Reforming Treasury Governance
141 DReps voted · 48 with a rationale · 3 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- No4.1M ₳Rationale
[Portuguese]
Optamos por votar "NÃO" nesta ação de governança "Reforming Treasury Governance" (gov_action1t5ap7etluvct2x69nj5mfqhurgakuvekyflcsrv2qkrhrs378n3qq3z2c22), pois compreendemos a importância do debate promovido por esta proposta e concordamos que a governança do Tesouro da Cardano precisa evoluir. O modelo atual, baseado em retiradas individuais do Tesouro, dificulta uma visão estratégica de longo prazo, obriga a comparação entre propostas de naturezas muito distintas e pode gerar conflitos desnecessários na alocação de recursos. Também avaliamos positivamente a ideia de organizar o orçamento por áreas temáticas, promovendo maior previsibilidade, coordenação e alinhamento estratégico. No entanto, votamos "NÃO" porque entendemos que a proposta, em sua forma atual, ainda não apresenta salvaguardas suficientes para a criação de uma entidade estratégica e de uma comissão de especialistas com influência significativa sobre o processo orçamentário. Embora reconheçamos que avaliações técnicas possam agregar valor por meio de due diligence, análise de custos, validação de marcos e avaliação da qualidade das propostas, acreditamos que a decisão final sobre a utilização dos recursos do Tesouro deve permanecer claramente sob responsabilidade dos DReps e da comunidade. Em nossa avaliação, qualquer estrutura de apoio dessa natureza deve possuir regras explícitas sobre transparência, conflitos de interesse, critérios de nomeação e remoção, remuneração, prestação de contas e limites claros de atuação, evitando a concentração excessiva de influência sobre decisões que pertencem à governança descentralizada. Assim, enxergamos esta proposta como um ponto de partida relevante para o debate, mas ainda insuficientemente amadurecido para ser incorporado como modelo de governança. Reformar o processo orçamentário é necessário, porém essa evolução deve preservar a legitimidade do voto dos DReps, evitar concentrações indevidas de poder, manter os custos administrativos proporcionais e estar fundamentada em regras constitucionais claras e amplamente consensuais. Por esses motivos, nosso voto é "NÃO".
[English]
We chose to vote "NO" on this governance action "Reforming Treasury Governance" (gov_action1t5ap7etluvct2x69nj5mfqhurgakuvekyflcsrv2qkrhrs378n3qq3z2c22), because we recognize the importance of the discussion initiated by this proposal and agree that Cardano’s Treasury governance should continue to evolve. The current model, based on individual Treasury withdrawal proposals, makes long-term strategic planning more difficult, forces comparisons between proposals with fundamentally different objectives, and can create unnecessary friction in the allocation of community resources. We also view positively the idea of organizing the budget around thematic areas, promoting greater predictability, coordination, and strategic alignment. However, we voted "NO" because we believe the proposal, in its current form, does not yet provide sufficient safeguards for the creation of a strategic body and an expert committee with significant influence over the budgeting process. While we recognize that technical evaluations can add value through due diligence, cost analysis, milestone validation, and proposal quality assessment, we believe the final decision on Treasury spending should remain clearly in the hands of DReps and the broader community. In our view, any supporting governance structure of this nature should operate under explicit rules regarding transparency, conflicts of interest, appointment and removal procedures, compensation, accountability, and clearly defined limits on its authority, ensuring that decision-making power remains appropriately decentralized. For these reasons, we see this proposal as a valuable starting point for discussion, but not yet sufficiently mature to serve as a governance model. Reforming Treasury governance is necessary, but such reforms should preserve the legitimacy of DRep voting, avoid undue concentration of power, maintain proportional administrative costs, and be grounded in clear and broadly supported constitutional principles. Therefore, our vote is "NO". - Yes3.8M ₳Rationale
Clearly, we need to distinguish between the treasury process as a whole and the subsets that fall under that umbrella: a coordinated budgeting process and, beneath that, a robust procurement management process. These are separate concepts and should be treated as such. I applaud this proposal for raising the point that things are obviously broken.
