Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ada
Discussed in the Governance Review for epochs 653 to 655.
44 DReps voted · 22 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
Voting concentration
4 of 44 DReps cast half of the voted power.
Largest voter 34.3%, top 5 combined 62.7% of 1.3B ₳ voted.
- Abstain445.8M ₳Rationale
I vote ABSTAIN on "Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ada".
1.My own honest view is YES. Lowering minPoolCost only lowers a floor; it forces no pool to change its setting and widens the options for small pools. This is a direction I have long supported, and I voted YES on the previous bundled action (Part 2) for the same reason.
2.What changed my judgment is the SPO reaction to that previous action. Of the 247 pools that voted, 59 (20% by stake) voted an explicit No, consistently citing "introduce minMargin first" and "75 ADA does not cover operating costs". The non-votes weigh even more. When the same Plutus limit change was proposed on its own (Part 1), 316 pools voted Yes and it passed; with minPoolCost bundled in (Part 2), Yes fell to 147 pools, and default No from non-voting pools made up 56% of the tally. In the same epochs (646–653), 302 pools voted Yes on the committee update, so this was not forgetfulness. I read it as broad, silent opposition from operators on the ground.
3.This time the change is a standalone economic parameter, so SPOs have no vote and that opposition has no path into the tally. Taking this broad, silent pushback from SPOs into account, I abstain. I will consider YES on a proposal that comes with a mitigation SPOs can accept, such as pairing it with the introduction of minMargin.「Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ada」にABSTAINを投票します。
1.私自身の素直な意見はYESです。minPoolCostの引き下げは下限を下げるだけで、各プールに設定変更を強いるものではなく、小規模プールの選択肢を広げます。以前から支持してきた方向であり、前回の抱き合わせ提案（Part 2）にも同じ理由でYESを投じました。
2.判断を変えたのは、前回のアクションに対するSPOの反応です。投票した247プールのうち59プール（stake比20%）が明示的にNoを投じ、理由は「minMarginを先に導入すべき」「75 ADAでは運営費を賄えない」で一貫していました。さらに重いのは無投票です。同じPlutus上限の変更を単独で出したPart 1では316プールがYesを投じて可決したのに、minPoolCostを同梱したPart 2ではYesが147プールにとどまり、無投票プールの既定Noが判定分母の56%を占めました。同じepoch 646〜653の委員会更新には302プールがYesを投じているので、投票忘れではありません。現場のオペレータからの広範な無言の反発と観測しています。
3.今回は経済パラメータ単独のためSPOに投票権がなく、その反発が票に現れる経路がありません。現場のSPOからの広範な無言の反発を加味して、今回の判断は棄権とします。minMarginの導入とセットにするなど、SPOの理解を得やすい緩和策を伴う提案であれば、YESを検討します。 - No112.5M ₳Rationale
I vote NO on “Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ada.”
This proposal conflates the delegator reward penalty affecting small pools with the long-term sustainability of stake pool operators.
Reducing minPoolCost to 75 ADA may improve the displayed return for delegators, but it does not improve block production frequency, delegated stake, operating costs, or income stability. Seventy-five ADA is not sufficient to support sustainable pool operations and lowering the floor may instead increase competitive pressure on operators to reduce fees further.
A larger number of pools does not automatically make the network more decentralized. What matters is the number of genuinely independent operators, the distribution of stake, multi-pool concentration, pledge, infrastructure diversity, and whether operators have a sustainable economic foundation. Increasing the number of economically unviable pools does not provide meaningful decentralization.
Cardano needs a broader redesign of stake pool incentives, including minPoolMargin, k, pledge influence, the reward curve, and incentives for multi-pool operation. Reducing one parameter in isolation does not address these structural issues.
This proposal offers a partial adjustment that may weaken operator sustainability without solving the underlying incentive problem. I cannot support treating a short-term improvement in delegator returns as a sufficient decentralization policy. Therefore, I vote NO.
「Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ada」にNOを投票します。
本提案は、小規模プールにおけるデリゲーターの報酬低下と、SPOの持続可能性を混同しています。
minPoolCostを75 ADAへ下げれば、デリゲーターの表面的な利回りは改善します。しかし、ブロック生成頻度、委任量、運営コスト、収入の安定性は何も改善しません。75 ADAは持続可能なプール運営を支える金額ではなく、実際にはSPO間の値下げ圧力を強める可能性があります。
また、プール数が多ければネットワークが分散化するとは限りません。重要なのは、プールの総数ではなく、独立した運営主体の数、ステークの分布、マルチプール運営による集中、プレッジ、インフラの多様性、そして各運営者が長期的に活動できる経済基盤です。採算の取れないプールを増やしても、実質的な分散化にはつながりません。
現在必要なのは固定費だけをさらに引き下げることではなく、minPoolMargin、k、プレッジ、報酬曲線、マルチプールへのインセンティブを含む、ステークプール報酬制度全体の見直しです。
本提案は根本的な問題を解決せず、SPOの持続可能性を弱めかねない部分的な変更です。短期的な利回り改善を分散化と同一視することには賛成できないため、NOと判断します。
- Abstain88.1M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes ABSTAIN on the parameter update reducing minPoolCost from 170 ada to 75 ada.
