DeltaDeFi: Hydra Trading Infrastructure Budget (₳1,500,000)
163 DReps voted · 67 with a rationale · 3 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- No891.3K ₳No rationale
- No881.2K ₳No rationale
- No861.5K ₳No rationale
- No825.2K ₳Rationale
We see this as a private initiative for private profit. Not to be funded by the treasury.
- No794.5K ₳Rationale
- Favor the team, know they can execute, a Hydra-based order book Defi trading platform would be awesome.
- I'm leery of ad-hoc Treasury withdrawals outside the core budgeting framework. I want to be very careful what we spend on, and ensure that the ecosystem benefits in a manner fair to all players.
- The scope of this budget, the track record of the team, and prior history leads me to believe Catalyst is a better platform for sourcing this funding.
- I'm more in favor of 'exceptions' to my evaluation framework when there is some payback or income mechanism that feeds back to the Treasury. And, in such a proposal, I'd want to see some detailed plans that give confidence to realizing that positive feedback (e.g. plans that facilitate attraction of liquidity / users to platform, estimated platform income, etc).
- Yes759K ₳No rationale
- Abstain717.5K ₳No rationale
- No705.1K ₳No rationale
- Abstain625.9K ₳Rationale
I'm abstaining on this Budget Info Action because it has been rendered procedurally obsolete by the recent enactment of Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4. Under the previous constitution, Budget Info Actions were mandatory prerequisites for Treasury Withdrawal proposals, a two-step governance process requiring DReps to first approve strategic budget frameworks before funds could be withdrawn. Constitution v2.4 eliminated this requirement entirely, collapsing treasury governance into single-step Treasury Withdrawal Actions that no longer reference or depend on prior Budget Info Actions.
This proposal was submitted under the old constitutional framework and represents genuine effort from the DeltaDeFi team, who invested time, resources, and the 100,000 ADA deposit to craft a detailed budget justification. That work is not in question. The problem is purely procedural: approving this Budget Info Action now serves no constitutional function. A subsequent Treasury Withdrawal Action can proceed directly to DRep vote without requiring this Info Action as a prerequisite, making this governance action redundant regardless of its merit.
This situation illustrates the collateral damage of enacting constitutional changes while proposals are in flight. DeltaDeFi submitted under rules that were active at the time but were superseded mid-process. The proposers are victims of governance timing, not governance failure. An abstain vote acknowledges this procedural reality without endorsing or rejecting the underlying budget request, which should be evaluated on its merits when submitted as a Treasury Withdrawal Action under the current constitutional framework. - No605.7K ₳Rationale
📛 OFFICIAL DRep POSITION: I VOTE NO
🧱 As a DRep on Cardano, I vote AGAINST the DeltaDeFi Info Action requesting ₳1,500,000.
❌ Why:
— We already have enough DEX platforms.
— There is no urgent trading infrastructure problem.
— This is not a breakthrough — just another order-book with fancy KPIs.
— Now is not the time to spend Treasury funds on this.📉 Liquidity doesn’t come from more exchanges.
🔍 Cardano needs real user demand — not another frontend.🛑 I vote NO. I do not support spending Treasury funds on duplicate infrastructure.
🖤 My DRep ID: ➡️ drep1y269ehxj30k4vfzfc2z84v0xykd3amuy2xn0kv9zf8rhcec2fg2jr
🔗 Details: https://t.me/PROCENT666/338#Cardano #Governance #DRep #Treasury #DeltaDeFi #мысляотэдгара
- No590.5K ₳No rationale
- No533.9K ₳Rationale
The Pentad will help for the top 15 or 20 Dapps , possibly more, and DeltaDefi should be included. This is why I voted No, waiting a little longer for the Pentad.
- No466.2K ₳No rationale
- No442.9K ₳No rationale
- Abstain385.2K ₳Rationale
Abstain so Krypto Labs is not an inactive DRep
Happy new year - Yes383K ₳No rationale
- Yes381.1K ₳No rationale
- No320.4K ₳Rationale
Unfortunately Panda vote NO. Panda thinks Hydra is awesome but tricky. Panda wants more info on
- who runs the nodes?
