Alchemy by Sundial x Charms: Cardano-Native Bitcoin Treasury Protocol
137 DReps voted · 51 with a rationale · 4 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Abstain574.1M ₳Rationale
"Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on Alchemy by Sundial x Charms: Cardano-Native Bitcoin Treasury Protocol. Yoroi recognises the importance of responsible governance during periods of ecosystem uncertainty.
- Ecosystem Situation: The trust our delegators place in Yoroi requires that we act only when we can do so with full confidence. In light of the current situation, Yoroi is choosing to withhold its vote on this proposal and will reassess our position once conditions allow for a considered decision."
- No385.9M ₳Rationale
Please check the following link for the reasons for the vote.（投票理由は次のページを参照してください。)
- AbstainRevoted333.2M ₳History
Earlier votes
Abstain21d agoSuperseded
- Abstain299.8M ₳Rationale
"EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on Alchemy by Sundial x Charms: Cardano-Native Bitcoin Treasury Protocol, with rationale outlined below.
Given the ongoing situation in the ecosystem, responsible governance requires us to act with full clarity and confidence. Until the current situation reaches resolution, EMURGO prefers to withhold judgment rather than vote without the certainty our mandate demands. We will revisit this proposal once the situation is resolved."
- No259.3M ₳No rationale
- No184.6M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes NO as the proposers have announced they do not wish to proceed with this treasury withdrawal.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Our NO vote does not evaluate the proposal but stems from the fact that the team has announced they no longer wish to proceed with this treasury withdrawal.
NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - Abstain182.7M ₳No rationale
- No177.9M ₳No rationale
- No91M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I vote NO on the proposal: Alchemy by Sundial x Charms: Cardano-Native Bitcoin Treasury Protocol
My rationale:
After discussing with the team, I found out that they are not able to deliver the project and that they will announce it publicly.
If my information is wrong, please feel free to contact me.
- AbstainChanged88.4M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes ABSTAIN on the treasury withdrawal "Alchemy by Sundial x Charms: Cardano-Native Bitcoin Treasury Protocol" (10,000,000 ada).
This action requests 10,000,000 ada (a modeled
$2.0M at$1.0M) funds delivery, audit, integrations, dashboards, governance reporting, legal work, and go-to-market. Intersect is proposed as interim fund administrator, subject to confirmation.$0.20/ADA) to build Alchemy, a Cardano-native Bitcoin treasury and BTCfi infrastructure layer proposed by Sundial Protocol and Charms. The request is split into two pools: Pool 1 ($1.0M) is treasury-supported launch liquidity, deployed in tranches, with profits, yield, and returns paid back to the Cardano Treasury quarterly; Pool 2 (SIPO supports the underlying direction. A transparent, Cardano-native way to hold and compose Bitcoin-backed exposure is a legitimate gap to address, and the design returns Pool 1's proceeds to the treasury rather than treating the full amount as spend. This places the proposal in the returnable-investment category SIPO considers on its merits, not a structural-No category.
SIPO does not, however, entrust 10,000,000 ada of treasury capital under the present structure, and so does not vote Yes. First, the Constitutional Committee voted against this action, 3 No to 1 Yes — the only proposal in the current set that the Committee does not find constitutional, and a signal SIPO weighs heavily on a novel treasury deployment. Second, fund administration is unsettled: Intersect is named only as the interim administrator "subject to confirmation and final agreement," so the custody and disbursement arrangement is not fixed at the time of the vote. Third, this is launch liquidity in a new, unproven BTCfi protocol; the treasury's return depends on the performance of that liquidity and on execution by a first-deployment system, and the Pool 2 delivery spend is not itself returnable. This is the same concern pattern that led SIPO to abstain on the Strike Finance liquidity deployment: a returnable-investment objective SIPO supports, but a return that is not yet enforced and a concentrated, at-risk position SIPO cannot fund on trust.
