Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME
Discussed in the Governance Review for epochs 650 to 652.
208 DReps voted · 86 with a rationale · 7 changed their vote · 2 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 5 to yes, 1 to no, 1 to abstain, together voting with 182.8M ₳ of voting power.
- Yes457.4M ₳Rationale
Summary
Yoroi DRep votes YES on the treasury withdrawal for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME. We believe the strategic importance of this initiative warrants our support.Rationale
Strategic Exception
While we have generally maintained a position to Abstain pending resolution of the current SecondFi situation, the critical nature of AlphaGrowth's Cardano PRIME initiative necessitates an exception. Stalling essential liquidity and growth programs would be detrimental to the broader ecosystem.Support for Ecosystem Growth
The 120,000,000 ADA is directed towards initiatives that directly benefit ADA holders by fostering a more robust and liquid DeFi environment. Supporting this proposal aligns with our commitment to user-facing value and long-term ecosystem health.
Conclusion
Yoroi supports this withdrawal as a crucial step for ecosystem growth and therefore votes YES. - Yes441.6M ₳Rationale
Please check the following link for the reasons for the vote.（投票理由は次のページを参照してください。)
https://adatool.net/treasury-votes
I vote YES on PRIME and YES on the NCL change.
I support this after deeply analyzing the demand-side risks of the proposal (measured data and the full picture of both sides: adatool.net/cardano-growth-primer).
Two premises must be accepted as fact.
Spending will not stop at ₳120M — incentive TVL is management-dependent, and this is year one of a multi-year growth function. Both the measured track record and the proposer's own responses confirm this. Year two is its own action; large integrations are separate withdrawals. A serious multi-year commitment can total hundreds of millions of ADA. The vote must be cast on the annuity-like total cost of a continuing program, not on the ₳120M sticker.
Ultimately the incentives must be replaced by incentives funded by the dApps themselves and become self-sustaining — this has never been measured anywhere; Cardano becomes the first test case.
Even with those premises, I weigh the following.
As laid out at adatool.net/cardano-growth-primer, growing DeFi users and usage is a precondition for Cardano to win. The rails and tools have been built, but they alone do not grow users or usage; attractive products and incentives are needed, and this proposal puts a team with a real track record on exactly that. Cardano's users and usage are low against same-scale competitors, so solving this deserves investment.
Everyone shouts that Cardano needs marketing and adoption; in my view this is a well-aimed attempt at marketing and adoption grounded in measurable KPIs. Zooming out, after years of enormous investment and experimentation, transactions on Cardano — as on almost every public blockchain — are mostly DeFi. And this proposal ties a track record, measurable KPIs and solid governance together. It may not be perfect, but it looks like a well-aimed attempt.
https://adatool.net/tx-roiIt is possible to list reasons this effort is imperfect — most likely ₳120M will not be enough for the DeFi ecosystem this proposal ultimately aims for — but I have not yet seen a better alternative. Several internal governance mechanisms are built in, and the program can be stopped if it does not work.
Accordingly, I also vote YES on the NCL change.
Under the current NCL's remaining headroom (₳76.8M), legitimate proposals — including PRIME (₳120M), which I voted YES on — physically cannot be executed. The budget ceiling is not the place to judge the merits of individual proposals; that judgment is expressed in each proposal's own vote — and I voted YES on PRIME individually, after tough analysis (analysis: adatool.net/cardano-growth-primer).
The NCL is a ceiling, not a spending plan. Raising it approves nothing by itself; every withdrawal must still clear the 67% DRep threshold on its own merits. Rather than killing growth investment on the procedural grounds of "no headroom", I vote to keep each proposal judgeable on substance. - Abstain350.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes304.6M ₳Rationale
Summary
EMURGO as a DRep votes YES on the treasury withdrawal titled "Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME", with the rationale outlined below.Rationale
While EMURGO acknowledges that our general stance has been one of abstention following the SecondFi incident, we recognize the critical importance of this specific proposal. AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME initiative represents a significant strategic step for the ecosystem's liquidity and growth.The withdrawal of 120,000,000 ADA is a necessary commitment to support core infrastructure and liquidity initiatives that are vital for Cardano's competitive positioning. By supporting this proposal, we are prioritizing the immediate and long-term strategic needs of the ecosystem, ensuring that essential growth initiatives are not stalled during this transitional period. For these reasons, EMURGO votes yes.
- Yes278.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes216.7M ₳Rationale
EDC is voting YES. AG is a team of professionals from outside Cardano, bringing a fresh perspective to the Cardano DeFi ecosystem. Over the last four weeks, their team engaged in discussions and learned a lot about the different perspectives of various projects. We, too, had a call with them to learn more about how they want to operate the program.
The proposal itself is solid. 12 months of analysis and adjustments to DeFi on Cardano. We are looking forward to their suggestions. We hope they will find more people willing to join the Operating Group and put in the work necessary to hold AG accountable.
- AbstainChanged185M ₳History
Earlier votes
No1mo agoSuperseded
- Yes182.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes170.6M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes YES. This proposal seeks to bridge Cardano’s DeFi liquidity gap and we believe this programme, as described in the metadata and the additional commitments made publicly, will support resilient growth of TVL.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
The problem PRIME targets is evident: Cardano has been adding capital-ready rails without converting them into retained liquidity or application depth.
Our YES rests on the programme's structure rather than on its headline target. Our decision is driven by the following factors:
- Gated release limits near-term exposure: Roughly 90 million ada sits behind a Month 4, Phase 3 release gate requiring an affirmative Operating Group decision, leaving ungated near-term exposure of approximately 30 million ada. Six return-to-treasury triggers cover unused, unearned, and unreleased funds.
