Update Constitutional Committee 2026
143 DReps voted · 48 with a rationale · 4 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- YesChanged480M ₳Rationale
Yoroi DRep votes YES on Update Constitutional Committee 2026. Yoroi recognises that a functioning Constitutional Committee is essential to the continuity of Cardano governance.
Position Update: Yoroi previously voted ABSTAIN on this proposal. At that time, we chose to withhold our vote while considering the responsibility entrusted to us by our delegators. Following further consideration, Yoroi is changing its vote to YES.
Governance Continuity: The Constitutional Committee must remain operational so that it can continue to carry out its constitutional responsibilities when needed. This proposal renews the seats whose terms are expiring and implements the outcome of the 2026 Constitutional Committee election.
For these reasons, Yoroi supports the proposal and votes YES.
Earlier votes
Abstain15d agoSuperseded
Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on Update Constitutional Committee 2026. Yoroi recognises the importance of responsible governance during periods of ecosystem uncertainty.
- Ecosystem Situation: The trust our delegators place in Yoroi requires that we act only when we can do so with full confidence. In light of the current situation, Yoroi is choosing to withhold its vote on this proposal and will reassess our position once conditions allow for a considered decision.
- Yes395.6M ₳Rationale
I vote YES on "Update Constitutional Committee 2026".
On the incoming members (Cardano Curia, Phil_uplc, Marek Mahut, and Leandros BSP): they are the same candidates I voted for in the CC election, so I have no objection. I support this action as a faithful enactment of the election results.
On the outgoing members, KtorZ and the Cardano Japan Council: my sincere gratitude for their patience and contribution in continuously carrying a demanding role, unpaid.
「Update Constitutional Committee 2026」にYESを投票します。
新たに就任するメンバー（Cardano Curia・Phil_uplc・Marek Mahut・Leandros BSP）について：私自身がCC選挙で投票した顔ぶれと同じであり、異論はありません。選挙結果をそのまま反映する本アクションを支持します。
任期満了となるKtorZとCardano Japan Councilについて：責任の大きい役割を無償で、継続的に引き受けてくださった忍耐と貢献に、心から感謝します。
- YesChanged305.5M ₳Rationale
EMURGO as a DRep previously voted ABSTAIN on Update Constitutional Committee 2026. At the time, we chose to withhold judgment in light of the ongoing situation in the ecosystem.
After further consideration, EMURGO is changing the vote to YES. We recognise the importance of ensuring that the Constitutional Committee remains operational and able to carry out its constitutional responsibilities when needed. This action implements the outcome of the 2026 Constitutional Committee election and renews the seats whose terms are expiring. Supporting this update is important for the continuity and stability of Cardano governance. EMURGO therefore votes YES.
Earlier votes
Abstain15d agoSuperseded
EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on Update Constitutional Committee 2026 with rationale outlined below.
Given the ongoing situation in the ecosystem, responsible governance requires us to act with full clarity and confidence. Until the current situation reaches resolution, EMURGO prefers to withhold judgment rather than vote without the certainty our mandate demands. We will revisit this proposal once the situation is resolved.
- Yes271.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes219.9M ₳Rationale
Thanks to the departing members of the CC for their service and thanks to the new members for taking on this currently unpaid role.
- Yes181.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes156.5M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes YES. We support the results of the Intersect-facilitated Constitutional Committee Election 2026.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
We participated in the preceding off-chain election, although the proposed committee roster does not completely reflect our initial preferences, we believe the final composition is adequate to preserve the necessary operational continuity for the Constitutional Committee to execute its duty of ensuring the Cardano Constitution is upheld. We also express our appreciation to Intersect for overseeing the election process.
The Cardano Foundation votes YES.
NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - Yes93.3M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I decided to vote on the proposal: Update Constitutional Committee 2026
My rationale:
This action faithfully implements the independently audited result of the 2026 Constitutional Committee election by appointing Philip DiSarro, Leandros BSP, Marek Mahut and Cardano Curia. It preserves the Committee’s staggered rotation, leaves the remaining three members and the ⅔ quorum unchanged, and complies with the current maximum term length. The re-election of two existing members provides continuity while the addition of two new members supports renewal.