- whats the damage if the nodes go down?
- is there a path for community members (open) to run nodes?
- what's the trade off to obtain low fees and fast trading with your solution?
- what are the risks?
Panda wants more info/assurances on the aspects of reliability, availability, censor resistance, users risks, and more.
What does the road ahead look like? Is there a path to improve on these aspects? - No314.4K ₳Rationale
I'm voting NO on this Budget Info Action for DeltaDeFi.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I love what DeltaDeFi is building—a Hydra-based, low-latency order-book exchange is exactly what Cardano needs, hands down! I'm 100% behind this team and their vision. But here's why I'm voting no:
This feels like a Catalyst proposal, not a Budget Info Action. The budget process should fund neutral, generic infrastructure—not commercial projects from specific companies.
For 2025, we've already hit what I'd consider the max reasonable spend. I'm reluctant for more spending right now (though not an absolute red line—if something's truly critical, I'd support it).
Most importantly: Funding one DEX distorts competition. We're essentially picking winners at the protocol level. What about other DEXes? DeltaDeFi gets an unfair advantage over competitors, and this isn't VC funding—it's treasury money.
I'd love to see DeltaDeFi succeed and get properly funded. But doing it through a governance Info Action at this time isn't the right way. Let's keep the budget for truly neutral infrastructure.
- No300.6K ₳No rationale
- No298.9K ₳Rationale
I was convinced to vote against this proposal by Jaromir Tesar in this post: https://x.com/JaromirTesar/status/2008124514148798841
Specifically this paragraph:
However, giving a single DEX team more than 2M ADA to develop without demonstrable results is too much in my opinion. At this stage, I would prefer the team to focus on attracting users and liquidity with what already exists (MVP), rather than requesting a large new budget to continue building.I don't see the demand for this product. Our blockspace is rarely full and DeltaDefi does not have a large number of users. The proposal is interesting and I hope they are successful, but this is not a priority at this time.
Deciding what not to do is as important as deciding what to do. - Steve Jobs
Signed,
William Doyle - No294.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes271.8K ₳No rationale
- No261K ₳Rationale
Governance Action Report (EN)
1. Introduction
This Budget Info Action asks dReps and the Cardano community to signal support for a ₳1,500,000, 6-month budget to harden and scale DeltaDeFi, a Hydra-based, low-latency order-book exchange intended to provide a “CEX-grade” trading venue for ADA and Cardano native tokens (CNTs). The budget targets three tracks:
- Hardening the existing beta Hydra spot DEX into a production-grade venue (security reviews/audits, risk controls, monitoring/incident response, API stability, and a public status page)
- Scaling Hydra/indexing infrastructure and integrations so DeltaDeFi can be used as ecosystem infrastructure
- Delivering a Vision 2030 KPI Measurement Programme consisting of a baseline report, a public KPI dashboard, and a final 6-month progress report
The split is 80% for trading infrastructure and 20% for the KPI programme, plus ₳100,000 for administration and independent audit.
Funds are proposed to be released in three phases (start, month 3, month 6) and administered via a 4-of-6 multisig under a proposed DeltaDeFi Administration Committee, with a stated fund return policy if the project is stopped.
No treasury withdrawal is executed by this action; it only signals whether this budget direction is desirable in principle.
2. Governance Action Analysis
Scope of what is being assessed
The proposal positions DeltaDeFi as a trading “venue” delivering a “CEX-grade” experience (low latency, fast execution, order book) using Hydra for throughput/latency, plus a data/dashboard layer to measure market quality.
The request is large (₳1.5M) and the text attempts to anchor part of its framing and KPIs to Cardano Vision 2030 (still under vote/refinement).
The institutional focus of this review is:
- Use-case coherence
- Centralization risk
- Treasury justification
- KPI adequacy/ambition
- Budget transparency
- Evidence of demand and liquidity
- Track record
Upsides
A plausible Hydra use case
Low-latency and high-frequency trading applications are among cases where Hydra can be a natural fit: L2 absorbs fast operations (orders/cancellations/market data), while L1 acts as the settlement and security layer.