SIPO does not vote No, because the direction is legitimate, the Pool 1 return-to-treasury design is made in good faith, and the two-pool separation is a reasonable structure. Consistent with its duty of care over treasury capital, SIPO abstains: it supports Cardano BTCfi depth and recognizes the design effort, but cannot commit 10,000,000 ada while the Constitutional Committee finds the action unconstitutional, the fund administrator is unconfirmed, and the return rests on the performance of launch liquidity in an unproven protocol. SIPO would reconsider support once the constitutionality concern is resolved, the administrator and on-chain-enforced return mechanism are fixed and published, and deployment is staged against verifiable performance. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep として、トレジャリー引き出し提案「Alchemy by Sundial x Charms: Cardano-Native Bitcoin Treasury Protocol」（10,000,000 ada）に棄権（ABSTAIN）を投じます。
本件は、Sundial Protocol と Charms が提案する、Cardano ネイティブの Bitcoin treasury / BTCfi インフラ層である Alchemy を構築するために 10,000,000 ada（約 $0.20/ADA でモデル上 約 $2.0M）を求めるものです。要求は 2 つのプールに分かれます。Pool 1（約 $1.0M）は treasury 支援の launch liquidity で、トランシェで投下され、利益・利回り・リターンが四半期ごとに Cardano 国庫へ返還されます。Pool 2（約 $1.0M）は開発・監査・統合・ダッシュボード・ガバナンス報告・法務・go-to-market に充てられます。Intersect は interim の fund administrator として提案されており、確認待ちです。
SIPO はその根底の方向性を支持します。Bitcoin 建てのエクスポージャを透明に保持・合成する Cardano ネイティブの手段は取り組むに値する空白であり、設計は全額を消費として扱わず Pool 1 の収益を国庫へ返します。これは本提案を、SIPO が是々非々で検討する返還型投資の類型に置くものであり、構造的 NO の類型ではありません。
しかし SIPO は、現在の構造で 10,000,000 ada の国庫資本を託すことはせず、したがって賛成（Yes）は投じません。第一に、Constitutional Committee が本アクションに反対を投じています（反対 3 / 賛成 1）— 現在の一群のうち Committee が合憲と認めない唯一の提案であり、新規の国庫投下について SIPO が重く見るシグナルです。第二に、fund administration が未確定です。Intersect は「確認と最終合意を条件とする」interim の administrator としてのみ記載されており、custody と支出の取り決めが投票時点で固定されていません。第三に、これは新規で未実証の BTCfi プロトコルにおける launch liquidity です。国庫のリターンはその liquidity のパフォーマンスと、初回デプロイのシステムによる実行に依存し、Pool 2 の開発支出はそれ自体返還されません。これは、SIPO が Strike Finance の liquidity deployment で棄権を選んだのと同じ懸念のパターンです — SIPO が支持する返還型投資の目的でありながら、返還がまだ強制されておらず、集中した、リスクにさらされたポジションを信頼で資金提供することはできない、というものです。
SIPO は反対（No）も投じません。方向性は正当であり、Pool 1 の国庫返還設計は good faith でなされ、2 プール分離は妥当な構造だからです。国庫資本への注意義務に忠実に、SIPO は棄権します — Cardano の BTCfi の厚みは支持し、設計の努力も認めるが、Constitutional Committee が本アクションを違憲と判断し、fund administrator が未確定で、返還が未実証プロトコルの launch liquidity のパフォーマンスに依存する状態で 10,000,000 ada をコミットすることはできない、という立場です。SIPO は、合憲性の懸念が解消され、administrator とオンチェーン強制の返還メカニズムが固定・公開され、デプロイが検証可能なパフォーマンスに対して段階化されれば、支持の再検討に開かれています。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
Earlier votes
Yes11d agoSuperseded
SIPO DRep votes ABSTAIN on the treasury withdrawal "Alchemy by Sundial x Charms: Cardano-Native Bitcoin Treasury Protocol" (10,000,000 ada).
This action requests 10,000,000 ada (a modeled
$2.0M at$1.0M) funds delivery, audit, integrations, dashboards, governance reporting, legal work, and go-to-market. Intersect is proposed as interim fund administrator, subject to confirmation.$0.20/ADA) to build Alchemy, a Cardano-native Bitcoin treasury and BTCfi infrastructure layer proposed by Sundial Protocol and Charms. The request is split into two pools: Pool 1 ($1.0M) is treasury-supported launch liquidity, deployed in tranches, with profits, yield, and returns paid back to the Cardano Treasury quarterly; Pool 2 (SIPO supports the underlying direction. A transparent, Cardano-native way to hold and compose Bitcoin-backed exposure is a legitimate gap to address, and the design returns Pool 1's proceeds to the treasury rather than treating the full amount as spend. This places the proposal in the returnable-investment category SIPO considers on its merits, not a structural-No category.
SIPO does not, however, entrust 10,000,000 ada of treasury capital under the present structure, and so does not vote Yes. First, the Constitutional Committee voted against this action, 3 No to 1 Yes — the only proposal in the current set that the Committee does not find constitutional, and a signal SIPO weighs heavily on a novel treasury deployment. Second, fund administration is unsettled: Intersect is named only as the interim administrator "subject to confirmation and final agreement," so the custody and disbursement arrangement is not fixed at the time of the vote. Third, this is launch liquidity in a new, unproven BTCfi protocol; the treasury's return depends on the performance of that liquidity and on execution by a first-deployment system, and the Pool 2 delivery spend is not itself returnable. This is the same concern pattern that led SIPO to abstain on the Strike Finance liquidity deployment: a returnable-investment objective SIPO supports, but a return that is not yet enforced and a concentrated, at-risk position SIPO cannot fund on trust.