- Separation of recommendation, oversight, and custody: AlphaGrowth produces analyses and disbursement memos, the Operating Group may veto or condition material actions, and Intersect administers the funds through the audited Sundae Labs treasury management contracts into a separate auditable account. This provides accountability and oversight via smart contract administration with staged, verifiable disbursement.
- Performance fee tied to verified growth: The fee is payable only against verified qualifying TVL growth, excludes ada price effects and non-attributable TVL, and returns to the treasury if unearned. A dedicated 2,000,000 ada independent audit or assurance allocation supports verification.
- Retention is now priced into the payout schedule. Three commitments made publicly by Alphagrowth during the action's lifetime address this:
- Performance unlocks are back-loaded 30% / 30% / 40% at 30 days, three months and six months, so the largest tranche follows persistence rather than peak;
- Accelerated payouts for over-performance will be removed and the structure will be capped, with results above the cap routed to future proposals rather than shortened retention, preserving DRep decision-making; and
- The TVL observation window extends from 12 to 24 months with the six-month retention requirement preserved, so decay after year one remains visible. Together, maximum payout requires liquidity that is both material and durable, and no result shortens the period over which the team carries that requirement.
- Operating Group governance is to be term-limited and broadened. AlphaGrowth has committed to term limits and to expanding and diversifying the group's composition once Phase 1 is operational. To preserve this safeguard, we expect the term rules and expanded composition settled before the Month 4 gate, not after it.
These commitments were made publicly rather than recorded in the metadata. We record them here as part of the public basis for this vote and expect them reflected in the operating documentation before first disbursement. Should they not be implemented as described, we would expect the Operating Group to withhold the Phase 3 release, and would treat the divergence as material to any follow-on request from this team.
The Cardano Foundation votes YES on this treasury withdrawal. We view PRIME as a credible attempt to turn Cardano's recent infrastructure progress into durable liquidity, and we regard its gating, return-to-treasury triggers, and audit allocation as an appropriate standard for treasury spending of this size, one we would like to see other proposers adopt.
- Abstain105.9M ₳Rationale
First, I strongly agree with the problem this proposal is trying to solve. Cardano has made significant progress in infrastructure, but that infrastructure has not yet translated into sufficient liquidity, DeFi activity, or capital inflows. I also agree that TVL and liquidity are more than just headline metrics. They are important signals of market maturity for institutional participants and RWA projects. Through direct conversations with people working on real-world asset initiatives, I have consistently heard that liquidity and TVL are among the first metrics they evaluate. From that perspective, I believe strengthening Cardano's liquidity is a worthwhile objective.
However, I do not believe this proposal is sufficiently mature to justify a Treasury withdrawal of this size.
My primary concern is that Phase 1 focuses on assessing the current state, while Phase 2 is dedicated to identifying gaps and developing implementation recommendations. For a proposal requesting 120 million ADA, I believe much of this research and analysis should already have been completed before asking the community to commit such a significant amount of Treasury funding. I would have liked to see clearer evidence explaining why these specific actions are the right solution, why they should happen now, and why this funding level is appropriate.
I also have questions regarding AlphaGrowth's compensation. My concern is not simply that the amount is large, but that the proposal does not sufficiently explain why that level of compensation is justified. Greater transparency around the budget, resource allocation, and comparable prior work would strengthen confidence.
While I recognize that TVL is an important metric, I do not believe it should be viewed in isolation. Long-term success should also be measured through user onboarding, real on-chain activity, and sustainable adoption. At the same time, I understand that liquidity and TVL are important signals for institutional participants and RWA initiatives. For that reason, I would have liked to see more concrete evidence addressing which RWA companies or institutions are expected to participate, what level of liquidity is considered sufficient for their participation, what the current bottlenecks actually are, and how many new participants or strategic partnerships PRIME realistically expects to attract. Providing that level of evidence would make the investment thesis much more compelling.
My biggest concern, however, is the Net Change Limit (NCL).
Even if the NCL is increased in the future, that alone would not justify approving this proposal. At that point, this proposal would still need to compete with many other Treasury opportunities, including Bitcoin DeFi initiatives, infrastructure improvements, scalability efforts, and other ecosystem priorities. Additional Treasury capacity does not automatically make this the highest-priority allocation.
Overall, I strongly support the direction and believe improving Cardano's liquidity is important for the ecosystem's long-term success. However, at this stage, I do not believe the proposal provides sufficient evidence regarding its readiness, likelihood of success, justification for its requested budget, or why now is the appropriate time to proceed.
For those reasons, I am unable to support this proposal in its current form. If these concerns are addressed with stronger evidence and clearer supporting data in a future revision, I would be happy to evaluate it again with an open mind.
