Cardano Treasury DeFi Liquidity Budget
153 DReps voted · 44 with a rationale · 1 changed their vote · 1 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 1 to no, together voting with 63.2M ₳ of voting power.
- No3.1M ₳No rationale
- No3M ₳Rationale
I don't think providing liquidity to DeFi operations should be funded from treasury ADA. DeFi operations have to be self-sustaining as they are completely a commercial product with the intent of making money from ADA holders.
- Yes2.8M ₳No rationale
- No2.7M ₳Rationale
Data Not Verifiable. Additionally only a link is given about the details of an action, no information is given where appropriate, irrespective of content of the action we should not set president with this type of submission format.
- No2.7M ₳No rationale
- No2.7M ₳No rationale
- No2.6M ₳No rationale
- No2.5M ₳Rationale
This has no chance of passing in current form sadly. Let's figure it out!
- No2.3M ₳No rationale
- No2.3M ₳No rationale
- No2.2M ₳No rationale
- No2.2M ₳No rationale
- No1.9M ₳No rationale
- No1.8M ₳Rationale
While I support the growth of DeFi on Cardano, I believe treasury funds should not be used to artificially bootstrap liquidity. Sustainable liquidity comes from real demand, utility, and user participation.
Cardano’s ecosystem is still evolving. As DeFi protocols mature and Bitcoin integration expands, I expect liquidity to increase naturally without the need for short-term subsidies.
- No1.7M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.6M ₳No rationale
- No1.6M ₳No rationale
- No1.3M ₳No rationale
- No1.3M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on this proposal.
While I am fundamentally supportive of the objective — increasing DeFi liquidity on Cardano — there are procedural and substantive concerns that warrant a negative vote.
First, there is a clear and definitive violation of Article III, Section 5 of the Cardano Constitution. The on-chain hash does not match the off-chain governance content. Procedural compliance is critical for maintaining the legitimacy and enforceability of governance outcomes. Allowing proposals that fail such basic checks would weaken trust in the system we are collectively building. Some might argue, that this is the CCs Job, but I won't vote yes for what I believe is unconstitutional to begin with.
Beyond the procedural issues, although I support the concept of using treasury funds to catalyze DeFi liquidity, I believe the scale of the request — 50 million ADA — is too large for an initial deployment. A pilot-sized deployment would provide a valuable proof-of-concept. I understand going too low might not make any impact at all, so I hope there are some reductions to be made and for the project to validate its concept.
I appreciate the design of the proposal’s governance structure. Creating a dedicated committee to manage funds is a positive step toward more specialized and efficient decision-making. I think this is the way to go in my personal opinion. The idea aligns with a concept of a “DAO of DAOs” — potentially enabling individuals to directly propose initiatives within specific governance domains. This is a governance evolution Cardano needs to foster for greater agility and effectiveness.
It appears likely that the proposers will resubmit after correcting the formatting and hash issues. I encourage this and would welcome a revised proposal that maintains the strong core ideas while addressing procedural compliance and adjusting the initial scope to a more conservative pilot phase.
VOTE0010
- No1.2M ₳Rationale
I'm voting NO because the plan asks the treasury to sink 50 million ADA into fiat-backed stablecoins without even specifying which ones.
Today Cardano's native stablecoin market is tiny—about $23 million total and almost all USD-pegged tokens.
Backing only dollar coins would tether our ecosystem to U.S. monetary policy and concentrate regulatory risk,
while monthly conversions of ADA to fiat could still pressure the price.
The scheme returns just 15 % of the yield to the treasury and puts principal at the mercy of smart-contract exploits or a stablecoin de-peg.
A small, fully on-chain pilot—say 5-10 million ADA,
multi-currency, milestone-gated, with instant claw-backs—could test the "sovereign-wealth" idea safely.