This is a constructive abstention. SIPO supports the direction of repairing small-pool economics, and on 7 August voted Yes on the earlier action that bundled this same reduction with the Plutus memory increase. Since then SIPO has looked more closely at what the previous reduction actually achieved, at whom a further reduction would reach, and at the sequencing the underlying research recommends. On that evidence SIPO does not oppose this change, but does not endorse it in this form.
First, the 2023 reduction from 340 ada to 170 ada did not change the structure it was meant to change. The Input Output Research SPO incentives report (November 2025) finds that 340 ada remains the most common fixed cost at every pool size, that the reduction did not cause a market-wide fee reduction, and that it instead split the market into incumbents at 340 ada and challengers at 170 ada. The proposal itself states that the 2023 reduction alone did not resolve the underlying structural pressure. SIPO's own reading of the ledger on 15 September is consistent with this. Among 2,672 pools with active stake, 1,747 declare 340 ada and hold 67.6 percent of active stake, while 503 declare 170 ada and hold 22.7 percent, including pools run by large institutional operators.
Second, the benefit of a further reduction is narrow. Using epoch 653 averages of about 290.7 ada per block, ignoring pledge effects and block variance, and assuming a zero margin, the change materially moves delegator returns only for pools of roughly 0.5 to 3 million ada. At 1 million ada, delegator return rises from about 0.90 percent to 1.60 percent. At 10 million ada, it rises from about 2.02 percent to 2.09 percent. Pools in the 0.5 to 3 million ada band number 342 and hold about 2.2 percent of active stake. Pools below 0.5 million ada expect fewer than one block every two epochs, and a lower floor does not change that. For operators at the floor, fixed-fee income falls from 12,410 ada to 5,475 ada a year.
Third, the sequencing departs from the research. The same report concludes that minPoolCost should be lowered to zero or removed, but suggests pairing that with a minimum margin parameter to prevent a race to the bottom on fees, and recommends that the minimum margin proposal be analysed with a corresponding reduction or elimination of the fixed cost considered alongside it. The proposal describes the long-term trajectory as zero, or replacement by the proportional minPoolMargin of CIP-23. This action takes the fixed-cost step on its own, before that safeguard exists. The proposal's own reversion plan also notes that a later revert cannot compel pools that have lowered their cost to raise it again, so the step is effectively one-way.
SIPO states its own position plainly. Each of SIPO's pools declares a fixed cost of 340 ada, so this change has no mechanical effect on SIPO's revenue. SIPO is also on the incumbent side of the market described above. A No from SIPO could reasonably be read as protecting incumbents, and blocking a change that carries no direct cost to SIPO is not a position SIPO wants to take on these grounds. An abstention records the concern without casting that weight against the proposal. Because this is an economic parameter, stake pool operators have no vote on it, which is correct under the guardrails. As an operator that is also a DRep, SIPO records the operator-side concern here.
SIPO would vote Yes on a proposal that pairs a reduction of the fixed cost with a minimum margin mechanism, or on one that arrives with a published model of operator income by pool size showing that independent operators remain viable at the new floor.
This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep は、minPoolCost を 170 ADA から 75 ADA へ引き下げるパラメータ更新に、棄権（ABSTAIN）を投じます。
これは建設的な棄権です。SIPO は小規模プールの経済性を立て直すという方向を支持しており、8 月 7 日には、同じ引き下げを Plutus メモリ上限の引き上げと束ねた前回のアクションに賛成しました。その後 SIPO は、前回の引き下げが実際に何をもたらしたのか、さらなる引き下げが誰に届くのか、そして根拠となる研究がどの順序を勧めているのかを、あらためて確認しました。その結果、SIPO は本変更に反対はしませんが、この形のままでは支持もしません。
第一に、2023 年の 340 ADA から 170 ADA への引き下げは、変えようとした構造を変えていません。Input Output Research の SPO インセンティブ報告（2025 年 11 月）は、340 ADA があらゆるプール規模で依然として最も多い固定費設定であること、引き下げが市場全体の手数料低下を起こさなかったこと、そして市場が 340 ADA の既存勢力と 170 ADA の挑戦者に二分されたことを示しています。提案自身も、2023 年の引き下げだけでは根本的な構造的圧力は解消されなかったと述べています。9 月 15 日に SIPO が台帳を確認した結果も、これと整合します。アクティブステークを持つ 2,672 プールのうち、340 ADA を宣言するのは 1,747 プールでアクティブステークの 67.6%、170 ADA は 503 プールで 22.7% です。後者には、大規模な機関系事業者が運営するプールも含まれます。