まず、この提案が解決しようとしている課題には強く共感しています。Cardanoには優れたインフラが揃いつつありますが、それが十分な流動性やDeFi利用、資本流入に結び付いていないという認識には僕も同意します。また、TVLや流動性は単なる数字ではなく、機関投資家やRWA事業者にとって市場の成熟度を判断する重要な指標でもあります。実際に、RWA事業に取り組む企業関係者からも、流動性やTVLを重視しているという話を直接聞いており、その意味でTVLを成長させる方向性自体には大きな価値があると考えています。
一方で、この規模のTreasury資金を要求する提案としては、まだ十分な準備が整っていないという印象を受けました。
特に気になったのは、Phase 1で現状調査を行い、Phase 2で課題分析や実行方針を策定する構成になっている点です。僕としては、120M ADAという大型の予算を要求するのであれば、それらの調査や分析は提案提出前に相当程度完了しているべきだと考えています。その上で、「なぜこの施策なのか」「なぜ今なのか」「なぜ120M ADAが必要なのか」を、より具体的なデータや分析をもとに示してほしかったと思います。
また、AlphaGrowthの固定報酬および成果報酬についても、その金額そのものより、「なぜその金額が妥当なのか」という説明が十分ではないように感じました。より詳細な内訳や、過去の実績との比較が示されていれば、納得感はさらに高まったと思います。
成果指標についても、TVLは重要な指標ではあるものの、それだけでは十分ではありません。最終的に重要なのは、実際のユーザー数、オンチェーン利用、継続的なアダプションなど、実需を伴った成長です。その一方で、TVLや流動性がRWA事業者や機関投資家にとって重要な判断材料であることも理解しています。だからこそ、どのRWA事業者や機関をターゲットとしているのか、どの程度の流動性が実現すれば参入の可能性が高まるのか、現在のボトルネックは何なのか、そしてPRIMEによって具体的に何件程度の新規参入や提携を見込んでいるのかといった、より具体的な裏付けを見たかったと感じました。
そして、僕にとって最大の論点はNet Change Limit（NCL）です。
仮に将来的にNCLが引き上げられたとしても、それだけでこの提案を承認する理由にはなりません。その時点では、Bitcoin DeFi、インフラ、スケーリング、その他のTreasury提案など、多くの候補と比較しながら限られた予算を配分する必要があります。そのため、NCLの追加枠が確保されたとしても、本提案が最優先になるとは限らないと考えています。
方向性には強く共感しています。しかし現時点では、準備状況、成功可能性を裏付ける分析、NCLとの整合性、そしてこのタイミングで実施すべき理由について、まだ十分な説明が示されていないと感じました。
そのため、今回はYesを投じることはできませんでした。今後、これらの点がより具体的な根拠や一次情報とともに示され、提案の完成度がさらに高まれば、改めて前向きに検討したいと考えています。
- Yes96M ₳Rationale
I know that there is a potential conflict for NCL problem. However, even though this vote becomes to info action like, I would like to put YES for this proposal.
Reason 1 : This action was agreed by Charles in SNS. My main delegetors are almost always to encourage to Chales opinion.
Reason 2 : The centralized tactics is necessary for present Cardano situation. Therefore, such kind of large promotion should be performed by powerful partner like they.From these reason, I put Yes in early stage of voting term and also put almost first priority to this. It would be affected to other GA until NCL voting make a result.
- Yes93.3M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I decided to vote YES on the proposal: Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME
My rationale:
Cardano is preparing for an important transition. Leios is being developed to provide substantially greater throughput, while Peras is intended to enable faster settlement. These critical upgrades should be on the mainnet soon.
At the same time, Cardano has gained important infrastructure. USDCx, Pyth, and Dune are live, while LayerZero is being introduced.
These developments strengthen Cardano’s technical and financial foundations, but infrastructure alone does not create economic activity. Greater throughput has limited value without users and transactions. Stablecoins, oracles, interoperability, and analytics have limited impact without liquid markets and applications that people actively use.
The next challenge is therefore activation: attracting users, liquidity providers, and institutions to Cardano. PRIME is designed to address this missing layer.
Cardano remains a major blockchain by market capitalization and community size, but its DeFi liquidity and protocol revenues remain disproportionately small.
AlphaGrowth has relevant experience in ecosystem growth. Its previous programs demonstrate an ability to generate material initial liquidity growth.
The public evidence is strongest regarding incentive sourcing and initial growth. Retaining liquidity after incentives end remains the more difficult test. Success is therefore not guaranteed. Nevertheless, AlphaGrowth brings capabilities, relationships, and experience that Cardano currently lacks.
PRIME also goes beyond liquidity incentives.
The proposal allocates ₳35M for ecosystem grants to address gaps identified in the initial ecosystem audit. It gives preference to Cardano-native teams.
I previously advocated for more ecosystem-led and in-house funding mechanisms.
However, many DReps expressed resistance to allowing organic Cardano initiatives or DRep-governed structures to allocate smaller grants. The prevailing preference has often been to use established external service providers, even when they request significantly higher fees.
As a DRep, I accept that feedback. If the community prefers a professional external operator, I am willing to support and pay such an operator to build the funding pipeline, evaluate opportunities, coordinate grants, and help ecosystem builders deliver.
The ₳27M liquidity-incentive envelope is also necessary. Cardano faces a liquidity cold-start problem. Shallow markets result in higher slippage, less efficient capital allocation, and more volatile rates and yields. This makes it difficult for applications to compete, even when their technology is sound.
Liquidity incentives are not a replacement for product-market fit, but they can help Cardano reach the market depth necessary for organic activity to develop. The important test will be whether PRIME attracts genuinely new capital and produces liquidity that remains after subsidies decline.
My support does not mean that I consider the proposal perfect.
The ₳120M request is large and high-risk. Its enactment is conditional on an applicable Net Change Limit with sufficient remaining capacity. In practice, this connects PRIME to the current governance debate over increasing the NCL.
The Operating Group represents a concentration of authority. DReps approve the overall framework through this withdrawal, but they will not directly approve the final Phase 3 plan, individual grants, or liquidity deployments.
AlphaGrowth remains responsible for execution, while the OG and Intersect will carry substantial responsibility for oversight. OG members will therefore share responsibility for whether major allocations proceed and whether the program’s controls work as intended.