The L2 throughput KPI (order-of-magnitude L2 transactions) can serve as a practical demonstration of a Hydra use case in production, provided the metric is well-defined and resistant to “inflating numbers”.
Execution capacity and public, verifiable evidence (track record)
Two prior proposals related to DeltaDeFi (Catalyst, total ~₳500k) were identified as completed with publicly verifiable evidence:
- A functional MVP/testnet and open-source repositories (smart contracts/scripts and backend)
- Open-source SDKs in multiple languages with demos, plus a Python trading bot with a public session
This reduces “non-delivery” risk within the specific DeltaDeFi scope and reinforces engineering capability, documentation quality, and the ability to publish public artifacts.
Additionally, the team (SIDAN Lab) has a broader history of participation in Catalyst and ecosystem initiatives, with other deliveries and contributions beyond the two proposals directly tied to DeltaDeFi.
Tooling reputation (Mesh and documentation standards)
The team has a strong technical reputation in the ecosystem, including relevant contributions in developer tooling (e.g., Mesh), with a history of delivery and documentation.
This track record is an institutional strength: it increases confidence in implementation quality and the ability to produce reusable documentation and repositories.
An attempt at “observable DeFi” via baselines/dashboards
The proposal attempts to tie execution to market quality metrics (spread, slippage, CEX gap, etc.) and promises baselines/dashboards/reports.
Even if the product does not become a market leader, a public standard to measure “market quality” could benefit the ecosystem, as long as the methodology is clear, auditable, and reusable.
Negative aspects
“CEX-grade venue” is a strong claim, but under-specified
“CEX-grade” implies strict operational requirements (observability, resilience, failover, SLOs, incident response, operational security, API stability, market data integrity).
The text uses the term as framing, but no explicit set of requirements/acceptance criteria was observed defining what “CEX-grade” means in operational metrics.
Without a definition, the term risks becoming aspirational marketing rather than a verifiable target.
Technical architecture and “feature scope” are insufficiently described
Even though a Catalyst-funded testnet already exists, this is a new, treasury-scale proposal. The proposal does not provide sufficient technical detail on:
- Which concrete features will be implemented (real increments vs generic “hardening”)
- The platform design in this new phase (matching, data infrastructure, indexers, Hydra integration)
- The operating model and technical governance in production
This matters because risk assessment (centralization, security, replicability, community participation) depends on design.
Without a clear technical scope, the proposal asks for trust where it should provide specification and evidence.
Minimum expectation: a technical appendix (or set of appendices) covering architecture, components, interfaces, and user-facing trust implications.
KPIs are insufficient to justify the scale of the investment
Targets for TVL, active traders, monthly volume, and revenue appear low relative to the ₳1.5M request, with a risk of delivering a “functional pilot” that later becomes a precedent for a larger follow-up request.
There is also the historical context: after years of funding DeFi-related proposals by multiple teams and contributors with resources from the treasury, mainly through Project Catalyst, the standard should be raised and recurring subsidies should not be extended indefinitely for products that should become financially sustainable and profitable without requiring repeated returns to Catalyst.
Under this context, “signs of life” are no longer an adequate KPI for large checks. The bar should be impact and sustainability, not mere functionality.
Metrics such as “protocol revenue” (e.g., 10k ADA/year) were interpreted as particularly weak to justify the allocation, even considering externalities.
Positive externalities are plausible but not operationalized
Possible arguments include: improved price discovery, lower slippage, reduced friction for broader DeFi, market-quality benchmarking, reduced reliance on CEX as a price source.
However, these effects were not translated into convincing, measurable KPIs (e.g., on-chain market share, share of volume on strategic pairs, spread/depth targets, integration targets with aggregators/routers, presence targets in relevant execution flows).
Without operationalization, externalities become difficult to audit.
