Reforming Treasury Governance
141 DReps voted · 48 with a rationale · 3 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Abstain584.2M ₳Rationale
Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on Reforming Treasury Governance. Yoroi acknowledges the importance of thoughtful treasury governance reform for the long-term health of the Cardano ecosystem.
- Need for Broader Consensus:
As a non-binding signalling action on a structurally significant topic, Yoroi opts to abstain and reserve its position until there is greater clarity and broader community consensus on the direction of treasury reform. We will engage further as the discussion develops.
- Need for Broader Consensus:
- Abstain435.8M ₳Rationale
Abstain. I do not oppose the overall idea. However, the most difficult question is ultimately how this strategic entity and expert commission would be selected and organized, and as long as that remains unresolved, it is hard for me to vote YES. The proposal does state that implementation is out of scope, but unless at least the selection and organizational process is defined—even in rough outline—I find it difficult to say YES even at the level of an idea.
As we all know, even Intersect—into which enormous sums were invested, with substantial support from the treasury as well—was unable to fulfill this role. The Cardano Foundation, of course, has not been able to do so either, and frankly, it does not even appear to be interested in doing so.
Abstain。全体的なアイデアとしては、反対しませんが、結局のところ、この戦略的エンティティと専門委員会をどう選定、組織するかという点が最も困難であり、そこが未解決である限り、YESと投票することは難しいです。実装は範囲外と確かに記載されていますが、少なくともこの選定、組織のプロセスが大まかにでも定義されていない限り、アイデアレベルでもYESとは言いづらいです。
ご存知のように莫大な金額が投資され、トレジャリーからも相当の補助があったIntersectであっても、その役割を担うことができませんでした。Cardano財団ももちろん、それを行うことはできず、おそらくそれを行うことに興味がないようにも見えます。
- Abstain293M ₳Rationale
EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on Reforming Treasury Governance, with rationale outlined below.
This proposal touches on foundational governance architecture that warrants careful deliberation. The scope of the proposed changes is broad, and EMURGO believes that decisions of this nature benefit from wider community input and a more structured review process before DReps commit to a position. EMURGO abstains at this stage and will engage further as the discussion matures.
- Abstain222.9M ₳Rationale
This could already be attempted, but it will likely fail to get participation. What about proposals that come up after the budget round, wait for a year to attempt getting funding if it isn't urgent enough?
Whenever the major chunks of the budget are to be distributed, the FE will likely capture the entire process. The deciding group would then be a gatekeeper.
That's just a few thoughts and concerns from reading this proposal. No specific critique, just observations from the past 2 budget seasons.
- Abstain174.6M ₳No rationale
- Abstain165.7M ₳No rationale
- Abstain120.2M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes Abstain. We recognise the intent behind this Info Action, and we agree with several points raised. However we believe this topic warrants discussion on each point and that an Info Action is not the best forum to decide on all of these issues at once.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
We agree that, generally, improvements to Cardano governance and treasury withdrawals can be made as the ecosystem matures. This Info Action identifies many issues which can be improved, however the “how” of these improvements, the operational element, requires further discussion.
Specifically, we have identified the following issues as particularly salient to governance growth, and are actively discussing these with other community members:
Treasury budget, coordination and agreed use: we would caution that implementation of this should avoid centralization or bottlenecks to a single actor
DRep support: we agree that expert insights into Treasury Withdrawals could be amplified to support DReps in their evaluations.
We encourage discussion of the points raised in this Info Action across existing channels, e.g. Intersect or Cardano Forum, to obtain feedback on each point raised.
We also note that once a concrete proposal is available, a CIP may be the optimal forum for technical refinement and enforceable implementation.The Cardano Foundation votes ABSTAIN to this Info Action.
NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - Abstain92.2M ₳No rationale
- No91.5M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I have decided to vote NO on the proposal: Reforming Treasury Governance
My rationale:
I support the discussion opened by this proposal. Cardano needs a more coherent treasury process, and I agree that the current model of isolated treasury withdrawals is not sufficient for long-term strategic governance.
However, I cannot support the proposal in its current form because I have concerns about shifting decision-making power away from DReps and the community towards a strategic entity or expert commission.
