Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713)
172 DReps voted · 72 with a rationale · 12 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Abstain575M ₳Rationale
Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713). Yoroi recognises the importance of responsible governance during periods of ecosystem uncertainty.
- Ecosystem Situation: The trust our delegators place in Yoroi requires that we act only when we can do so with full confidence. In light of the current situation, Yoroi is choosing to withhold its vote on this proposal and will reassess our position once conditions allow for a considered decision.
- Yes384.3M ₳Rationale
Please check the following link for the reasons for the vote.（投票理由は次のページを参照してください。)
https://adatool.net/treasury-votes?lang=en&a=151
Under the current NCL's remaining headroom (₳76.8M), legitimate proposals — including PRIME (₳120M), which I voted YES on — physically cannot be executed. The budget ceiling is not the place to judge the merits of individual proposals; that judgment is expressed in each proposal's own vote — and I voted YES on PRIME individually, after tough analysis (analysis: adatool.net/cardano-growth-primer).
The NCL is a ceiling, not a spending plan. Raising it approves nothing by itself; every withdrawal must still clear the 67% DRep threshold on its own merits. Rather than killing growth investment on the procedural grounds of "no headroom", I vote to keep each proposal judgeable on substance. - Abstain331.6M ₳No rationale
- Abstain299.7M ₳Rationale
EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713), with rationale outlined below.
Given the ongoing situation in the ecosystem, responsible governance requires us to act with full clarity and confidence. Until the current situation reaches resolution, EMURGO prefers to withhold judgment rather than vote without the certainty our mandate demands. We will revisit this proposal once the situation is resolved.
- Yes258.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes219.4M ₳Rationale
A few months ago the Cardano community set the NCL to 350m ADA. A lot got funded.
Increasing the NCL to unsustainable amounts must not be the norm and can't be done every year, but we don't want to block AG through not voting YES in the increased NCL.
We will look into the AG proposal next week.
- YesChanged175.4M ₳Rationale
I'm changing my vote to "YES" because I've gotten a guarantee from the Cardano Node and Plutus Team that they will take serious any feature request from AlphaGrowth for the onboarding efforts they push for. This is the comprehensive push that I think is both necessary and required for the success of that effort
Earlier votes
No1mo agoSuperseded
- Abstain171.3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain123.7M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes ABSTAIN. The room remaining under the current 350,000,000 ada NCL is close to exhausted, but a new limit set without an accompanying spending strategy is not one we can endorse.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
We recognize the practical problem this action addresses. The Net Change Limit agreed for Epochs 613–713 no longer leaves meaningful room for the treasury withdrawals now before DReps. Our reservations concerning the increase are the following:
- No basis is given for the amount. The motivation explains why more room would be useful but does not show how 500,000,000 ada was derived. There is no projection of expected demand over the remaining period, no assessment of treasury sustainability under the higher cap, and no comparison against other values within the range.
- A limit without a strategy is a weaker guardrail. We would support an increase framed strategically: room allocated across defined spending categories with designated allocations and accountable recipients, anchored to a shared long-term direction such as the Cardano 2030. The ecosystem should set those categories deliberately, weighing trade-offs and understanding what it costs to build and maintain Cardano.
- Raising the cap to accommodate pending requests inverts its purpose. A limit that moves whenever demand approaches it functions as a spending target rather than a fiscal constraint. We would rather see the ceiling derived from agreed priorities than from the size of the requests in front of us.
The Cardano Foundation votes ABSTAIN. Our abstention should be read as a reservation about method, not as opposition to ever adjusting the Net Change Limit. We encourage future proposers to derive the figure from budgeted categories and stated priorities rather than from pending requests, and we are committed to participating in the work of defining those categories with the community.
- Yes92.2M ₳No rationale
- No90.6M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I vote NO on the proposal: Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613–713).
My rationale:
Cardano governance must be able to define strategy, set priorities, and allocate Treasury resources responsibly. A necessary step is better coordination among DReps on how the available budget should be used.