I nevertheless have reservations about the process. Participation was limited to 38 DReps representing ₳2.332B, and the fourth-place margin over AACC was approximately ₳146M. The approval-voting model also allows large DReps to apply their full voting power to several candidates, increasing the influence of concentrated stake over the resulting slate. These aspects should be reviewed before the next election.
The enactment design is also unnecessarily fragile: because the proposed terms use the full 146-epoch maximum, the action cannot be ratified until Epoch 653. Future committee updates should leave sufficient term-length headroom to avoid dependence on the final epoch.
These weaknesses merit improvement, but they do not invalidate the published result. Without evidence of manipulation, an audit failure or an incorrect on-chain implementation, the legitimate outcome of the election should be respected.
If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.
MANDA Pool ID:
pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8My DRep ID:
drep1y2m0g4r66...skqwqpBuy me a beer:
https://pay.cexplorer.io/pay/c0410d5b237b6ec0 - Yes92.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes89.4M ₳No rationale
- YesChanged87.5M ₳History
Earlier votes
Abstain2d agoSuperseded
- Yes84.3M ₳Rationale
This action formally appoints the four candidates elected through a public process and independently audited election. I support this proposal to respect the community’s electoral decision and ensure the continuity of the Constitutional Committee.
本提案は、公開された選挙プロセスと独立監査を経て選出された4名を、憲法委員会の新たなメンバーとして正式に承認するものです。コミュニティによる選挙結果を尊重し、憲法委員会の継続性を確保するため、本提案を支持します。
- Yes82.9M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes YES on the governance action "Update Constitutional Committee 2026".
This action renews the four Constitutional Committee seats whose terms expire at the end of Epoch 653, seating the four candidates elected in the 2026 Constitutional Committee election, and formally removes the seat of a member who had already retired. The quorum is unchanged at two-thirds. The three members whose terms run to Epoch 726 — Eastern Cardano Council, Tingvard, and Ace Alliance — are untouched by this action. After enactment the committee comprises Marek Mahut, Cardano Curia, Philip DiSarro, Leandros BSP, Eastern Cardano Council, Tingvard, and Ace Alliance: seven members, above the committeeMinSize of five.
SIPO supports this because the process that produced it was sound, and because the alternative is institutional failure. Intersect facilitated the election under Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, with open candidate registration, a public voting period, an independent audit of the results, and publication of the audited outcome before this action was submitted. SIPO has identified no procedural defect. Rejecting a validly conducted election without identifying such a defect would damage the electoral mechanism itself, and it would do so at a real cost: if these four seats lapse at Epoch 653 without renewal, the committee falls to three members, below the committeeMinSize of five, and ceases to be able to function. A No vote here does not produce a better committee. It produces no functioning committee.
SIPO records one substantive concern, which is about representation rather than process. Cardano Japan Council leaves the Constitutional Committee through this action. The Asia Africa Cardano Coalition finished fifth in the election, immediately outside the four available seats. After enactment, Eastern Cardano Council is the only seat held outside a Western or primarily technical profile. SIPO is a Japanese stake pool operator, and states plainly that it would prefer a Constitutional Committee in which the Japanese and wider Asian communities are represented.
SIPO is equally plain that this action is neither the cause of that outcome nor the place to remedy it. Cardano Japan Council does not appear among the ten candidates who stood in the election; the seat was not lost in a contest, it was not contested. The remedy is candidacy and turnout in the next cycle, not the rejection of a valid result in this one. SIPO records the concern here so that it stands on the public record ahead of the next election.
Two observations on composition, recorded as facts rather than objections. Marek Mahut is the founder of Five Binaries and the creator of Blockfrost, infrastructure whose treasury-funded transition to a public good SIPO supported in Epoch 645. Philip DiSarro serves on the Operating Group of the AlphaGrowth PRIME program, which SIPO supported in Epoch 646, and which places him on the body deciding the release of approximately ninety million ada at that program's Month 4 gate. Neither fact is improper: the Constitutional Committee rules on constitutionality and does not administer program funds. But both place an individual at two layers of influence over the same treasury flows, and SIPO's expectation is that members recuse themselves from constitutional determinations concerning programs in which they hold an executive or oversight role.
SIPO also notes that the proposal discloses, clearly and unprompted, that the ledger will permit enactment only in Epoch 653, because each member's term is measured backwards from a fixed expiration epoch and any earlier enactment would produce a term longer than the 146-epoch committeeMaxTermLength. That disclosure is a mark of careful drafting, and SIPO records it as such.