SIPO does not vote No, because the direction is legitimate, the Pool 1 return-to-treasury design is made in good faith, and the two-pool separation is a reasonable structure. Consistent with its duty of care over treasury capital, SIPO abstains: it supports Cardano BTCfi depth and recognizes the design effort, but cannot commit 10,000,000 ada while the Constitutional Committee finds the action unconstitutional, the fund administrator is unconfirmed, and the return rests on the performance of launch liquidity in an unproven protocol. SIPO would reconsider support once the constitutionality concern is resolved, the administrator and on-chain-enforced return mechanism are fixed and published, and deployment is staged against verifiable performance. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep として、トレジャリー引き出し提案「Alchemy by Sundial x Charms: Cardano-Native Bitcoin Treasury Protocol」（10,000,000 ada）に棄権（ABSTAIN）を投じます。
本件は、Sundial Protocol と Charms が提案する、Cardano ネイティブの Bitcoin treasury / BTCfi インフラ層である Alchemy を構築するために 10,000,000 ada（約 $0.20/ADA でモデル上 約 $2.0M）を求めるものです。要求は 2 つのプールに分かれます。Pool 1（約 $1.0M）は treasury 支援の launch liquidity で、トランシェで投下され、利益・利回り・リターンが四半期ごとに Cardano 国庫へ返還されます。Pool 2（約 $1.0M）は開発・監査・統合・ダッシュボード・ガバナンス報告・法務・go-to-market に充てられます。Intersect は interim の fund administrator として提案されており、確認待ちです。
SIPO はその根底の方向性を支持します。Bitcoin 建てのエクスポージャを透明に保持・合成する Cardano ネイティブの手段は取り組むに値する空白であり、設計は全額を消費として扱わず Pool 1 の収益を国庫へ返します。これは本提案を、SIPO が是々非々で検討する返還型投資の類型に置くものであり、構造的 NO の類型ではありません。
しかし SIPO は、現在の構造で 10,000,000 ada の国庫資本を託すことはせず、したがって賛成（Yes）は投じません。第一に、Constitutional Committee が本アクションに反対を投じています（反対 3 / 賛成 1）— 現在の一群のうち Committee が合憲と認めない唯一の提案であり、新規の国庫投下について SIPO が重く見るシグナルです。第二に、fund administration が未確定です。Intersect は「確認と最終合意を条件とする」interim の administrator としてのみ記載されており、custody と支出の取り決めが投票時点で固定されていません。第三に、これは新規で未実証の BTCfi プロトコルにおける launch liquidity です。国庫のリターンはその liquidity のパフォーマンスと、初回デプロイのシステムによる実行に依存し、Pool 2 の開発支出はそれ自体返還されません。これは、SIPO が Strike Finance の liquidity deployment で棄権を選んだのと同じ懸念のパターンです — SIPO が支持する返還型投資の目的でありながら、返還がまだ強制されておらず、集中した、リスクにさらされたポジションを信頼で資金提供することはできない、というものです。
SIPO は反対（No）も投じません。方向性は正当であり、Pool 1 の国庫返還設計は good faith でなされ、2 プール分離は妥当な構造だからです。国庫資本への注意義務に忠実に、SIPO は棄権します — Cardano の BTCfi の厚みは支持し、設計の努力も認めるが、Constitutional Committee が本アクションを違憲と判断し、fund administrator が未確定で、返還が未実証プロトコルの launch liquidity のパフォーマンスに依存する状態で 10,000,000 ada をコミットすることはできない、という立場です。SIPO は、合憲性の懸念が解消され、administrator とオンチェーン強制の返還メカニズムが固定・公開され、デプロイが検証可能なパフォーマンスに対して段階化されれば、支持の再検討に開かれています。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- No84.9M ₳Rationale
I am unconvinced this is prudent spending given competing demands on the Cardano Treasury and how quickly the Treasury will reach zero given current spending levels.
- Abstain76.7M ₳No rationale
- Abstain76.2M ₳Rationale
I strongly support the vision of bringing Bitcoin liquidity to Cardano. I also appreciate the proposal's design of returning profits generated from Treasury-supported liquidity back to the Cardano Treasury. I believe BTCfi represents an important strategic direction for Cardano.
However, under the current Net Change Limit (NCL), I am not yet sufficiently convinced that allocating 10 million ADA is the right decision at this stage.
The key issue is that the existence of a BTCfi market does not automatically demonstrate that Alchemy will succeed within that market.
While the proposal presents a compelling case for the growth and potential of BTCfi, I am not yet convinced that Alchemy has sufficiently demonstrated the execution certainty and sustainable competitive position necessary to justify an investment of this scale.
Given the current NCL constraints, I believe a more prudent approach would be to begin with a smaller proof of concept, validate execution and market adoption, and expand funding based on demonstrated results rather than committing a large upfront allocation.
If future evidence demonstrates stronger execution, measurable adoption, and sustainable competitiveness, and if the proposal adopts a smaller initial budget with milestone-based expansion, I would be inclined to support it.
I am optimistic about the long-term potential of BTCfi on Cardano. However, at this stage, I do not have sufficient confidence to either fully support or reject a Treasury allocation of this magnitude.
For these reasons, I vote Abstain.