AlphaGrowth has indicated that it is willing to expand the OG, which I consider a positive sign. However, any expansion should be formally documented, including the resulting quorum, voting thresholds, and replacement process.
For future proposals of this type, I recommend conducting an open nomination and selection process before submission.
The final TVL-attribution methodology will be finalized after the Treasury withdrawal is approved, as it will determine whether AlphaGrowth may earn up to ₳29M in performance compensation.
The performance-fee formula is primarily driven by verified qualifying TVL growth. Transaction volume, protocol fees, active users, and six-month liquidity persistence are reported, but they are not separate payout conditions.
I expect the OG to use its authority to establish conservative attribution rules, strong evidence requirements, and effective protection against temporary or externally caused TVL.
AlphaGrowth’s total potential compensation, ₳11M fixed and up to ₳29M performance-based, is high. This places significant responsibility on the OG, Intersect, and independent assurance providers to ensure that success is measured fairly and conservatively.
Under the current proposal, approximately ₳90M of Phase 3 funding requires an explicit M-of-N OG approval after the initial audit, gap analysis, and deployment plan are available.
I also consider the cost of inaction. Cardano cannot continue investing in scaling, interoperability, stablecoins, and other infrastructure without making a serious attempt to convert those investments into usage. Waiting for organic growth alone has so far not produced sufficient results.
PRIME introduces a type of coordinated DeFi growth program that Cardano has not previously operated at this scale. The timing is appropriate: the Cardano protocol will be upgraded, important infrastructure is in place, native protocols are maturing, and Cardano needs an activation strategy before another opportunity is lost.
My YES vote is therefore based on the strategic need, the relevance of AlphaGrowth’s experience, the importance of funding ecosystem builders, and the need for liquidity incentives.
It is not a blank check. I expect the Operating Group to apply a high standard before releasing Phase 3 and to demand credible counterparties, conservative attribution, strong risk controls, and evidence that the program can create lasting economic activity. As I mentioned, after approval, oversight will not be in the hands of DReps, but in the hands of OG members.
The proposal carries significant risks, but Cardano also faces substantial risk by remaining slow, fragmented, illiquid, and economically underused.
I believe PRIME is a credible attempt to address that problem, and I am willing to allow it to deliver.
If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.
MANDA Pool ID:
pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8My DRep ID:
drep1y2m0g4r66...skqwqpBuy me a beer:
https://pay.cexplorer.io/pay/c0410d5b237b6ec0 - Yes89.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes89.1M ₳No rationale
- No88.1M ₳Rationale
This is far too much money and a severe abdication of the power of the purse. A very easy "no" vote.
- Yes83.9M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes YES, with expectations, on the treasury withdrawal "Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth's Cardano PRIME".
This is the largest withdrawal before DReps this cycle, and it is also the most tightly constructed one SIPO has assessed. PRIME is a twelve-month program to convert Cardano's existing DeFi infrastructure into retained liquidity: Phase 1 publishes a current-state audit, Phase 2 identifies integration and product gaps, and Phase 3 deploys incentives and capital only after an independent Operating Group affirms the deployment plan. The request is 120,000,000 ada, referenced at 19.2 million US dollars on a $0.16 per ada planning assumption.
Fund control is the strongest class SIPO recognises, and it is the principal reason this vote differs from the No votes SIPO cast earlier in this cycle. The withdrawal recipient is the 2026 Intersect Treasury Reserve Smart Contract at the script credential stake1784sdxt6jjennmstphgdu7l7c2scf5d02a6cve2dgn5s2kq5u3j9v, on the Sundae Labs treasury-contracts framework, with two independent audits published by TxPipe and MLabs. Intersect MBO acts as Constitutional Administrator and manages the withdrawn funds directly. AlphaGrowth does not hold or control program funds, the Operating Group does not hold funds, and no single party controls recommendations, approval, and custody together. Funds sit under abstain delegation while held before disbursement, so they cannot convert into governance power. Six return-to-treasury triggers cover unused, unearned, unreleased, and excess amounts, and 2,000,000 ada is ring-fenced for independent audit or assurance. In Epoch 645 and again in Epoch 646, SIPO voted No on withdrawals whose recipients were single-key addresses and whose safeguards were promises rather than enforced controls. This proposal meets the standard those votes asked for.
The Month 4 release gate materially limits what this vote commits. Approximately 90,000,000 ada — all LP incentives, the performance fee reserve, the second tranche of ecosystem grants, and the Months 5 to 12 fixed fee — is released only on a three-of-five affirmative vote by the Operating Group, taken after the Phase 1 audit and the Phase 2 analysis are public. If the Operating Group does not affirm release, those tranches remain undisbursed and do not flow to program envelopes. The irreversible commitment at enactment is therefore closer to 30,000,000 ada than to 120,000,000.
The measurement design is unusually rigorous for an incentive program. Qualifying TVL is the net additional value that would not have arrived absent PRIME, after published carve-outs. Ada price effects are excluded, so token appreciation cannot be booked as program performance. Measurement requires TVL to hold for at least thirty days at the measurement date, and a six-month rolling persistence figure is published alongside the headline number expressly to distinguish durable capital from mercenary capital. The performance fee is capped, and growth-attributable upside above the cap accrues to the ecosystem rather than to the executor. The Operating Group's five voting members serve unpaid, and no seat is held by an employee or principal of AlphaGrowth. AlphaGrowth has run this class of program before, having delivered Compound DAO's growth mandate through that DAO's own governance process.
SIPO attaches expectations, and states one reservation plainly.
