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Pogun: Capital Without Compromise

System3mo ago1 post
DReps 220SPOs 0

220 DReps voted · 81 with a rationale · 17 changed their vote

Open a row to read the rationale.

  • Yoroi W₳llet
    Abstain584.2M ₳Rationale

    Summary
    Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on "Pogun: Capital Without Compromise." While Yoroi recognises the strategic opportunity this proposal targets and the technical effort behind it, the proposal raises questions around delivery sequencing and the scale of the treasury commitment at this stage of development.
    Rationale
    A promising concept at an early stage of validation.
    Pogun's framing around Bitcoin DeFi is strategically relevant, and the oracle-free bilateral lending design is a genuine differentiation from conventional pool-based protocols. The proposal asks the treasury to fund three integrated components simultaneously, however, before any of them has reached mainnet, which places a significant delivery burden on a team without an established Cardano track record at this scale.

    Bridge execution risk warrants careful consideration.
    The BitVM bridge is the most technically complex of the three components, and it depends on cryptographic infrastructure that has not yet been demonstrated in production on Cardano. Yoroi does not question the theoretical robustness of the 1-of-N security model, but the gap between a sound design and a deployed, audited system handling real Bitcoin is substantial enough to warrant a more staged approach to funding.

    The treasury ask would be stronger with a phased structure.
    A proposal that funds the credit market to mainnet first, with subsequent disbursements contingent on verified delivery, would be significantly easier to support. Yoroi encourages the team to consider resubmitting with a structure that better reflects the current stage of development and gives the community a meaningful opportunity to validate progress before committing the full amount.

    Conclusion
    Yoroi recognises the ambition behind Pogun and the genuine strategic opportunity it targets. Our decision to abstain is not a dismissal of the project, but a considered view that the scale of the treasury commitment should be matched by a clearer delivery foundation. We would welcome a revised proposal that takes a more incremental approach and look forward to engaging with the team as the project matures.

  • YUTA
    No435.8M ₳Rationale

    I vote NO to "Pogun: Capital Without Compromise".

    1. Large-scale fundraising for early-stage products is inherently a high-risk investment, and 12,290,000 ADA is a highly speculative investment. The Marlowe/SmartClaimz project, which the proposer's leaders were working on (as can be seen on LinkedIn), did not seem to lead to adoption, so I cannot verify their track record on Cardano to justify a 12,290,000 ADA investment. Furthermore, this area is being pursued by multiple teams, raising concerns about competition.

    2. Projects envisioning investment schemes in treasuries should ideally contact the Orion Fund first. This fund already has a treasury profit-sharing mechanism approved by DRep.

    —

    私は「Pogun: Capital Without Compromise」にNOを投票します。

    1.初期のプロダクトの大きな資金調達は基本的にリスクが高い投資であり、12,290,000ADAはかなり投機的な投資です。linkinにより確認できる提案者のリーダー陣が取り組んでいたmarlowe/SmartClaimzプロジェクトはほとんど採用につながらなかったと思いますので、12,290,000ADAの投資を信頼できるほどのCardanoにおける実績を確認できていません。また、一方でこの分野は複数のチームが取り組んでおり、競争上の問題も心配です。

    2.基本的にはトレジャリーへの投資型スキームを構想するプロジェクトは、まずはOrion fundへ連絡することをオススメします、これはDRepがすでに承認しているトレジャリーへの利益還元機構が組み込まれたFundです。

  • EMURGO
    Abstain293M ₳Rationale

    Summary
    EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on the treasury withdrawal titled "Pogun: Capital Without Compromise", with rationale outlined below.
    Rationale
    Pogun presents a technically considered vision for Bitcoin DeFi on Cardano, and the bilateral lending model addresses real shortcomings in conventional credit infrastructure. The treasury repayment structure, committing a share of EBITDA until the full amount is returned followed by a perpetual contribution, reflects a more mature approach to public funding than is typical for proposals of this kind.

    The difficulty lies in the relationship between the current stage of the project and the scale of the request. At 12.29M ADA, this is a substantial commitment for a team that has not yet established a mainnet delivery track record on Cardano at this level of complexity. The three components, a credit market, a yield layer, and a BitVM bridge, each carry meaningful execution risk independently, and the bridge relies on cryptographic infrastructure that has not yet been demonstrated in a Cardano production context.

    A more incremental structure, one that funds the credit market to mainnet first and gates subsequent tranches on demonstrated performance, would give the community a stronger basis for committing at this scale. EMURGO would welcome a resubmission along those lines and remains genuinely interested in the direction this project is pursuing.

  • CryptoCrow
    Yes254.7M ₳No rationale
  • Eternl DRep Committee
    No222.9M ₳Rationale

    Overview of EDC vote on IO + Tweag proposals:

    ❌ IO: Developer Experience Initiative
    ✅ IO: Cardano Upgrades
    ✅ IO: Consensus Initiative
    ✅ IO & Ensurable Systems: Cardano Maintenance Initiative
    ❌ IO & Midgard Labs: L2 Scalability Initiative
    ➖ IO: Cardano High Assurance Technical Collaboration
    ✅ IO & VacuumLabs: Enhancing Plutus - Performance, Correctness, and Usability
    ❌ Blockfrost: Maintenance and Next Generation Indexing
    ❌ Pogun: Capital Without Compromise
    ❌ Tweag Core Cardano Infrastructure: Treasury Withdrawal 2026–2028
    ✅ IO: Cardano Vision 2026: Human Centred, Scalable, Post Quantum Secure - IO Research

    Combined:

    ✅ YES: 147.7m ADA / 35.5m USD
    ❌ NO: 74.0m ADA / 17.7m USD
    ➖ ABSTAIN: 13.1m ADA / 3.1m USD

    All proposed initiatives sound like nice-to-haves for Cardano; some are essential for Cardano's momentum. The asks on almost all of the proposals are too high. That's why we had to triage and prioritize the essentials over the nice-to-haves, allow for a remainder on the NCL, and leave room for other vendors to enter the race for this year's budget.

    We want to make it clear that a NO does not mean we are against the proposed tech. Quite the opposite, for example we'd love to look into Midgard and Pogun for Eternl. We also appreciate the work Blockfrost is doing, trying to replace itself with decentralized tech.

    But we need to leave some part of the NCL for other vendors and initiatives.

  • Sebastien Guillemot セバ
    Abstain174.6M ₳Rationale

    I really like a lot of the ideas behind Pogun, but I generally abstain for commercial proposals

  • Everstake
    Yes165.7M ₳No rationale
  • Cardano Foundation
    Yes120.2M ₳Rationale

    This document includes the Cardano Foundation’s voting decisions and individual voting rationales for nine Treasury Withdrawal governance actions submitted by Input Output Global.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    We have decided to create a unified document to record our votes as many of the initiatives are connected.

    We invite the proposers and anyone else from the Cardano Community to carefully review our individual rationales below per proposal, as well as the following table.

    Governance Action Title CF DRep Vote
    97. IO - Developer Experience Initiative NO
    98. IO - Cardano Upgrades YES
    99. IO - Consensus Initiative YES
    100. IO & Ensurable Systems - Cardano Maintenance Initiative ABSTAIN
    101. IO & Midgard Labs - L2 Scalability Initiative ABSTAIN
    102. IO - Cardano High Assurance Technical Collaboration YES
    103. IO & VacuumLabs - Enhancing Plutus - Performance, Correctness, and Usability NO
    104. Blockfrost - Maintenance and Next Generation Indexing NO
    105. Pogun - Capital Without Compromise YES

    Individual Rationales

    The following section contains all nine individual voting rationales for the above-mentioned proposals.

    97. IO - Developer Experience Initiative

    Summary

    The Cardano Foundation votes NO. We are eager to collaborate on DevX, but this proposal is expensive, lacks financial granularity, and risks duplicating ecosystem efforts. We encourage returning with a leaner, more detailed, and coordinated resubmission addressing the points as recommended below.

    Rationale Statement

    We recognize that developer onboarding is a critical vertical, and we appreciate the proposers targeting legitimate ecosystem pain points. While we fully support the overarching goals, we cannot approve this treasury withdrawal in its current form due to the following structural and financial concerns:

    1. Costs Lacking Granularity: The request for approximately 900k USD is exceptionally high for a 6-month timeframe. The budget lacks a meaningful Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) breakdown, allocating 81% to a broadly categorized "Development & Engineering" bucket. This makes it difficult to distinguish between community bounties, hackathon prizes, and administrative overhead, hindering our ability to evaluate financial proportionality.Creating CLI tooling, cleaning documentation, and building contract templates can be achieved in a cost-effective way which does not require a budget of this size.
    2. Overlap with Active CF and Intersect Initiatives: The proposal intends to restructure the "Developer HUB" using the Developer Portal as its primary entry point. The Developer Portal is already actively maintained, funded, and strategized by the Cardano Foundation alongside Intersect committees. While we are highly receptive to ecosystem contributions, requesting nearly 900k USD to duplicate or restructure ongoing work is inefficient. We would welcome collaboration on this workstream to improve cost efficiency.
    3. Severe Execution Risk: The proposal requests funding for only six months. The proposer indicates that the engineering team for these workstreams has not yet been established and will be hired using the funds released from this withdrawal. Setting up a new team and familiarizing them with the necessary ecosystem intricacies will conservatively consume a significant portion of this short timeframe, jeopardizing the delivery schedule. A future proposal would be significantly strengthened by establishing an upfront execution structure. Clearly identifying, aligning, and sharing ownership with ecosystem partners from the outset ensures precise accountability for all deliverables.
    4. Lack of Long-Term Ownership and Maintenance: There is no clear transition strategy for the resulting products (such as cardano-init or the contracts library) after the initial six-month funding period. The ecosystem requires continuous, ongoing feedback and maintenance for developer tools, rather than a highly expensive, short-term sprint that risks leaving behind abandoned infrastructure if subsequent funding is not secured.
    5. Open Source Fragmentation: While cardano-init is explicitly designed as an aggregation layer to unify and elevate existing ecosystem tools rather than replace them, its long-term value hinges heavily on sustained community buy-in. The proposal’s strategy for allocating bounties and incentives to existing tool maintainers is a strong step toward coordination. However, the primary risk shifts from community fragmentation to the execution of integrations: we must ensure that external toolmakers actively maintain these integrations over time so the aggregator remains a reliable, up-to-date entry point for new developers.
    Conclusion