BTCをCardanoへ呼び込むという方向性には強く賛同します。また、Treasuryが提供する流動性から得られた利益をTreasuryへ還元する設計についても高く評価しています。CardanoがBTCfi市場へ参入する必要性そのものは否定しません。
一方で、限られたNet Change Limit（NCL）の中で約1,000万ADAを配分するには、現時点では十分な確信を持つことができませんでした。
最大の理由は、BTCfi市場が存在することと、Alchemyがその市場で成功することは別問題だからです。
提案では市場規模や成長性について十分に説明されていますが、Alchemyが実際に競争力を確立し、持続的な利用や流動性を獲得できることについては、まだ十分に立証されているとは判断できませんでした。
また、約1,000万ADAという予算規模は、現在のNCLを考えると非常に大きな投資です。私は、このような新しい分野への挑戦については、小規模なPoC（概念実証）や段階的なマイルストーンを通じて実績を積み重ね、その成果を確認した上で追加投資を判断する方が、Treasuryにとって望ましいアプローチだと考えています。
もし今後、
Alchemyの実現可能性や市場競争力が、実績や客観的なデータによってより明確に証明されること
より小規模な初期投資から開始し、成果に応じて段階的に資金を拡大する設計となることが示されれば、私は本提案を前向きに支持したいと考えています。
BTCfiという方向性には大きな期待を寄せています。しかし現時点では、限られたTreasury資金の優先順位と投資規模を踏まえると、賛成・反対のいずれにも十分な確信を持つことができませんでした。
そのため、本提案については棄権します。
- Abstain74.6M ₳No rationale
- No73.9M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on this proposal.
The proposal is extremely vague, and based on my current understanding, the project itself has been put on hold with no intention to pursue it at this time. Given that uncertainty, I cannot justify supporting the proposal in its current form.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting NO on this proposal.
The proposal is extremely vague, and based on my current understanding, the project itself has been put on hold with no intention to pursue it at this time. Given that uncertainty, I cannot justify supporting the proposal in its current form.
- No53.8M ₳Rationale
I'm voting No on the Alchemy by Sundial x Charms proposal.
I recognize that Cardano should compete in BTCfi, but I'm voting No for the following reasons.
- The proposal calls itself "Cardano-native," but its core infrastructure isn't. Charms, which handles FIRE/ICE issuance and the BTC connection, is a metaprotocol launched by BitcoinOS and still part of its stack. It targets multiple UTXO chains like Bitcoin, Litecoin, and Dogecoin, and is now expanding to Ethereum. Cardano is just one of its target chains.
It's questionable why the Cardano treasury alone should carry the cost. Once this infrastructure matures, the results extend to every chain Charms supports, meaning Cardano would effectively be funding a multichain project's early development and liquidity on everyone else's behalf.
- For a request of this size, the KPIs are thin. The only real benchmark is a 30-day average TVL of $60M, with no metrics for actual ecosystem gains like active users, transactions, or adopted wallets and DEXs. And TVL is a self-fulfilling metric the treasury's own liquidity can fill, so it's hard to accept as evidence of success.
To sum up, this has the Cardano treasury single-handedly funding a multichain project's early development and liquidity, without the standards to verify its results.
Treasury funds should go where value stays within Cardano and outcomes can be measured, so I'm voting No.
- Abstain51M ₳Rationale
Because of fundamental concerns with the current treasury process, I vote Abstain on all Treasury Withdrawal proposals until the treasury budgeting process undergoes fundamental reform.
More information: https://x.com/ada_stat/status/2068315882539921703
- Yes49.4M ₳No rationale
- No42.1M ₳No rationale
- Abstain39.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain37.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes37.3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain34.5M ₳No rationale
- No31.5M ₳Rationale
While the proposal includes strong governance controls, reporting, and milestone‑gated deployment, the overall structure places substantial financial and volatility risk on the Cardano Treasury. The request is large (10M ADA), directed toward a new BTCfi protocol rather than core infrastructure, and relies on Treasury‑provided launch liquidity that is exposed to BTC price movements. This makes the Treasury a risk‑bearing participant in a new market category rather than a beneficiary of essential maintenance or protocol‑level infrastructure. The proposal does not reduce long‑term Treasury dependence and does not qualify as foundational “life‑support” infrastructure under my criteria. For these reasons, I vote NO.
- Abstain30.6M ₳Rationale
Socious abstains on this GA because we are not sure of the proposal.
- No30M ₳Rationale
While the concept is interesting, I do not believe the Treasury should fund this type of commercial venture at this stage with the current price of ADA. I will vote NO.
- No28.1M ₳No rationale
- No27.9M ₳Rationale
My understanding is that this project has been put on hold.
- YesRevoted25.9M ₳History
Earlier votes
Yes1mo agoSuperseded
Disclaimer: I know both founders of both Sundial and Charms but have no vested financial interest in either teams companies. There is a however a vested interest in seeing our Defi ecosystem grow and prosper, this proposal addresses both and effectively grows exposure to BTC liquidity if successful.
