Should stakePoolTargetNum (k) be raised from 500 to 1000? (SPO poll)
Discussed in the Governance Review for epochs 660 to 662.
132 DReps voted · 68 with a rationale · 1 changed their vote · 1 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 1 to abstain, together voting with 43.5M ₳ of voting power.
Voting concentration
6 of 132 DReps cast half of the voted power.
Largest voter 13.7%, top 5 combined 48.7% of 3.5B ₳ voted.
- Abstain479.6M ₳Rationale
The proposal invites DReps to vote, but states that "DRep votes are not included when determining whether this Info Action has established an SPO mandate." As this is an SPO poll and DRep votes do not affect the outcome, I abstain.
提案文は DRep の投票も歓迎していますが、「DRep votes are not included when determining whether this Info Action has established an SPO mandate（DRep の票は SPO の支持判定に含めない）」と明記しています。SPO 向けの意思確認であり、DRep 票は結果に影響しないため、ABSTAIN とします。
- Abstain398.2M ₳Rationale
Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on "Should stakePoolTargetNum (k) be raised from 500 to 1000? (SPO poll)". Yoroi recognises the importance of responsible governance during periods of ecosystem uncertainty.
- Ecosystem Situation: The trust our delegators place in Yoroi requires that we act only when we can do so with full confidence. In light of the current situation, Yoroi is choosing to withhold its vote on this proposal and will reassess our position once conditions allow for a considered decision.
- No288.7M ₳No rationale
- No225.3M ₳Rationale unavailable
- No212.4M ₳No rationale
- Abstain212.2M ₳Rationale
EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on "Should stakePoolTargetNum (k) be raised from 500 to 1000? (SPO poll)", with rationale outlined below.
Given the ongoing situation in the ecosystem, responsible governance requires us to act with full clarity and confidence. Until the current situation reaches resolution, EMURGO prefers to withhold judgment rather than vote without the certainty our mandate demands. We will revisit this proposal once the situation is resolved.
- No144.6M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes NO. In our view, raising stakePoolTargetNum (k) from 500 to 1000 would redistribute a fixed reward pot without addressing the factors that determine whether independent operators can remain viable.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
We thank the stake pool operators whose work keeps the Cardano network producing blocks every epoch. We also recognise the care the proposer has taken to set out the mechanics of k neutrally, including its limits.
This is the view applies both to the Foundation's DRep vote and to the votes cast by the Foundation's stake pools.
Our vote is based on the following factors:
- More pool IDs are not more operators. The proposal states that raising k would not automatically "create new pools or independent operators" or prevent an operator "from registering more pool IDs". At k=1000, the saturation point would be about 38.9 million ada. On-chain data for epoch 655 shows 214 pools above that line, and 83 of them have fewer than 20 delegating addresses. These are mostly private or custodial pools. Raising k would leave about 4.9 billion ada above the new cap, and almost half of it (2.3 billion) sits in those 83 pools. In our view, operators of this kind can split their stake across new pools with little effort, leaving control of that stake unchanged.
- The reward pot does not grow. As the proposal notes, total epoch reward resources are unchanged; only the saturation limit decreases. We believe lower-saturated pools struggle in large part because a fixed fee absorbs much of the reward on one or two blocks per epoch, and because they rarely attract enough stake to produce blocks consistently. k changes neither the fixed fee nor where redelegated stake goes. In our view, halving the maximum potential reward per pool would also ask the network to sustain twice as many viable pools from the same resources while reserves decline. We see the pending proposal to lower minPoolCost to 75 ada as an interim correction rather than a definitive answer to stake pool economics, and we look forward to the structural work on the minPoolMargin parameter (CIP-0023), which would reduce the distortion caused by a fixed floor.
- The cost falls on passive delegators. k last changed in December 2020. The proposal acknowledges that delegators in pools above the new saturation point "could receive fewer rewards", and that those who do not actively monitor saturation "may bear that opportunity cost longer". The proposal itself asks whether a lower saturation point would disadvantage community pools that built their delegation over many years. We expect it would, because those pools cannot coordinate a controlled redelegation.
The Cardano Foundation votes NO. This is a position on this specific proposal. It is not a vote against lower-saturated or community-run pools, or against decentralization, which we continue to pursue in balance with economic sustainability, as set out in "Our Cardano".
NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - Abstain128.8M ₳Rationale
This Info Action is primarily intended to determine whether SPOs support increasing stakePoolTargetNum (k) from 500 to 1000.
Because this change would directly affect stake pool economics and the saturation point, I believe the position of SPOs themselves should first be clearly established. The proposal also explicitly states that DRep votes are not included when determining whether an SPO mandate has been established.