第二に、さらなる引き下げの効果が及ぶ範囲は狭いです。エポック 653 の平均である 1 ブロックあたり約 290.7 ADA を用い、pledge の効果とブロック数のばらつきを無視し、マージン 0% と仮定すると、委任者の利回りが意味のある幅で動くのは、おおむね 50 万〜300 万 ADA のプールに限られます。100 万 ADA のプールでは約 0.90% から 1.60% へ上がりますが、1,000 万 ADA のプールでは約 2.02% から 2.09% です。50 万〜300 万 ADA の帯にあるプールは 342 で、アクティブステークの約 2.2% です。50 万 ADA 未満のプールは 2 エポックに 1 ブロックも見込めず、下限を下げてもその状況は変わりません。下限に張り付く運営者の固定費収入は、年 12,410 ADA から 5,475 ADA に減ります。
第三に、順序が研究の勧めと異なります。同じ報告は、minPoolCost は 0 に下げるか廃止すべきだとしつつ、手数料の底なし競争を防ぐために最低マージンという新しいパラメータと組み合わせることを示し、最低マージン案を分析する際に、固定費の引き下げや廃止もあわせて検討するよう勧告しています。提案自身も、長期の行き先をゼロ、または CIP-23 の比例型 minPoolMargin による置き換えと記しています。本アクションは、その安全装置がまだない段階で、固定費の一歩だけを先に進めます。さらに提案の Reversion Plan は、後から元に戻しても、すでに固定費を下げたプールに引き上げを強制できないと述べており、この一歩は実質的に一方通行です。
SIPO は自らの立場を明示します。SIPO のプールはいずれも固定費として 340 ADA を宣言しており、本変更は SIPO の収益に機械的な影響を与えません。同時に SIPO は、上で述べた市場の既存勢力の側にいます。SIPO の反対票は既存勢力の防衛と受け取られても不思議ではなく、SIPO に直接のコストが生じない変更をこれらの理由で止めることは、SIPO の取りたい立場ではありません。棄権は、懸念を記録しつつ、その重みを提案への反対には投じない選択です。本件は経済パラメータであり、ガードレール上、SPO の投票対象ではありません。これは正しい設計です。そのうえで、SPO でもある DRep として、SIPO は運営者側の懸念をここに記録します。
固定費の引き下げを最低マージンの仕組みと組み合わせた提案、または新しい下限でも独立系の運営者が成り立つことを示す、プール規模別の運営者収入モデルを伴う提案であれば、SIPO は賛成を投じます。
本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- Yes87.8M ₳Rationale
Allowing a free market with respect to minPoolCost is more consistent with the ethos of crypto. It's unclear whether this will actually allow smaller pools to compete more effectively with established pools in a real on-the-ground measurable way. But, history seems to indicate that allowing the free market to do its thing (barring any tragedy of the commons externalities) is generally the more fruitful path. While a minPoolCost of zero would be a true free market, this seems right directionally.
- Yes80.5M ₳No rationale
- No69.8M ₳Rationale
As a DRep and SPO, i am voting ❌NO on this proposal, because we need a minMargin parameter of at least 5% first before thinking about to lower minPoolCost even more. Does not make any sense to me, there is still a threshold which puts small pools in a disadvantage. Getting rid of minPoolCost while introduction minMargin is the way to go! But i am against any lowering of minPoolCost without introducing a minMargin parameter with a sustainable number parameter first.
- No65.2M ₳No rationale
- No55.8M ₳Rationale
Voting NO. This lowers the floor on SPO income without changing the total reward pool. At current prices 75 ADA per epoch is roughly $23-73 per month, below the cost of running a pool. The 2023 reduction did not resolve the same pressure, and the proposal concedes this is a stopgap.
I am voting NO on this Parameter Change reducing minPoolCost from 170 ADA to 75 ADA.
I agree with the problem this proposal identifies. Block rewards have fallen from roughly 1,800 ADA at Shelley launch to around 300 ADA today, while infrastructure costs have risen. Small pool operators are under genuine and worsening pressure, and the delegator penalty on single-block pools is a real structural distortion. The concern is legitimate.
But minPoolCost is a distribution parameter, not a supply parameter. It determines how a pool's rewards are split between the operator and delegators. It does not increase the reward pool by a single ADA. Lowering it moves income from operators to delegators, in the hope that improved advertised return on staking attracts delegation that does not currently exist. The total available to the ecosystem is unchanged either way.
Ironically, the proposal itself concedes that this measure will have limited effect. minPoolCost was already halved from 340 to 170 ADA in 2023, yet the proposal reports that of 1,614 active pools, 873 operators (54%) remain below the delegation threshold associated with consistent block production, acknowledging that the 2023 reduction did not resolve the underlying structural pressure. The proposal further projects that even after this reduction, the delegator penalty on single-block pools reaches 100% by around epoch 758 in February 2028. The proposal describes itself as a stopgap, and that description is accurate. That is precisely why I cannot support it as a response to the problem it identifies.