Expert review can be useful. It can help with due diligence, technical evaluation, milestone assessment, and contract review. However, final accountability for Treasury decisions must remain with DReps and the community.
Any future model involving expert commissions or execution bodies must include strong transparency requirements, conflict-of-interest rules, clear appointment and removal mechanisms, public reporting, and meaningful oversight by DReps.
Changes to the Cardano Constitution should also accompany changes to the budget process and governance model.
The Constitution should more clearly separate the roles of voters (DReps) and executors. A party that can directly benefit from the approval of a proposal should not also act as a voter on that proposal.
Today, the rules are not applied evenly in practice. Some DReps abstain from voting on their own proposals, which can negatively affect approval, while Pentad members may support each other's proposals or their own proposal.
The Constitution should establish clear and consistent rules for all actors.
It may also be necessary to define additional governance roles and their competencies.
If an expert commission or execution body is established, elected DRep representatives should be part of it with one vote. They should have the right to review contracts under NDA where necessary.
DReps should retain the final authority to approve or reject recommendations made by such bodies.
Another important issue is cost. Establishing expert commissions or execution bodies can become expensive. Therefore, maximum compensation levels, budget limits, and accountability rules must be defined in advance.
Any future compensation model should avoid creating new imbalances. It would not be healthy for the governance system if execution bodies were generously compensated while DReps and CC members remained largely uncompensated.
Compensation should be transparent, proportionate, and aligned with responsibility.
The current Constitution addresses compensation primarily for Constitutional Committee members.
However, Treasury governance involves more actors and different kinds of responsibilities. DReps decide who receives funding, face significant public pressure, are asked for consultations, and are expected to provide rationales and oversight. The Constitution should address compensation more comprehensively for all governance actors.
The greater the DRep's voting power, the greater the responsibility and social pressure. The biggest ones are even forced to change their vote. Some DReps have already retired and left Cardano forever. This is an unacceptable situation.
One possible option is to allocate a small percentage of the NCL or approved budget, for example, 1–5%, to compensate for governance-related work. Another possibility is to link staking with governance in a way that better aligns incentives.
The NCL concept also needs reform. It should either be removed or turned into a proper protocol parameter. The protocol, or temporarily DReps, should ensure gradual allocation across the full NCL period. Allocating the entire budget at the beginning of a cycle is not a sustainable model.
The budget process should ensure that resources are distributed fairly across the ecosystem. Categories such as infrastructure, research, integrations, operations, ecosystem growth, tooling, education, and community support should be clearly defined.
Proposals should then request funding within specific categories, rather than forcing DReps to compare unrelated proposals against each other. We need a synchronization mechanism and to select the best proposals from many in a given category.
I would also support a multi-year planning model. DReps should approve a three-year strategic budget plan so that the ecosystem can see in advance which budget categories are expected to receive less funding over time, which categories are expected to receive more funding, and where future funding needs are likely to emerge. This would improve predictability, planning, and strategic alignment.
It is also essential that proposals follow a uniform format. If smaller submitters are expected to provide FTE estimates, cost breakdowns, and detailed milestones, the same requirements must apply to all proposals, including those submitted by founding entities.
Governance deserves deeper reform. These are only some of my thoughts, but they explain why I cannot support the proposed direction in its current form.
At the same time, I see this governance action as a useful starting point for debate. Every DRep may have a different view of what Cardano governance should look like, and this discussion is necessary.
However, any reform must preserve DRep accountability, prevent conflicts of interest, and ensure that Treasury governance remains transparent, fair, and community-controlled.
If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.
MANDA Pool ID:
pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8My DRep ID:
drep1y2m0g4r66pyaw3p7u454wc0p4f0ygm8ueaev0mgd3tvwm7sskqwqp - Abstain86M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes ABSTAIN on the info action "Reforming Treasury Governance."