The reservation is fiscal concentration. Treasury withdrawals debited since the start of Epoch 613 now total approximately 335.6 million ada against the 350,000,000 ada Net Change Limit, leaving roughly 14.4 million. This withdrawal is conditional by its own terms on an agreed Net Change Limit with sufficient remaining capacity, which in practice means the 500,000,000 ada limit. SIPO voted Yes to that limit as a price adjustment restoring capacity lost to a fall of about 42 percent in ada, and recorded at the time that agreeing a limit authorises no withdrawal and that SIPO would continue to judge each withdrawal on its own merits. Approving this action commits roughly 73 percent of the restored headroom to a single program for the eleven months remaining to the close of Epoch 713. SIPO supports it, and records that it does so knowingly, and that the headroom left behind will be treated as scarce when the next withdrawals are judged.
The expectations follow from that. First, the Month 4 gate must function as a gate: if the Phase 1 audit and the Phase 2 analysis do not support deployment, SIPO expects the Operating Group to withhold affirmation, and would read a pro-forma approval as a governance failure rather than a formality. Second, maximum executor compensation is 6.4 million dollars, a third of the request; SIPO expects the attribution methodology — the net-additional test, the carve-outs, and the exclusion of ada price effects — to be applied strictly and published in full with each performance-fee release. Third, the six-month rolling persistence figure should be published every quarter alongside headline TVL, including in periods where it shows decay; a program that measures durability honestly is worth more to Cardano than one that reports a favourable headline. Fourth, this is incentive spend rather than infrastructure, and incentivised liquidity has a documented tendency to leave when incentives end; SIPO will judge PRIME on liquidity retained after the program, not on peak TVL during it. None of these conditions the vote; they are the basis on which SIPO will judge delivery. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep は、トレジャリー引き出し提案「Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth's Cardano PRIME」に、期待事項を付して賛成（YES）を投じます。
本件は今サイクルで DRep の前にある最大の引き出しであると同時に、SIPO が評価した中で最も緻密に設計された提案でもあります。PRIME は、Cardano が既に構築した DeFi インフラを「留まる流動性」へ転換するための 12 ヶ月プログラムです。Phase 1 で現状監査を公開し、Phase 2 で統合・プロダクト・エコシステム支援のギャップを特定し、Phase 3 では独立した Operating Group が展開計画を承認して初めてインセンティブと資本を投入します。要求額は 120,000,000 ADA（$0.16/ADA の計画前提で 約 1,920 万ドル）です。
資金統制は SIPO が認める最強の類型であり、これが本投票を今サイクルの反対票と分ける主たる理由です。引き出し先は 2026 Intersect Treasury Reserve Smart Contract（script credential: stake1784sdxt6jjennmstphgdu7l7c2scf5d02a6cve2dgn5s2kq5u3j9v・Sundae Labs treasury-contracts フレームワーク上）であり、TxPipe と MLabs による独立監査 2 本が公開されています。Intersect MBO が Constitutional Administrator として引き出し資金を直接管理します。AlphaGrowth はプログラム資金を保持も支配もせず、Operating Group も資金を持たず、推薦・承認・保管を単一の主体が併せ持つことはありません。支出前の保有期間中、資金は abstain 委任の下に置かれ、投票力に転化しません。未使用・未獲得・未放出・超過分に対する国庫返還トリガーが 6 種設けられ、独立監査・保証のために 2,000,000 ADA が区分されています。SIPO はエポック 645 および 646 において、引き出し先が単一鍵アドレスであり、安全装置が強制される制御ではなく約束にとどまる提案に反対を投じました。本提案は、それらの投票が求めた基準を満たしています。
Month 4 の放出ゲートは、本投票が確定させる範囲を実質的に限定します。約 90,000,000 ADA — LP インセンティブ全額、成功報酬引当、エコシステム助成の第 2 トランシェ、および 5〜12 ヶ月目の固定報酬 — は、Phase 1 監査と Phase 2 分析が公開された後に行われる Operating Group の 5 名中 3 名の賛成によってのみ放出されます。承認されなければ、これらのトランシェは未支出のまま各費目へ流れません。したがって可決時点で不可逆に確定するのは、120,000,000 ADA ではなく 30,000,000 ADA 程度です。
測定設計は、この種のインセンティブプログラムとしては異例に厳格です。Qualifying TVL は、公開された carve-out の後、PRIME がなければ到来しなかったであろう純増分と定義されます。ADA の価格変動効果は除外され、トークンの値上がりをプログラムの成果として計上できません。測定にあたっては測定時点で TVL が 30 日以上維持されていることが要求され、さらにヘッドライン数値と併せて 6 ヶ月ローリングの持続性数値が公開されます。これは durable な資本と mercenary な資本を明示的に区別するためのものです。成功報酬には上限があり、成長に帰属する上振れのうち上限を超える部分は、実行者ではなくエコシステムに帰属します。Operating Group の議決権を持つ 5 名は無報酬で、AlphaGrowth の従業員または principal が占める席はありません。AlphaGrowth はこの種のプログラムの実行経験を持ち、Compound DAO の成長マンデートを同 DAO のガバナンスプロセスを通じて遂行しています。
SIPO は期待事項を付し、あわせて 1 つの留保を明示します。
留保は財政的な集中です。エポック 613 開始以降に確定したトレジャリー引き出しは、350,000,000 ADA の Net Change Limit に対して現在 約 3 億 3,560 万 ADA に達し、残枠は 約 1,440 万 ADA です。本引き出しは、提案自身の条件により、十分な残容量を持つ Net Change Limit が合意されていることを前提としており、実務上それは 500,000,000 ADA の上限を意味します。SIPO はその上限に対し、ADA の約 42% の下落によって失われた能力を回復する価格調整として賛成し、その際「本アクションは上限を合意するものであり、いかなる引き出しも承認しない。SIPO は引き続き各引き出しをそれ自体の是非で判断する」と記録しました。本アクションの承認は、エポック 713 終了までの残り 11 ヶ月に対し、回復された枠の約 73% を単一のプログラムに割り当てることを意味します。SIPO はこれを支持しますが、それを承知の上で行っていること、そして残された枠は次の引き出しを判断する際に希少なものとして扱うことを、ここに記録します。