Ideally, we should first define some form of budget bucket system that makes clear how much funding should be allocated to key categories such as core infrastructure, research, integrations, liquidity, ecosystem support, commercial adoption, community projects, and other priorities.
Without preparation, coordination, structure, and prioritization, increasing the NCL risks becoming another unstructured run on the Treasury. Teams will compete to submit additional withdrawals, and DReps will be expected to process them without a clear strategic framework.
DReps are already exhausted after the Intersect budget process. They have reviewed more than 100 proposals, with many still active. Most community DReps work for free, and it is also the summer vacation period in many countries. Burdening DReps with a large number of additional proposals at this point is not reasonable.
I understand the argument that Cardano should invest even beyond current Treasury income because we need growth and commercial adoption. I partially agree with that view. However, this makes strategy and prioritization even more important, not less. If we want to increase the NCL, we should first have a serious debate among DReps about how the additional budget should be allocated and what outcomes we expect from it.
Approving an increase in the NCL without a clear strategy, allocation framework, and prioritization process seems irresponsible to me. Before expanding the spending capacity of the Treasury, we need to address the governance and coordination issues that currently limit our ability to make wise funding decisions.
If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.
MANDA Pool ID:
pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8My DRep ID:
drep1y2m0g4r66pyaw3p7u454wc0p4f0ygm8ueaev0mgd3tvwm7sskqwqpBuy me a beer:
https://pay.cexplorer.io/pay/c0410d5b237b6ec0 - Yes88.6M ₳Rationale
Given market fluctuations, this is likely a reasonable adjustment.However, I believe that governance rules need to be continuously re-examined.
- Yes88.4M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes YES on the Info action agreeing a Net Change Limit of 500,000,000 ada for the Cardano Treasury for Epochs 613-713.
SIPO reads this as a price adjustment, not an expansion of spending.
When this period opened at the start of Epoch 613 on 13 February 2026, ada traded at about $0.2832, and the 350,000,000 ada limit then in force represented roughly $99.1 million of real spending capacity. Ada trades at about $0.1646 today. The same 350,000,000 ada limit now represents roughly $57.6 million - a contraction of about 42% in real terms that no governance decision authorised and no DRep voted for. A limit denominated in ada silently tightens whenever ada falls. At today's price, 500,000,000 ada is worth about $82.3 million, which restores roughly 83% of the capacity the limit carried when the period began; a full restoration would require about 602,000,000 ada. On the measure that matters - what the treasury can actually fund - this proposal does not expand the envelope. It partially repairs it.
SIPO anticipated exactly this. In February 2026, voting Yes to the 300,000,000 ada limit for this same period, SIPO recorded that a static Net Change Limit does not respond to significant ada price fluctuations, and argued that Cardano should evolve toward an adaptive fiscal model indexed to treasury balance, annual inflows, and market conditions. That limitation has now materialised, and this action is the consequence of not having built the adaptive mechanism.
The constraint is also real in practice. Treasury withdrawals debited since the start of Epoch 613 total approximately 302.7 million ada, about 86.5% of the 350,000,000 ada limit, leaving roughly 47.3 million ada for the remaining eleven months to the close of Epoch 713. Fiscal capacity is not the binding concern at this level: treasury inflows are running at roughly 323 million ada per year, and 500,000,000 ada across this 100-epoch period is equivalent to about 365 million ada per year - a net draw of roughly 42 million ada per year against a treasury balance of about 1.47 billion ada.