The proposal is framed entirely in ADA-denominated ratios, restoring the delegator penalty from roughly 52.8% toward 25%. It never states what the resulting income is in the currency operators actually pay their costs in. For a pool producing one block per epoch, 170 ADA per epoch is roughly 12,410 ADA per year, and 75 ADA per epoch is roughly 5,475 ADA per year. At recent ADA prices, that is on the order of 50 to 165 US dollars per month at the current floor, and 23 to 73 US dollars per month at the proposed floor. At that level many SPOs will be unable to operate even a minimal block producer with relays. The current setting is already below viability for these operators. The proposed setting is not a smaller version of the same problem; it is outside the range in which the question is meaningful. Margin income does not close this gap: for a pool at the floor producing one block per epoch, margin on the residual reward amounts to a few ADA per epoch.
This exposes the deeper issue. The proposal optimises an ADA-denominated ratio while the binding constraint on operators is denominated in fiat. Cardano's monetary design assumed that declining reserve emission would be offset by increasing scarcity supporting the price of ADA. Over the period I have measured, that relationship does not hold: reward per block and ADA price have declined together, and the precondition of the design has been undermined. Reserve emission reduces new supply and works toward scarcity, while Treasury withdrawals release ADA into circulation and work against it. When the second exceeds the first, the mechanism that was supposed to support operator economics through price does not operate. No adjustment to the split between operators and delegators addresses this.
There is a further consequence that sits beyond this action but bears on it. Falling reward levels weaken the incentive to hold ADA in self-custody. ADA moved to custodial venues such as centralised exchanges is, in current practice, either delegated by the custodian rather than by its owner, or removed from effective delegation altogether. Declining effective delegation therefore carries a governance concentration risk, not only an SPO income risk. Cardano provides no self-correcting mechanism here: because pool rewards are calculated against total supply rather than active stake, undistributed rewards return to the reserve and the yield for remaining delegators does not rise as participation falls. Nothing pulls participation back on its own.
Before lowering the fee floor again, the ecosystem should answer why rewards continue to decline and whether that trajectory is acceptable. Specifically, whether the 20% Treasury allocation of monetary expansion remains appropriate given the observed effect of Treasury withdrawals on circulating supply, and how the transition from reserve emission to fee-based sustainability will be managed. This proposal treats those answers as given and optimises around them.
I would support a reduction in minPoolCost, or its replacement by a proportional minPoolMargin under CIP-0023, as part of a package that also addresses the size of the reward pool. Presented on its own, this change lowers the floor on operator income without improving operator viability, and defers the question that actually determines whether small pools survive.
For these reasons I vote NO.
[Japanese version follows / 日本語版]
minPoolCostを170 ADAから75 ADAへ引き下げる本パラメータ変更案に対し、反対票を投じます。
本提案が指摘する問題については同意します。Shelleyローンチ時に約1,800 ADAあったブロック報酬は現在約300 ADAまで低下し、一方でインフラコストは上昇しています。小規模プールオペレーターが実際に、そして悪化する圧力にさらされていること、1ブロックプールにおける委任者ペナルティが構造的な歪みであることは事実です。問題意識そのものは正当だと考えます。
しかしminPoolCostは分配のパラメータであって、供給のパラメータではありません。プールの報酬をオペレーターと委任者の間でどう分けるかを決めるだけであり、報酬の総額を1 ADAも増やしません。引き下げは、オペレーターから委任者へ収入を移し、表示上のリターン改善によって、現在存在していない委任を呼び込むことを期待するものです。エコシステムが受け取る総額は、どちらに転んでも変わりません。