    The Cardano Foundation votes NO. While the ambition to improve Cardano's developer experience is valued, this proposal's steep cost, execution risks, and overlapping scope prevent us from approving it in its current form. To secure approval, a resubmission must be leaner, more cost-effective and provide a granular FTE budget breakdown for financial transparency. It should also integrate with active Cardano Foundation and Intersect initiatives to avoid duplicating ongoing work, establish an execution structure with a pre-identified team to ensure delivery within the tight six-month window, and outline a strategy for long-term maintenance and community buy-in.

    98. IO - Cardano Upgrades

    Summary

    The Cardano Foundation votes YES. CIP-159, CPS-23, and Native Babel Fees have potential to improve L2 reserves, protect against volatility, and improve onboarding. Despite certain budget and execution concerns, we view the 13.1M ada ask as an acceptable investment.

    Rationale Statement

    We recognize the impact these three platform-level capabilities will have on Cardano’s economic models and ecosystem growth. We are voting YES based on the following technical and strategic assessments:

    1. Critical Infrastructure and Economic Resilience: The CIP-159 (Account Address Enhancements) upgrade bridges the gap between UTXO and Account models. By solving the minUTxO constraints, it enables micro-fee collection, cheaper DeFi batcher operations, and introduces new smart contract paradigms more familiar to EVM developers. Furthermore, it is a prerequisite for seamless L2 reserve management. CPS-23 (Multi-Asset Treasury) enables the Cardano Treasury to hold stablecoins or other native assets, which is a next step for long-term sustainability. It could protect the ecosystem's funding runway from ADA price volatility and introduce the potential for diverse treasury holdings.
    2. Native Babel Fees and Onboarding: While non-native (smart contract-based) Babel fees currently exist within the ecosystem, they have struggled to gain significant traction. Allowing users to interact with Cardano DApps using stablecoins or bridged assets without first acquiring ADA will hopefully be a driver for mainstream institutional and retail adoption.

    3. Feedback for Ongoing Alignment: While we support funding this initiative, there are elements of this proposal which raised concerns and we wish to offer feedback.

    Implementing CIP-159 fundamentally alters Cardano's accounting model. With alternative nodes like Amaru and Dingo actively in development, introducing such massive ledger changes requires careful coordination. Making frequent, significant modifications directly onto the Layer 1 core ledger introduces substantial maintenance fatigue for open-source builders, which can be lessened with coordination. We urge IO to collaborate to establish a clear framework for alignment with other node implementation and material downstream tooling teams to prevent consensus fragmentation.

    Workstream 2 allocates roughly $565,000 USD primarily to design and draft the Multi-Asset Treasury CIP. For a design-phase deliverable, this is a premium investment. We expect this effort to feature rigorous, high-quality deliverables, contributions to improvements to the overall CIP process and extensive community consultation to reflect the amount.

    Workstream 3 includes integration with the Lace wallet. Given the use of treasury funds, we expect the IO team to ensure that the underlying infrastructure for Native Babel Fees is open and easily accessible for all ecosystem wallets, Tx builders (e.g., Mesh, Lucid Evolution), and indexers, rather than focusing support solely on its own products.

    Although these concerns are valid, we appreciate the dialogue with IOG on this proposal which contributed to this voting decision.

    Conclusion

    The Cardano Foundation votes YES. The combination of Account Enhancements, a Multi-Asset Treasury, and Native Babel Fees represents a step forward for Cardano's scalability, developer experience, and economic sustainability.

    99. IO - Consensus Initiative

    Summary

    The Cardano Foundation votes YES. Leios is important for scaling Cardano and long-term competitiveness. Despite concerns over budget opacity and prior funding overlaps, delaying this upgrade risks ecosystem stagnation. We approve to ensure development continuity.

    Rationale Statement

    We recognize the impact that the Consensus Initiative (Leios) will have on the network’s capacity. We are voting YES based on the following technical and strategic assessments:

    1. Essential Base Layer Scaling: Scaling through Leios is fundamentally positive and provides Cardano with a massive upgrade. To ensure Cardano remains competitive with newer Layer 1 blockchains in terms of throughput, upgrading the base protocol is non-negotiable. This prevents the network from adopting unsustainable design patterns, such as forcing all high-volume activity to Layer 2 solutions.
    2. Core Infrastructure Investment: This proposal is a direct investment in the core protocol infrastructure. The Leios research phase has produced solid, academic-level work fully in the spirit of a peer-reviewed blockchain.
    3. Development Continuity: Leios development requires highly specialized knowledge. Voting NO at this critical juncture would risk halting momentum, meaning expert engineering teams would need to be replaced or re-assembled at a later date. Approving this proposal ensures the unbroken continuation of the roadmap toward the Dijkstra era.
    Conclusion

    The Cardano Foundation votes YES. We recognize that Leios is a credible path available to meet Cardano's 2030 scaling ambitions. While we have significant concerns regarding the insufficiently detailed, escalating budget, the risk of derailing base-layer scaling is too significant.

    100. IO & Ensurable Systems - Cardano Maintenance Initiative

    Summary

    The Cardano Foundation votes ABSTAIN. We appreciate the dialogue with IOG on this proposal, which contributed to our voting decision. While continuous maintenance is important for long-term network stability, this 62.1M ada proposal presents fiscal uncertainty and the scope appears to duplicate funding of other concurrent initiatives.

    Rationale Statement

    While the critical importance of keeping the network operating securely is undisputed, our evaluation reflects several material concerns regarding the current formulation of the proposal:

    1. Lack of Budget Detail/Potential Duplications: This proposal bundles nine maintenance workstreams into a single budget, grouping 74% (46M ada) of the funds into a broad "Development" category, which, without a granular Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) headcount breakdown, limits the capacity to verify cost efficiency. Additionally, given that the same development teams contribute across multiple initiatives, there appears to be a funding overlap with resources already requested in the Upgrades, Plutus, Consensus, and Developer Experience proposals. Providing a more detailed budget breakdown would help the community in conducting a clear cost-benefit analysis and ensure there is no duplication of funding.
    2. Lack of Quantifiable Deliverables: The proposal functions structurally as an open-ended funding commitment lacking defined technical boundaries, presenting a deficit of tangible deliverables, milestones, or open-source repository evidence mapping out the work. Without clear engineering baselines, it acts as an unquantifiable blanket retainer that challenges our ability to properly assess the proposal.
    3. Substantial Budget Inflation: The requested amount of 62.1M ada (approximately 14.9M USD) represents a high allocation of treasury resources. Industry baselines indicate that these costs are significantly inflated relative to the actual operational overhead required for equivalent DevOps and core maintenance tasks.
    4. Structural Preference for Targeted Initiatives: The Cardano Foundation maintains a clear structural preference for a modular funding framework wherever possible. Funding generalized blanket proposals introduces fiscal uncertainty, whereas smaller, targeted sub-proposals (such as specific consensus, developer experience, or scaling layer initiatives) feature transparent line-item budgets and clearly defined milestones that allow for rigorous milestone-based verification.
    5. Node Diversity Risks: To support a healthy multi-client ecosystem, overarching services such as global network monitoring and core documentation (e.g., the Cardano Blueprint) should be gradually decoupled from node-specific maintenance to ensure a completely product-agnostic and inclusive infrastructure landscape.
    Conclusion

    The Cardano Foundation votes ABSTAIN. We appreciate the critical nature of network maintenance and the expertise of the proposing teams. However, we require greater financial transparency, and a more node-agnostic approach to ecosystem tooling in order to properly assess this proposal. If this proposal does not reach the required approval threshold, we ask the proposers to refine and resubmit. A resubmission would greatly benefit from a decoupled structure, detailed FTE allocations, and an independent oversight mechanism to ensure verifiable and neutral delivery.

    101. IO & Midgard Labs - L2 Scalability Initiative

    Summary

    The Cardano Foundation votes ABSTAIN. While Layer 2 scaling is important for enterprise DApps, the proposal's lack of budget granularity, contested IP, and unresolved 2025 milestones introduce uncertainty. While we do not oppose this proposal, we urge a refined resubmission if it does not pass.