This is a non-binding info action: it authorizes no treasury spending and changes no protocol parameter or the constitution. It invites the community to discuss reforming Cardano's treasury-governance process. Submitted by AtlasHub, it diagnoses a real dysfunction — that isolated treasury withdrawals are voted on one against another, turning distinct and independently important domains into a competition for scarce funds, which has bred conflict and contributed to a funding gridlock — and it sketches an alternative: DReps would vote on domain-structured budgets rather than on individual projects, under a three-stage process (Net Change Limit, then budget, then a consolidated withdrawal), prepared by an elected strategic entity and an elected expert commission across eight budget domains.
SIPO shares the diagnosis. SIPO's stated objective is to build sustainable decentralized governance for Cardano, and the present pattern — in which dozens of withdrawal actions are simultaneously voted down amid escalating friction — is not healthy treasury governance. The problem this action names is real and worth the community's attention.
SIPO does not, however, endorse this particular framework, and therefore does not vote Yes. Two of its central mechanisms sit in tension with principles SIPO has committed to as a DRep. First, delegating project evaluation and selection to an appointed expert commission, and reducing DReps to voting on budgets rather than on the funding of specific projects, narrows the direct, project-level scrutiny that SIPO regards as part of decentralized governance and of the "maximum utilization of direct voting functions" that SIPO's activity policy advocates. Second, the accountability, election method, capture-resistance, and removal process for the proposed strategic entity and expert commission are left unspecified, and concentrating budget preparation and project selection in two appointed bodies is a centralizing step that would require far stronger guardrails than a discussion sketch can provide. SIPO also notes that treasury and budget reform is already advancing through the established Cardano Budget Process route, which SIPO has supported, and SIPO prefers reform to converge and mature there rather than to endorse a parallel, single-author proposal at the sketch stage.
Nor does SIPO vote No, which on a discussion-stage info action would read as dismissing a legitimate and necessary conversation. Consistent with its policy of advocating for the community as a whole without being tied to any specific group or position, SIPO abstains: it recognizes the problem, engages in the discussion, and neither endorses nor rejects this specific, incomplete framework. SIPO remains committed to constructive treasury-governance reform and will continue to engage as concrete, well-guardrailed proposals develop. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep として、情報提案「Reforming Treasury Governance（財務ガバナンスの改革）」に棄権（ABSTAIN）を投じます。
本件は拘束力のない情報提案（info action）です。財務からの支出を承認するものでも、プロトコルパラメータや憲法を変更するものでもなく、Cardano の財務ガバナンスプロセスの改革について community に議論を呼びかけるものです。提案者 AtlasHub は現実の機能不全を指摘しています — 個別の treasury withdrawal が互いに対立する形で投票にかけられ、本来それぞれ独立して重要な各領域が「限られた資金の奪い合い」に変質し、対立を生み、資金供給の膠着を招いている、と。そのうえで代替案を素描しています。DRep は個別プロジェクトではなく領域別に構造化された「予算」に投票し、3 段階のプロセス（Net Change Limit → 予算 → 統合された引き出し）を、選挙で選ばれた戦略エンティティと専門家委員会が 8 つの予算領域にわたって準備する、というものです。
SIPO はこの診断を共有します。SIPO の掲げる目標は Cardano の持続可能な分散型ガバナンスの構築であり、現状 — 数十の withdrawal が摩擦の高まりの中で同時に否決されている状態 — は健全な財務ガバナンスではありません。本提案が名指しする問題は現実のものであり、community が向き合うに値します。
しかし SIPO は、この特定の枠組みを是認するものではなく、したがって賛成（Yes）は投じません。その中核をなす 2 つの仕組みが、SIPO が DRep としてコミットしてきた原則と緊張関係にあります。第一に、プロジェクトの評価・選定を任命制の専門家委員会に委ね、DRep を個別プロジェクトの資金供給ではなく「予算」への投票に縮小することは、SIPO が分散型ガバナンスの一部と位置づけるプロジェクト単位の直接的な精査を狭めます。これは SIPO の活動方針が掲げる「直接投票機能の最大限の活用」とも相反します。第二に、提案される戦略エンティティおよび専門家委員会について、その説明責任・選出方法・キャプチャ耐性・解任プロセスが未定義であり、予算の準備とプロジェクト選定を 2 つの任命制機関に集約することは中央集権化の一歩であって、議論段階の素描が提供できる以上に遥かに強固な guardrail を要します。加えて SIPO は、財務・予算改革が既に、SIPO も支持してきた既存の Cardano Budget Process のルートを通じて前進していることを指摘し、改革はそこで収斂・成熟すべきであって、素描段階の単独提案を並行して是認することは望ましくないと考えます。
一方で SIPO は反対（No）も投じません。議論段階の情報提案への No は、正当かつ必要な議論そのものを退けると読まれかねないからです。特定の group や立場に与せず community 全体を代弁するという方針に従い、SIPO は棄権します — 問題を認識し、議論に参加し、この特定の未完成な枠組みを是認も否認もしない、という立場です。SIPO は建設的な財務ガバナンス改革へのコミットを維持し、具体的で guardrail の整った提案が発展していくのに合わせて関与を続けます。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- No84.3M ₳Rationale
I do not favor removing the ability of individual proposals to reach the DReps without going through a centralized budget. I am unpersuaded that would be an improvement. Sounds like more centralization and more bureaucracy. Some on the inside would surely prefer that. But, I am unconvinced it would be a net benefit for our decentralized ecosystem or that it is even philosophically consistent with decentralization.