SIPO's expectations are three. First, that the election working group actively encourages regional candidacy, including from Japan and the wider Asian community, in the next cycle, so that the composition of the committee reflects the geography of the people it governs. Second, that committee members recuse themselves from determinations concerning treasury programs in which they hold executive or oversight roles. Third, that independent audit of results, and their publication before submission, remain standard practice for every future committee election — it is precisely why this action can be supported on process grounds. None of these conditions the vote; they are the basis on which SIPO will assess the next cycle. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep は、ガバナンスアクション「Update Constitutional Committee 2026」に賛成（YES）を投じます。
本アクションは、エポック 653 末で任期が満了する憲法委員会の 4 議席を更新し、2026 年憲法委員会選挙で選出された 4 名を着任させるとともに、既に退任していた委員の議席を正式に除去するものです。定足数は 3 分の 2 のまま変更されません。任期がエポック 726 まで残る 3 名 — Eastern Cardano Council、Tingvard、Ace Alliance — は本アクションの対象外です。発効後の委員会は、Marek Mahut、Cardano Curia、Philip DiSarro、Leandros BSP、Eastern Cardano Council、Tingvard、Ace Alliance の 7 名となり、committeeMinSize の 5 を上回ります。
SIPO がこれを支持するのは、これを生んだプロセスが健全であること、そして代替案が制度の機能不全であることの 2 点によります。Intersect は憲法 第 III 条 第 3 節 (2) に基づいて選挙を実施し、候補者登録の開放、公開投票期間、結果の独立監査、そして本アクション提出前の監査済み結果の公表を経ています。SIPO は手続き上の瑕疵を確認できませんでした。瑕疵を指摘することなく、正当に実施された選挙を否決することは、選挙メカニズムそのものを毀損します。しかもその代償は実在します。この 4 議席が更新されないままエポック 653 で失効すれば、委員会は 3 名に減り、committeeMinSize の 5 を下回って機能し得なくなります。ここでの反対票は、より良い委員会をもたらしません。機能する委員会が存在しない状態をもたらします。
SIPO は、実質的な懸念を 1 点記録します。これはプロセスではなく代表性に関するものです。本アクションにより Cardano Japan Council が憲法委員会を去ります。Asia Africa Cardano Coalition は選挙で 5 位となり、4 議席のすぐ外側で落選しました。発効後、西欧圏または主として技術的な profile の外にある議席は Eastern Cardano Council のみとなります。SIPO は日本のステークプールオペレーターであり、日本およびより広いアジアのコミュニティが代表される憲法委員会を望むことを、明確に述べます。
同時に SIPO は、本アクションがその結果の原因ではなく、またそれを是正する場でもないことも、同じく明確に述べます。Cardano Japan Council は、立候補した 10 名の候補者の中に含まれていません。議席は争って失われたのではなく、争われなかったのです。是正されるべき手段は次回サイクルにおける立候補と投票参加であって、今回の正当な結果の否決ではありません。SIPO は次回選挙に先立って、この懸念が公的な記録として残るようここに記します。
構成について、異議ではなく事実として 2 点を記録します。Marek Mahut は Five Binaries の創業者であり Blockfrost の作者です。Blockfrost の国庫資金による公共財への移行提案を、SIPO はエポック 645 で支持しました。Philip DiSarro は AlphaGrowth PRIME プログラムの Operating Group を務めており、同プログラムを SIPO はエポック 646 で支持しました。これにより同氏は、当該プログラムの Month 4 ゲートにおける約 9,000 万 ADA の放出を判断する立場に置かれます。いずれも不適切ではありません。憲法委員会は合憲性を判断する機関であって、プログラム資金を管理する機関ではないからです。しかしいずれも、同一の国庫フローに対して 1 人の個人を 2 つの層に位置づけるものであり、SIPO は、委員が自ら執行または監督の役割を持つプログラムに関する合憲性判断からは回避（recuse）することを期待します。
SIPO はまた、本提案が、求められることなく明確に、ledger の制約により発効はエポック 653 でのみ可能であることを開示している点にも触れます。各委員の任期は固定された満了エポックから逆算されるため、それより早い発効は 146 エポックの committeeMaxTermLength を超える任期を生じさせるからです。この開示は周到な起草の証 であり、SIPO はそのように記録します。
SIPO の期待事項は 3 点です。第一に、選挙ワーキンググループが次回サイクルにおいて、日本およびより広いアジアのコミュニティを含む地域からの立候補を積極的に促し、委員会の構成が統治される人々の地理を反映するようにすること。第二に、委員が自ら執行または監督の役割を持つ国庫プログラムに関する判断から回避すること。第三に、結果の独立監査とその提出前公表が、今後のすべての委員会選挙で標準的な実務として維持されること。まさにそれこそが、本アクションをプロセスの観点から支持できる理由だからです。これらはいずれも本投票の条件ではなく、SIPO が次回サイクルを評価する際の基礎です。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- Yes68.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes56.2M ₳Rationale
I am voting Yes on New members of Constitutional Committee, as respecting the prior off-chain voting result.