We must bring a values-based discussion to the table about the role of the treasury as a whole and the constraints under which it should operate. Then we need a clear discussion about Cardano’s budgeting process, its timeline, and its constraints.
After that, we need to discuss procurement. Currently, we have vendors proposing whatever fees, hours, KPIs, and deliverables they wish, and we only have the option to vote yes or no. There is no mechanism for pushback, adjustment, negotiation, or evaluating how one project fits within a broader strategy or overall budget.
Proposals are ad hoc and one-off. Voting no leads to Twitter tirades and a minimum of 30 days lost to a slow governance cycle. This is a doomed process.
The fact that this system doesn’t work has led to the suboptimal outcome that only the largest vendors are receiving funding. I believe this is driven more by risk aversion than by optimal planning.
Let’s call things what they are. This first round of governance was not a success. While it was not a total failure, it has enough flaws that the future of the chain and its projects is threatened. I believe that was the core point of this non-binding Info Action: to raise a hand and say, “Can we at least agree that we have a problem?” That is the first step toward fixing things.
That, I have to support.
- No3M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.8M ₳No rationale
- Abstain2.8M ₳No rationale
- No2.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.6M ₳Rationale
私は本Info Actionに賛成します。これはTreasury改革の議論開始に賛成するものです。
現在のCardano Treasury governanceは、個別提案が並列に競合し、DRepに過大な認知負荷を与え、コミュニティ内の対立も生みやすい構造になっています。
NCL、予算、個別Treasury Withdrawalを明確に分け、戦略的な予算構造、専門的評価、監査・説明責任を組み込む方向性は妥当です。
ただし、将来の実装では、戦略主体や専門委員会が新たな中央集権にならないよう、選出方法、任期、利益相反管理、議事録、評価基準、DRepによる最終統制を制度的に担保する必要があります。
I support this Info Action. My support is for starting a discussion on Treasury reform.
The current Cardano Treasury governance process puts many individual proposals in direct competition, creates a heavy cognitive burden for DReps, and can increase conflict within the community.
I agree with the direction of clearly separating the NCL, the budget process, and individual Treasury Withdrawals, while introducing strategic budget categories, expert evaluation, audits, and accountability.
However, any future implementation must prevent a strategic entity or expert commission from becoming a new centralized gatekeeper. Selection methods, terms, conflict-of-interest rules, meeting records, evaluation criteria, and final DRep oversight must be institutionally secured.
- Abstain2.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain2.5M ₳Rationale
Due to rationales becoming stressful and the bear market vibes - I will not be providing rationale. I voted the way that I did bc we need a 'no stress' environment more than ever.
- Abstain2.1M ₳Rationale
I am abstaining, as this is my own proposal.
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- No2.1M ₳Rationale
I am voting No on this Info Action.
I agree with the underlying concern that Cardano needs better treasury governance, clearer prioritisation, stronger accountability, and more effective coordination between proposers, DReps, SPOs, the Constitutional Committee, and the wider community.
However, I do not believe this proposal is defined clearly enough to justify an on-chain endorsement. It appears to signal support for a broad reform direction that may later require changes to governance processes or even constitutional interpretation, but it does not yet provide enough detail on the proposed model, accountability structures, decentralisation safeguards, implementation pathway, or how competing coordination approaches would remain open and permissionless.
Cardano does need better treasury coordination, but that coordination should emerge transparently through open tooling, public analysis, milestone tracking, community review, and competitive governance infrastructure — not through a broad mandate that risks pre-shaping the process before the ecosystem has fully debated the design.
For these reasons, I support continued discussion and future refinement, but I cannot support this Info Action in its current form.
- Abstain2M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.8M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.8M ₳Rationale
Cardano’s treasury governance does need improvement in these areas so I agree with the general sentiment of this info action. However, I am abstaining as I would prefer to see a more coordinated effort to give it the best chance of success.
- No1.8M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.7M ₳No rationale
- No1.7M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.6M ₳No rationale
- No1.6M ₳Rationale
I appreciate the effort of the proposer, but I believe reforms of this nature should first be discussed and socialized within the Cardano community before being brought on-chain for endorsement.
