator after this funding round. Strategic opportunity cost, competitive neutrality, and ecosystem coordination 8 5 The DAO has meaningful ecosystem coordination among active builders. Still, the Treasury would be delegating 20M ADA to a member-governed allocator where applicants can vote inside the system. That risks winner-picking and reduces direct DRep oversight. Base score 100 56 Useful and proven, but below the v11 support bar for a very large hybrid ecosystem-coordination proposal. Ecosystem Coordination Premium +5 +3 Awarded for real coordination among Cardano builders, public governance, and repeated participation. Not higher because the proposal lacks shared risk, direct Treasury upside, and stronger reusable public outputs. DRep Conviction Adjustment ±5 -4 Subtracted for scale, weak Treasury return, self-allocation risk, KPI attribution uncertainty, and repeat-funding dependency. Final assessment score 100 55 Lean No / Revise and Resubmit. Under v11, the proposal fails key support thresholds for treasury upside, public-asset strength, risk control, and sustainability. Minimum thresholds passed? No Treasury upside is below the v11 hybrid threshold. Risk management and sustainability are also below support level for a very large request. Automatic no or revise issue? Yes The main issues are weak enforceable Treasury return, public funds supporting private commercial upside, structural self-allocation risk, and insufficient independent outcome verification. Vote stance No / Revise and Resubmit A revised version should reduce the ask, expose final recipients before approval, add clawbacks, require independent KPI attribution, require anti-gaming covenants, and give Cardano enforceable upside or strong public-asset rights where funded companies retain commercial value. Earlier votes
No1mo agoSuperseded
I'm using a personal Cardano DRep Commercial Treasury Rule Book v6 that I have created to reflect some of my thinking in order to be able to better assess commercial and commercial/hybrid proposals - in a way that is aligned with my own general thinking. This framework may still evolve.
I am being assisted with AI in this process, as I want to create a process that I can relatively neutrally apply to the large number of proposals that are requesting funding.
The document is here:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fXaNY3L8oGWEGJmMubTKn7FnyhXCzOhiophXzFQFC_c/edit?usp=sharingCB DAO has operating history thanks to earlier Treasury funding. It says it already distributed ₳11.1M across 34 proposals in two rounds.
The proposal asks the treasury to fund a second grant process at large scale. The proposal shows process metrics, although outcome proof would be better. Votes happened. Funds moved. It does not definitely prove that funded projects produced net-new monthly active users, transactions, or durable TVL because of CB DAO funding - in a process that is worth the invested sum.
The conflict structure for me remains too weak. Builders vote on builders. CB DAO says builders review and vote on funding requests. That creates a recipient-allocator overlap. Returning unused funds is good stewardship, but it is not upside.
CATEGORY / SCORE / REASON:
Public value, additionality, ecosystem gap 8 / 13 [Weak proof that this beats direct treasury funding]
Business quality and traction 4 / 6 [Real DAO operations. Weak proof of funded-project ROI.]
Price versus value 4 / 7 [No benchmark proving ₳20M is the right size.]
Applicant integrity and past delivery 7 / 8 [Prior delivery, unused fund return, KYC/KYB, and public records help.]
Public asset, open-source, data rights 4 / 12 [Dashboards and on-chain records help. Recipient-level public asset obligations remain weak.]
Treasury upside, instrument fit, risk sharing 3/15 [Unused-fund return is not upside. No risk-sharing instrument.]
Milestones, verification, anti-gaming 8/13 [Better milestones and third-party assurance. Still focused on process, not post-grant impact.]
Risk management, margin of safety 6/12 [Smart contracts, staged milestones, KYC/KYB, and duplicate-funding rules help. Treasury remains first-loss capital.]
Sustainability and exit 4 / 9 [Repeat treasury dependency remains likely.]
Opportunity cost and neutrality 2/5 [Broad builder funding is more neutral than single-project funding, but still favors insiders and DAO members.]
Base score: 50 / 100
Conviction adjustment: -5
Final score: 45 / 100 - No7.2M ₳No rationale