SIPO's Yes is not an endorsement of raising the cap whenever it binds. A guardrail that moves each time it becomes uncomfortable stops being a guardrail. SIPO supports this adjustment because it is grounded in a measurable price change, and repeats the position it took in February: Cardano should replace ad hoc renegotiation with a rule-based, adaptive Net Change Limit, transparent and constitutionally grounded, so that future adjustments follow a published formula rather than a vote taken under pressure. This action agrees a limit; it authorises no withdrawal, and SIPO will continue to judge each withdrawal on its own merits. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep は、Cardano トレジャリーの Epoch 613-713 における Net Change Limit を 500,000,000 ADA と合意する Info アクションに賛成（YES）を投じます。
SIPO は本件を、支出の拡張ではなく価格調整と読みます。
本期間が開始した 2026 年 2 月 13 日（Epoch 613 開始時点）、ADA は約 $0.2832 で取引されており、当時の 350,000,000 ADA という上限は実質で約 9,910 万ドルの支出能力を意味していました。現在 ADA は約 $0.1646 です。同じ 350,000,000 ADA という上限は、いま約 5,760 万ドルしか意味しません。ガバナンス上の決定を一切経ず、どの DRep も投票していないまま、実質で約 42% 縮小したことになります。ADA 建ての上限は、ADA が下落するたびに自動的に引き締まります。現在価格では 500,000,000 ADA は約 8,230 万ドルであり、期間開始時に上限が持っていた能力の約 83% を回復するにとどまります。完全に回復させるには約 602,000,000 ADA が必要です。実際に国庫が何を賄えるかという尺度で見れば、本提案は枠を拡張していません。部分的に修復しているだけです。
SIPO はこの事態を予期していました。2026 年 2 月、同じ期間の 300,000,000 ADA 案に賛成した際、SIPO は固定型の Net Change Limit について「ADA 価格が大きく変動した場合に自動調整が働かない」と記録し、トレジャリー残高・年間流入額・市場環境を反映する動的な財政モデルへ進化すべきだと論じました。その限界がいま現実化したのであり、本アクションは適応的な仕組みを作らなかったことの帰結です。
制約は実務上も現実です。Epoch 613 開始以降に確定したトレジャリー引き出しは合計 約 3 億 273 万 ADA で、350,000,000 ADA の上限の約 86.5% に達し、Epoch 713 終了までの残り約 11 ヶ月に対して残枠は約 4,730 万 ADA です。この水準では財政容量は制約要因になりません。トレジャリーへの流入は年率 約 3 億 2,300 万 ADA で推移しており、100 エポックの本期間における 500,000,000 ADA は年率換算で約 3 億 6,500 万 ADA、約 14 億 7,000 万 ADA の残高に対して年 約 4,200 万 ADA の純減にあたります。
SIPO の賛成は、上限が窮屈になるたびに引き上げることへの承認ではありません。不都合になるたびに動くガードレールは、もはやガードレールではありません。SIPO が本調整を支持するのは、測定可能な価格変動に根拠があるためであり、2 月に取った立場をここで繰り返します。Cardano は場当たり的な再交渉を、透明で憲法的整合性を持つルールベースの動的 Net Change Limit に置き換えるべきです。そうすれば将来の調整は、圧力下の投票ではなく公開された算式に従います。本アクションは上限を合意するものであり、いかなる引き出しも承認しません。SIPO は引き続き各引き出しをそれ自体の是非で判断します。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- No85M ₳Rationale
I've expressed my viewpoint on the NCL over and over again in my votes, in videos, and on X. Happy to repeat it again here. I do not support levels of spending that would zero out the Cardano Treasury within a decade. I certainly cannot support even higher levels that would zero out the Treasury in something like a half-decade. Everyone can examine this for themselves at the Treasury Depletion Calculator: https://tempo.vote/treasury.
- No77.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes76.7M ₳No rationale
- No75.9M ₳Rationale
I vote No on this proposal.
The Net Change Limit (NCL) is not intended to maximize Treasury spending. Its purpose is to provide fiscal discipline by ensuring that limited Treasury resources are allocated only to the highest-priority proposals. It is one of the key guardrails that helps Cardano's governance operate responsibly.
This proposal argues that the remaining capacity under the current 350 million ADA limit is becoming constrained. However, it does not provide sufficient objective evidence explaining why the existing limit is no longer adequate, which critical proposals cannot proceed under the current NCL, or why 500 million ADA is the appropriate new threshold.