- Abstain1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.5M ₳Rationale
The current process of pitting individual proposals against each other across unrelated domains is structurally broken, as this governance cycle has demonstrated. A budget-first, category-based approach with expert evaluation is the right direction for Cardano treasury governance to mature.
- No1.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.4M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.2M ₳Rationale
I vote ABSTAIN on Reforming Treasury Governance because I agree that Cardano needs better treasury coordination, clearer budget categories, and more expert input to help DReps evaluate complex proposals. However, I am not ready to endorse this specific direction as presented, because a strategic entity and expert commission must be very carefully designed so they support decentralized liquid governance rather than centralize decision-making. I am willing to accept some governance friction if that helps preserve openness, direct accountability, and the ability for independent proposals and DReps to challenge the process. Future treasury reform should keep expert review advisory, transparent, conflict-aware, and ultimately accountable to DReps and the wider community.
- No1.2M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.1M ₳No rationale
- No1.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes1M ₳No rationale
- No988.4K ₳No rationale
- No971.5K ₳Rationale
We vote NO on this information action. While we agree that treasury governance needs improvement and that a more strategic budgeting process is an important topic for the Cardano ecosystem, we do not believe this proposal is suitable in its current form.
The proposal raises relevant concerns, but it remains too vague and informal for a governance action that discusses such a fundamental restructuring of treasury governance. We are also concerned by the lack of clear author information and the presence of formal issues in the proposal metadata. For a topic this important, we expect a higher standard of transparency, structure, accountability, and implementation clarity.
Treasury governance reform should be discussed seriously, but it should be introduced through a more complete, better specified, and properly attributable proposal. For these reasons, we vote no.
- NoRevoted954K ₳History
Earlier votes
No1mo agoSuperseded
- Yes931.8K ₳No rationale
- No923.6K ₳No rationale
- No861.5K ₳No rationale
- No825.2K ₳Rationale
We see high risk in having yet another "authority" to run this budget process.
We support the Intersect lead in a decentralized way the budget process. - Yes798.4K ₳No rationale
- No794.5K ₳No rationale
- Abstain747.4K ₳No rationale
- No731.5K ₳No rationale
- No705.1K ₳Rationale
no.
- No625.9K ₳Rationale
Voting NO. I agree with the problem diagnosis that treasury governance is dysfunctional. But every proposed solution is an unenforceable social contract. Without ledger-level enforcement, this is "won't do harm" governance, not "can't do harm."
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
The problem statement has genuine merit, the funding impasse is real, domain-vs-domain competition is destructive, and DReps being asked to directly compare a consensus improvement against a marketing initiative is cognitively incoherent. AtlasHub is diagnosing real dysfunction. The issue is that every proposed remedy is a social contract dressed up as a governance structure.
The "strategic entity" in [h] can be appointed by vote, but DReps cannot be compelled to follow its budget recommendations, they will simply vote however they choose. The "expert commission" in [i] is advisory by design, which means it adds a bureaucratic layer without adding enforcement. The thematic budget structure with domain allocations in categories 1-8 is entirely aspirational, because there's no on-chain mechanism that rejects a treasury withdrawal do to it "overrunning” the Community & Marketing bucket or leaves Core Infrastructure underfunded. The 3-step treasury governance process requires DReps to voluntarily sequence their behavior in a specific way with no ledger-level consequence for deviating.
Structural constraints work because they make bad outcomes impossible, not because participants agree to avoid them. Everything in this info action relies on good-faith coordination among parties who have already demonstrated they can't coordinate. That's precisely the problem it's trying to solve.
Voting NO on this info action doesn't mean the problem statement is wrong, it means I’m declining to endorse these specific solutions as the direction for reform. - Abstain619.5K ₳No rationale
- No605.7K ₳No rationale
- No589.7K ₳Rationale
There should be first much greater off-chain discussion before moving forward like this.
- No587.6K ₳No rationale
- No533.9K ₳Rationale
No. Not in the cards ATM.
- No479.9K ₳No rationale