    Rationale Statement

    We support the technological objectives and the necessity of Layer 2 scaling, however we require further clarity regarding the following uncertainties before we are able to support:

    1. Unclear Scope and Structural Bundling: The proposal bundles two Layer 2 technologies at different stages of their respective product lifecycles into a single governance action. Furthermore, the financial distribution is skewed; despite being a titular focus of the initiative, the Midgard workstream receives only 9% of the allocated funding, while Hydra consumes approximately 73%.
    2. Milestone Accountability and Prior Deliverables: Midgard's 2025 funded milestones under contract EC-0001-25 were previously reported as past due and paused. While new evidence was submitted on May 19 to claim milestones 2–5, these submissions remain pending final verification. Committing additional treasury resources without a fully finalized reconciliation of past deliverables introduces significant fiscal uncertainty.
    3. Budget Granularity and Potential Overlaps: The 10.4M ada request lacks a granular breakdown. The technical scope for Workstream 2 (Hydra) closely mirrors the team's existing public roadmap and open pull requests, making it difficult to isolate net-new work from previously funded core engineering efforts. Additionally, the 1.8M ada requested for a bespoke Data Availability (DA) prototype does not sufficiently clarify why existing modular alternatives are unsuitable.
    4. Technical, IP, and Organizational Risks: The proposal contains contradictory timelines regarding the Midgard mainnet launch (end of 2026 versus Q1 2027). Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) also noted unresolved authorship and payment disputes (e.g., PR #434) that introduce contested-IP risks. Finally, the legal distinction and relationship between "Midgard Labs" and Anastasia Labs require clarification to ensure accountability.
    5. Unsubstantiated Metrics and Commercial Dependencies: Performance claims such as "10,000+ TPS" are presented without concrete benchmarking data or baseline metrics. Furthermore, the proposal relies heavily on specific commercial partners (like Delta DeFi and Masumi) continuing to build, without providing contingency plans. Ideally, commercial entities utilizing the stack for enterprise applications should contribute to the hardening of the infrastructure they rely upon.
    Conclusion

    The Cardano Foundation votes ABSTAIN. We appreciate the dialogue with IOG on this proposal which contributed to our voting decision. We value the technical ambition of this initiative and respect the engineering teams involved, but we cannot support this proposal in its current state without proper budget breakdowns, clarity on IP, and clear accountability for past milestones. If this proposal does not reach the required approval threshold, we ask the proposers to refine and resubmit their initiative.

    102. IO - Cardano High Assurance Technical Collaboration

    Summary

    The Cardano Foundation votes YES. Automating formal verification is a strategic public good that reinforces network security. Despite significant concerns regarding budget opacity and adoption risks, the ecosystem benefits outweigh the reservations.

    Rationale Statement

    We support this proposal because it aligns with Cardano's core value proposition of security, correctness, and determinism. Our YES vote is grounded in the following primary drivers:

    1. Strategic Digital Trust Infrastructure: Cardano’s underlying smart contract model, based on Lambda calculus and determinism, is uniquely positioned for formal mathematical verification. Recent high-profile vulnerabilities in EVM-based DeFi protocols, such as the ~$300M Kelp DAO exploit, highlight that verifiable security is a strict prerequisite for institutional adoption. This enables a shift away from high-risk environments toward highly secure, institutional-grade DeFi applications.
    2. Universal Ecosystem Support via UPLC: The proposed automated verification tool, Blaster, operates directly on Untyped Plutus Core (UPLC). This architectural choice is strategic, as it avoids siloed development and simultaneously supports developers across the ecosystem, regardless of whether they write in Aiken, Plutus, or other high-level smart contract languages.
    3. Lowering the Barrier to Entry: Historically, formal verification has been restricted to specialized experts. By providing a Lean4-based verification enabler, integrating it directly into native toolchains (e.g., VS Code), and offering extended "one-click" containerized developer environments, this initiative significantly democratizes access to production-ready, secure smart contract development.
    4. AI-Agentic Workflow Readiness: As software engineering transitions toward AI-assisted development, the emphasis on robust Command Line Interfaces (CLIs) within this proposal provides a strong, secure foundation for future integration with autonomous AI agents, ensuring Cardano's toolchain remains forward-looking.
    5. Reusable and Auditable Components: The initiative focuses on d
  • JAZZ
    Abstain92.2M ₳No rationale
  • CardanoYoda (MANDA Pool)
    No91.5M ₳Rationale

    As a DRep, I decided to vote NO on the proposal: Pogun: Capital Without Compromise

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    My rationale:

    The idea itself is strategically attractive. Bitcoin liquidity is enormous, and Cardano would clearly benefit if BTC holders could bridge assets into the ecosystem, borrow against them, earn yield, and increase DeFi activity on Cardano. The non-margin lending model is also genuinely interesting because it avoids oracle-driven liquidations, which remain a major weakness in many traditional DeFi lending protocols.

    However, my primary concern is structural.

    This proposal is not core infrastructure in the same category as protocol scaling, node maintenance, or Plutus improvements. It is primarily a commercial DeFi venture. If successful, it may benefit Cardano, but it would also create a private business with its own revenue streams, market share, and strategic upside. That distinction matters when treasury funds are involved.

    The proposal combines:

    1. Bitcoin bridge infrastructure — potentially public infrastructure that could benefit the broader ecosystem
    2. A credit market — a revenue-generating DeFi application
    3. A yield/private credit/RWA layer — an even more commercial and potentially regulated business model

    These components have very different risk profiles and should not be bundled into a single treasury proposal.

    The bridge layer could reasonably be considered ecosystem infrastructure because other Cardano applications may benefit from it. The lending and yield layers are clearly monetized products that generate fees through origination fees, servicing fees, bridge fees, and performance fees. This is funding the development of a future revenue-generating business.

    The proposed treasury return model also raises concerns. The proposal offers 20% of EBITDA until the treasury is repaid and 5% of EBITDA in perpetuity afterward. At first glance, this sounds attractive. However, EBITDA is highly flexible and can be materially affected by operational expenses, expansion costs, infrastructure spending, legal costs, and other business decisions. This does not imply bad intent, but it does mean treasury returns are far less predictable than they may initially appear.

    If IO wants treasury funding for commercial ventures, the structure should look much closer to an actual investment. That could mean a loan structure, revenue-share agreements with stronger protections, equity-like rights, or significantly more favorable repayment terms for the treasury. Public funds should not absorb early-stage business risk without receiving adequate protections or upside participation.

    The proposal also does not clearly disclose several important issues that should be addressed when public treasury funds are used to support a commercial venture. It remains unclear whether there are future token issuance plans, whether private investors may enter later, what the ownership structure looks like, whether founders or advisors receive equity upside, and whether the treasury would have any stronger protections in the event of restructuring, acquisition, or future fundraising rounds.

    There is also a broader ecosystem concern. Pogun is not entering an empty market. Other Cardano teams are already building adjacent infrastructure. Sundial is developing Bitcoin-related infrastructure and recently received recognition at Paris Blockchain Week, while FluidTokens has already demonstrated native Bitcoin–Cardano atomic swaps on mainnet. Treasury funding should be careful not to unintentionally pick winners in competitive markets where multiple ecosystem teams are already innovating.

    Execution risk is also very high. The proposal attempts to simultaneously deliver a new lending model, a yield platform, a Bitcoin bridge, BitVM infrastructure, operator architecture, institutional onboarding, and products that may face meaningful regulatory scrutiny due to private credit and RWA exposure. The bridge architecture involving BitVM, BABE witness encryption, Mithril state attestation, Groth16 proofs, and 1-of-N operator assumptions is technically ambitious and promising, but it is also highly complex. A Q4 2026 mainnet target feels aggressive.

    I believe Pogun is an interesting idea with potential long-term value for Cardano. However, I do not believe the Treasury should fund the full commercial stack in its current form.

    A stronger proposal would separate:

    1. Open-source Bitcoin interoperability infrastructure
    2. Public credit primitives
    3. The commercial frontend/business model

    I would be far more open to supporting the public infrastructure components separately.

    For now, I believe this proposal is better suited for private capital, strategic partnerships, or a much smaller pilot before requesting treasury funding at this scale.

    For these reasons, I voted NO.

    If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.

    MANDA Pool ID:
    pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8

    My DRep ID:
    drep1y2m0g4r66pyaw3p7u454wc0p4f0ygm8ueaev0mgd3tvwm7sskqwqp

  • BTBF_XSP
    Abstain88.6M ₳Rationale

    The market opportunity in Bitcoin DeFi — credit and liquidity infrastructure collateralized by BTC — is understandable. However, this proposal is Treasury equity-style funding for a single operator's business launch, and even with the promised EBITDA return (20% until repayment, then a perpetual 5%), the business and competitive risks are highly uncertain. I will not make a definitive call on deploying Treasury funds into a specific venture, so I abstain.

  • SIPO
    YesRevoted86M ₳Rationale

    SIPO DRep votes YES on Pogun: Capital Without Compromise.

    Governance Action ID: gov_action1w0shrfxqwv95kk0v4cn34wylz25a2cmqkq5jpc0e2yrahhqava3qsuae57l
    DRep: drep1yffld2866p00cyg3ejjdewtvazgah7jjgk0s9m7m5ytmmdq33v3zh
    Date: 2026-05-09

    SIPO supports this proposal as the strategic positioning move that establishes Cardano as the structural home for institutional-grade Bitcoin DeFi, and as the precedent-setting Treasury Investment that combines phase-gated disbursement, refund clauses, and an explicit return commitment to the Treasury (20% of EBITDA until full USD-equivalent repayment, then 5% perpetual). Bitcoin is a $1.5T asset with ~1% in DeFi today; the credit and liquidity infrastructure to unlock the rest is the largest open market in crypto. Pogun delivers a three-layer system — non-margin Credit Market (Q2 2026), Yield DApp (Q3 2026), BitVM-powered trust-minimized Bridge (Q4 2026) — leveraging Cardano's structural EUTXO advantage that account-based chains cannot replicate.