- Abstain74.5M ₳Rationale
I strongly agree with the proposal’s assessment that Cardano’s current treasury governance lacks strategic direction and that individual funding proposals are often forced into unnecessary competition with one another. A more structured budgeting process and long-term strategic planning would likely benefit the ecosystem.
However, the proposal’s central concepts—the Strategic Entity and Expert Commission—remain insufficiently defined. It is unclear how these bodies would be selected, governed, held accountable, or protected from conflicts of interest.
There is also a risk that this proposal simply relocates existing governance challenges rather than solving them. Creating an expert commission raises new questions about who evaluates the experts, who oversees them, and how neutrality is maintained.
In addition, sustained participation from qualified experts requires well-designed incentives and accountability mechanisms, which are not adequately addressed in the proposal.
I believe the concerns raised are valid and worthy of further discussion. However, I do not believe the governance model outlined here is sufficiently developed to support a Yes vote at this stage. Therefore, I abstain.
本提案が指摘する「現在のTreasuryガバナンスには明確な戦略や予算構造が欠けており、個別提案同士が不必要に競合している」という問題意識には強く共感します。Cardanoが持続的に成長するためには、より戦略的な予算編成や長期的な方向性が必要であるという点には賛成です。
しかしながら、本提案の中核である「Strategic Entity」と「Expert Commission」については、どのように選出し、どのように監督し、どのように利益相反を防ぐのかが十分に示されていません。
また、現在の課題を新たな組織へ移管しただけになる可能性もあります。専門委員会を設置したとしても、その専門性や中立性を誰が評価するのかという新たなガバナンス課題が生まれます。
さらに、専門家による継続的な活動には適切なインセンティブ設計が必要ですが、その運営モデルについても具体性が不足していると感じます。
問題提起そのものは非常に価値があり、今後の議論を進めるべきテーマだと考えています。しかし現時点では、実現可能な制度設計として十分に成熟しているとは判断できないため、Abstainとします。
- No73.1M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO. While I agree the current treasury process is adversarial, creating an "Expert Commission" and a "Strategic Entity" centralizes too much power.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting NO. While I agree the current treasury process is adversarial, creating an "Expert Commission" and a "Strategic Entity" centralizes too much power. This distances the community from actual funding decisions and risks reducing DReps to mere rubber stamps for top-down omnibus budgets. We must solve DRep cognitive overload through better tooling and voluntary coalitions, not by creating centralized bureaucracy that removes our granular oversight.
- Abstain62.7M ₳No rationale
- No53.8M ₳Rationale
I'm voting No on the Reforming Treasury Governance proposal.
First off, I actually agree with a good part of the problem this proposal is pointing at. Even so, the reason I'm voting No is that I think the fix it proposes goes in the opposite direction of solving that problem.
The core issue is that [h] a term-based strategic entity and [i] an appointed expert commission would concentrate the power to prepare, propose, and select projects for the budget, while [f] and [g] would cut off the path for individual proposals to reach DReps directly.