Cardano has staking infrastructure, DeFi infrastructure, and governance infrastructure, but it does not yet have a true Bitcoin financial infrastructure layer. Conclusion: Conditional Pass. Vote: YES, moderate-high conviction. Alchemy attempts to build that missing layer through FIRE, ICE, reserve architecture, dashboards, reporting, integrations, and treasury-supported launch liquidity. The strategic case is strong because this targets net-new Bitcoin capital, new BTC-backed primitives, reserve infrastructure, and a category Cardano currently lacks. The strongest stewardship feature is the separation between productive treasury capital and operating expenses, with launch liquidity intended to remain treasury-supported while profits and excess ADA return to treasury.
The key weakness is treasury risk: principal return depends on a $60M 30-day TVL condition and a future governance action, which means treasury-owned capital may remain deployed longer than expected. Stablecoin alignment is neutral because the proposal does not describe stablecoin treasury reserves, stable asset budgeting, or ADA volatility hedging; ICE may be lower-volatility BTC exposure, but it is not a stablecoin strategy. Intersect is identified as the proposed administrator, which lowers take-and-run risk, but no individual administrators are named and final confirmation still matters. This is medium-high execution risk due to reserve mechanics, FIRE/ICE adoption, Charms integration, audits, and market education, but the upside is meaningful: builders gain BTC primitives, users gain BTC-backed assets, and Cardano gains a serious shot at becoming a Bitcoin financial ecosystem.
- Abstain23.7M ₳No rationale
- No21.5M ₳Rationale
I vote NO on the treasury withdrawal action “Alchemy by Sundial x Charms: Cardano-Native Bitcoin Treasury Protocol” (0f75dd11be0b7a6cb4b305a175b17cf4b60cd307c052fccabf9f572950e70583#0).
This appears to be a somewhat rushed proposal and I am not sure why extra time was taken to clarify key elements ahead of submission. I understand that there has been a “race to the NCL” in 2026 but some of the ambiguities in this proposal are perplexing to say the least.
First of all, “Intersect is proposed as interim fund administrator, subject to confirmation and final agreement”. Why was this not confirmed prior to submission? This ambiguity alone pushes this proposal into unconstitutional territory right out of the gate. Naming an administrator “in case they accept” is not the same as having a defined and agreed administrator. DReps are expected to vote on a proposal with a named administrator so that they can verify and vet the appointed administrator if required.
Secondly, the designated receiving address points to the Intersect 2025 Treasury Reserve Smart Contract. If Intersect has not been confirmed as the administrator, how can the proposer point the treasury withdrawal at Intersects smart contract framework in this proposal?
Furthermore, this is the 2025 smart contract which is the most curious aspect of this whole proposal given that Sundial is one of the co-proposers. All of the treasury withdrawal proposals from the Intersect budget process 2026 point to the 2026 Treasury Reserve Smart Contract. Sundial is a part of the recently expanded 2026 Oversight Committee, as listed in all of the Intersect TWGA proposals under “Intersect Budget Management Tooling – Specifics”. This distinction should have been well known and understood by them.
- No20.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.1M ₳Rationale
I believe the BTCfi infrastructure package proposed by Sundial and Charms will bring reusable Cardano BTCfi primitives to the Cardano ecosystem and does nicely augment the Pogun initiative and not compete with it.
- Abstain17.1M ₳Rationale
We support the strategic direction of bringing BTC liquidity and BTCfi primitives to Cardano. Alchemy is an interesting concept with useful elements such as launch liquidity, public dashboards, reporting, and profit/yield return to the treasury.
However, we are not comfortable voting YES in the current form. Our main concerns are treasury exit rights, custody and administrator certainty, regulatory risk, ADA price protection, market validation, and public-good guarantees.
The launch liquidity principal is not automatically returnable and may require a later governance action. The FIRE/ICE structure is financially complex and should have stronger legal and risk review before a larger treasury commitment.
This is not a rejection of BTCfi or Alchemy, but a ₳10M withdrawal into a novel structured-product protocol needs stronger safeguards and clearer treasury-return mechanics.
- Abstain16.9M ₳Rationale
Alchemy by Sundial x Charms: Cardano-Native Bitcoin Treasury Protocol
- No14.1M ₳No rationale
- Abstain13.2M ₳Rationale
RCADA Rationale
RCADA abstains on Alchemy by Sundial x Charms: Cardano-Native Bitcoin Treasury Protocol.
This is a constructive abstention.
RCADA recognises the strategic importance of Bitcoin liquidity and agrees that Cardano should explore ways to attract BTC-aligned capital into its DeFi ecosystem. A credible Cardano-native BTCfi infrastructure layer could strengthen liquidity, create new composable assets, support wallets and DEXs, and help Cardano compete in a category that is currently developing quickly on other chains.