Therefore, I am voting ABSTAIN as a DRep to record my participation without adding a position for or against an SPO-specific poll.
If a subsequent Parameter Change Governance Action is submitted, I will evaluate it separately, taking into account the result of this SPO poll, decentralization, the long-term sustainability of stake pool operations, and the potential impact on delegators.
本Info Actionは、stakePoolTargetNum（k）を500から1000へ引き上げることについて、SPOの支持を確認することを主目的としています。
この変更はステークプールの経済性や飽和点に直接影響するため、まずはSPO自身の意思が明確に示されるべきだと考えます。また、提案文においても、DRep票はSPOの支持判定に含まれないとされています。
そのため、DRepとして投票への参加を記録しつつ、SPOを対象とした意思確認に賛成または反対の立場を加えることは控え、ABSTAINとします。
将来、実際のパラメータ変更案が提出された場合には、今回のSPO投票の結果に加え、分散化、ステークプール運営の持続可能性、委任者への影響などを総合的に検討します。
- Abstain116.8M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes ABSTAIN on the Info Action "Should stakePoolTargetNum (k) be raised from 500 to 1000? (SPO poll)".
This poll asks stake pool operators for a clean, stake-weighted signal, and the proposal states that DRep votes are not included in determining whether an SPO mandate has been established. SIPO is both a DRep and the operator of three stake pools, and it records its substantive position on this question through its SPO votes, which are NO, with a published rationale. Casting a second, DRep-side vote on the same question would add nothing to the result and would blur the distinction the poll is designed to preserve.
For the record, SIPO's view as DRep is the same as its view as operator: raising k redistributes a fixed reward pot and does not grow it, and parameters that shape stake-pool economics should be changed as a coherent design rather than one at a time. If a Parameter Change action on k follows, SIPO will vote on it as DRep on its merits. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep は、Info Action「Should stakePoolTargetNum (k) be raised from 500 to 1000? (SPO poll)」に棄権（ABSTAIN）します。
本 poll はステークプール運営者に対してステーク加重の明確なシグナルを求めるものであり、本提案は SPO の意思が示されたかどうかの判定に DRep の票を含めないとしています。SIPO は DRep であると同時に 3 つのステークプールの運営者であり、この問いに対する実質的な立場は SPO としての投票（NO・理由を公開）で記録しています。同じ問いに DRep として二重に票を投じても結果には何も加わらず、本 poll が保とうとしている区別を曖昧にするだけです。
記録として、DRep としての SIPO の見解は運営者としての見解と同じです。k の引き上げは一定の報酬の総額を分け直すだけで総額を増やさず、ステークプールの経済に関わるパラメータは一つずつではなく整合した設計として変更されるべきです。k に関する Parameter Change アクションが後に提出された場合、SIPO は DRep としてその内容に基づき投票します。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- Abstain110.8M ₳No rationale
- Abstain96.6M ₳No rationale
- Abstain95M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I have decided to abstain from the proposal: Should stakePoolTargetNum (k) be raised from 500 to 1000? (SPO poll)
My rationale:
This info governance action is designed for SPOs. It explicitly states:
"DReps are invited to vote and submit rationales, but DRep votes are not included when determining whether this Info Action has established an SPO mandate."
Note: As a DRep, I would likely vote YES if I were deciding on the parameter change.
If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can find the time for governance activities.
MANDA Pool ID:
pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8My DRep ID:
drep1y2m0g4r66...skqwqpBuy me a beer:
https://pay.cexplorer.io/pay/c0410d5b237b6ec0 - Yes83.5M ₳Rationale
As I have stated many times on the videos, I support this increased decentralization of Cardano stake pools. Whether or not the resulting economic incentives would be effective at current ADA prices is an entirely different question. For now, I will just vote in favor of increased decentralization.
- Abstain73.4M ₳Rationale
I'm voting Abstain on this Info Action.
This is a poll of SPO sentiment, and DRep votes aren't counted toward the result. I'm abstaining out of respect for the SPOs' call.
I'll share my position on raising k when an actual parameter change is proposed. At that point, I'll judge it on whether it increases the number of independent operators rather than just the number of pools, and whether it's designed together with related parameters like pledge influence and minPoolMargin.
- No71.6M ₳Rationale
I am voting ❌NO on this raising k to 1000, here are some of my reasons in random order:
- total misconception of where redelegated ada will flow. it will NOT flow to small/tiny pools. if even, stake will flow to midrange pools near the new saturation point of ~35M. not to pools below 10M imo.
- not sustainable with current ada price, typical pool values generate low rewards for spos. keep it sustainable for the current pools, don't make it unsustainable for all pools.