Cardano's challenge today is not expanding the spending limit. The real challenge is making disciplined capital allocation decisions and ensuring Treasury funds are directed toward proposals that create the greatest long-term value. The NCL exists precisely to force those difficult prioritization decisions.
This proposal focuses on increasing the available spending capacity without sufficiently demonstrating why the existing fiscal guardrail should be relaxed. In my view, raising the NCL without a compelling and evidence-based justification weakens the purpose of the guardrail itself.
If, in the future, objective evidence demonstrates that the current 350 million ADA limit has become a genuine bottleneck due to an increase in high-quality proposals, I would support revisiting the NCL. At this time, however, I do not believe that case has been sufficiently established.
For these reasons, I vote No.
私は本提案に反対します。
Net Change Limit（NCL）は、Treasuryからより多くの資金を支出するための仕組みではありません。限られたTreasury資金を、本当に優先順位の高い提案へ配分するための財政規律であり、Cardanoガバナンスを健全に機能させるための重要なガードレールです。
しかし本提案では、「350M ADAでは余裕が少なくなってきた」という説明はあるものの、なぜ現在の上限では不足するのか、どのような重要提案が現行NCLによって実現できなくなるのか、そしてなぜ500M ADAという水準が適切なのかについて、十分な客観的根拠が示されていません。
現在のCardanoに必要なのは、支出枠を広げることではなく、限られたTreasury資金をどの提案へ優先的に配分するかを慎重に判断することです。NCLが存在するからこそ、DRepは難しい優先順位付けを行い、より高い価値を生み出す提案を選択する責任を果たすことができます。
本提案は、「より多く支出できるようにする」ことに重点が置かれている一方で、「なぜガードレールを緩和すべきなのか」という説明が十分ではありません。私は、このような段階でNCLを引き上げることは、Cardano Treasuryの財政規律を弱めるメッセージになりかねないと考えています。
将来的に、高品質な提案が増え、現行の350M ADAでは明確に不足することが客観的なデータによって示されれば、NCLの見直しには賛成できます。しかし現時点では、その必要性は十分に立証されていないと判断し、本提案には反対します。
- Yes74.6M ₳No rationale
- No73.6M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on the Info Action to increase the Net Change Limit to 500 million ADA for Epochs 613 through 713. This decision ultimately rests on a fundamental question of fiscal reality: can we truly justify expanding our spending ceiling during a period of sustained market weakness.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting NO on the Info Action to increase the Net Change Limit to 500 million ADA for Epochs 613 through 713. This decision ultimately rests on a fundamental question of fiscal reality: can we truly justify expanding our spending ceiling during a period of sustained market weakness? Cardano has slipped from the top 10 and continues to struggle within the top 20, reflecting some of our weakest relative market performance to date.
As a DRep, I cannot in good conscience signal approval for an expanded spending cap. We have already exhausted the majority of our original 350 million ADA limit, and simply raising the ceiling to accommodate further drawdown is an unsustainable path forward. At current market rates of roughly $0.17 per ADA, a 500 million ADA limit represents approximately $85 million USD. We are consistently spending far more than the treasury accumulates, maintaining a pattern of deficit spending that cannot continue while broader market conditions remain challenging.
Furthermore, treasury deployment to date has suffered from a lack of broad ecosystem distribution. Capital remains tightly concentrated within a small, isolated circle of familiar entities. While certain voices continue to cheer for unchecked treasury deployment, everyday ADA holders are the ones who bear the tangible cost through persistent sell pressure and suppressed price action.
Voting NO sends a clear, necessary message to both DReps and the broader community that our spending power requires firm boundaries and strategic discipline. Future budget frameworks must be built around a far more thoughtful, equitable allocation process rather than repeatedly lifting guardrails to satisfy the same recipient groups. Ultimately, enforcing a strict cap instills vital investor confidence by proving that Cardano governance is grounded in fiscal responsibility and genuine treasury stewardship.
- Yes69.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes53.8M ₳Rationale
I'm voting Yes on the Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713) proposal.