RCADA also acknowledges that this proposal is detailed and more thoughtfully structured than a simple grant. It includes separated funding pools, staged launch liquidity, public dashboards, monthly reporting, audit and security review allocations, ADA price protection, pause rules, refund conditions, and a commitment to return profits, yield, and returns from Treasury-supported launch liquidity to the Cardano Treasury. These are positive safeguards.
However, RCADA is not yet comfortable giving full approval to this proposal at this stage. Alchemy is a novel structured-finance protocol involving BTC-backed reserve mechanics, FIRE and ICE assets, reserve-ratio rules, launch liquidity, bridge or protocol-layer assumptions, oracle and accounting risk, legal and compliance considerations, and user-facing risk disclosures. This is materially different from funding established developer tooling, protocol maintenance, or infrastructure continuity.
RCADA’s main concern is Treasury exposure to an unproven DeFi protocol. The proposal requests 10,000,000 ADA, with approximately half intended for protocol infrastructure and staged launch liquidity. Treasury-supported launch liquidity may help bootstrap the system, but it also means public funds would be used to seed a new market-facing financial protocol before it has demonstrated live resilience, sustained demand, broad integrations, and stress-tested reserve behaviour.
RCADA is also concerned about technical and economic complexity. FIRE and ICE may be innovative, but the model requires users, DReps, and the wider community to understand BTC volatility, reserve ratios, senior and junior exposure, minting and redemption constraints, bridge or protocol-layer risk, oracle risk, liquidity dynamics, and downside scenarios. Even with dashboards and reporting, this complexity raises the standard for audit, education, disclosure, and governance oversight.
The Charms and protocol-layer dependency is another important risk. The proposal itself acknowledges that bridge, oracle, asset-accounting, or protocol vulnerabilities could impair reserve health. RCADA appreciates the proposed mitigations, including independent security review, economic modelling, staged launch, dashboards, and pause rules, but these mitigations do not remove the underlying risk of launching a new BTCfi system with Treasury-backed liquidity.
RCADA also notes the precedent risk. If approved, this proposal may become a reference point for future Treasury-backed launch liquidity requests from DeFi protocols. That could be a valuable direction if Cardano develops clear standards, but RCADA would prefer to see stronger ecosystem-level guidance before public Treasury funds are used to seed novel protocol liquidity at this scale.
At the same time, RCADA does not want to dismiss the proposal. The BTCfi opportunity is real, the proposal is ambitious, and Sundial and Charms are attempting to address a strategic gap in Cardano’s DeFi landscape. The safeguards, reporting commitments, fund separation, rollover clause, and return-of-yield commitments are all meaningful positives.
For these reasons, RCADA abstains rather than voting no. This abstention is not opposition to BTCfi on Cardano, nor is it opposition to Sundial, Charms, or the Alchemy concept. It is a signal that the direction is promising, but the proposal asks the Treasury to assume too much early-stage protocol, liquidity, and structured-finance risk for RCADA to support it fully at this time.
RCADA would be more comfortable supporting a future version if it includes completed independent audits before Treasury liquidity deployment, clearer legal and user-risk disclosures, a smaller or more phased initial Treasury exposure, demonstrated testnet or pilot performance, confirmed administrator arrangements, stronger third-party economic review, published integration commitments, and clearer community standards for Treasury-backed protocol liquidity.
RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here:
https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/ - No12.1M ₳Rationale
The principal concern is not that Bitcoin integration or BTCfi lacks strategic value for Cardano. Rather, the proposal asks the Cardano Treasury to assume substantial exposure to a complex and relatively novel financial protocol before sufficient evidence has been provided that the risks are adequately controlled and that the requested funding is clearly distinct from previously funded work.
The outstanding concerns include the relationship between the proposal and the earlier ₳1.8 million Catalyst-funded Bitcoin–Cardano infrastructure project, the status of the remaining deliverables from that funding, the potential for overlapping or duplicative funding, the protection and custody of Treasury-funded liquidity, the resilience of the FIRE/ICE economic model under severe market conditions, and the extent to which external Bitcoin liquidity and adoption are actually committed rather than projected.
In our assessment, the proposal may have significant strategic potential, but a ₳10 million allocation represents an exceptionally large exposure for a high-complexity protocol with substantial technical, financial, regulatory and execution risks. The Treasury should not be expected to underwrite this level of risk without stronger evidence of completed prior deliverables, independently verified security and economic safeguards, clear non-duplication of funding, robust custody arrangements, and binding evidence of external market demand.
Therefore, we vote NO. This vote is not a rejection of Bitcoin-focused DeFi or the broader strategic objective. It reflects the view that the proposal, in its current form, does not yet provide sufficient assurance that the requested Treasury allocation represents an appropriately controlled and accountable use of Cardano community funds.
- No10.9M ₳No rationale
- Abstain10.4M ₳Rationale
I believe the proposal needs refining prior to resubmission. The idea is good
- No9.5M ₳Rationale
My vote here is No.