期待事項はこの留保から導かれます。第一に、Month 4 のゲートはゲートとして機能しなければなりません。Phase 1 監査と Phase 2 分析が展開を支持しない場合、SIPO は Operating Group が承認を留保することを期待し、形式的な承認は手続きではなくガバナンスの失敗として読みます。第二に、実行者報酬の上限は 640 万ドル、要求額の 3 分の 1 に相当します。SIPO は帰属方法論 — 純増分の判定、carve-out、ADA 価格効果の除外 — が厳格に適用され、成功報酬の各放出時に全文が公開されることを期待します。第三に、6 ヶ月ローリングの持続性数値は、減衰を示す期間も含めて、四半期ごとにヘッドライン TVL と並べて公開されるべきです。持続性を正直に測るプログラムは、都合の良いヘッドラインを報告するプログラムより Cardano にとって価値があります。第四に、本件はインフラではなくインセンティブ支出であり、インセンティブ付き流動性はインセンティブ終了とともに流出する傾向が広く記録されています。SIPO は PRIME を、プログラム期間中のピーク TVL ではなく、プログラム後に留まった流動性で判断します。これらはいずれも本投票の条件ではなく、SIPO が履行を判断する際の基礎です。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- Yes80.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes78.6M ₳Rationale
支持方向， 把现有基础设施转化成真实流动性，交易和协议收入。认可提案它把资金保管，项目执行和监督权分开。但对总体规模保留意见，最终看激励结束以后到底留下多少真实流动性。
- Yes75.3M ₳Rationale
I am casting a YES vote for the Cardano PRIME ₳120,000,000 liquidity and protocol readiness initiative.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am casting a YES vote for the Cardano PRIME ₳120,000,000 liquidity and protocol readiness initiative.
I approach this decision with deep conviction, though it represents a significant departure from my initial stance. At the outset, I was fully prepared to vote NO. An expenditure of this magnitude directly challenges the strict fiscal discipline I have consistently advocated for. However, after intentionally challenging numerous facets of this framework, engaging in extensive dialogue with the architects, and conducting a rigorous analysis of Cardano's current market position, my perspective has fundamentally shifted.
Cardano possesses world-class infrastructure, yet our DeFi ecosystem currently captures only around $90M in Total Value Locked (TVL). As we approach major, usage-heavy upgrades, we are hitting innovation limits that can only be overcome with deep, sophisticated liquidity. Establishing durable DeFi activity, robust fee generation, and capital retention is not a luxury; it is the absolute prerequisite for the long-term sustainability of our treasury. Consequently, I recognize this initiative as a necessary, strategic exception to catalyze foundational growth.
I want to extend my sincere gratitude to everyone involved in this proposal for their transparency and willingness to engage. Over weeks of persistent discussion, I have been deeply impressed by how the proposers absorbed community feedback and materially improved the initiative. The strategic reduction in the marketing budget, the resolute commitment to a "Cardano-first" integration approach, and the extension of the TVL observation window from 12 to 24 months all signal a mature commitment to durable growth rather than short-term metric inflation.
Furthermore, I raised strong concerns regarding the initial concentration of the Operating Group. For this program to succeed legitimately, oversight must be dynamic and open. The team listened, updating their framework to introduce term limits and explicitly committing to expand and diversify the Operating Group's composition. This willingness to decentralize oversight and adapt to governance feedback ultimately solidified my support.
Bridging Cardano's liquidity gap comes at a substantial cost, but the cost of stagnation is far greater. I am confident that this strategic deployment of capital will yield profound, lasting benefits for the Cardano ecosystem, its users, and our collective future.
- Yes69.8M ₳No rationale
- No55.4M ₳Rationale
I am voting No on this proposal. This year's Net Change Limit (NCL) has been set well above the level I consider sustainable. Under my published voting framework, an appropriate NCL is roughly 15% of the previous year's staking rewards (on the order of 82M ADA), whereas the NCL currently in force is several times that amount. Because the treasury is already authorized to disburse far beyond my personal NCL threshold, I am voting No on all treasury withdrawal proposals until aggregate withdrawals are brought back within a sustainable limit — regardless of the individual merits of any single proposal. This vote reflects a position on total treasury spend, not a judgment on the value of your specific project. Reference: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem/\n\n[Japanese version follows]\n\n本提案に反対票を投じます。今年のNet Change Limit（NCL）は、私が持続可能と考える水準を大幅に上回って設定されています。公開済みの投票フレームワークでは、適正なNCLは前年のステーキング報酬の約15%（82M ADA）ですが、現行のNCLはその数倍に達しています。トレジャリーは既に私のpersonal NCL（個人として許容する上限）を大きく超える出金が認められている状態にあるため、出金総額が持続可能な範囲に戻るまで、個別提案の良し悪しに関わらず、すべてのトレジャリー出金提案に反対票を投じます。本投票はトレジャリー支出全体に対する立場の表明であり、貴提案の価値そのものを否定するものではありません。参照: https://coffeepool.jp/notes/drep-voting-framework-for-sustainable-ecosystem-jp/
- Yes53.3M ₳Rationale
I'm voting Yes on the AlphaGrowth's Cardano PRIME proposal. Personally, this is a project I'm genuinely excited about.