That means gathering the strategic direction and the funding-allocation decisions into a small set of appointed bodies, and it shrinks the DReps' role down to basically rubber-stamping a budget the commission has already put together.
On top of that, I can't really agree with the way this bundles nine propositions of quite different natures into a single Info action and asks for one up-or-down vote, when this is the kind of broad, constitution-level reform that deserves better.
I recognize the value of raising the issue, but I can't get behind a centralized budgeting body as the solution, so I'm voting No.
- Abstain50.5M ₳Rationale
I am abstaining because this proposal falls outside my area of expertise. I do not feel I have enough technical knowledge to make a fully informed decision for or against it.
- Yes50.4M ₳Rationale
I am voting "Yes" on this proposal. Although the details are needed to be discussed further, I welcome the awareness of current governance problems. As I expect this for a kick start, I support this proposal.
- Abstain50M ₳Rationale
Overall, I support the idea that governance needs reform. However, this proposal lacks sufficient detail, and many aspects are either not described at all or only addressed in very general terms. For that reason, I'm abstaining.
- No49.5M ₳No rationale
- No47.6M ₳No rationale
- Abstain36.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes34.6M ₳No rationale
- No31.4M ₳Rationale
I vote NO.
I agree with the overall direction of improving treasury governance and recognize the importance of establishing a more strategic and structured process. However, this information action does not define the concrete implementation process required to move from concept to execution.In particular, the proposal does not specify the responsible entity, the method for selecting such an entity, or the scope of authority it would hold. Without clarity on these foundational elements, it is difficult to assess how the proposed reforms would function in practice.
For these reasons, I cannot support this action at this stage.
- Yes31.1M ₳No rationale
- Abstain27.9M ₳Rationale
I think this Info Action is somewhat of a step in the right direction, but not quite a workable solution. In my opinion we definitely need to figure out some way to separate planning and spending into two separate things. That way the treasury withdrawals themselves end up being more of a formality to carry out the agreed-upon plan. Splitting spending into different category buckets is one way of doing that, but I'm not sure how we get to that point simply from reading this info action. Will vote ABSTAIN because I am not convinced one way or the other.
- No26.1M ₳No rationale
- No23.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain21.5M ₳No rationale
- No21.5M ₳Rationale
I vote NO on the info action “Reforming Treasury Governance” (5d3a1f657fe330b51b459ca9b482fc1a3b6e3336227f880d8a058771c23e3ce2#0).
This may be just an Info Action but it does not mean that we should lower proposal standards this far into year 2 of Cardano governance. DReps and CC members are already seriously overburdened this year without having to spend even more time voting on poorly executed governance actions. This action is unconstitutional out of the gate for not having an immutable metadata anchor link. It uses a standard GitHub url which could have been easily resolved by using a GitHub permalink. It also does not follow the CIP-108 standard of using GitHub markdown styling which has led to improper rendering of HTML tags on governance explorers. We have test networks explicitly for this purpose, with Preprod having recently lowered the govAction deposit amount to allow better access for testing govAction submissions. With a 100,000 ada deposit that has real world value, and often tax event implications, I find it hard to understand why more care is not taken with some proposals.
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain19.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes17.3M ₳Rationale
IO: Hydra
- Abstain16.7M ₳Rationale
We support the need to reform Cardano treasury governance. The current process is too fragmented, reactive, and difficult for DReps to evaluate consistently. Large and unrelated proposals are often assessed in isolation, without clear categories, shared priorities, or uniform standards for transparency, accountability, and milestones.
However, we are not ready to fully support this direction as presented. Treasury reform must not shift too much decision-making power away from DReps and the community toward expert commissions or execution bodies. Expert review can be useful, but final accountability should remain with elected governance actors.
Any improved model must include clear conflict-of-interest rules, transparent appointment and removal processes, public reporting, budget limits, and consistent requirements for all proposers, including founding entities.
We also believe this discussion should continue in a more structured way. The emerging DRep DAO aims to address some of these issues by bringing DReps together to discuss treasury standards, proposal evaluation, budget categories, and governance improvements. We encourage DReps to join the discussion and help design a better model: https://x.com/DRepDAO
For these reasons, we abstain. We agree that reform is needed, but the future model must preserve DRep accountability, improve transparency, and keep treasury governance community-controlled.