皮肉なことに、本提案自身がこの提案があまり効果がないことを認めています。2023年に、minPoolCostを340 ADAから170 ADAへ半減する施策も行われましたが、現在も1614のアクティブプールのうち873オペレーター（54%）が安定的なブロック生成に必要な委任量の閾値を下回ったままとなっていることを明記しており、つまり2023年の引き下げは根本的な構造的圧力が解消しなかったことを認識しています。そして本提案においても、今回の引き下げを行ってもなお、1ブロックプールの委任者ペナルティが2028年2月頃、エポック758あたりで100%に達すると見込んでいます。本提案は自らを応急措置と位置づけており、その記述は確かにその通りです。そしてそれこそが、本提案を、それ自身が指摘する問題への回答として支持できない理由です。
本提案は全体がADA建ての比率で構成されており、委任者ペナルティを約52.8%から25%へ戻すと説明しています。しかし、その結果としてオペレーターが得る収入が、実際にコストを支払う通貨でいくらになるのかは一度も示されていません。1エポックに1ブロックを生成するプールの場合、170 ADAは年間約12,410 ADA、75 ADAは年間約5,475 ADAです。近時のADA価格では、現行フロアで月あたり概ね50〜165米ドル、提案されるフロアで月あたり概ね23〜73米ドルとなります。ブロックプロデューサーとリレーという最小構成であっても、この金額では多くのSPOが運用できなくなるでしょう。つまり現行の設定がすでに採算ラインを下回っており、提案される設定は同じ問題の程度が小さい版ではなく、議論が成立する範囲の外にあります。マージン収入はこの差を埋めません。フロアにいる1ブロックプールの場合、残余報酬に対するマージンは1エポックあたり数ADAにとどまります。
ここに、より深い問題が表れています。本提案はADA建ての比率を最適化していますが、オペレーターを実際に制約しているのは法定通貨建てのコストです。Cardanoの通貨設計は、リザーブからの新規供給が減少することで希少性が高まり、ADA価格がそれを補うという前提に立っていました。私が計測した期間において、この関係は成立していません。ブロックあたり報酬とADA価格は、ともに低下しており、設計の前提条件が損なわれています。リザーブ減衰は新規供給を減らし希少性を高める方向に働きますが、トレジャリー引き出しはADAを流通に放出し、それを打ち消す方向に働いています。後者が前者を上回るとき、価格を通じてオペレーターの採算を支えるはずだった機構は機能しません。オペレーターと委任者のあいだの分配をどう調整しても、これには作用しません。
本アクションの範囲を超えますが、関連する帰結がもう一つあります。報酬水準の低下は、ADAを自己管理下で保有し続ける動機を弱めます。そして現在、CEXなどのカストディアルな場所に移されたADAは、保有者本人ではなくカストディアンによって委任される、もしくは有効委任から解除されることが多いのが現状です。したがって実効委任率の低下は、SPOの収入の問題であると同時に、ガバナンス集中のリスクでもあります。そしてCardanoには、ここに自己修正の機構がありません。プールの報酬はアクティブステークではなく総供給量に対して計算されるため、未配分の報酬はリザーブに戻り、参加率が下がっても残った委任者の利回りは上昇しません。参加を自然に引き戻す力がどこにも存在しないということです。
手数料フロアを再び引き下げる前に、エコシステムはなぜ報酬が低下し続けているのか、そしてその軌道が許容できるものなのかに答えるべきです。具体的には、トレジャリー引き出しが流通供給に与えている観測された影響を踏まえたうえで、金融拡大の20%をトレジャリーに配分するという設定が今も妥当なのか、そしてリザーブ由来の発行から手数料による持続可能性への移行をどう管理するのか、という問いです。本提案はこれらの答えを所与のものとし、その周辺を最適化しています。
報酬プールの規模そのものに対処する施策とあわせて提示されるのであれば、minPoolCostの引き下げ、あるいはCIP-0023によるminPoolMarginへの置き換えを支持します。しかし単独で提示された本変更は、オペレーターの収入の下限を引き下げるだけで、オペレーターの存続可能性を改善せず、小規模プールが生き残れるかどうかを実際に決定づける問いを先送りしています。
以上の理由により、反対票を投じます。
- No40.2M ₳Rationale
While this proposal aims to “improve the competitiveness of small-scale pools,” simply lowering the numerical values of the parameters while leaving the fixed-cost structure intact will not resolve the root causes, such as the downward trend in rewards and disparities in marketing capabilities. On the contrary, it even carries the risk of worsening the profitability of honest individual operators and weakening civic resilience due to excessive competition to lower fees. Therefore, we oppose mere numerical adjustments that do not involve a fundamental review of the revenue-sharing model itself (such as the introduction of a percentage-based system or the redesign of pledge mechanisms).
- Yes36.9M ₳No rationale
- No34.5M ₳Rationale
No. Lowering minPoolCost to 75 ADA gives small pools more pricing flexibility, but I need stronger evidence of sustainable operator outcomes and a defined review plan. I accept that retaining 170 ADA leaves the current small-pool disadvantage in place.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Vote: No
I do not support reducing minPoolCost from 170 ADA to 75 ADA through this standalone change. The fixed-fee burden on delegators to small pools is real. My concern is whether this adjustment produces durable improvements in independent operator viability, and how that outcome will be measured.
Under the HOSKY Cardano First framework, I need a clearer case for the proposed transition across Decentralization and Economic Sustainability.
Pillar analysis
Decentralization (lead pillar)
Lowering the floor gives small pools more flexibility to offer competitive returns. It does not force any operator to lower its fee, and I recognize that the proposal's account of the 2023 reduction does not support claiming an inevitable market-wide race to the bottom.
The intended outcome, however, is more viable independent pools. Improving the return advertised to delegators is one part of that outcome. The proposal expects small pools to respond to competitive pressure by lowering their fees, but whether the resulting delegation gains compensate for lower fixed-fee income depends on actual behavior. I am not satisfied that this tradeoff has been resolved well enough for another standalone reduction.