Cardano has grown into a technically excellent chain that maximizes the value of decentralization like no other. But in return, it has struggled to capture the market's attention and to bring in users and liquidity from outside ecosystems.
Fortunately, the Pentad has now built the environment for them to flow into Cardano. We have USDCx as a tier-1 stablecoin, LayerZero for cross-chain connectivity, and oracle and data infrastructure like Pyth and Dune. Now is the time to build on that infrastructure and put a strategic growth drive behind Cardano's key ecosystem players, so they can win more attention and actually bring in users and liquidity.
By that standard, AlphaGrowth's PRIME can play an important role.
Through this proposal, we can put Cardano's competitive products in front of the market, and give far more people the chance to directly experience what only Cardano offers, from liquid staking with no slashing to a fair trading environment free of MEV.
As I've said many times, Cardano has spent its years focused on the network's fundamentals and decentralization. Now it's time to take that outward and expand.
I hope this proposal passes and, on top of the foundation the Pentad has laid, becomes the moment Cardano takes its leap in this market.
- Abstain50.8M ₳Rationale
Because of fundamental concerns with the current treasury process, I vote Abstain on all Treasury Withdrawal proposals until the treasury budgeting process undergoes fundamental reform.
More information: https://x.com/ada_stat/status/2068315882539921703
- No43.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes42.3M ₳Rationale
Pushing DeFi adoption is currently the most sure way to make Cardano successful.
- No41.6M ₳No rationale
- No40.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes39.5M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on two governance actions, one with the hash a75645e0871f3d...7fbf#0 and one with the hash 529dccaadaa000...96d7#0.
First, there is some unavoidable conflict of interest inherent in the AlphaGrowth proposal: every DeFi protocol (and IMO, the whole ecosystem) stands to benefit from more capital being deployed into DeFi on Cardano. That being said, the funds allocated in the proposal to an independent eligibility audit to avoid favoritism are, to me, sufficient protections against my own conflict of interest.
In response, I am voting yes on both the increased NCL, and the use of that increase in support of the AlphaGrowth proposal.
In orbital dynamics, there is a concept called delta-V. This represents the change in velocity available to you by your current fuel reserves. Spend a certain amount of fuel, change your velocity by a set amount, and this determines how you change the shape of your orbit.
If, however, you're in a decaying orbit, this Delta-V becomes time sensitive. As the orbit decays from drag from the atmosphere, the Delta-V required to correct and sustain the orbit long term increases. Conserving fuel and expending it slowly over time to try to maintain your current orbit is a losing game, because you have finite resources. The longer you wait, the more your orbit decays, and the more Delta-V is required to repair your orbit at all, until you hit a point of no return and your crash to earth is inevitable.
I believe this is the position Cardano finds itself in. It has a fairly large reserve of ADA. Through unbelievable feats of human engineering it finds itself in a low, somewhat stable orbit. But it is decaying slowly over time.
In my view, conserving that budget to spend it judiciously over a long period of time while the value of that treasury shrinks is consigning Cardano to a painful crash into the Atlantic ocean. Perhaps conserving that treasury will delay that crash by a few years, or allow us some leniency to steer that crash into safer, gentler waters, but nonetheless, we will crash.
The solution, then, is to figure out how to stabilize the orbit. The Delta-V available in a stable orbit becomes a moot point. If we are stable, and self sustaining, we will have time to secure a resupply, and from that stable orbit our launch into the stars becomes far easier.
More concretely, the Cardano treasury will not replenish or grow its expenditures through transaction fees alone. It will grow it's holdings by fostering billion dollar businesses that have no choice but to invest in the continued success of Cardano.
I believe the AlphaGrowth proposal is our best use of what fuel we have to change the trajectory of Cardano for the better. They have a proven track record, a concrete plan, and the right mindset to attract those businesses.
You can find a larger writeup justifying my vote here.
- Abstain37M ₳No rationale
- Yes36.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes36.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes35.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes34.3M ₳Rationale
Vote: Yes. This action requests 120,000,000 ADA for Cardano PRIME, a 12-month program focused on protocol readiness, integrations, incentives, and durable DeFi liquidity. Most deployment capital remains behind a Month 4 release gate.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Cardano has spent years building strong technology without converting enough of it into users, liquidity, revenue, or sustained economic demand. The Cardano First framework supports this proposal under Adoption and Economic Sustainability.
Preserving the treasury while Cardano loses commercial relevance would be managed decline, not responsible stewardship. PRIME addresses a problem Cardano has repeatedly failed to solve through engineering alone: turning capable protocols into products and markets that attract outside capital and retain users.
The amount is large, and incentive programs can produce temporary or poorly attributed growth. Those risks are real. The proposal responds with Operating Group oversight, Intersect custody, published disbursement records, independent assurance funding, performance-attribution rules, return triggers, and a Month 4 gate before most capital can be released.
These controls do not guarantee success. They make failure visible and limit how much capital can be deployed before the program proves its direction. Cardano is running out of time to compete commercially, and the cost of continued inaction is now greater than the controlled risk of trying.