Using Cardano Vision 2030 as an anchor before ratification/refinement
The proposal references Vision 2030, but the document is still under vote and its KPIs are explicitly subject to refinement.
This is seen as institutional premature anchoring: it creates an alignment framing without ensuring adherence to final KPIs that may be formalized/refined later.
Aligning with the roadmap is conceptually positive. The issue is using a “moving document” as a rhetorical pillar to justify treasury allocation without revisitable commitments.
Risks and concerns
Conceptual tension: “DEX” vs potentially centralized architecture
A relevant conceptual critique applies: an order-book model with off-chain matching (potentially operated by infrastructure controlled by a single operator) can exhibit centralized characteristics, even if custody remains non-custodial.
This creates semantic misalignment risk: self-identifying as a DEX while core elements (matching/data infrastructure) may function as centralized services.
For an ecosystem that values decentralization, the proposal should be more explicit:
- Which components are permissionless
- Which are operated by the team
- Which are replicable by third parties
- What the progressive decentralization path is
Trust model / Hydra topology / user risk are poorly explained
Even for an L2 trading product, the trust model must be explicit:
- Who runs the Hydra Head?
- Must users be head participants, or are they “clients” of operators?
- What are the failure modes (operator offline, partial collusion, network partition)?
- Is there unilateral exit to L1 if the operator goes down?
Without this, the proposal leaves a gray zone where the user may be in a system that should be trust-minimized but becomes trust-shifted.
Decentralization and community participation as a counterbalance to centralization
Across several Cardano DEX designs, centralization is sometimes mitigated via infrastructure operated by third parties (e.g., SPOs acting as batchers/relayers/operators, depending on the design).
Here, it is unclear whether an analogous mechanism exists or whether there is any auditable path to broaden participation and reduce operational concentration. Without that, the system risks reinforcing a central bottleneck.
Structural dependency on liquidity and market makers: insufficient evidence
The proposal suggests improving market quality and attracting professional traders, but no robust evidence was observed of:
- Structured interviews/research with market makers
- LOIs/pilots/commitments (even non-binding)
- A clear diagnosis of MM blockers on Cardano (stablecoin rails, settlement risk, infra, operational compliance, etc.)
- A concrete liquidity bootstrapping strategy that does not rely on ongoing treasury funding
This is critical because a “CEX-grade venue” without liquidity becomes a “well-built but empty product”, and Cardano DeFi history already shows a risk of chronic treasury dependence.
Throughput analysis: unclear math and unit definition (risk of “inflating the KPI”)
A throughput section was identified that mixes:
- A “theoretical L1 tx/month ceiling” (derived from TPS)
- A “gap” to reach a target (3x)
- The “contribution” of an L2 transactions KPI as a percentage of that gap
Problems:
- The “gap” (e.g., 18M) is not transparently derived
- Assumptions and rounding are not stated
- There may be a unit mismatch: L1 throughput is used to give weight to L2 transactions, which only makes sense if the KPI formally considers “L1+L2 activity”, not only L1
Without a clear methodology, the section reads as quantitative narrative rather than evidence.
Transparency and accountability failures
Budget: insufficient granularity for any treasury standard
Even with a macro split (Hydra/trading infra; baseline+dashboard; admin+audit), the proposal lacks minimal breakdown:
- Headcount by function and time allocation
- Cost/rate assumptions
- Monthly burn rate
- Infrastructure/observability costs (cloud, indexers, storage, data)
- Independent audit scope and cost (what is audited, by whom, criteria)
- Contingency and risks
This prevents proportionality evaluation and overlap identification with previously funded work.
KPI Measurement Program / dashboards: high cost and potential redundancy with ecosystem solutions
Allocating ~20% of the budget to dashboards is difficult to justify given analytics solutions already being developed/adopted in the ecosystem (e.g., Dune and related tooling), which can produce many of the metrics (TVL, volume, MAU, transactions) with lower marginal cost and public reusability.
If additional analytics are needed, a neutral, ecosystem-wide initiative would be more appropriate than embedding a large dashboards line into a single venue’s budget.