Timing matters in this market right now. The institutional adoption wave is open, and this is the moment to convert that opportunity into real users and liquidity on top of the infrastructure the Pentad has built.
Proposals that matter for ecosystem expansion, like AlphaGrowth's PRIME, shouldn't be blocked because there's no headroom left rather than because of their own merits. That's a situation we should avoid.
In the sense of securing the room we need at a moment when Cardano should be making its leap, I'm voting Yes.
- Yes51M ₳Rationale
I prefer not to evaluate future proposals based solely on whether they fit within the total budget. Instead, each proposal should be assessed individually based on its quality, impact, and value for money. Having a higher maximum budget provides flexibility and helps avoid rejecting strong proposals simply due to an artificial overall limit.
- No50.4M ₳Rationale
I vote NO on setting a new Net Change Limit of 500M ADA for Epochs 613 to 713. First, it hollows out the NCL itself. A limit for this same period was already agreed at 350M, and raising it mid-period because the room is becoming constrained inverts the purpose of a cap. If 350M can become 500M, then 500M can become 650M, and the NCL becomes a formality amended whenever it is reached. Second, the premise reveals over-spending, not an inadequate cap. About 414.9M ADA was already withdrawn in the ten months to April 2026, exceeding the 350M limit. The right response to hitting a cap is to slow spending, not raise the cap. Third, 500M is nearly twice the Treasury's annual income of about 252M, and in my published DRep Voting Framework I argue an appropriate NCL is about 15 percent of prior-year staking rewards, roughly 82M ADA. Against that, 500M is about six times the sound level. The 2025 pace already accelerated ADA's effective inflation by roughly 51 percent while ADA/BTC fell about 48.7 percent, the measurable footprint of Treasury dilution. Raising the cap licenses more of the dilution already visible in the price. Instead, I would respect the existing 350M limit and review 2025 to 2026 spending outcomes before discussing any new limit. Framework: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem/ [Japanese version follows] ]Epoch 613から713の新NCLを500M ADAとする提案に反対します。第一に、NCLという制度そのものを形骸化させます。この同じ期間の上限はすでに350Mで合意されており、枠が窮屈だからと途中で引き上げることは上限の目的を転倒させます。350Mを500Mにできるなら500Mも650Mにでき、NCLは上限に達するたびに修正される形式的手続きに堕します。第二に、前提が示すのは過剰支出であって上限の不足ではありません。2026年4月までの10ヶ月で約414.9M ADAがすでに引き出され、350Mを超過しています。上限に達したときの正しい対応は支出の減速であり、上限の引き上げではありません。第三に、500MはTreasuryの年間収入約252Mのほぼ2倍です。私のDRep投票フレームワークでは、適正NCLを前年ステーキング報酬の約15%、およそ82M ADAとしており、500Mはその約6倍にあたります。2025年の引き出しペースはADAの実効インフレを約51%加速させ、同期間にADA/BTCは約48.7%下落しました。これはTreasury希薄化の測定可能な足跡であり、上限引き上げはすでに価格に表れた希薄化をさらに許容することを意味します。代わりに、既存の350M上限を尊重し、新たな上限の議論の前に2025年から2026年の支出成果を検証することを支持します。フレームワーク全文はhttps://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem/にて公開しています。
- Yes50.2M ₳Rationale
I believe AlphaGrowth is a must-win proposal for the ecosystem. Therefore, I have no choice but to support an increase in the Net Change Limit to ensure it can be funded.
- No49.5M ₳No rationale
- No47.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes39.9M ₳Rationale
Fund Growth.