- extremely big risk to force delegators to redelegate during this bear market. rewards on cardano are generally low nowadays. i predict that many stakers will leave the cardano ecosystem as a whole, because there are options with a much higher roi out there.
- the pools that will suffer from such a change are community pools that have done nothing wrong in the past 6 years, they worked hard to gain stake and delegators over time. such a k change to 1000 would drive them into saturation. which hurt the delegators of such community pools a big time.
- changing k to 1000 is like stealing staking from large community pools, enterprise pools simply split. it does not hurt them.
- enterprise pools with full delegation control will simply double there pools. larger community pools will suffer.
- i wanna see CIP50 play out first. we got it to be implemented, now we should not frontrun its activation and pledge depending saturation level playout with a k change.
- we have a good decentralization, we dont need more pools
- some are suggesting to split pools, which only drives up hardware and costs. better if an SPO can run one pool instead of two pools with half the amount for stake each.
- No65.6M ₳No rationale
- AbstainChanged43.5M ₳Rationale
I reconsidered and realized that if it isn't used in conjunction with minPoolCost, it might not be very effective after all. In fact, this whole discussion is pointless unless it's used in conjunction with minPoolMargin.
Earlier votes
Yes1mo agoSuperseded
今回はYESとします。
もちろん、kパラメータの変更単体ですべての課題が解決するとは考えていません。マルチプールの乱立対策やプレッジ効果の再設計など、包括的な議論が不可欠であるという前提に立ちつつも、まずは停滞している分散化への議論を一歩前進させるための契機として賛成票を投じます。 - No43M ₳No rationale
- No41.9M ₳No rationale
- No34.5M ₳No rationale
- No31.9M ₳Rationale
I vote NO on changing k in isolation. SPO economics depend on minPoolCost, minPoolMargin (CIP-23), pledge influence and CIP-50 together. Changing k alone makes its effect hard to assess and may add new distortions. I would reconsider once a coherent design and impact analysis covering these related parameters is presented.
- Yes28.9M ₳Rationale
The text of this Info Action was put together from much of my own research and the efforts of the parameter committee. Unfortunately the draft was stolen and sabotaged via changing the sucess threshold to virtually guarantee a failed outcome. In any case, I plan to submit an actual parameter change governance action myself proposing to raise stakePoolTargetNum to 1000 and will (re)present all the arguments there.
- Yes28.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain24.4M ₳Rationale
What empirical evidence demonstrates that doubling K will increase the number of economically sustainable, independently controlled stake pool operators rather than simply incentivize existing multi-pool operators to split their infrastructure?
- Abstain23.7M ₳Rationale
Cardanians also operates stake pools and therefore has a direct economic interest in changes to saturation and staking incentives. Our DRep abstention does not endorse increasing k to 1000 or reject further consideration of the change.
We believe further research and stronger empirical evidence are needed to properly assess any future Parameter Change action. This should include analysis of independent operator concentration, likely redelegation behaviour, delegator rewards, operational sustainability and interactions with pledge and pool-fee parameters.
Any subsequent proposal should demonstrate how the expected benefits outweigh the risks and distinguish an increase in pool count from a meaningful improvement in independent control.
Our objective is a sustainable network with broadly distributed control and reliable independent operators.
- No22.2M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on raising k to 1000.
See the rationale attached to my SPO NO vote on this governance action:
https://gateway.pinata.cloud/ipfs/bafkreifthguhkiwwlqjsxe3lyledrd4h3brdyqpvs7bwgy44wnxaxud3au - Abstain21.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes21.3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain20.3M ₳No rationale
- No16.1M ₳Rationale
I support the goal of increasing decentralization and I am not fundamentally opposed to raising k to 1000. However, I do not believe this is the right time.
Cardano is facing declining reserve-funded rewards, limited transaction fee revenue, and increasing operational costs for SPOs.
Raising k will not increase the number of blocks produced or the total reward pot. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence that the resulting stake redistribution would meaningfully benefit independent operators rather than existing multi-pool entities.
Before making this change, we should demonstrate that it improves decentralization without compromising the long-term economic sustainability of stake pool operators.
My vote is NO under the current conditions, not NO to the idea itself.
- Yes12M ₳No rationale
- Abstain11.9M ₳Rationale
As Wada DRep, we choose to abstain on this governance action because it specifically seeks to establish the opinion of Stake Pool Operators (SPOs) on whether the stakePoolTargetNum parameter should be increased from 500 to 1,000. Since SPOs are the primary stakeholders whose perspectives this poll intends to capture, we believe the decision-making process should be led by them. Our abstention reflects our intention to respect their role in expressing the ecosystem's position on this parameter change, rather than influence the outcome through a DRep vote. We encourage SPOs to participate actively and express their views through the designated polling process.