I vote Yes. - No32.4M ₳Rationale
NO — This proposal requests an exceptionally large withdrawal (₳120M) for a DeFi incentive program rather than core infrastructure. Under my criteria, Treasury funds must prioritize essential, non‑optional infrastructure that preserves network reliability and user access. PRIME is an application‑layer liquidity initiative with uncertain long‑term impact, high Treasury dependency, and significant depletion risk. While governance controls are strong, the scale, volatility exposure, and non‑infrastructure nature of the program make it incompatible with responsible Treasury stewardship. I therefore vote NO.
- Yes31.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes30.6M ₳Rationale
Cardano has built robust core infrastructure, but ecosystem activity and available DeFi liquidity remain significantly under-scaled relative to the protocol’s market capitalization and technical capabilities. Building infrastructure alone is no longer sufficient; active growth execution is necessary to bootstrap decentralized exchange (DEX) depth, stablecoin liquidity, and protocol adoption.
The Cardano PRIME proposal addresses this cold-start problem through a structured, 12-month ecosystem growth program executed by AlphaGrowth. Although the 120,000,000 ADA request represents a substantial treasury outlay, the proposal incorporates unprecedented oversight, milestone gating, anti-gaming performance metrics, and constitutional safeguards managed by Intersect.
- Yes30.6M ₳Rationale
I support this proposal because stronger DeFi infrastructure, deeper liquidity, and better ecosystem integrations can directly benefit projects like SNEK and others. More users and capital entering Cardano should create more opportunities for trading, lending, payments, and broader token utility. Initiatives that make Cardano more competitive can strengthen the environment in which it operates. The proposal is ambitious, but its phased funding, oversight, and accountability measures make the potential upside worth supporting.
It is time for Cardano to make a serious effort to catch up with other ecosystems. I am not in favor of excessive spending and will likely support a lower NCL after this proposal, but considering the current state of the ecosystem, I do not think we have much of a choice.
- Yes28.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes28.1M ₳Rationale
This is a difficult vote for me. The 120M ADA price tag and the timing are my biggest concerns. Cardano is simultaneously preparing to deliver Ouroboros Leios, Ouroboros Peras, nested transactions, and several other huge architectural changes for the fast-approaching Dijkstra Era. I worry about aggressively attracting liquidity before those foundational changes are ready, especially in the off chance that one of them results in a critical bug on the layer 1. However, the recent commitments to back-load performance payouts, extend TVL observation to 24 months, and diversify the Operating Group significantly improve the alignment of incentives. I think AlphaGrowth could be a big help for Cardano, and while the risks are substantial, I believe the potential benefits outweigh them. For these reasons, I am voting YES.
- Yes27.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes26M ₳Rationale
Operationally this is the right move, my yes vote along with every other dreps votes is moot though if the new NCL for 500 million is not approved. The team has a proven track record of achieving its goals so even thought the ask is high I am not being asked to go out on a limb to approve a grant that may or may not work like so many others that we have funded here in the past.
The 5 member admin is more then capable of managing the deliverables and the majority of the payment the Alpha Growth team receives is merit based so that also allows me to sleep at night. There are two people in particular on the Admin in Christina and Kris which also make me more comfortable, the first has been a stalwart proponent of good funds management and has been outspoken about there they may not have been in the past. She also created her own treasury funding working group reviewing the past grants and auditing their deliverables. The second is a very pragmatic and business driven individual who also spend a lot of his time freely to our ecosystem, there is no reason to believe either of them would allow anyone to spend mismanage these fundds as it just isn't a part of who they are.
I expect them along with the other members to work as hard as they possibly can to ensure Alpha team do their very best to help our chain succeed, of this I have a supreme confidence in.
- Yes25.9M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on Withdraw 120,000,000 ada for AlphaGrowth’s Cardano PRIME. As an entrepreneur I believe we've lost DeFi. That being said, the best DeFi minds in our ecosystem beleive this will be beneficial and give us a real shot at winning, so we owe it to the ecosystem to try. And if we fail here to capture meaningful DeFi market then that's the indicator for the ecosytem to aggressively pursue adotion outside of DeFi.
- Yes25.8M ₳Rationale
I will support the launch of Alpha Growth, as some ADA are expected to be provided as liquidity, while the rest will be swapped in stablecoins. Currently, no founding entity is willing to do this role of liquidity provider, which is critical for the DeFI.
Indeed, in many situations, liquidity providers were willing to provide stablecoins on Cardano, but none wanted the ADA side. This could have been provided only by the Founding Entities, which have been refusing to take this role for various reasons.
- Yes23.6M ₳Rationale
Let's go!
- Yes22.4M ₳No rationale
- Abstain21.7M ₳No rationale
- Abstain21.5M ₳Rationale
We support the objective of strengthening Cardano DeFi and believe AlphaGrowth has relevant experience to contribute.
Our remaining concerns are mainly around how success and Treasury value are measured. TVL growth alone is not enough, especially when liquidity is incentive-driven. We would like stronger emphasis on durable liquidity retention, protocol fees, stablecoin depth, active users, transaction volume, and activity that continues after incentives decline.
We also remain concerned about the overall level of AlphaGrowth compensation, the relatively large and broadly defined marketing budget, the lack of stronger ADA/USD protection, and the long-term sustainability of the model if similar Treasury-funded incentive programs are needed again in the future.
The proposal addresses a real weakness in Cardano and we want to see the initiative succeed, but these points prevent us from giving an unconditional YES.
- Yes20.3M ₳Rationale
We absolutely need this for Cardano DeFi. The AlphaGrowth team has an excellent track record and I am confident they will execute their palybook on Cardano.
- No20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes15.3M ₳No rationale