- Yes16.4M ₳Rationale
Vote: YES
This is a non-binding Info Action titled "Reforming Treasury Governance" (gov_action1t5ap7etluvct2x69nj5mfqhurgakuvekyflcsrv2qkrhrs378n3qq3z2c22), submitted on June 9, 2026 with voting closing July 13, 2026. It requests no funds and changes no protocol parameter. It diagnoses treasury governance as being in a poor state — a persistent funding impasse, and a treasury process that is pivotal to Cardano's stability and growth yet only indirectly addressed and barely supported by the existing governance system — and it calls on the community to collaborate on reforming that process, outlining guardrails for strategic direction that would require further refinement and eventual amendments to the current process and the Constitution.
Dracula DAO votes YES. The diagnosis is correct and overdue. The 2026 cycle made the dysfunction concrete: 69 proposals requesting roughly 331.6M ADA against a Net Change Limit debated between 350M and 500M, an IOG research roadmap that drew opposition from a large majority of DReps, and a Cardano Summit that won a majority but died for lack of a stake-weighted supermajority. That is not a healthy allocation process; it is a series of unstructured, high-stakes standoffs. Treasury governance today decides who gets paid before it has decided what should be built, and it does so with almost no machinery for reconciling competing claims. An Info Action that names this problem and opens a structured reform track carries essentially zero risk — no ADA leaves the treasury, no parameter moves, no ADA is burned — and real option value in shaping what comes next. Supporting the direction costs nothing and forfeits nothing.
The honest limitation is that this is a signal, not a solution. An Info Action "sketches basic ideas"; it commits no one to anything, and its guardrails are stated at a level of generality that could later be filled in well or badly. A YES here is a vote for the conversation, not a blank endorsement of whatever emerges from it. Dracula DAO will judge every concrete instrument that follows — constitutional amendments, revised budget frameworks, new NCL structures — on its specific merits, and will oppose any "reform" that concentrates discretionary spending authority, weakens on-chain DRep ratification, or substitutes a standing executive's judgment for verifiable delivery.
Dracula DAO enters this reform process with a specific position already on record. Treasury funds should be allocated as grants paid on completion of well-defined features — not as pre-funded team operating budgets. The DREP's proper role is to vote on what to build, while who gets paid and how much is pushed to competitive, sprint-based bidding: work broken into short stories that teams bid on, funded per sprint through a smart contract that pays out only on signed-off delivery and returns undelivered funds to the treasury. That model directly answers the two failures this action identifies — it breaks the funding impasse by separating feature prioritization from team financing, and it gives treasury governance the direct, accountable support the current system lacks. Milestone-gating with independent sign-off is a partial approximation of this, better than a lump sum but short of true competitive per-sprint bidding. We vote YES to reform treasury governance, and we will press for reform of this shape.
- Abstain13.3M ₳Rationale
RCADA votes ABSTAIN on Reforming Treasury Governance.
RCADA welcomes this Info Action as a serious and timely discussion starter. Treasury governance is one of the hardest problems Cardano now has to solve. The current process has exposed real weaknesses: fragmented proposal-by-proposal voting, DRep workload, limited shared budget strategy, difficult comparisons between unrelated funding domains, and community tension around scarce Treasury resources.
RCADA agrees with the core diagnosis. The Net Change Limit is a ceiling, not a budget. A collection of individual Treasury withdrawals does not, by itself, create a coherent strategy. Cardano would benefit from a clearer process for setting funding priorities, defining budget categories, reducing unnecessary competition between unrelated domains, and giving DReps better tools for evaluating proposals.
RCADA is especially interested in the proposed sequence of moving from the Net Change Limit, to a thematic budget structure, and only then to project evaluation. In RCADA’s companion deep-dive analysis, we identify this NCL → thematic budget → project selection sequence as one of the most promising and actionable parts of the proposal. We believe this idea deserves further development regardless of whether the community ultimately supports a strategic entity or expert commission.