Until such a scoped proposal appears, the prudent move is to preserve treasury funds and let open-market demand grow stablecoin liquidity organically. - No1.2M ₳No rationale
- No1.2M ₳No rationale
- No1.2M ₳Rationale
I vote NO because:
The full content of the proposal is not clearly displayed on GovTool, making it difficult to evaluate transparently and thoroughly.
Approving the current version could lead to conflicts or duplication if the proposer later submits an updated version.
*I am open to reconsidering my vote once a complete and clearly presented version is resubmitted through the proper process.
Vietnamese Translation
Tôi bỏ phiếu NO vì:
Nội dung đầy đủ của đề xuất hiện không được hiển thị rõ ràng trên GovTool, gây khó khăn trong việc đánh giá minh bạch và toàn diện.
Việc thông qua bản hiện tại có thể dẫn đến xung đột hoặc trùng lặp khi bản mới được người đề xuất đệ trình sau đó (nếu có)
*Tôi sẵn sàng xem xét lại khi bản đề xuất được cập nhật đầy đủ, rõ ràng và nộp lại đúng quy trình.
Japanese Translation
私はNOに投票します。その理由は以下の通りです：
現在、この提案の完全な内容がGovTool上で明確に表示されておらず、透明性と網羅性のある評価が困難です。
提案者が後に更新版を提出した場合、現行バージョンを承認すると重複や矛盾が生じる可能性があります。
※ 提案が完全かつ明確に整理され、正式な手続きに従って再提出された場合には、再検討する意思があります。
- Abstain1.2M ₳No rationale
- No1.2M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.1M ₳No rationale
- No1.1M ₳Rationale
While the ambition to increase stablecoin liquidity on Cardano is understandable, I must express strong reservations about this proposal on several strategic and operational grounds.
First, the requested budget of 50 million ADA—3.33% of the treasury—is disproportionate given the current state of DeFi on Cardano and the broader crypto landscape. The history of DeFi projects is replete with failures, rug pulls, and speculative memecoins that have eroded trust and capital. Allocating such a significant portion of our treasury to seeding liquidity in this volatile space risks misappropriation of community resources without guaranteed returns or meaningful ecosystem advancement.
Second, the proposal’s governance and remuneration structure raises concerns. A seven-person committee compensated at $2,000 per month each—totaling $168,000 annually—may appear modest but, combined with liquidity deployment, creates a complex fund management scenario that lacks clear, measurable value-add beyond liquidity provision. The committee’s passive management approach, while cost-conscious, does not sufficiently address the dynamic risks of DeFi protocols or provide robust mechanisms for accountability beyond monthly reporting and community feedback channels, which are inherently reactive rather than proactive.
Third, the assumption that stablecoin liquidity alone will catalyze sustainable growth underestimates the multifaceted nature of Cardano’s ecosystem development. True long-term value emerges from innovation in protocol improvements, Layer 2 scaling solutions like Hydra, and fostering real-world use cases that leverage Cardano’s unique UTxO model—not merely from liquidity injections into DeFi protocols that may not survive market cycles or regulatory scrutiny.
Furthermore, the proposal’s risk mitigation strategy—minimizing ADA price impact via staggered monthly purchases and holding up to 35% in ADA—while prudent, does not fully address systemic risks such as stablecoin issuer solvency, regulatory clampdowns, or smart contract vulnerabilities inherent in nascent DeFi projects.
Given Cardano’s fixed supply and disinflationary emission schedule, our treasury must be stewarded with a long-term, business-minded approach that prioritizes stability, scientific rigor, and strategic innovation. Deploying a large portion of funds into speculative liquidity pools without clear evidence of sustainable ecosystem benefits contradicts these principles.
I firmly believe that Cardano’s future lies in leveraging its unique technological strengths—not in chasing short-term DeFi yields that mirror the pitfalls seen elsewhere. We must focus on empowering projects that build foundational infrastructure, enhance scalability, and foster genuine adoption.
Therefore, I vote No on this proposal. Our treasury deserves a more disciplined, visionary, and risk-aware allocation strategy that secures Cardano’s position as the most decentralized, scientifically grounded, and scalable blockchain network for the decades ahead.