Responsibility mapping and technical workstreams
Without a breakdown, it is unclear whether critical areas (SRE/ops, security, data infra, indexing, matching engine, etc.) have sufficient capacity. Therefore, it is not possible to judge whether “CEX-grade” is achievable within the proposed time and budget.
Evidence and annexes are incomplete for the requested amount
Even with the track record identified, the GA does not appear to have fully attached/referenced:
- Links and IDs for prior proposals
- Consolidated evidence of what was delivered
- A structured “already paid vs new ask” diff
- Organized learnings and technical gaps
For ₳1.5M, the evidence package should be substantially stronger.
Institutional considerations on the Treasury
Public goods vs subsidizing private commercial models
The treasury should prioritize public goods, open source, and common infrastructure, avoiding recurring funding of profit-oriented private businesses without clear terms.
Subsidy can be justified as a strategic initial contribution, but not as chronic dependence.
Lack of clear policy and “narratives to legitimize withdrawals”
The lack of shared policy encourages proposals to fit narratives (e.g., Vision 2030) to legitimize large withdrawals. The larger the check, the higher the accountability requirements should be:
- Ambitious KPIs
- Granular budgets
- Demand evidence
- Technical transparency
What is “Unknown” and must be explicitly marked
- Evidence of real demand from market makers and professional traders via API (method, LOIs, pilots)
- A concrete liquidity bootstrapping plan without chronic treasury dependence
- Operational definition of “CEX-grade” (SLOs, uptime, incident response, status page)
- Rigorous methodology for market-quality KPIs (baseline, attribution, verification, auditability)
- Formal methodology for throughput analysis (gap, assumptions, L1 vs L2 unit)
- Budget breakdown and team allocation by workstream
- Progressive decentralization plan and community participation (what is centralized today and how it evolves)
- Technical scope of this new phase: new features and architectural changes vs generic “hardening”
Objective questions and requirements for the proposer
- Full budget pack: headcount/rates/monthly burn/infra/audit scope/contingency
- “Delivered vs new” map: what was funded in Catalyst vs what is requested now and why
- “CEX-grade” definition: measurable SLOs and acceptance criteria (p95 latency, uptime, error budgets, failover, incident playbooks)
- Liquidity/MM: structured evidence, blockers, and commitment signals (or acquisition plan)
- KPI revisions: targets calibrated to the amount, including market quality (spread/depth/slippage), relative adoption (on-chain market share), and sustainability
- Throughput methodology: fix units, derive the gap transparently, and add anti-inflation criteria for L2 transactions
- Technical architecture: appendices with design and user-facing trust implications
- Decentralization: clarify what is permissionless/replicable by third parties and whether there is a participation mechanism (e.g., external operators) to counterbalance centralization
3. Vote and Rationale
Vote: NO
There is technical merit and real delivery track record: the team ships artifacts and demonstrates engineering capability. The Hydra trading use case is plausible and could serve as a production proof point.
However, the current package fails basic requirements to justify treasury-scale support: low-impact KPIs, insufficient budget detail, weak demand and liquidity evidence, and missing technical detail needed to assess centralization, trust model, and community participation. The dashboards/KPI measurement line also appears expensive and potentially redundant.
Alignment with Vision 2030 is conceptually positive but institutionally weak due to reliance on a moving document and refinable KPIs, which can function as rhetorical framing without revisitable commitments.
4. Conclusion
Technical merit and delivery capability are present, and the Hydra trading use case is plausible as a production proof point. Treasury-scale support is not justified under the current package due to low-impact KPIs, insufficient budget granularity, weak liquidity/market-maker demand evidence, and missing technical detail needed to evaluate centralization and the trust model.