- Yes37.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes37.3M ₳No rationale
- No34.5M ₳Rationale
あらかじめ決めていた予算の上限が足りなくなりそうだからといって、期間の途中でいきなり引き出し枠を増やすという内容は、一般的な金銭感覚からすると無責任
- Yes34.4M ₳Rationale
Socious votes Yes. This Info Action sets a Net Change Limit of 500,000,000 ADA on total treasury withdrawals for the period from epoch 613 (February 13, 2026) through epoch 713 (on or about July 3, 2027), with withdrawals already debited during the period counting toward the cap. A hard aggregate ceiling is what makes individual withdrawal votes meaningful: it forces proposals to compete within a known budget instead of each being judged against an unbounded treasury, it gives ADA holders a predictable worst-case outflow, and it is the fiscal guardrail the Cardano Constitution's treasury provisions contemplate for withdrawals. Whatever one's view of any single spending proposal, agreeing a defined, binding envelope for the period is basic fiscal discipline, and Socious supports it.
Sociousは賛成します。本Info Actionは、エポック613（2026年2月13日）からエポック713（2027年7月3日頃）までの期間について、トレジャリーからの引き出し総額に500,000,000 ADAのNet Change Limit（純変動上限）を設定するもので、期間中に既に執行された引き出しも上限に算入されます。総枠の上限があってこそ、個々の引き出しへの投票は意味を持ちます。各提案は無制限のトレジャリーに対してではなく既知の予算枠の中で競争を強いられ、ADA保有者は最悪ケースの流出額を予見でき、Cardano憲法のトレジャリー条項が引き出しの前提として想定する財政上のガードレールとなります。個別の支出提案への賛否がどうであれ、期間に対して明確で拘束力のある枠を合意することは基本的な財政規律であり、Sociousはこれを支持します。
- Yes33.5M ₳Rationale
Vote: Yes. This Info Action replaces the existing 350 million ADA Net Change Limit with a 500 million ADA limit for Epochs 613 through 713. It does not authorize any treasury withdrawal.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
The Net Change Limit is a fiscal guardrail, not a budget and not an instruction to spend. Raising it does not approve AlphaGrowth or any other treasury proposal. Every withdrawal must still receive its own DRep support and satisfy the constitutional requirements for administration, oversight, custody, and reporting.
The existing limit is becoming a barrier to considering serious commercial investments through July 2027. An NCL should protect the treasury from uncontrolled spending, but it should not reject future proposals before DReps can examine their merits.
The risk is that additional capacity may encourage weaker proposals or create political pressure to use the full allowance. I accept that risk because DReps retain full authority to reject every withdrawal. The 500 million ADA limit remains a fixed ceiling, and withdrawals already made during the period count toward it.
The treasury exists to protect and advance Cardano. A full treasury attached to a commercially irrelevant network would not be a successful outcome. Cardano must retain the ability to fund credible growth while there is still time for that funding to matter.
I vote Yes. - Yes31.5M ₳No rationale
- No31.4M ₳Rationale
I vote No on this proposal because the current governance framework for Treasury withdrawals is fundamentally insufficient.
First, the Net Change Limit (NCL) does not function as a meaningful financial guardrail. Whenever the limit becomes insufficient, a new proposal to raise the NCL is simply submitted and approved, which undermines the purpose of having a limit in the first place.
Second, the recent decline in ADA’s price suggests that past Treasury approvals may have weakened market confidence, highlighting the need for stronger financial governance.
Third, Treasury funding decisions should follow a holistic annual process, as previously suggested by Charles, where all proposals are submitted together once per year and prioritized based on the full budget picture. This approach would allow DReps to make strategic, well‑informed decisions. Under the current ad‑hoc approval model, DReps cannot accurately assess priorities, and projects that should be lower priority may receive funding merely due to timing.
For these reasons, improving the governance framework must come before raising the NCL, and I therefore vote No on this proposal. - YesChanged30.6M ₳History
Earlier votes
No5d agoSuperseded
- Yes28M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.9M ₳Rationale
After much deliberation, I've decided to vote YES to increase the NCL to 500M ADA until epoch 713. After adjusting to the sticker shock from many different treasury withdrawal proposals, I've concluded that Cardano is currently in a make-it-or-break-it situation. It is vital that we see the growth and usage necessary to keep our chain sustainable, else we risk the treasury valuation going even lower in terms of USD even without spending the ADA in it.