While the proposal is well-developed and technically thoughtful, I do not believe it represents an appropriate use of Cardano Treasury funds at this time. It is fundamentally a market bet on a specific Bitcoin DeFi product category rather than broadly applicable public infrastructure, and its success depends on significant ecosystem adoption that has not yet been demonstrated. Given the funding requested and competing ecosystem priorities, I cannot support this level of treasury investment. - No8.6M ₳Rationale
コミュニティや市場の状況を考慮し、一歩引くという判断をされたことを評価します。\n\nI appreciate your decision to step back after considering the views of the community and the current market conditions.
- Abstain8.1M ₳No rationale
- NoRevoted7.4M ₳Rationale
Voting NO as submitted
I scored this proposal using my own public rulebook and scoring system, which is available here: Cardano DRep Commercial Treasury Rule Book v9 – Intelligent Risk Edition (https://docs.google.com/document/d/13EcIlJguBz-MJv91a3YYtb8O96K8uf9B9AOHsDOxeVE/edit?usp=sharing). The document is still evolving, but it reflects how I assess commercial and hybrid Treasury proposals.
I use AI assistance in this process because I want a scoring method that I can apply as neutrally and consistently as possible across the large number of proposals requesting funding. AI does not make the decision for me. It helps me structure the review, test the proposal against the same criteria, and spot issues I may otherwise miss. When a proposal is borderline, I look at it even more closely.
Rationale: I do not support this proposal in its current form. Alchemy targets a real gap: Cardano needs credible Bitcoin liquidity and reusable BTCfi infrastructure, and the proposal offers useful public pieces such as reserve reporting, SDKs, dashboards, audits, integrations, staged treasury-owned launch liquidity, ADA price protection, and quarterly return of treasury liquidity yield. The market thesis is also credible; Strategy reported large STRC proceeds and daily volume, and Strive has moved into daily SATA preferred dividends, so structured Bitcoin exposure is not fantasy. The team is not vaporware either: Sundial has an active Fund13 Catalyst project with 4 of 6 milestones completed and ₳1,148,250 already distributed, and Charms has public MIT-licensed Bitcoin/Cardano code. But the ask is too large for the current proof. This is a ₳10,000,000 request for a novel structured BTC protocol whose reserve model, Charms dependency, oracle path, accounting, custody/locker design, regulatory treatment, fund administration, and real user demand are not yet independently proven. I give credit for staging, audits, dashboards, rollover language, and treasury-owned liquidity, but the Treasury still takes meaningful first-loss and execution risk while receiving no binding fee share, revenue share, warrants, equity-like rights, hard repayment right, or treasury-controlled exit beyond a later governance vote after a $60M TVL condition. I also weigh Sundial’s own Fund13 statement that it would make no future attempts to draw from Catalyst or the Cardano treasury and community; even if Alchemy is a different structure, that weakens confidence in sizing discipline. Given the opportunity cost, including alternatives like the Orion Fund’s equity-first mandate for Cardano-native institutional DeFi and Bitcoin/Cardano liquidity, I would vote No / revise and resubmit unless the ask is reduced, private capital takes more first-loss risk, and Cardano receives enforceable upside plus clearer legal, custody, audit, and exit controls.
Classification: Hybrid public/commercial BTCfi infrastructure, liquidity deployment, and tokenized protocol growth. I used the general investor-hard scorecard, not the marketing appendix.
# Category Max Score Assessment 1 Public value, additionality, ecosystem gap, and market timing 12 9.0 Strong category fit. Cardano lacks deep BTCfi infrastructure, and the proposal offers reusable reserve reporting, assets, dashboards, and integrations. Some market claims are promotional and should not carry the vote alone. 2 Team quality, traction, and adaptive execution 7 4.5 Sundial and Charms show real activity, public repos, and an active Fund13 delivery record. Still, delivery is not complete, public usage appears early, and Alchemy itself is not yet proven in production. 3 Price versus value 6 2.5 The budget is itemized, but ₳10,000,000 is large for an unproven protocol with unfinished prior Catalyst work and no independent demand proof. 4 Applicant integrity and past delivery 8 4.5 No clear bad-faith issue appears, but the prior “no future attempts” Catalyst statement conflicts with the spirit of this new large treasury request. Fund13 is also still in progress. 5 Public asset, open-source, verifiability, and data rights 12 8.0 SDKs, dashboards, public reporting, audit work, and open-source Charms components are positive. The proposal still needs a tighter list of what will be open, what stays protected, who controls each component, and what Cardano can independently verify. 6 Treasury upside, instrument fit, and risk sharing 14 8.0 Treasury-owned liquidity and yield return are meaningful. They are not enough for this size and risk. There is no binding protocol fee share, revenue share, warrant, equity-like right, hard repayment right, or stronger first-loss protection. 