    Why SIPO votes YES

    1. Cardano's strategic positioning for the largest addressable market in crypto. Bitcoin is over $1.5T market cap with only ~1% in DeFi. Crypto lending hit $73.6B in Q3 2025 with 67% on-chain. The credit infrastructure institutional Bitcoin holders require — fixed-rate bilateral terms, collateral at risk only on definitive default rather than price volatility, transferable bond instruments — does not exist on any chain at production scale today. Cardano's EUTXO model provides specific structural advantages: deterministic execution without front-running or MEV, native asset security, parallelized financial logic, and pennies-per-tx predictable fees that make structured credit viable at scale. This connects directly to SIPO's Cardano Architecture Paradigm Shift and EUTXO-EVM Divergence doctrines.

    2. New Treasury Fit category: Treasury Investment with binding return commitment. Unlike grant-style proposals where the Treasury sees no return after work ships, Pogun commits to returning 20% of quarterly EBITDA until USD-equivalent $2.95M is repaid, then 5% in perpetuity. The grace period is explicit (no return while EBITDA is negative), verification is on-chain (protocol fees from credit market, bridge, yield DApp are independently auditable), and quarterly transparency reports reconcile revenue against payments. This operationalizes Pillar 5 Focus Area E.1 (Treasury evolving from passive pool to yield-generating multi-asset reserve) on a specific commercial venture.

    3. Phase-gated four-tranche disbursement plus comprehensive refund clauses bound the Treasury exposure. Funds release in four tranches (Phase 1 33%, Phase 2 25%, Phase 3 25%, Phase 4 17%), each contingent on independent administrator verification of prior milestones. Five distinct refund triggers — milestone failure, team dissolution, BitVM technical infeasibility, voluntary termination, partial delivery — return undisbursed funds on failure. The Treasury never pays for work that has not been completed.

    4. Governance, advisory, and technical foundation are materially serious. The Product Committee — Pi Lanningham (Sundae Labs CTO), Philip DiSarro (Anastasia Labs CEO), Lucas Rosa (Aiken creator), Santiago Carmuega (TxPipe CEO) — represents the most credible technical leadership in the Cardano ecosystem and serves pro-bono. The Advisory Board adds Robin Linus (BitVM creator), Russell Shapiro / Fallen Icarus, and Bo Zhang. The bridge is built on BABE witness encryption, evolved from the Cardinal construction demonstrated live on Bitcoin mainnet at Bitcoin 2025; BABE achieves 1,868× off-chain storage reduction versus BitVM3 at comparable on-chain cost. The 1-of-N security model means the bridge remains secure as long as a single honest operator exists. Credit market smart contracts are under formal security audit by TxPipe with completion expected 27 May 2026.

    Governance and oversight follows the standard SIPO has approved on Amaru, Dingo, HLabs, DeFi Liquidity, and Orion Fund (Sundae Labs treasury-contracts framework, Intersect administration, 5-entity Oversight Committee). Net Change Limit compliant.

    Expectations (YES with binding operational commitments)

    • Pogun team track record independent verification: SIPO expects publication of the team's prior delivery record with third-party attestation before Phase 2 disbursement.

    • 1-of-N operator economics disclosure: Operator count, bond size, slashing economics, and honest-operator assumption sensitivity must be published before bridge alpha (Phase 2). Institutional adoption depends on this being legible.

    • TxPipe audit report full publication: The Phase 1 audit completing 27 May 2026 must be published in full with all findings, risk assessments, and remediation status — not an executive summary.

    • EBITDA reporting format pre-publication: SIPO expects the cost breakdown, revenue attribution, and EBITDA methodology published as a sample format during Phase 1, before any return is due.

    • Treasury Investment precedent commitment: SIPO supports the Treasury Investment model (phase-gated + refund + return commitment) as a structural improvement over pure grants, and expects Pogun, Intersect, and CF to participate in formalizing this category for future commercial venture proposals.

    Closing

    Pogun is Cardano's positioning move for Bitcoin DeFi at the moment the addressable market is largest and the competitive window is narrowing. The Treasury Investment structure makes Treasury exposure bounded and creates a precedent for future commercial ventures. The product committee composition, BABE technical foundation, and phase-gated disbursement together reduce execution risk to a level commensurate with the strategic upside. With expectations above treated as binding operational commitments, SIPO DRep votes YES.

    For these reasons, SIPO DRep votes YES.

    SIPO DRepとして、本提案「Pogun: Capital Without Compromise」に賛成（YES）を投じます。

    Governance Action ID: gov_action1w0shrfxqwv95kk0v4cn34wylz25a2cmqkq5jpc0e2yrahhqava3qsuae57l
    DRep: drep1yffld2866p00cyg3ejjdewtvazgah7jjgk0s9m7m5ytmmdq33v3zh
    Date: 2026-05-09

    SIPOは本提案を、Cardanoをinstitutional-grade Bitcoin DeFiの構造的homeとして位置づける戦略的ポジショニング・ムーブとして、また phase-gated disbursement・refund clauses・Treasuryへの明示的 return commitment（USD-equivalent全額返済までEBITDAの20%、その後永久5%）を組み合わせる先例設定 Treasury Investment として支持します。Bitcoinは$1.5Tの資産で、現在DeFi参加は約1%のみ — 残りを解放するcredit・liquidityインフラは暗号業界最大の未開拓市場。Pogunは3層システムを提供：非マージンCredit Market（Q2 2026）、Yield DApp（Q3 2026）、BitVMベース trust-minimized Bridge（Q4 2026） — account-based chainsが再現できないCardanoの構造的EUTXO優位性を活用。

    SIPOがYESと判断する理由

    1. 暗号業界最大addressable marketに対するCardanoの戦略的ポジショニング。Bitcoin時価総額$1.5T超、DeFi参加は約1%のみ。crypto lendingは2025年Q3に$73.6Bに到達、67%がon-chain。institutional Bitcoinホルダーが必要とする credit infrastructure（fixed-rate bilateral terms、価格変動ではなく definitive default時のみのcollateralリスク、譲渡可能bond instruments）は今日どのチェーンでもプロダクションスケールで存在しません。CardanoのEUTXOモデルが提供する構造的優位性 — front-running/MEVなしのdeterministic execution、native asset security、parallelized financial logic、structured creditを任意のスケールでviableにするpennies-per-tx の予測可能手数料 — を活用。SIPOのCardano Architecture Paradigm Shift・EUTXO-EVM Divergenceドクトリンと直接接続。

    2. 新カテゴリ Treasury Fit：拘束力ある return commitment を伴う Treasury Investment。grantスタイル提案と異なり、Pogunは四半期EBITDAの20%をUSD-equivalent $2.95M返済までTreasuryに支払い、その後永久に5% EBITDAを支払うとコミット。grace period は明示的（EBITDA negative の間 return なし）、verification はon-chain（credit market・bridge・yield DAppからのプロトコル手数料は独立検証可能）、四半期 transparency reports が revenue と支払いを reconcile。Pillar 5 Focus Area E.1（Treasury を passive pool から yield-generating multi-asset reserve へ進化）を、特定の商業 venture 上で運用化したもの。

    3. 4トランシュ phase-gated disbursement と包括的 refund clauses が Treasury exposure を bounded にする。資金は4トランシュ（Phase 1 33%、Phase 2 25%、Phase 3 25%、Phase 4 17%）、各々が独立 administrator による前 milestone 検証に依存。5 つの distinct refund triggers — milestone failure、team dissolution、BitVM technical infeasibility、voluntary termination、partial delivery — が failure 時の未 disburse 資金返還を保証。Treasury は完了していない仕事に対して支払うことがありません。

    4. ガバナンス・アドバイザリー・技術基盤が material seriously で pro-bono。Product Committee — Pi Lanningham（Sundae Labs CTO）、Philip DiSarro（Anastasia Labs CEO）、Lucas Rosa（Aiken creator）、Santiago Carmuega（TxPipe CEO） — は Cardano エコシステムで最も信頼できる技術リーダーシップを代表し、pro-bono 運営。Advisory Board は Robin Linus（BitVM creator）、Russell Shapiro/Fallen Icarus、Bo Zhang を加えます。Bridge は Cardinal 構成（Bitcoin 2025 で Bitcoin mainnet 上 live demo）から進化した BABE witness encryption 上に構築。BABEは BitVM3 比較で off-chain storage 1,868× 改善、on-chain cost comparable。1-of-N security model は honest operator が1人でも存在する限り bridge が secure。Credit market smart contracts は TxPipe による formal security audit 中（2026年5月27日完了予定）。

    ガバナンス・監視構造はSIPOがAmaru、Dingo、HLabs、DeFi Liquidity、Orion Fundで承認した標準と同一です。Net Change Limit準拠。

    期待事項（YESには拘束力のある運用上のコミットメントを伴う）

    • Pogun team track record の独立検証：Phase 2 disbursement 前に、第三者 attestation を伴うチーム過去デリバリー実績の公開を期待。

    • 1-of-N operator economics の開示：Operator 数、bond サイズ、slashing 経済性、honest-operator assumption の sensitivity を bridge alpha（Phase 2）前に公開。institutional 採用はこれが legible であることに依存。

    • TxPipe audit report の完全公開：2026年5月27日完了の Phase 1 audit を、全 findings、risk assessments、remediation status を伴う完全公開（executive summary ではなく）。

    • EBITDA 報告フォーマットの事前公開：cost 内訳、revenue attribution、EBITDA 方法論を Phase 1 中にサンプルフォーマットとして公開 — return 発生前。

    • Treasury Investment 先例化への commitment：SIPO は Treasury Investment モデル（phase-gated + refund + return commitment）を pure grant に対する構造的改善として支持し、Pogun・Intersect・Cardano Foundation がこのカテゴリを将来の商業 venture 提案のために formalize する作業に参加することを期待。

    結び

    Pogunは addressable market が最大かつ競争 window が narrowing するこの瞬間における Cardano の Bitcoin DeFi ポジショニング・ムーブです。Treasury Investment 構造は Treasury exposure を bounded にし、将来の商業 venture の先例を作ります。Product committee 構成、BABE 技術基盤、phase-gated disbursement が組み合わさることで、execution risk を strategic upside に見合うレベルまで削減。上記期待事項が拘束力のある運用上のコミットメントとして扱われることを前提として、SIPO DRep は本提案に賛成（YES）を投じます。

    以上の理由により、SIPO DRepとして本提案に賛成（YES）を投じます。

    Earlier votes

    Yes2mo agoSuperseded

    SIPO DRep votes YES on Pogun: Capital Without Compromise.