- Yes27.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes26.1M ₳Rationale
Due to the drop in value of ada, which directly impacts everyone who depends on treasury either to keep the things we have currently being maintained or new things we are building. This needs to pass or we potentially see some leave the space completely and some suffer so badly that they may never be the same. We have supported a large percentage of builders (currently approved) and there are others who deserve our support, this isnt the time to drop the ball.
- Yes25.3M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES to increase the Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713). We have to spend to win during the bear.
- Yes23.6M ₳Rationale
Time to invest in ourselves. No more clutching pearls. Get serious about being successful.
- Abstain21.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain21.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes20M ₳Rationale
Needed to accomodate AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME with high importance for the ecosystem.
- No17.4M ₳Rationale
Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713)
- No16.9M ₳Rationale
We understand that the NCL is only a ceiling and does not directly approve any treasury withdrawal. Each proposal still needs to be evaluated and approved on its own merits.
However, raising the spending ceiling before Cardano has a clearer treasury strategy, budget categories, prioritization framework, and coordination among DReps is risky. The current process is already fragmented, with many large proposals competing for treasury funding without a clear view of what the ecosystem should prioritize first.
Before expanding the available spending capacity, we should define clearer budget buckets, expected outcomes, fiscal limits, and standards for proposal evaluation. Otherwise, increasing the NCL may encourage more uncoordinated withdrawals rather than better treasury governance.
We support responsible treasury use and credible ecosystem investment, but not a higher spending ceiling without stronger strategy and prioritization.
- No16.3M ₳Rationale
Vote: NO
This is a non-binding Info Action, "Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713)" (gov_action15at...hakceq), submitted July 2, 2026 with voting closing August 2, 2026. It proposes replacing the existing 350,000,000 ADA Net Change Limit for Epochs 613-713 (February 13, 2026 through July 3, 2027) with a 500,000,000 ADA limit — a 43% increase in the ceiling on treasury withdrawals for a period already more than a third elapsed. The NCL caps total lovelace removed from the treasury by enacted Treasury Withdrawals; treasury inflows are not netted against it.
The proposal is correct on one point of framing: an NCL is a ceiling, not a mandate, and DReps retain full discretion to reject every individual withdrawal beneath it. It is also legitimate to revisit a limit mid-period if the limit is demonstrably binding — that is, if worthy, well-structured proposals are being turned away for want of headroom rather than for want of merit. Dracula DAO would consider that case seriously if it were made.
That case has not been made. Roughly 68M ADA has actually been withdrawn against the existing 350M ceiling; the current limit is not the constraint on ecosystem funding, and there is no evidence that a single qualifying proposal has failed because the cap was reached. The 2026 cycle's approximately 331.6M ADA of requests failed on their merits and on DRep judgment, not on headroom. Raising a ceiling that has been utilized at under 20% does not unlock funding — it removes a discipline, and it does so at a moment when the treasury's purchasing power is depressed and every ADA spent today is sold into weakness. Dracula DAO's position has been consistent since the 2025 NCL votes: ADA not spent today is ADA available tomorrow, when priorities and conditions have clarified. A lower NCL is the better long-term posture, and 350M is already generous relative to demonstrated, accountable demand. The stake-weighted signal so far reflects this — SPOs have voted against by a margin exceeding forty to one, and DReps remain net negative.
Dracula DAO votes NO. The problem the 2026 cycle exposed is not an insufficient spending ceiling; it is the absence of a credible allocation mechanism beneath it. Treasury funds should be awarded as grants paid on completion of well-defined features — the ecosystem specifies what it wants built and pays once it exists and has been verified. It should not fund team operating budgets, roadmaps, or projected work, however that funding is scheduled or subdivided. A ceiling governs how much can leave the treasury; it says nothing about whether anything of value comes back. Until the community is paying for delivered features rather than financing intentions, a larger ceiling raises the cost of governance failure without improving the quality of what gets funded. Fix what the treasury buys before raising what it may spend; Dracula DAO will revisit the limit when there is evidence the limit — and not the process — is what binds.