I stand ready to collaborate on proposals that reflect these values and safeguard our shared vision.
- Abstain969.9K ₳No rationale
- No951.2K ₳No rationale
- No929.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes927.7K ₳No rationale
- No884.5K ₳No rationale
- No829.9K ₳Rationale
An Issue has been identified with the hash of this proposal. The submitter has expressed his intention of resubmitting therefore we are voting NO to avoid any potential duplicity with the resubmitted proposal.
- No796.1K ₳Rationale
Invalid. Will re-evaluate a future submission.
- NoChanged792.3K ₳Rationale
Sorry mate, the metadata is invalid. Try again after it all expires.
Earlier votes
Abstain1y agoSuperseded
- No760.2K ₳No rationale
- No742.6K ₳No rationale
- No737.8K ₳No rationale
- No663.8K ₳Rationale
We, the Dutch DRep, vote No on this proposal due to a mismatch between the provided hash and the referenced document. This makes the proposal unverifiable.
We believe the integrity of the process matters, and setting a precedent where incorrect hashes are accepted would weaken trust in on-chain governance. The hash should match.
We encourage resubmission with the correct hash.
- Abstain637.5K ₳No rationale
- No636.4K ₳No rationale
- No604.7K ₳Rationale
I'm voting no on the 50 million for DeFi liquidity due to significant concerns regarding its financial scope, governance structure, and overall feasibility. The request for 50 million ada is exceptionally large, specifically with regards to the current active NCL (Net Change Limit) and community approved treasury expenditures. Such a substantial allocation of community funds is not justified by the proposal's contents, which lack clearly defined goals and key performance indicators (KPIs). Furthermore the reliance on a basic multi-sig wallet instead of a more secure and transparent smart contract-based solutions introduces too many fundamental weaknesses in its financial planning, oversight structure, and technical implementation.
This is all in addition to the most pressing issue of an accompanying invalid metadata anchor.
- No582.9K ₳No rationale
- No579.1K ₳No rationale
- No573.2K ₳No rationale
- No550.1K ₳No rationale
- No503.6K ₳Rationale
First off, Kudos to the proposers. I know how hard they work in the ecosystem and I really do respect the energy and thought that went into this. It’s clear they care deeply about Cardano and about pushing DeFi forward in the right direction.
That said… I’m voting no. Not because the idea is bad. Actually, I think it’s quite solid. But fifty million ADA is still… well, fifty million ADA. That’s a big number. A number that deserves a second, third, maybe even a fourth look. Especially with so many other proposals and ideas in motion, this just feels like bad timing. If the budget was smaller or rolled out in phases, I’d probably feel different.
I also think we need a bit more clarity around transparency and who gets access to the funds. The team looks strong, no doubt about that. But strong teams still need strong guardrails, especially when you’re asking for 50m ada.
So I’m saying no, but it’s a soft no, not a slammed door. I hope they come back. I hope they tighten a few things, maybe ask for less, and I’d love to see this evolve into something the whole community can rally behind.
Much love to the team.
I’m rooting for you. Just not voting yes this time. - Yes479.2K ₳Rationale
It is a coherent and advantageous proposal in all aspects that I have seen.
It serves as a driver for the DeFi environment at a crucial moment for Cardano, with monetary responsibility, ensuring a significant return for the Treasury.
We missed the timing in the last halving due to the reduced number of smart contracts. We cannot miss the current window of opportunity due to lack of liquidity, having great native stablecoins.
- Abstain393.6K ₳No rationale
- No379.5K ₳Rationale
I'm voting No on this governance action because it was submitted with invalid metadata and the proposers already said that they are planning to submit another action with correct metadata. If the proposal would have been technically correct, I would have tended to vote Yes since providing liquidity for stablecoins seems to be one of the less wasteful uses of treasury ADA to me and the proposers are qualified to execute that plan in my opinion.