However, RCADA is abstaining because the proposal remains a rough outline. That is not meant as a criticism of AtlasHub. The proposal itself is framed as an Info Action to open public discussion, not as a complete implementation plan. RCADA appreciates that approach. At the same time, an Info Action can still create a durable governance signal, and we do not want a Yes vote to be read later as endorsement of structures whose details are not yet defined.
The most important open questions relate to the proposed strategic entity and expert commission. RCADA is open to exploring expert input, structured budget planning, and professional review processes. These could help DReps make better decisions and could help Cardano develop a Treasury model that other ecosystems may learn from. But the next phase of discussion needs to define the operating model much more clearly.
For RCADA, future work should answer questions such as:
- What specific problem is each body solving?
- Would an expert commission be advisory, decision-making, or implementation-focused?
- Would DReps retain the final vote over actual Treasury withdrawals?
- Who would be eligible to serve?
- Would members be elected by DReps, elected by ada holders, appointed by institutions, selected by open application, or chosen through another process?
- Should these bodies include Cardano community members, independent external experts, technical specialists, financial reviewers, governance experts, or a mix?
- Would members be paid, contracted, reimbursed, or voluntary?
- If paid, who sets compensation and how is it capped?
- How would conflicts of interest be disclosed and managed?
- Could members evaluate proposals from organisations they are affiliated with?
- What recusal rules would apply?
- What transparency would be required around scoring, meeting notes, dissenting opinions, and recommendation logic?
- What appeal or challenge mechanism would proposers and DReps have?
- How would smaller builders and community projects be protected from insider gatekeeping?
- What term limits, sunset clauses, and re-ratification requirements would apply?
- How would the community measure whether the reform is actually improving Treasury governance?
These questions are not presented as a rejection of AtlasHub’s proposal. They are the next layer of design work RCADA believes is needed before any implementation proposal could be responsibly supported.
For RCADA, any future Treasury reform built around strategic entities, expert review, or thematic budgeting should be guided by minimum safeguards:
- DRep and delegator oversight must remain central. Expert review should inform decisions, not replace accountable voting.
- Authority must be narrow and explicit. Preparing, recommending, selecting, and implementing are different powers and should not be blurred.
- Participation must be open and competitive. Funding access should not depend on proximity to insiders or institutions.
- Conflicts of interest must be public and enforceable. Disclosure should be paired with recusal rules where direct conflicts exist.
- Review logic must be transparent. Scores, assumptions, dissenting views, and recommendation criteria should be published.
- Roles must be time-limited and reviewable. Any new body should include term limits, removal mechanisms, and sunset or re-ratification.
- Small proposers must remain protected. A more professional process should not become so complex that only large organisations can participate.
- The model should be piloted before becoming permanent. A trial cycle with public metrics would be safer than immediately embedding a standing structure.
These safeguards are RCADA’s own view of what would be needed for responsible implementation. They are informed by our governance values and the community concerns we have seen around accountability, open participation, conflicts of interest, transparency, decentralised oversight, and protection against insider gatekeeping. They are not presented as requirements already contained in the Info Action.
RCADA appreciates AtlasHub putting forward a structured starting point. The proposal does more than name the problem; it offers a possible sequence and budget framework that deserves further exploration. We would welcome deeper work on thematic budgeting, anti-bundling principles, project evaluation support, expert review design, and how a future Treasury process can remain both strategic and decentralised.
For these reasons, RCADA votes ABSTAIN. We support the need for Treasury governance reform and welcome further development of this proposal, but we are not ready to endorse the outlined model until the roles, safeguards, authority boundaries, and accountability mechanisms are more clearly defined.
RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here: "https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/."
RCADA has also prepared a companion deep-dive analysis to explore these trade-offs in more detail:
Reforming Cardano Treasury Governance: A Comparative Analysis and Reform Roadmap
https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/supporting%20docs/Cardano%20treasury%20governance%20reform.html - Abstain12.1M ₳Rationale
We acknowledge that treasury governance is a critical area of Cardano's long-term sustainability and agree that the ecosystem should continue exploring ways to improve how treasury resources are governed and allocated. The proposal identifies legitimate concerns regarding strategic coordination, long-term planning, and the current challenges surrounding treasury decision-making.