Relatório de Ação de Governança (PT-BR)
1. Introdução
Esta Budget Info Action solicita que dReps e a comunidade Cardano sinalizem apoio a um orçamento de ₳1.500.000 por 6 meses para reforçar e escalar a DeltaDeFi, uma exchange de livro de ordens baseada em Hydra, de baixa latência, destinada a oferecer um “venue” de negociação com padrão “CEX-grade” para ADA e ativos nativos da Cardano (CNTs). O orçamento mira três frentes:
- Endurecimento da Hydra spot DEX atualmente em beta para um nível de produção (revisões/auditorias de segurança, controles de risco, monitoramento/resposta a incidentes, estabilidade de API e uma página pública de status)
- Escalonamento de infraestrutura de Hydra/indexação e integrações para que a DeltaDeFi possa ser usada como infraestrutura do ecossistema
- Entrega de um Programa de Mensuração de KPIs da Visão 2030 composto por um relatório de baseline, um dashboard público de KPIs e um relatório final de progresso ao fim de 6 meses
A divisão proposta é 80% para infraestrutura de trading e 20% para o programa de KPIs, além de ₳100.000 para administração e auditoria independente.
Os fundos são propostos para liberação em três fases (início, mês 3, mês 6) e administração via multisig 4-de-6 sob um Comitê de Administração da DeltaDeFi proposto, com uma política declarada de devolução de fundos caso o projeto seja interrompido.
Nenhum saque do tesouro é executado por esta ação; ela apenas sinaliza se essa direção orçamentária é desejável em princípio.
2. Análise da Ação de Governança
Escopo do que está sendo avaliado
A proposta posiciona a DeltaDeFi como um “venue” de negociação entregando uma experiência “CEX-grade” (baixa latência, execução rápida, livro de ordens) usando Hydra para throughput/latência, além de uma camada de dados/dashboard para mensurar qualidade de mercado.
O pedido é grande (₳1,5M) e o texto tenta ancorar parte do seu framing e KPIs à Visão 2030 da Cardano (ainda em votação/refinamento).
O foco institucional desta revisão é:
- Coerência do caso de uso
- Risco de centralização
- Justificativa de tesouro
- Adequação/ambição de KPIs
- Transparência orçamentária
- Evidência de demanda e liquidez
- Histórico de entregas
Pontos favoráveis
Um caso de uso plausível para Hydra
Aplicações de trading de baixa latência e alta frequência estão entre os casos em que Hydra pode ser um encaixe natural: a L2 absorve operações rápidas (ordens/cancelamentos/dados de mercado), enquanto a L1 atua como camada de liquidação e segurança.
O KPI de throughput em L2 (ordem de grandeza de transações em L2) pode servir como uma demonstração prática de um caso de uso de Hydra em produção, desde que a métrica seja bem definida e resistente a “inflar números”.
Capacidade de execução e evidências públicas e verificáveis (histórico)
Duas propostas anteriores relacionadas à DeltaDeFi (Catalyst, total ~₳500k) foram identificadas como concluídas com evidência publicamente verificável:
- Um MVP/testnet funcional e repositórios open source (contratos/scripts e backend)
- SDKs open source em múltiplas linguagens com demos, além de um bot de trading em Python com uma sessão pública
Isso reduz o risco de “não entrega” dentro do escopo específico da DeltaDeFi e reforça capacidade de engenharia, qualidade de documentação e habilidade de publicar artefatos públicos.
Além disso, a equipe (SIDAN Lab) tem histórico mais amplo de participação no Catalyst e em iniciativas do ecossistema, com outras entregas e contribuições além das duas propostas diretamente ligadas à DeltaDeFi.
Reputação em tooling (Mesh e padrões de documentação)
A equipe tem forte reputação técnica no ecossistema, incluindo contribuições relevantes em tooling para desenvolvedores (ex.: Mesh)
- Abstain260.2K ₳Rationale
While the proposal is strategically aligned with Vision 2030 and addresses a real infrastructure gap, there remain material execution risks around liquidity attraction, Hydra production readiness, and the sustainability of measured KPIs. I therefore abstain at this stage, with conditional support for a future proposal that demonstrates proven market demand, external validation of metrics, and reduced delivery risk.