    Governance Action ID: gov_action1w0shrfxqwv95kk0v4cn34wylz25a2cmqkq5jpc0e2yrahhqava3qsuae57l
    DRep: drep1yffld2866p00cyg3ejjdewtvazgah7jjgk0s9m7m5ytmmdq33v3zh
    Date: 2026-05-09

    SIPO supports this proposal as the strategic positioning move that establishes Cardano as the structural home for institutional-grade Bitcoin DeFi. Bitcoin is a $1.5 trillion asset with approximately 1% of its market cap participating in DeFi today; the credit and liquidity infrastructure to unlock the remaining 99% is the largest open market opportunity in the industry. Pogun delivers an integrated three-layer system — non-margin Credit Market (Q2 2026), Yield DApp (Q3 2026), and BitVM-powered trust-minimized Bridge (Q4 2026) — leveraging Cardano's structural EUTXO advantage that account-based chains cannot replicate. SIPO additionally supports this proposal as a precedent-setting Treasury Investment: the first commercial venture that meets Treasury Fit through the combination of phase-gated disbursement, refund clauses, and an explicit return commitment to the Treasury (20% of EBITDA until full USD-equivalent repayment, then 5% perpetual).

    Why SIPO votes YES

    1. This is Cardano's strategic positioning for Bitcoin DeFi, the largest addressable market in crypto. Bitcoin is over $1.5T market cap with only ~1% in DeFi. Crypto lending hit a record $73.6 billion in Q3 2025 with 67% on-chain. The credit infrastructure that institutional Bitcoin holders require — fixed-rate bilateral terms, collateral at risk only on definitive default rather than price volatility, transferable bond instruments — does not exist on any chain at production scale today. Pogun is purpose-built to fill that gap, and Cardano's EUTXO model provides structural advantages for this specifically: deterministic execution without front-running or MEV, native asset security, parallelized financial logic, and pennies-per-transaction predictable fees that make structured credit viable at any scale. This connects directly to SIPO's Cardano Architecture Paradigm Shift doctrine and the EUTXO-EVM Divergence doctrine.

    2. Pogun establishes a new category of Treasury Fit: Treasury Investment with binding return commitment. Unlike grant-style proposals where the Treasury sees no financial return after work ships, Pogun commits to returning 20% of quarterly EBITDA to the Treasury until the USD-equivalent $2.95M is repaid, then 5% of EBITDA in perpetuity. The grace period is explicit (no return while EBITDA is negative), the verification path is on-chain (protocol fees from credit market, bridge, and yield DApp are independently auditable), and quarterly transparency reports reconcile revenue against payments. This is the "passive pool to yield-generating multi-asset reserve" outcome Pillar 5 Focus Area E.1 calls for, made operational on a specific commercial venture.

    3. Phase-gated four-tranche disbursement plus comprehensive refund clauses make the Treasury exposure verifiable and bounded. Funds release in four tranches (Q2 2026 33%, Q3 2026 25%, Q4 2026 25%, Q1 2027 17%), each contingent on independent administrator verification of prior-phase milestones. Five distinct refund triggers cover milestone failure, team dissolution, BitVM technical infeasibility, voluntary termination, and partial delivery. The Treasury never pays for work that has not been completed, and undisbursed funds always return on failure. This is the disciplined gating structure SIPO has consistently asked for in any large Treasury withdrawal.

    4. Governance and advisory structure is materially serious and pro-bono. The Product Committee — Pi Lanningham (Sundae Labs CTO), Philip DiSarro (Anastasia Labs CEO), Lucas Rosa (Aiken creator), and Santiago Carmuega (TxPipe CEO) — represents the most credible technical leadership in the Cardano ecosystem, and explicitly serves pro-bono with no treasury funds, tokens, or compensation allocated. The Advisory Board adds Robin Linus (BitVM creator), Russell Shapiro (Fallen Icarus, the credit market design originator), and Bo Zhang (institutional partnerships, former Function COO). This composition is itself a strong ecosystem signal.

    5. The BABE / BitVM technical foundation is past the speculation phase. Pogun's bridge is built on BABE witness encryption, evolved from the Cardinal construction demonstrated live on Bitcoin mainnet at Bitcoin 2025. BABE achieves 1,868× off-chain storage reduction, 2,022× setup time reduction, and 2,783× decryption time reduction versus BitVM3, with comparable on-chain cost. The 1-of-N security model means the bridge remains secure as long as a single honest operator exists — institutions can act as one of the N operators themselves. This is engineered infrastructure, not research speculation. Smart contracts for the credit market are under formal security audit by TxPipe with completion expected 27 May 2026.

    Governance and oversight structure follows the standard SIPO has approved on Amaru, Dingo, HLabs Pebble + Gerolamo, DeFi Liquidity Budget, and Orion Fund (Sundae Labs treasury-contracts framework, Intersect administration, 5-entity Oversight Committee, multi-signature disbursement, refund clause). Net Change Limit compliant.

    Expectations (YES with binding operational commitments)

    • Pogun team track record independent verification: The proposal does not include detailed delivery track record for the Pogun core team itself. SIPO expects publication on the Pogun website of the team's prior delivery record with third-party attestation, before Phase 2 disbursement.

    • 1-of-N operator economics disclosure: Operator count, bond size, slashing economics, and honest-operator-assumption sensitivity must be published before the bridge alpha milestone (Phase 2). Institutional adoption depends on this being legible.

    • TxPipe audit report full publication: The Phase 1 audit completing 27 May 2026 must be published in full with all findings, risk assessments, and remediation status — not an executive summary.

    • EBITDA calculation methodology and quarterly report format: SIPO expects the operating cost breakdown, revenue source attribution, and EBITDA calculation methodology to be published as a sample format during Phase 1 — well before any return is due — so the community can pre-validate the reporting discipline.

    • BitVM infeasibility judgment criteria: The refund clause references "fundamental technical infeasibility" determined by independent technical review. SIPO expects the criteria for that review and the selection process for reviewers to be published before Phase 3 disbursement.

    • Treasury Investment precedent commitment: SIPO supports the Treasury Investment model (phase-gated + refund + return commitment) as a structural improvement over pure grants. SIPO expects Pogun, Intersect, and Cardano Foundation to participate in formalizing this category for future commercial venture proposals, contributing to a public framework that other ventures can apply against.

    Closing

    Pogun is Cardano's positioning move for Bitcoin DeFi at the moment the addressable market is largest and the competitive window is narrowing. The Treasury Investment structure (20% repayment to USD-equivalent par, then 5% perpetual) makes Treasury exposure bounded and creates a precedent that future commercial ventures can be evaluated against. The product committee composition, BABE technical foundation, and phase-gated disbursement together reduce execution risk to a level commensurate with the strategic upside. With expectations above treated as binding operational commitments, SIPO DRep votes YES.

    For these reasons, SIPO DRep votes YES.

    SIPO DRepとして、本提案「Pogun: Capital Without Compromise」に賛成（YES）を投じます。

    Governance Action ID: gov_action1w0shrfxqwv95kk0v4cn34wylz25a2cmqkq5jpc0e2yrahhqava3qsuae57l
    DRep: drep1yffld2866p00cyg3ejjdewtvazgah7jjgk0s9m7m5ytmmdq33v3zh
    Date: 2026-05-09

    SIPOは本提案を、Cardanoをinstitutional-grade Bitcoin DeFiの構造的homeとして位置づける戦略的ポジショニング・ムーブとして支持します。Bitcoinは$1.5兆の資産であり、その時価総額の約1%のみが現在DeFiに参加しています — 残り99%を解放するcredit・liquidityインフラは業界最大の未開拓市場機会です。Pogunは統合された3層システムを提供します：非マージンCredit Market（Q2 2026）、Yield DApp（Q3 2026）、BitVMベース trust-minimized Bridge（Q4 2026） — account-based chainsが再現できないCardanoの構造的EUTXO優位性を活用します。SIPOはまた、本提案を Treasury Investment として支持します：phase-gated disbursement、refund clauses、Treasuryへの明示的な return commitment（USD-equivalent全額返済までEBITDAの20%、その後永久に5%）の組み合わせでTreasury Fitを満たす商業ventureの第1号事例です。