However, this governance action presents a high-level direction rather than a sufficiently defined governance framework. While it outlines the need for reform, it does not provide enough detail on the proposed governance model, institutional responsibilities, decision-making processes, accountability mechanisms, or how any new structures would interact with existing governance bodies. As a result, it is difficult to assess the potential benefits, risks, and unintended consequences of the proposed direction.
Our abstention should not be interpreted as opposition to treasury governance reform. Rather, we believe additional community discussion and more concrete proposals are needed before we can confidently support or reject a specific approach. We encourage future governance actions to provide greater clarity on governance design, transparency, conflict-of-interest management, accountability, and constitutional implications so that DReps can evaluate a well-defined framework on its merits.
- Abstain10.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain9.6M ₳No rationale
- No9.2M ₳No rationale
- Abstain8.8M ₳Rationale
私は本提案について棄権します。本提案は、財務ガバナンスに関する課題提起と複数の改善案を提示しています。財務ガバナンスの重要性や、現在のプロセスに改善の余地があるという問題意識については理解できます。一方で、本提案は議論のための基本的な考え方を提示するものであり、具体的な制度設計や実装内容を提案するものではありません。現時点では提案全体を支持または反対する判断材料としては十分ではないと考えるため、棄権します。\n\nI am abstaining on this proposal. This proposal raises issues regarding treasury governance and presents several ideas for improvement. I understand the importance of treasury governance and the view that there is room for improvement in the current process. However, the proposal presents basic ideas for discussion rather than proposing a concrete institutional design or implementation plan. At this stage, I do not believe there is sufficient basis to either support or oppose the proposal as a whole, and therefore I am abstaining.
- Abstain7.6M ₳Rationale
I ABSTAIN as I don't see this as a comprehensive proposal yet, but on the other hand I welcome debate on Reforming Treasury Governance
I welcome initiatives to improve processes. Many of the diagnostic elements in this governance action are evidently true. The proposed solution does have some suggestions for improvement. Some of the proposed ideas for improvement make sense - but this is not a concrete implementation and the proposer admits it is beyond scope here.
So, as it contains a snapshot of the situation and some elements that are food for further thought, I abstain.
I would point out that there are no experts who can actually transpose success to Cardano and it is hard to enlist such experts in the expert commission. The term expert commission might be alluring and might comfort us.
Domain expertise in a group of experts will not naturally result in a comprehensive strategy that is coherent. Like having an expert for car brakes, an expert for tires and an expert for headlights and an expert for interior design - who may all disagree on the best model of car that should be developed for the market. When do we have all the necessary experts on board? What if we miss the raw materials expert, the marketing expert, the human resources expert, the foreign trade expert, the business expert, the distribution network expert, the fuel expert, etc... It is hard to develop things by committee.
Essentially, this is a field where things are pretty tricky. We have had some projects developed on Cardano by extremely expert people and they failed to lead to adoption. So, I remain skeptical about proposals until they convince me. The expert commission does not convince me.
- Abstain7.2M ₳No rationale
- No5.9M ₳Rationale
I am voting No on this information action because I disagree with its underlying characterization of Cardano’s treasury governance.
While our governance processes are still maturing and there are certainly opportunities for improvement, I do not believe they are fundamentally dysfunctional. Robust debate, differing priorities, and difficult funding decisions are expected in a decentralized governance system—not evidence that it is failing.
Many of the ideas presented here may be worth discussing in the future, but they begin from a premise that I do not accept. Cardano governance is evolving, proposals are being evaluated, funding decisions are being made, and the system is functioning as designed. Incremental improvements should be based on observed experience rather than an overstated narrative of crisis.
- Yes5.8M ₳No rationale
- No5.4M ₳No rationale
- No5.3M ₳No rationale
- No4.6M ₳No rationale
- Abstain4.4M ₳Rationale
I am abstaining on this governance structure proposal.
I am neither opposed to nor in favor of it, but I do not believe it delivers the process reforms we actually need.
That said, I will not stand in the way of the community’s final decision, which is why I am choosing to abstain. - Yes4.2M ₳No rationale