I would want the evaluation to track independent operators retaining or gaining viable delegation, operator income and concentration together. A fee reduction alone is not a sufficient measure of success.
Economic Sustainability
This action changes reward distribution; it does not create additional rewards or reduce the cost of running infrastructure. Pools that choose a lower fee accept less fixed-fee income for a given reward pot in exchange for the possibility of attracting more delegation. That can be a sensible choice, but its effect on long-term operator viability remains the decision I need to assess.
The proposal itself describes 75 ADA as an interim step toward more structural reform, including a proportional minimum margin. I prefer a clearer transition plan that evaluates those changes together and explains how independent operators remain viable as reserve-funded rewards decline. That preference carries a real cost: structural reform takes longer than a parameter adjustment available today.
Governance Transparency
The requested value is explicit, the rationale is public, and the action changes only minPoolCost. The proposal identifies adverse effects that could justify reconsideration, but does not set a review schedule or quantitative decision thresholds for judging whether the change has helped operator viability.
I would want those measures and the responsibility for publishing the evaluation specified in advance. They would give delegators and operators a common basis for assessing the outcome and any subsequent adjustment.
Risks I'm accepting with this No
1. Keeping the current disadvantage for small pools
The existing floor can consume a large share of rewards in pools producing few blocks. A No leaves that pressure in place and may prevent some independent operators from attracting delegation. This is the strongest argument against my position.
2. Delaying an available improvement
The proposed reduction could provide useful relief while broader reform is developed. Waiting for a clearer transition may cost time that small operators do not have. I accept that risk, while recognizing that the unchanged setting also needs scrutiny.
Decision
The problem deserves action, but I am not persuaded that this standalone reduction has a sufficiently defined path to sustainable independent operation and measurable follow-up. No.
- Yes28.3M ₳Rationale
Generating enough transaction fees for Cardano to sustain itself is one of the toughest challenges we face. But there are two sides to the equation. Network revenue is just the numerator. The denominator is operating costs. And reducing operating costs is arguably the only other way we have to meaningfully affect self-sustainability.
minPoolCost prevents pools from competing to lower operating costs, and it props up pools that cannot operate as cost-efficiently. That’s likely one reason we still have roughly 3,000 registered pools and over 1,600 active pools even though stakePoolTargetNum is set to 500. Having a minimum margin instead (CIP-23) fixes the issue as well, but at the cost of time. It is at least two hard forks and another parameter change governance action away, but our endeared community SPOs are already being forced to close left and right.
Personally I want as many honest pools as possible to be successful, and the original incentives structure was beautifully designed to do exactly that. But we have to give the parameters some tender loving care. To get where we want to be, successful pools should be able to compete primarily on pledge, and then on operating costs, without sacrificing performance. Lowering the minimum fixed fee is the first step to get there, and I'm putting my own money where my mouth is to see it through.
If we want Cardano to last, we need to attack the problem from both directions and let SPOs fairly compete to lower costs.
Vote to lower minPoolCost to 75.
- No27.2M ₳No rationale
- No20.3M ₳Rationale
Hard NO. 75 ADA minPoolCost is not sustainable under current market conditions.
Before reducing minPoolCost any further, we must first introduce a minMargin in the 5–10% range to ensure sustainable SPO operations.
SPOs voted down this proposal only a few epochs ago, albeit in another context where it was bundled with a Plutus update. Parameters that directly affect stake pool economics should not be changed without adequate SPO support.
See also my Constitution Amendment Proposal: “Require SPO Approval for Changes to Stake Pool Economic Parameters”
https://cap.intersectmbo.org/#/detail/10 - No20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes16.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes7.6M ₳Rationale
Imagine two Cardanos.
Cardano A has 100 highly efficient professional operators.
Cardano B has 1,000 geographically, politically and organizationally independent operators, even if some of them are less efficient or simply different.
A may look better from a narrow efficiency perspective. I still prefer B. Redundancy and resilience have value - especially in complex networks. Apparent efficiency can mask tail risk.
If the 170 ADA minPoolCost puts smaller pools at a structural disadvantage and pushes delegation towards larger operators, reducing it to 75 ADA is reasonable. It does not guarantee greater decentralization, but it removes some of the pressure working against it.
I understand there are economic realities for every SPO. Reducing minPoolCost potentially reduces operator income. I support 75 ADA as an incremental step. My support for 75 ADA should not be read as support for any particular future change to SPO parameters.
Essentially, I am willing to accept some inefficiency in exchange for greater resilience. Cardano does not need maximum efficiency if greater concentration leads to a system that may prove to be more fragile when unexpected threats emerge.
- Yes6.8M ₳No rationale
- No5.7M ₳Rationale
After careful (re-)consideration, we do not hold this to be appropriate under the current conditions.
- Yes5.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.3M ₳Rationale
Following up with my previous support:
Improves small-pool competitiveness.
Looks to be pragmatic and in the right direction, even if not perfect.