- Yes51M ₳Rationale
All candidates for the Constitutional Committee are well-known within the Cardano community. Since I have no reason to doubt their integrity, I'm voting Yes.
- Yes44M ₳No rationale
- Yes42.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes41.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes36.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes35.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes32.3M ₳Rationale
I voted Yes because this governance action is essential to maintaining a functional and compliant Constitutional Committee. The proposal renews expiring seats with candidates elected through a transparent, audited community process, ensuring the committee remains above the required minimum size and continues to operate according to the Cardano Constitution and protocol parameters. Supporting this update helps preserve the stability, security, and continuity of Cardano’s on‑chain governance.
- Yes28.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes28M ₳Rationale
These are all honorable members of the Cardano community and this list was curated via an off-chain vote facilitated by Intersect. I see no reason to vote against this.
- Yes26M ₳Rationale
I vote YES on "Update Constitutional Committee 2026".
I vote YES on “Update Constitutional Committee 2026.”
The incoming members—Cardano Curia, Phil_uplc, Marek Mahut, and Leandros BSP—are the same candidates I supported in the CC election. This action faithfully implements those election results.
My sincere thanks to outgoing members KtorZ and the Cardano Japan Council for their patience, service, and commitment to carrying this demanding role without compensation.
- Yes23.6M ₳Rationale
No objections
- Yes21.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.2M ₳Rationale
I wish the new constitutional committee best of success!
- Yes16.6M ₳Rationale
The four appointed members received the highest stake-weighted support in the public election. We acknowledge concerns regarding low participation, reduced geographic diversity, the all-or-nothing slate and four seats sharing the same expiry date. These should be addressed in the next election and through better term staggering. However, they do not justify rejecting a valid election or allowing the Constitutional Committee to fall below its required minimum size.
- Yes16.3M ₳Rationale
Vote: YES
This Update Committee governance action (729daaf2f9f89f842a61f6e3ebf7e57d16d6fa4116e29c13114780cb39090850) seats the four members elected in Cardano's 2026 Constitutional Committee election — Philip DiSarro, Leandros BSP, Marek Mahut (deliberative.cc), and Cardano Curia — replacing the four of seven seats whose terms expire at epoch 653. The new terms run to epoch 799, the 146-epoch maximum the protocol permits. It was submitted on-chain July 31, 2026 following an off-chain election conducted on the Ekklesia platform that closed July 13 and was verified by an independent third-party auditor. No ADA is requested and no treasury funds are involved.
Dracula DAO votes YES. This is the routine, scheduled renewal of a core constitutional body, and it arrives through the process the ecosystem built for exactly this purpose: an open candidacy period, a stake-weighted DRep election, an independent audit of the raw voting data, and on-chain ratification by DReps and SPOs. Dracula DAO voted YES on July 1, 2026 to reduce committeeMinSize from 7 to 5, and stated in that rationale that we would continue to weight the full and prompt seating of the Constitutional Committee as a governance priority. This action is the direct discharge of that commitment. The consequence of failure is concrete rather than theoretical: with four seats vacated and no replacements ratified, three members remain — below the minimum of five — and every CC-dependent action, including treasury withdrawals and protocol-parameter changes, stalls regardless of how DReps vote on them. Cardano has already lived through one such shutdown following the Cardano Atlantic Council's retirement in November 2025. Repeating it by inaction would be a self-inflicted failure.