- No245.5K ₳No rationale
- No238.8K ₳Rationale
While the DeltaDeFi team is competent and Hydra development is valuable for Cardano, the treasury should not subsidize operational costs or scaling for a single commercial DEX at this scale, especially amid ongoing treasury depletion, low inflows, and ADA price pressures. Direct funding risks picking winners in a competitive market (e.g., vs. Minswap) and lacks clear strategies for attracting liquidity/users/market makers, which are outside the team's control. Projects like this should pursue Project Catalyst, private loans or even treasury loans (as seen with SNEK). Reserve treasury resources for neutral public goods, protocol-level infrastructure, and critical ecosystem needs. Let's prioritize fiscal discipline now to protect long-term sustainability.
- Yes232.7K ₳No rationale
- Yes217.4K ₳Rationale
Good stuff
- No215.5K ₳No rationale
- No191.1K ₳No rationale
- No182.2K ₳No rationale
- No178.9K ₳No rationale
- Abstain138.4K ₳No rationale
- No137.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes131.9K ₳No rationale
- No126.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes110.9K ₳No rationale
- No108.3K ₳Rationale
I am not in favor of this proposal. While I appreciate the value that a group like DeltaDeFi brings to the ecosystem, I do not agree with using the treasury as an accelerator fund for private projects. Although the proposal is written in a way to highlight the benefits to the ecosystem, it is still in essence funding a private project, not public infrastructure. I could be persuaded to change my mind under certain conditions. There would need to be a focus on a set of protocols being built that would be tailored to solve a general problem instead of a use case of one project. A case would then need to be made that these protocols could solve other issues for the wider ecosystem and be made open source. There would also need to be a very clear return on investment, which I don't see as being obvious in this case. Therefore, in its current format, I cannot support this initiative.
- Yes103.1K ₳No rationale
- No94.9K ₳No rationale
- No71.3K ₳No rationale
- No64.4K ₳No rationale
- Yes55.9K ₳Rationale
this would actually be more fitting to catalyst. Im not a fan of this, as its yet another project trying to bite into the defi cake, but vote yes either way, as its a nice proposal, grass roots approach and 1.5m isnt outrageous. They should get one attempt at this.
- No50.5K ₳No rationale
- Abstain49.6K ₳Rationale
With the highest of regard and admiration I truly do endorse The talented team from SIDAN LABS. But I will have to for now abstain from voting on this particular proposal due to lack of research on my part in regards to the Hydra trading infrastructure implementation to include its benefits, also with the current hold on the Cardano 2030 vision mission strategy framework and kpis proposal due to it not passing its previous vote I am interested in knowing how that will affect the Delta DeFi budget request. I do look forward to seeing more from this team. They are tenured members in the community; they are consistent developers and part of the future of the blockchain.
LourdeOuroborus Imperator Aeternalis - No48.6K ₳Rationale
No. We already have enough of them
- No46.5K ₳Rationale
No, this is just a demo and do not have concrete example on the Defi with risk emerged. The team also secured rounds of other fundings on Cardano Catalsyt
- No45.8K ₳Rationale
Wistkey Lab appreciates the DeltaDeFi team’s technical work and exploration of Hydra. However, we do not support this proposal for Treasury funding. The Cardano Treasury should prioritize neutral, ecosystem-wide public infrastructure, not subsidize individual, privately operated DEX products competing in an open market. Core DEX activities—such as market making, API development, operational scaling, and ongoing maintenance—are commercial responsibilities that should be funded by the team through product revenue, venture capital, or Project Catalyst, rather than the Treasury.
Liquidity is the most critical success factor in DeFi, yet the proposal does not provide a concrete or credible strategy for sourcing and sustaining liquidity (e.g., initial providers, incentives, or market-maker commitments). Without this analysis, funding a business-driven proposal carries high risk and uncertain ecosystem impact. We believe this initiative is better suited for Catalyst or VC funding, where commercial viability can be properly evaluated and external investment can bring broader benefits to Cardano. For these reasons, Wistkey Lab DRep votes NO. - No45.2K ₳No rationale