    SIPOがYESと判断する理由

    1. これは暗号業界最大の addressable market である Bitcoin DeFi に対する Cardano の戦略的ポジショニング。Bitcoinは時価総額$1.5T超、うちDeFi参加は約1%のみ。crypto lendingは2025年Q3に過去最高$73.6Bに到達、67%がon-chain。institutional Bitcoinホルダーが必要とする credit infrastructure — fixed-rate bilateral terms、価格変動ではなく definitive default 時のみのcollateralリスク、譲渡可能bond instruments — は今日どのチェーンでもプロダクションスケールで存在しません。PogunはそのギャップをfillするためにCardanoのEUTXOモデルが提供する構造的優位性 — front-runningやMEVなしのdeterministic execution、native asset security、parallelized financial logic、structured creditを任意のスケールで viable にする pennies-per-transaction の予測可能手数料 — を活用して構築されています。これはSIPOのCardano Architecture Paradigm Shift・EUTXO-EVM Divergenceドクトリンと直接接続します。

    2. Pogunは新カテゴリ Treasury Fit を確立する：拘束力ある return commitment を伴う Treasury Investment。仕事がship した後Treasuryが財務的return を見ない grant スタイル提案と異なり、Pogunは四半期EBITDAの20%をUSD-equivalent $2.95M返済までTreasuryに支払い、その後永久に5% EBITDAを支払うとコミットします。grace period は明示的（EBITDA negative の間 return なし）、verification パスはon-chain（credit market、bridge、yield DAppからのプロトコル手数料は独立検証可能）、四半期 transparency reports が revenue と支払いを reconcile します。これはPillar 5 Focus Area E.1が呼びかける「passive poolからyield-generating multi-asset reserveへ」という outcome を、特定の商業 venture 上で運用化したものです。

    3. 4 トランシュ phase-gated disbursement と包括的 refund clauses が Treasury exposure を verifiable かつ bounded にする。資金は4 トランシュでリリース（Q2 2026 33%、Q3 2026 25%、Q4 2026 25%、Q1 2027 17%）、各々が独立 administrator による前 phase milestone 検証に依存。5 つの distinct refund triggers — milestone failure、team dissolution、BitVM technical infeasibility、

  • Army of Spies
    No84.3M ₳Rationale

    Unfortunately, we cannot fund every single proposal that we would with infinite money. I am not yet persuaded this is the best use of funds at this time.

  • Dumpling🥟
    No77.7M ₳No rationale
  • Phil UPLC
    Yes76.8M ₳Rationale

    Because the only avenue to Cardano achieving economic sustainability for validators without reliance on subsidies is through successful applications with revenue sharing. If Ethereum had secured 20% revenue share of any of their top 10 dApps they would have achieved economic sustainability already.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    Support because Pogun targets real DeFi demand: Bitcoin liquidity, credit, yield, offers upside back to the community treasury via clear repayment structure and a perpetual revenue stream. An important note is that Pogun will need to add support for margin lending in addition to its current markets because it is the primary market for on-chain lending.

    Economic sustainability for SPOs is only achievable by establishing symbiotic relationships with applications in revenue sharing.

  • ranket
    Yes75.2M ₳No rationale
  • SASA_nagamaru_ながまる
    YesChanged74.5M ₳Rationale

    After further consideration, I have decided to vote YES on this proposal.

    Initially, I leaned toward voting NO because I believed the proposal carried substantial technical and execution risk relative to its scale and the current Treasury situation. The architecture involving BitVM, Mithril, recursive ZK proofs, and trust-minimized Bitcoin bridging is highly ambitious, and I still believe careful evaluation is necessary regarding long-term operational stability and execution at production scale.

    However, after spending more time reviewing the proposal and reconsidering Cardano’s current position, I ultimately came to the conclusion that Cardano must seriously pursue initiatives capable of creating real economic demand and attracting external liquidity into the ecosystem.

    At the current stage, I believe one of Cardano’s greatest challenges is not the lack of technology, but the lack of sufficiently strong economic gravity compared to competing ecosystems. Cardano already possesses strong research, decentralization, security, and technical foundations. However, in areas such as capital inflow, liquidity, DeFi activity, and real market demand, the ecosystem still has significant room for growth.

    From that perspective, I believe this proposal represents one of the few initiatives directly attempting to address that structural challenge by bringing Bitcoin liquidity and Bitcoin-native financial activity into Cardano.

    I also highly value the proposal’s attempt to explore alternative approaches beyond traditional DeFi models through non-margin lending, oracle-minimized infrastructure, trust-minimized bridge architecture, and Treasury repayment mechanisms. In particular, I believe the idea of treating Treasury funding not merely as grant distribution, but as a long-term ecosystem investment mechanism with potential returns, is an important direction for Cardano governance to explore going forward.

    Of course, this proposal carries significant technical ambition and execution complexity, and success is not guaranteed.

    However, after reconsidering Cardano’s long-term competitiveness and broader ecosystem trajectory, I came to believe that initiatives capable of attracting external liquidity, expanding real economic activity, and creating new demand layers are strategically necessary for Cardano’s future.

    For that reason, I have decided to support this proposal and vote YES.

    再考した結果、僕は本提案に対してYESを投じることに決めました。

    当初、僕は本提案に対してNO寄りの考えを持っていました。理由としては、BitVM、Mithril、recursive ZK proof、trust-minimized Bitcoin bridgeなどを含む全体アーキテクチャが非常に高度かつ野心的であり、現在のTreasury状況に対して提案規模や技術的難易度が高いと感じていたためです。実運用レベルでの安定性や長期的な実行可能性についても、慎重に見る必要があると考えていました。

    しかし、その後改めて提案内容や現在のCardanoの状況を考え直した結果、最終的には「Cardanoは、外部資本や実需を呼び込む挑戦を本格的に進めなければならない段階に来ている」と感じるようになりました。

    現在のCardanoにおける課題は、技術不足というよりも、「経済圏としての重力不足」にあると僕は考えています。Cardanoには優れた研究力、安全性、分散性、技術基盤があります。一方で、他チェーンと比較した際に、資本流入、流動性、DeFi活動、そして実際の市場需要という面では、まだ十分に強い状況とは言えません。

    その中で、本提案はBitcoin流動性やBitcoin由来の金融活動をCardanoへ取り込もうとしており、この構造的課題に真正面から挑戦している数少ない提案の一つだと感じました。

    また、non-margin lending、oracle依存を抑えた設計、trust-minimized bridge、Treasury返済モデルなど、従来のDeFiとは異なる方向性に挑戦している点も高く評価しています。特に、「Treasuryを単なるgrant配布ではなく、将来的なリターンを伴う長期的なエコシステム投資として扱おうとしている」という考え方は、今後のCardanoガバナンスにおいて重要な方向性になり得ると考えています。

    もちろん、本提案は技術的難易度も高く、大規模な挑戦であることに変わりはありません。また、成功が保証されている提案ではないとも考えています。

    しかし、現在のCardanoの立ち位置や長期的な競争力を改めて考えた結果、外部流動性の獲得、実需の拡大、そして新たな需要層の創出に繋がる取り組みは、今後のCardanoにとって戦略的に必要な挑戦だと考えるようになりました。

    そのため、今回は本提案を支持し、YESを投じます。

    Earlier votes

    No2mo agoSuperseded

    I have decided to vote NO on this proposal.

    First, I want to clearly state that I strongly support the overall vision and direction of this proposal. Bringing Bitcoin DeFi activity, external liquidity, and real economic demand into the Cardano ecosystem is, in my view, one of the most important strategic opportunities for Cardano at the current stage.

    I also highly appreciate the proposal’s attempt to pursue a different approach from traditional DeFi models through non-margin lending, oracle-free design, a trust-minimized BitVM bridge, and a treasury repayment model. In particular, I believe the idea of treating Treasury funding as a long-term investment mechanism rather than a simple grant distribution model is an important discussion for the future of Cardano governance.

    However, despite strongly agreeing with the direction, I believe the proposal currently carries substantial uncertainty from both a technical and market perspective.

    The architecture involving BitVM, Mithril, recursive ZK proofs, and the broader bridge infrastructure is extremely ambitious and technically complex. At this stage, I believe it is necessary to carefully evaluate whether such a system can realistically achieve production-grade security, operational stability, and long-term reliability.

    Most importantly, given the current Treasury situation, I believe allocating approximately 12 million ADA at this stage introduces a level of risk that is simply too large.

    This should not be interpreted as opposition to the proposal’s vision or objectives. On the contrary, I believe this represents one of the directions Cardano should seriously explore in the future. However, at the current stage, the scale of the proposal relative to its uncertainty makes me believe a more cautious approach is appropriate, and for that reason I have decided to vote NO.