7 Milestones, verification, and anti-gaming design 13 8.0 Staged liquidity and monthly reporting help. The anti-gaming design is still weak for TVL, trading volume, related-party activity, subsidized usage, and dashboard self-reporting. 8 Risk management, margin of safety, and obsolescence resilience 12 7.0 The proposal names major risks and includes audits, reserve zones, pause rules, and ADA price protection. The custody/locker, oracle, regulatory, bridge/accounting, and market risks remain too high for the current ask. 9 Sustainability and exit plan 8 4.5 The revenue and maintenance model is not yet strong enough. Treasury principal return depends on a future TVL condition and another governance action, not a clean enforceable exit. 10 Strategic opportunity cost, competitive neutrality, and ecosystem coordination 8 4.0 Sundial x Charms is real coordination, but the proposal still subsidizes one private protocol in a competitive BTCfi market. A smaller pilot, neutral liquidity program, RFP, or equity-return vehicle may protect the Treasury better. Base score 100 60.0 Useful idea, but not investable on current terms. Ecosystem coordination premium +5 +2.0 Sundial and Charms bring complementary roles. The premium is capped because commitments, funding separation, and neutral access need stronger enforcement. DRep conviction adjustment ±5 -4.0 The ask is too large; the Treasury takes too much first-loss risk; legal/custody/oracle details remain unresolved; and the prior “no future treasury/community draw” statement lowers confidence. Final score 100 58.0 No / revise and resubmit Earlier votes
No1mo agoSuperseded
Voting NO
DRep Assessment Rationale
I am using a personal Cardano DRep Commercial Treasury Rule Book v6 that I created to reflect some of my thinking and help me assess commercial and commercial/hybrid proposals more consistently.
This framework may still evolve. I am being assisted with AI in this process because I want to create a process that I can apply relatively neutrally across the large number of proposals requesting funding. If a proposal is borderline, I will look at it even more closely.
The document is here:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fXaNY3L8oGWEGJmMubTKn7FnyhXCzOhiophXzFQFC_c/edit?usp=sharing
Proposal Classification
This is a hybrid public/commercial + liquidity deployment + tokenized protocol growth proposal.
Under the rulebook, liquidity proposals need:
- Treasury-owned assets or LP positions
- Exit rights
- Custody controls
- Public reporting
Hybrid/commercial proposals need public assets plus one or more of the following:
- Co-funding
- Repayment
- Revenue share
- Ecosystem access rights
- Another real return to the Treasury
Alchemy partly passes this test. It offers Treasury-owned liquidity and public reporting. But it does not yet offer clean exit rights, confirmed custody controls, protocol-fee participation, warrants, equity-like rights, or binding open-source/public-asset terms for all funded outputs.
Key Concerns
Regulatory Risk
The regulatory risk is material.
FIRE and ICE look like structured financial products. ICE is USD-denominated BTC-backed exposure. FIRE is leveraged residual BTC exposure.
The rulebook explicitly warns DReps to seek specialist review for proposals involving securities, lending, custody, stablecoins, market-making, and other high-risk areas. A $75k legal/compliance budget looks thin for that risk profile.
Administrator Risk
The administrator is not locked.
Intersect is only “proposed” and subject to confirmation. If Intersect does not confirm, the proposer nominates another administrator.
For a ₳10M proposal, the administrator should be confirmed before voting.
Possible Improvements
The proposal would be stronger if:
- The administrator is confirmed before disbursement.
- Treasury liquidity has clear custody rules and exit rights.
- Pool 2 is paid only after strict milestones, not upfront.
- All funded SDKs, adapters, dashboards, schemas, reserve proofs, and non-sensitive smart-contract code are open-source under MIT/Apache-2.0 before final payment.
- An independent legal memo addresses securities, custody, redemption, and marketing risk.
- TVL KPIs exclude Treasury funds, related-party deposits, subsidized deposits, circular liquidity, market-maker wash activity, and temporary incentive-driven liquidity.
- The Treasury receives protocol-fee share, warrants, or another economic return beyond profits on its own liquidity position.
Plain-English Rationale
Alchemy could be strategically valuable, but the current terms make the Treasury first-loss capital for a novel Bitcoin structured-product protocol.
The upside is real, but the controls are not strong enough for ₳10M.
Sundial and Charms could revise, tighten custody and exit rights, confirm the administrator, bind the open-source terms, and give the Treasury stronger upside before asking for this much ADA.
Scorecard
Category Score Public value, additionality, ecosystem gap 11 / 13 Business quality and traction 3 / 6 Price versus value 3 / 7 Applicant integrity and past delivery 5 / 8 Public asset, open-source, data rights 7 / 12 Treasury upside, instrument fit, risk sharing 10 / 15 Milestones, verification, anti-gaming 8 / 13 Risk management, margin of safety 6 / 12 Sustainability and exit plan 5 / 9 Opportunity cost and competitive neutrality 3 / 5 Base score 61 / 100 DRep conviction adjustment -2 Final score 59 / 100
Vote Stance
**No
- No7.2M ₳No rationale
- No5.8M ₳No rationale
- No5.4M ₳No rationale
- No5.4M ₳No rationale