The honest weakness here is the thinness of the electoral mandate. Only 38 DReps participated in the election, representing 2.332 billion ada of delegated voting power, and the fourth-placed candidate was seated on 55.26% of participating power — a majority of a small turnout, not a broad expression of ecosystem will. The on-chain tallies show the same pattern: as of August 17, DRep support stood at 32.46% against a 67% threshold and SPO support at 1.95% against 51%. Dracula DAO reads these numbers as apathy rather than opposition, since no substantive case against any of the four candidates has been advanced. That is not reassuring. A constitutional body seated by default, on turnout this low, carries less legitimate authority than the role demands, and the ecosystem should treat the 2026 turnout figures as a problem to fix before the next cycle rather than a quirk to note in passing.
Dracula DAO's ultra long-term view of Cardano's institutions resolves this cleanly. A thin mandate is a weakness to be corrected through better participation in future elections; an inquorate Constitutional Committee is a governance failure with immediate effect on every other action before the chain. Withholding support to protest turnout would punish the ecosystem for a defect the candidates did not cause and cannot remedy. The election was properly run, independently audited, and produced a result. Dracula DAO ratifies it.
Dracula DAO notes that this action requires SPO ratification at a 51% threshold, and that SPO participation as of mid-August was 1.95% — the more urgent of the two shortfalls. The VAMP stake pool, operated by Vampyre Fund, has voted YES in the SPO track. We urge all SPOs who have not yet voted to do so before epoch 653. Abstention here is not neutrality; on an action with a hard expiry and a quorum cliff behind it, a vote not cast is a vote to freeze Cardano's governance.
- Yes15.5M ₳Rationale
Update Constitutional Committee 2026
thank you for your work
- Yes10.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes10.9M ₳No rationale
- No10.4M ₳Rationale
Phil is not a professional that should have any constitutional role. He attacks community members, uses racial slurs and has potentially use defamatory language against multiple community members/projects.
- Yes9.5M ₳Rationale
Update Constitutional Committee 2026 — YES
I am voting YES on this update. I don't have any significant concerns with the proposed Constitutional Committee changes, and maintaining a fully functioning Constitutional Committee is important for governance continuity. This appears to be a reasonable operational update, and I support moving it forward.
Reduce minPoolCost to 75 ADA & Increase Plutus Memory Limits (Part 2) — YES
I am voting YES on these parameter updates. Lowering minPoolCost continues the effort to better align stake pool economics as rewards naturally decline, while increasing Plutus memory limits provides additional capacity for developers and smart contracts with low expected technical risk based on the testing and phased rollout that has preceded these changes.
That said, I do want to register one concern with the governance process itself. I do not believe unrelated parameter updates should be bundled into a single governance action. Each parameter change should stand on its own merits so DReps can evaluate and vote on each independently.
- Yes8.5M ₳Rationale
2026年憲法委員会選挙の結果として新たに就任する4議席の委員（Philip DiSarro、Leandros BSP、Marek Mahut、Cardano Curia）が、今後2年間にわたりCardano憲法を遵守し、憲法委員会の委員として責任ある判断を行い、その判断の根拠を明確に示しながら投票し、その責務を果たすことを期待して、本提案に賛成します。\n\nI vote Yes on this proposal. I expect the four newly elected Constitutional Committee members (Philip DiSarro, Leandros BSP, Marek Mahut, and Cardano Curia) to uphold the Cardano Constitution over the next two years, exercise responsible judgment as Constitutional Committee members, cast votes while clearly explaining the rationale for their decisions, and faithfully fulfill their responsibilities.
- Yes7.5M ₳Rationale
Welcome to the hunger games, Tributes.
(On a more serious note: thanks for volunteering!) Let's get the CC rolling.
- Yes7.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes6.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.6M ₳Rationale
Congrats to all new CC members!
- Yes5.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes5M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes4.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes4M ₳No rationale
- Yes4M ₳Rationale
I believe passing this is simply recognition of the outcome a fair vote process in how our governance system is currently used. While I do not personally support all of the candidates and believe there are some that do not reflect the professionalism expected of the post, that personal opinion should not override the duty of DReps to ratify the results of free elections and processes. Thus, I vote yes.
- Yes3.5M ₳No rationale