- Yes5.2M ₳No rationale
- No5M ₳Rationale
While reducing the minimum pool cost (minPoolCost) from 170 ADA to 75 ADA might appear beneficial to small stake pools at first glance, this move actually poses significant risks to the security and decentralization of the Cardano network.
First, the minimum fee was established to prevent a "race to the bottom" and guard against Sybil attacks. Drastically lowering this fee reduces financial barriers, making it easy for large entities such as exchanges to spin up numerous "clone" pools with rock-bottom fees to attract delegations. Paradoxically, this could lead to even greater centralization of power.
Second, operating a stable, secure, and professional stake pool entails real infrastructure maintenance costs (servers, electricity, network connectivity, etc.). Excessively low fees might force operators to cut corners by using substandard systems, thereby undermining the reliability of the entire network.
This is why, during the vote held in early September, the majority of SPOs (approximately 65.5%) rejected a similar proposal. Rather than altering a single parameter in isolation, the network requires a more comprehensive overhaul (such as simultaneously adjusting the K parameter and the a0 pledge influence factor). Consequently, voting "No" at this juncture is a prudent decision to safeguard Cardano's core economic structure.
- No2.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.7M ₳Rationale
私は本Protocol Parameter Changeに賛成します。
minPoolCostを170 ADAから75 ADAへ引き下げることで、小規模SPOに「自分の取り分を減らしてDelegatorへの還元率を上げる」という競争手段を与えることができます。これは、固定費によって小規模Stake Poolが受ける構造的不利益を緩和し、Cardanoの分散化を支える妥当な暫定措置だと考えます。
これはSPOに75 ADAを強制するものではなく、将来的なminPoolMarginなど報酬制度の抜本的改善までの橋渡しです。
I vote YES on this Protocol Parameter Change.
Reducing minPoolCost from 170 ADA to 75 ADA gives smaller SPOs the option to reduce their own fixed fee and improve returns for delegators. This helps reduce the structural disadvantage faced by smaller stake pools and supports Cardano’s decentralization.
This does not force SPOs to set their fee at 75 ADA. I see it as a reasonable interim step toward broader reward-system reforms such as minPoolMargin.
- No2.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.1M ₳Rationale
I vote YES to reduce
minPoolCostfrom ₳170 to ₳75.I supported this change when it was previously bundled with the Plutus memory-limit increase, and I support it even more strongly now that the two unrelated parameter changes have been separated.
The fixed
minPoolCostincreasingly disadvantages smaller and independent stake pools as block rewards decline. For pools producing only one or a few blocks per epoch, a fixed ₳170 cost can consume a disproportionately large share of gross rewards, reducing returns to delegators and making smaller pools less competitive against large and multi-pool operators.Reducing the floor to ₳75 does not force SPOs to charge ₳75. It simply gives operators greater freedom to determine an appropriate cost structure for their own pool and allows greater competition within the staking market.
I also believe unbundling this change is better governance.
The previous action required an SPO vote because it included security-relevant Plutus parameters. This standalone change affects only
minPoolCost, which is an economic protocol parameter and therefore correctly follows the DRep and Constitutional Committee ratification path without requiring an SPO vote.SPO views remain extremely valuable, and the linked CIP-179 survey provides an excellent mechanism for gathering wider ecosystem input on the longer-term direction of Cardano's pool fee structure.
This should not be seen as the final solution to staking economics. I continue to support broader work around proportional minimum margins,
k, pledge incentives and other mechanisms that can improve the viability of independent operators while strengthening decentralisation.But reducing
minPoolCostto ₳75 is a sensible, evidence-based interim step.More flexibility. More competition. Fewer structural disadvantages for smaller pools.
I vote YES.
- No1.8M ₳Rationale
BKIND votes No. At action 154 I opposed both the bundling and the cut. This resubmission resolves the bundling objection; the objection to the cut stands: it acts on the income of the operators it is meant to help, and repeats a 2023 reduction that left no trace. Re-measured at epoch 653.
Action: parameter change 75e7882a8ef2bc...dd9b#0, Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ada.
What is being decided. One parameter moves: minPoolCost from 170 to 75 ada. I verified the on-chain payload: only that change, with the correct predecessor reference and guardrails script. Without the bundled security parameter of action 154, SPOs cannot vote on this action; DReps and the Constitutional Committee decide alone.
I verified the document I am voting on. The blake2b-256 digest of the bytes retrieved from https://gateway.pinata.cloud/ipfs/bafkreidy6ftyudcx6lwkualmjbgkurhlqo35s6jarq3phxendcr5el6n34 equals the anchor hash recorded on chain, e32f6117912d810c82f0f153e7bf787024870ddb82601113e580c7d86bd8f384.
At action 154 I voted No with a full rationale on chain: I supported the Plutus memory increase, opposed this cut, and objected that one vote could not record both. The proposer has now unbundled the two, which is the form my rationale asked for, and I credit that. This vote is therefore about the cut alone.