    僕は本提案に対してNOを投じます。

    まず前提として、僕は本提案の思想や方向性そのものには強く共感しています。Bitcoin DeFi市場をCardanoへ取り込み、外部流動性や実需をエコシステムへ呼び込もうとする方向性は、現在のCardanoにとって非常に重要なテーマだと考えています。

    また、non-margin lending、oracle-free設計、BitVMを活用したtrust-minimized bridge、そしてTreasuryへの返済モデルなど、既存DeFiとは異なるアプローチに挑戦している点についても高く評価しています。特に、「Treasuryを単なるgrant配布ではなく、将来的なリターンを伴う投資的な仕組みへ近づけようとしている」という考え方は、今後のガバナンスにおいて重要な議論になり得ると感じています。

    一方で、現時点では、本提案には技術面・市場面の両方で高い不確実性が存在すると考えています。

    特に、BitVM、Mithril、recursive ZK proofなどを含む全体アーキテクチャは非常に高度であり、実運用レベルで安全かつ安定的に運用できるかについては、慎重に見る必要があると感じています。

    そして何より、現在のTreasury状況を踏まえると、約1200万ADA規模の資金をこの段階で投じるには、リスクが大きすぎるように感じました。

    僕は、本提案の方向性や問題意識そのものを否定しているわけではありません。むしろ、Cardanoが今後向かうべき方向性の一つとして非常に重要な挑戦だと考えています。しかし、現時点では提案規模に対して不確実性が大きく、限られたTreasury資金を配分する優先順位としては慎重に判断すべきだと考え、今回はNOを選択しました。

  • Dave
    No73.1M ₳Rationale

    I vote NO. The Treasury is not a VC firm. Fronting 12.29M ADA for a private venture forces us to shoulder all market risk whilst privatising the upside. It also unfairly weaponises public funds against dedicated long term ecosystem builders. EBITDA offers no real financial protection.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    building a robust Bitcoin DeFi and credit layer is technically compelling, I fundamentally reject the premise that a public, decentralised Treasury should act as an angel investor for private, commercial enterprises.

    This proposal requests over twelve million ADA to seed a private venture, introducing a gross asymmetry of risk and reward. We are being asked to socialise the massive downside whilst privatising the upside. The refund clauses outlined in Section 6.5 only protect the Treasury against a failure to ship code; they offer zero protection against a failure to find market fit. If the platform launches but fails to attract volume, the ADA holders absorb a one hundred percent financial loss. Conversely, if it successfully captures its projected multi billion dollar market, the private founders will reap the overwhelming majority of the wealth generated, entirely subsidised by our public capital.

    Furthermore, the proposed repayment mechanism is structurally flawed. Pogun promises to return twenty percent of its EBITDA until repaid. However, for an unlisted private entity, EBITDA is a notoriously malleable metric. Because it represents earnings after operational expenses, a private venture can effortlessly suppress its EBITDA to zero through aggressive expensing, inflated administrative costs, or high executive compensation, thereby legally circumventing any obligation to repay the Treasury whilst remaining perfectly compliant with the agreement.

    Additionally, deploying public capital to fund this venture actively weaponises the Treasury against our existing ecosystem builders. We have dedicated founders who have demonstrated long term commitment to Cardano, bootstrapping their own credit and liquidity protocols through immense personal effort. Subsidising a new competitor with twelve million ADA of public money creates an entirely unlevel playing field. The Cardano Treasury exists to fund vital public goods and core open source infrastructure. If this venture represents such a lucrative commercial opportunity, its founders should secure funding through traditional private capital markets. I absolutely cannot support deploying public funds to underwrite private risk.

  • Martin Lang
    No69.4M ₳No rationale
  • Peter Bui
    YesChanged62.7M ₳History

    Earlier votes

    Abstain2mo agoSuperseded

  • Dori
    No53.8M ₳Rationale

    I'm voting NO on the Pogun and Blockfrost governance proposals.

    Both proposals are clearly important and meaningful for the ecosystem, but with limited treasury assets, we have to vote based on priorities to make sure those funds get used efficiently.

    First, on the broader question of commercial proposals: we already have Catalyst and Orion Fund in place as channels for projects to raise funding. I don't think it makes sense for the treasury to additionally invest in commercial companies and commercially-oriented projects on top of that.

    Blockfrost is genuinely the dominant RPC service in the Cardano ecosystem, but they run a business model with a paid premium tier. The argument that they need a subsidy because they hold 90% market share actually cuts the other way for me. It risks blocking other competitive indexer services from entering the market, undermining fair competition, and further entrenching their monopoly position. I think the healthier path for Blockfrost is to raise outside investment, or apply through Orion Fund or Catalyst, and let their business model prove its sustainability in fair competition with other players, rather than relying on treasury support.

    Pogun is an attractive proposal given how important Bitcoin DeFi is in this market. The revenue-return structure is a step up from a standard grant, but at the end of the day it's still a commercial project. If IO truly believes this is a strong business, the right move is for them to seed it with their own capital. Same as with Blockfrost, they should apply to Orion Fund, go through Catalyst, or pursue external seed investment. There's also a fairness issue here, since other BTCfi and bridge projects are already building in this space. If treasury money goes as a grant to some projects and not others, you end up distorting the market.

    My view is that the treasury is public-good capital, and it should be concentrated on the areas the market can't fund on its own, the shared infrastructure that benefits the entire Cardano ecosystem. Commercial projects should be funded through the channels built for that purpose, Orion Fund and Catalyst, plus the external capital markets.

  • Goofycrisp
    Abstain50.5M ₳Rationale

    Bitcoin DeFi on Cardano could become a major strategic narrative, and the proposal has potential upside, especially if revenue can return to the treasury. However, there are also valid concerns about overlap with existing ecosystem builders already working in this area and whether this is the highest-priority use of treasury funds right now. I support the direction in principle, but I am not fully convinced this specific allocation should be approved at this stage.

  • hix_coffeepool
    No50.4M ₳Rationale

    I am voting No on this proposal. As a DRep, I evaluate all treasury withdrawal governance actions against my published voting framework, with a focus on the healthy development and long-term sustainability of the ecosystem. This proposal does not meet the framework's requirements, and I am voting No on that basis.

  • AdaStat
    Yes50M ₳Rationale

    I decided to vote Yes, since I believe the long-term value for the ecosystem outweighs the requested funds.

  • Chris-O
    Yes49.5M ₳No rationale
  • PoolTool
    Yes47.6M ₳No rationale
  • HISAI
    No42.9M ₳No rationale
  • Patrick_Tobler
    Yes40.1M ₳Rationale

    I believe this is a strong proposal and I'm a strong supporter of the Bitcoin DeFI Narrative on Cardano. The team seems strong and there is a very clear path towards a payback to the Cardano Treasury outlined, which is fantastic and exactly what we want to see.

    I would've prefered this to be an equity component instead of a revenue share though, so that the project has a chance at future fundraising and hyperscaling.

  • drep1yffcjs0njfe...
    No38.1M ₳Rationale

    I believe DeFi should remain a competitive market where projects succeed or fail based on product quality, execution, security, and adoption.

    Treasury funds are probably better focused on shared public infrastructure rather than specific commercial DeFi ventures. This type of project feels more suitable for Catalyst or private fundraising, so I’ll vote No.

  • Linda - Cryptofly
    AbstainChanged37.8M ₳History

    Earlier votes

    Yes2mo agoSuperseded

  • Liqwid DAO
    Abstain36.9M ₳No rationale
  • MUEN
    Yes34.6M ₳Rationale

    技術的に信頼できるIO Groupが、失敗した場合には未支出分を返金するというガードレールを設けて挑戦するのであれば、CardanoのTVL不足を解消する起爆剤として検討する価値は十分にあり。

  • Socious
    Yes34.3M ₳Rationale

    Socious votes Yes. Pogun requests 12,290,000 ADA (about $2.95M) to build a Bitcoin liquidity and credit engine on Cardano — an oracle-free peer-to-peer credit market, a yield layer, and a BitVM-based bridge — delivered in stages through 2026.

    The opportunity is real and largely uncontested: Bitcoin is a roughly $1.5T asset with very little native DeFi, and no ecosystem has yet won that market. Pogun is positioned to bring external Bitcoin liquidity onto Cardano rather than redistribute existing ADA, which is the kind of net-new value the Treasury should be willing to seed.

    Socious weighed this proposal carefully, because treasury funding of a market-facing commercial venture is a different category from funding core infrastructure, and the execution and competitive risk is genuine. Two features tip the balance to Yes. First, the staged delivery through 2026 means funding tracks demonstrated progress rather than arriving as a single lump. Second, Pogun's commitment to return 20% of EBITDA to the Treasury until repaid, then 5% in perpetuity, reframes the withdrawal as closer to an investment than a grant — and sets a precedent worth encouraging for commercially-oriented proposals. Socious supports it, and will judge later tranches on delivery against the quarterly roadmap.

    ソーシャスは本提案に賛成します。Pogunは12,290,000 ADA（約295万ドル）を求めるもので、Cardano上にBitcoinの流動性・信用エンジンを構築します。内容は、オラクルに依存しないピアツーピアの信用市場、利回りレイヤー、そしてBitVMを用いたブリッジで、2026年を通じて段階的に提供されます。

    機会は現実のものであり、競合もまだ少ない領域です。Bitcoinはおよそ1.5兆ドルの資産でありながら、ネイティブなDeFiがほとんど存在せず、その市場をまだどのエコシステムも取れていません。Pogunは、既存のADAを再配分するのではなく、外部のBitcoin流動性をCardanoに取り込む狙いであり、これはトレジャリーが進んで初期投資すべき、純粋な新規価値の創出にあたります。

    ソーシャスは本提案を慎重に検討しました。市場と向き合う商業的な事業へのトレジャリー出資は、コアインフラへの出資とは性格が異なり、実行リスクと競争リスクも現実に存在するからです。それでも賛成へと傾けたのは二つの点です。第一に、2026年を通じた段階的な提供により、資金が一括ではなく実績に沿って投入されること。第二に、資金回収まではEBITDAの20%を、その後は恒久的に5%をトレジャリーへ還元するという約束が、この引き出しを助成というより投資に近いものへと位置づけ直し、商業性のある提案について後押しに値する前例となることです。ソーシャスは本提案を支持し、今後の資金分配については四半期ロードマップに対する実績で判断していきます。