- Yes10.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes10.6M ₳Rationale
RCADA votes YES on this Info Action asking whether there is sufficient SPO support to proceed with a later parameter-change action to raise stakePoolTargetNum / k from 500 to 1000.
RCADA supports this action because stake-pool economics are central to Cardano’s decentralisation, resilience, and long-term network health. A change to k would materially affect SPOs, delegators, saturation dynamics, and reward distribution, so it is appropriate to seek a clear standalone SPO signal before moving to a formal parameter-change action.
RCADA appreciates that this proposal separates the k question from other parameters. The 2023 SPO poll bundled stakePoolTargetNum with minPoolCost, which made it harder to interpret as a clean standalone mandate. This Info Action focuses only on whether there is sufficient SPO support to proceed toward k=1000, using standard CIP-1694 voting semantics rather than introducing a special turnout formula.
RCADA also supports the decentralisation motivation behind the proposal. Raising k from 500 to 1000 would lower the saturation point from 1/500 to 1/1000 of circulating ada, creating stronger reward incentives for stake to spread away from larger saturated pools. While this does not guarantee more independent operators, it may help create conditions where stake distribution can become healthier if delegators, wallets, SPOs, and the wider ecosystem respond constructively.
RCADA recognises that increasing k is not a complete decentralisation solution by itself. The proposal correctly notes that a higher k would not automatically create new pools, prevent multi-pool operators from registering additional pools, determine where redelegated stake moves, or guarantee improved entity-level decentralisation. Outcomes would depend on participant behaviour, wallet design, delegator awareness, operator grouping, exchange/custodian behaviour, and the interaction with other economic parameters.
RCADA also recognises that there may be disruption for established pools and delegators if the saturation point is lowered. Some pools that are currently healthy could become oversaturated for reward purposes, and some delegators may need to actively reassess their delegation. These effects should be taken seriously and should be part of any later parameter-change review.
However, this Info Action does not itself change k. It asks whether there is sufficient SPO support to proceed. RCADA considers that a fair and useful governance step. SPOs are the actors most directly affected by stake-pool economic parameters, and their explicit on-chain signal should carry significant weight before the ecosystem advances to a binding parameter-change action.
RCADA’s YES vote should therefore be understood as support for the SPO mandate-seeking process and for continued serious consideration of k=1000, not as unconditional approval of every detail of a future parameter-change proposal. If a later parameter-change action is submitted, RCADA would still expect clear analysis of decentralisation impact, delegator effects, entity-level concentration, multi-pool behaviour, exchange/custodian stake, small-pool viability, and interaction with minPoolCost, pledge influence, and other reward parameters.
On balance, RCADA supports this Info Action because it provides a clean, transparent, stake-weighted way for SPOs to express whether the ecosystem should proceed toward k=1000. This is a meaningful step toward more evidence-based parameter governance and a healthier discussion about Cardano’s long-term decentralisation. - Abstain9.5M ₳Rationale
ABSTAIN. I can see reasonable arguments both for and against increasing stakePoolTargetNum from 500 to 1000, and I don't have a sufficiently strong position on the underlying parameter change at this time. This is also an informational action rather than an actual parameter update, and the discussion around it has become entangled in disagreements over the process and framing of the poll itself. I am therefore abstaining and recording no position for now; I would evaluate any future parameter-change action on its own merits, evidence, and expected impact on stake-pool economics and decentralization.
- Yes8.3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain7.6M ₳Rationale
Abstain
This motion is canvassing SPOs... so I abstain.
- No7.2M ₳No rationale
- No6.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.2M ₳Rationale
YES — high confidence.
Not because k=1000 is already proven to be the correct parameter, but because getting a clean, current, stake-weighted SPO mandate on that specific question is valuable information and a sensible prerequisite to the actual parameter vote.
This is one of the clearer YES votes: low treasury risk, no expenditure, no parameter change enacted, and materially better information for the subsequent decision.
- No6M ₳No rationale
- Yes6M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.8M ₳No rationale
- No5.8M ₳Rationale
We hold this to be detrimental under current market conditions.
- Abstain5.1M ₳Rationale
This poll is asking stake pool operators whether they want this change, and DRep votes don’t count towards the result. The change mainly affects how pool operators earn their rewards, so I’m leaving this decision to them
- Abstain5.1M ₳No rationale
- Abstain4.5M ₳Rationale
This GA is mostly for SPOs.
- Yes4.2M ₳No rationale
- No3.8M ₳Rationale
With the current economics of the chain, I don't believe the SPOs are sufficiently safe in sufficient income to have us encourage more competition and dilution of stake. This would make it even harder for this critical part of the ecosystem to make a fair wage.
- No3.4M ₳No rationale