The mechanism is unchanged since I analysed it at 154. The fixed fee recovers an operator's fixed costs, which do not scale with stake, and discloses those costs on chain; minPoolCost is read in exactly one place in the ledger, the validation that refuses a certificate priced below it. It stops underpricing and enables nothing else. The proposal expects market pressure to push declared fees down to the new floor: pressure to declare a fee other than what the pool costs to run, the behaviour the minimum exists to prevent. I do not object to revisiting the level. I object to converting a disclosure of costs into an instrument of price competition.
The measurement, re-run at epoch 653 across the 765 public operators (margin below 100%) whose pool earned a reward: removing 95 ada costs the median operator 21.2% of take-home income; the 233 operators declaring exactly 170 lose 39.2%; the lowest income class (88 operators) 52.1%, the highest (97 operators) 6.3%. The 98 pools at 100% margin are untouched, collected 66.1% of all operator income that epoch, and paid their delegators 1.8 ada in total. At 154 (epoch 645) these figures were 21.3, 38.7, 51.5, 6.2 and 67.8 percent: materially unchanged, on both of my independent data sources.
A small operator has two options and no third: match the lower fee and lose that income while the servers cost what they cost, or hold it and advertise a lower return to delegators who compare precisely that number. Competition on a fixed fee is competition in who can best afford to give up fixed income, and that is by construction the party who needs it least.
BKIND votes No. The form of this action is right; the mechanism inside it is unchanged, measured twice now, eight epochs apart, with the same result. I vote to keep power dispersed, and keeping the operators we have is part of that (govActionId 75e7882a8ef2bc...dd9b#0).
- No1.8M ₳No rationale
- No1.6M ₳Rationale
As I stated before, I won’t approve reducing minPoolCost to 75 ada at this moment in time. I want to see a minPoolMargin introduced, preferably with a value of at least 5%, ideally 10%, together with setting minPoolCost to 0 ada. As long as this new parameter isn’t introduced, I don’t think it’s wise to further tinker with minPoolCost.
- Yes1.2M ₳Rationale
Small pools are disadvantaged by a min pool cost. A reduction leads to more equitable return for delegators who want to support a smaller pool
- No1.1M ₳Rationale
My vote stands at "No" for the same reasons outlined before. Why vote for another tactical reduction when the previous tactical reduction already proved insufficient?
There's still no concrete evidence that reducing minPoolCost from 170 to 75 ADA is necessary: the market did not collapse after the 2023 reduction, and the proposal itself shows that 340 ADA remains the dominant setting. Lowering the floor may improve short-term competitiveness for marginal pools, yet it also reduces treasury inflows and risks postponing the structural work that matters more, namely transaction-fee growth, sustainable network demand, proportional pool economics, and a credible path toward minPoolMargin.
Even if we lower the minPoolCost again, the core economic fact does not change, because** minPoolCost is a distribution parameter. It does not create one additional ADA of rewards! It only changes who gets how much of an already shrinking pie. And if the pie is the problem, which it is, arguing over slice geometry is not a strategy**. This ain't rocket science. Also, let's not forget that SPOs pay costs in fiat. Therefore, dropping the floor to 75 ADA does not magically make a marginal pool viable once SPOs have to pay for living costs in the real world! If anything, it risks pushing operators into a worse position while pretending the network became fairer.
The culprit is reward decay and the absence of structural reform. Cutting the floor again is just another round of parameter fiddling while the actual economic model keeps slipping. We must stop treating declining reserve rewards as a reason to keep lowering the floor and instead require the economic model, namely minPoolMargin pathway (I'd say 5%-1% seems realistic) and fee-growth strategy to advance together.
- Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
- No984.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes866.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes622.2K ₳No rationale
- No569.9K ₳No rationale
- No357K ₳Rationale
Since this is a repeated attempt to change this parameter, I'll copy my rationale from last time:
75 Ada ($17.17 today after a recent Ada price pump) per epoch is NOT sustainable for any pool, and especially not for small single pools which make up all of Cardano's real distribution and allow it to be decentralized. Lowering minPoolCost with no other method of fair operator rewards in place would be wildly irresponsible. "It's just a minimum" is a tone-deaf misunderstanding of the reality of operating a stake pool. Small single pools must always stick to the minimums to stay competitive and retain delegators, and lowering the minimums pushes them away due to the costs associated with running and maintaining a stake pool. Without these small pool operators the chain would soon be captured by massive multi-pools and centralized exchange pools using user funds to profit and vote - these lower the minimum attack vector significantly and create a massive risk for the network. - Yes317.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes140.2K ₳No rationale
- Yes100.8K ₳No rationale
- Yes90.5K ₳Rationale
Reducing minPoolCost to 75 ada eases a fixed fee that disproportionately penalises small pools, helping them stay competitive.
- Yes6.8K ₳No rationale