  • HOSKY
    Abstain33.5M ₳Rationale

    Abstain. ₳12.29M for a BTC credit market, yield app, and BitVM bridge. The 20% then 5% perpetual return is the right precedent, but Cardano already has BTC DeFi live (Indigo iBTC, Wanchain wanBTC, Liqwid, Fluid Tokens) so the policy bet is too speculative to endorse. Structure deserves to ride.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    Abstaining. ₳12.29M treasury withdrawal for a BTC credit market, yield app, and BitVM bridge, with a 20% EBITDA return to the Cardano Treasury until USD-equivalent funding is repaid and 5% in perpetuity thereafter. The repayment structure is the right precedent and the policy bet is too speculative to endorse. The Cardano First framework reads in opposite directions across pillars:

    Economic Sustainability: Lead reason for not voting No. The 20% EBITDA, then 5% perpetual, return is the bar every large treasury withdrawal should meet from here on. Pogun is the first proposal in this slate that ties the recipient to the treasury's long-term P&L rather than only to a delivery milestone. The return is contingent on Pogun reaching positive quarterly EBITDA, which is uncertain given the existing Cardano BTC DeFi stack.
    Adoption: Lead reason for not voting Yes. Cardano is not virgin territory for BTC DeFi. Indigo Protocol's iBTC has been live for over a year and provides synthetic BTC exposure without bridging. Wanchain's wanBTC has been on Cardano since 2023 and gives the chain a working BTC bridge today. Liqwid is the established Cardano money market and already handles BTC-pegged collateral. Fluid Tokens is already running peer-to-peer lending on Cardano, the exact category Pogun's non-margin credit market is positioned in. Pogun's differentiation (BitVM-based trust-minimized bridging, unified credit-plus-yield-plus-bridge product) is real but not yet production-grade.
    Scalability: The Q4 2026 bridge delivery is gated on BitVM3 maturing past research. The §6.5 refund trigger covers the binary "fundamentally infeasible" case but not the partial-failure mode where the bridge ships but never reaches the institutional security profile the thesis requires.
    Governance Transparency: Standard Intersect 2025 TRSC pattern (milestone-gated disbursement, third-party Assurer, five refund triggers, auto-abstain delegation). Same shape we voted Yes on for Pebble + Gerolamo and Dingo. Pillar engaged and clean.

    Risks I'm accepting with this Abstain:

    Perpetual-return precedent unanchored at the DRep level. A Yes here would have entered the 20% + 5% perpetual return shape onto the record as DRep-endorsed. Abstain is silent. The precedent will need to be re-established by the next proposal that adopts it.
    Withholding capital from an action whose administrative structure is sound. The Intersect 2025 TRSC framework here is the same shape we voted Yes on for Pebble + Gerolamo and Dingo. An Abstain on a structurally-compliant action signals that policy concerns can outweigh administrative soundness.
    Asymmetric treatment of risk-bearing proposals. This is a "late-into-a-locally-served-niche" call against incumbents already shipping, not a blanket rule against ambition.

    The structure is the right precedent and deserves to ride. The policy bet is not, and we do not yet have the evidence to endorse it at the DRep level. Abstain.

  • Aichi/Tokai_DRep
    No31.4M ₳Rationale

    I am voting No on this proposal.

    Sundial already provides a public-good foundation for a BitVM-based BTC bridge on Cardano.
    Given this existing work, the requested amount in this proposal presents an unfavorable cost‑to‑risk balance, and the public‑good value of the project is relatively limited.

    For these reasons, I cannot support the proposal.

  • FIMI
    Yes31.1M ₳No rationale
  • NEDSCAVE.IO
    No30.7M ₳No rationale
  • Cerkoryn
    Yes27.9M ₳Rationale

    As the self-proclaimed #1 fan of the DeFi Kernel concept, Pogun is one of the most exciting proposals I've seen. I am relieved to see that the lending primitives are being designed as open-source, public infrastructure. Additionally, the treasury payback plan and indefinite royalties are more than enough in my mind to justify spending public funds on a commercial venture. I do have some slight reservations about transparency in regards to the possibility of a token launch in the future, and some lesser concerns about protocol fees for using Pogun's lending primitives that may stifle competition. However, in my mind the potential benefits vastly outweigh the risks of this proposal, making it an easy YES for me.

  • TERA DRep
    No27.9M ₳No rationale
  • Drep One
    Yes27.5M ₳No rationale
  • Florian Volery
    No26.3M ₳Rationale

    There are enough credit solutions on Cardano, and all can accept Bitcoin as collateral as soon as it will be available.

    Just to name a few: Liqwid, Fluid, etc.

  • Blockjock (James Meidinger)
    Yes26.1M ₳Rationale

    Rationale — Pogun: Capital Without Compromise
    Header

    Bitcoin liquidity is the largest unlocked market in crypto. Pogun is a direct attempt to bring that capital into Cardano and make it productive.

    Constitutional Gate

    Assessment: Conditional Pass

    The proposal aligns with ecosystem growth, sustainability, and long-term utility. It includes KPIs, milestones, repayment mechanics, audits, reporting, and refund protections.

    The main concern is execution risk, especially around BitVM, bridge delivery, and multi-layer product complexity.

    Decision Declaration

    Vote: YES — High conviction, with execution risk acknowledged.

    This is closer to a treasury-backed investment proposal than a traditional grant. The upside is meaningful if delivery is successful.

    Core Rationale

    Pogun proposes a Bitcoin DeFi system on Cardano built around non-liquidation credit markets, yield infrastructure, and a trust-minimized BTC bridge.

    The strongest argument is that it brings external BTC liquidity into Cardano rather than recycling existing ADA liquidity. This could expand Cardano’s DeFi base, improve TVL, and create new credit markets.

    Strategic Alignment

    The proposal supports BTCfi expansion, institutional adoption, cross-chain liquidity, and treasury sustainability.

    It also aligns with Cardano’s broader need to attract external capital and build productive financial infrastructure.

    Economic Impact

    Pogun targets up to $450M in base-case TVL and includes a treasury return model through 20% EBITDA repayment plus a 5% perpetual return.

    That structure shifts the proposal from simple spending toward an investment-style model with potential recurring upside for the treasury.

    Execution Risk

    The risk is material.

    Key risks include BitVM feasibility, BTC bridge execution, timeline slippage, and adoption assumptions.

    Those risks are partly mitigated through phased funding, milestone gates, audits, independent verification, and refund clauses.

    Accountability

    The proposal includes milestone-gated disbursement, independent verification, audits, refund protections, and on-chain revenue visibility.

    These controls do not eliminate execution risk, but they make the proposal more governable.

    Stablecoin Utilization

    The proposer should define how received ADA will be managed against downside volatility. Converting an appropriate portion into stablecoins would help protect operating runway, audit costs, development budgets, and milestone delivery.

    The treasury disbursement process should also consider staged or rules-based stablecoin conversion where predictable purchasing power is required.

    Relying on ADA to remain at a certain price is not a treasury strategy.

    End-User Lens

    For users, this could allow Bitcoin holders to access credit and yield without selling BTC or relying on liquidation-heavy lending structures.

    For builders, it introduces new primitives around BTC liquidity, credit markets, and yield infrastructure.

    For capital providers, it creates potential exposure to fixed-rate credit and transferable debt instruments.

  • Kyle Solomon
    No25.3M ₳No rationale
  • wolf31o2 (Chris Gianelloni)
    No23.5M ₳Rationale

    I'm not voting yes on anything with a token. The treasury takes all of the downside risk. I'm also not convinced that we're bringing significant Bitcoin liquidity. This is the latest "next thing" and I don't see Bitcoiners chomping to deploy their coins.

  • Duc Tiger
    AbstainChanged22M ₳History

    Earlier votes

    No2mo agoSuperseded

  • DINO
    No21.5M ₳No rationale
  • Hephaestus Stake Pool [HEPHY]
    Abstain21.5M ₳No rationale
  • Moonstake
    Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
  • CTEC-Stake-Pool
    Yes20.3M ₳No rationale
  • Chris [STR8] - Straightpool
    Yes19.9M ₳Rationale

    This is a no-brainer YES vote for me.

    The most important part is the production ready open standard DeFI Kernel with peer-to-peer and non-custodial DeFi with non-margin credit market. With Russel on the advisory board, I am confident this will be a success. This can't come soon enough. With all the centralized DeFi exploits on other protocols, the overall market is ready for serious DeFi like this. This is the first DeFi on all protocols, I am interested in partaking myself. We absolutely need this to get Bitcoin liquidity on chain and to activate the 99% of ADA stake not active in our current speculation playground DeFi.

    The Yield component toggled on and off with a "single-click" is in my understand the implementation of the original Bitcoin DeFi toggle button idea. Finally, this is in a proposal! I have been waiting on this. There is hoping official Bitcoin wallets will also include this toggle outside of Lace wallet, once this sees enough adoption. Yield in combination with DeFi Kernel is a killer combo in my view.

    To benefit from the vast Bitcoin liquidity using best-in-class secure DeFi enabled by the first two components, we need a trust-minimized bridge. This is what the third part is about to complete the picture.

    Charms is really close already on finding a good solution for this, I wouldn't mind the team help the Charms team to overcome their last hurdle to upgrade zkVM SP1 of SuccinctLabs to produce Groth16 over BLS12-381, instead of pursuing their own solution with BitVM with unclear outcome. The race for the first truly trust-minimized Bitcoin - Cardano bridge is on.

    I am confident in the stellar team, as well.

    Overall, this is a must win proposal in my book.