Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction
137 DReps voted · 56 with a rationale
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Abstain575M ₳Rationale
"Yoroi DRep votes ABSTAIN on Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction. Yoroi recognises the importance of responsible governance during periods of ecosystem uncertainty.
- Ecosystem Situation: The trust our delegators place in Yoroi requires that we act only when we can do so with full confidence. In light of the current situation, Yoroi is choosing to withhold its vote on this proposal and will reassess our position once conditions allow for a considered decision."
- Yes384.3M ₳Rationale
Please check the following link for the reasons for the vote.（投票理由は次のページを参照してください。)
- Abstain331.6M ₳No rationale
- Abstain299.7M ₳Rationale
"EMURGO as a DRep votes ABSTAIN on Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction, with rationale outlined below.
Given the ongoing situation in the ecosystem, responsible governance requires us to act with full clarity and confidence. Until the current situation reaches resolution, EMURGO prefers to withhold judgment rather than vote without the certainty our mandate demands. We will revisit this proposal once the situation is resolved."
- No258.5M ₳No rationale
- No219.4M ₳Rationale
We voted NO, while recognizing that the proposal addresses a real challenge for Cardano DeFi and that Dano Finance is a capable team.
Our main concern is that the proposal combines public infrastructure with significant funding for Dano’s commercial products. We would prefer these elements to be assessed separately.
We also believe the proposal needs a more detailed budget, and a more meaningful long-term return for the Treasury.
We would reconsider a revised proposal addressing these points.
- Abstain175.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes171.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes123.7M ₳Rationale
The Cardano Foundation votes YES. The proposal seeks to address liquidity fragmentation in Cardano DeFi through an open standard, reusable tooling, and two production primitives, and its substance is unchanged from the version we supported during the Intersect budget process.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
We recognise Dano Finance and its collaborators as an experienced team working on infrastructure that Cardano DeFi currently lacks. Having assessed this governance action, our decision is driven by the following factors:
- Consistency with our prior assessment: We supported this proposal during the off-chain signalling phase of the Intersect budget process 2026. The changes in the on-chain submission are minimal and the substance of the proposal remains the same, so our position remains the same.
- A structural gap addressed with public goods: DeFi Kernel is presented as an open, fee-free and royalty-free compatibility standard, with a public registry, published script hashes and datum/redeemer schemas, and an SDK that makes that metadata usable by wallets, bots and indexers. This aligns with the principles set out in "Our Cardano", in particular open-source core development and permissionless access. The registry and SDK retain value to the ecosystem independently of the adoption of any single protocol.
- Demonstrated operational traction: The team points to an operating protocol with on-chain usage and to prior work across lending, concentrated liquidity and composable transaction flows. In our view this lowers execution risk relative to a proposal without a delivery record.
- Measurable commitments: The proposal defines volume KPIs verifiable from public on-chain data, gates mainnet milestones on security review, and commits to returning 5% of protocol fees from the funded contracts for 12 months.
Our YES vote is not an endorsement of every element. The request is large relative to demonstrated adoption, and the three protocol and tooling work packages are each priced at 1,000,000 ada in broad terms that we would expect to see decomposed further. Four concurrent tracks introduce execution complexity, and the milestone acceptance criteria would benefit from tighter, measurable definitions. We also encourage the team to articulate how the neutrality and long-term governance of the DeFi Kernel standard will be maintained once this funding ends. We expect Minswap Labs, as budget administrator, to disburse against verified milestones and to make progress and spending publicly verifiable.
The Cardano Foundation votes YES on this governance action. We look forward to the registry, the SDK and the two protocols reaching mainnet, and we encourage the team to publish milestone evidence and KPI results as they are delivered. We will consider that reporting, and the clarity of the standard's long-term governance, when assessing any future request from this team.
---> **_NOTE on 'Internal Voting':_**> The fields _constitutional_ and _unconstitutional_ below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are _for_ or _against_ the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well. - No90.6M ₳Rationale
I decided to vote NO on the proposal: Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction
My rationale:
The underlying problem is real. Cardano DeFi integrations remain highly protocol-specific, and better standards for contract discovery and reusable transaction-building tools could reduce friction for developers. CIP-89 is technically credible, and Dano Finance is a capable team with an existing product and a demonstrated ability to deliver.
However, this proposal bundles a potential public good with two commercial Dano products.
Approximately ₳300k is allocated to the public registry, while ₳2M would fund Dano’s spot-leverage and options products. A further ₳1M would fund an SDK initially focused primarily on integrating these same products.
I would prefer the neutral infrastructure to be separated from the commercial product development so that DReps can assess each funding decision independently.
Demand also remains unproven. The proposal does not provide strong commitments from wallets, indexers, major DeFi protocols, or other independent builders to adopt the Kernel.
Leveraged spot trading and American options are potentially interesting, especially if initiatives such as AlphaGrowth’s proposal succeed in bringing additional liquidity, users, and professional market makers to the ecosystem.
There is also a technical limitation to the proposed interoperability model. Publishing script hashes, datum schemas, redeemers, and integration instructions is useful, but it does not make materially different protocols automatically interoperable. Each protocol may still require a custom adapter and its own security analysis. The Kernel can improve discoverability and documentation, but claims that protocols automatically inherit shared liquidity, users, and tooling appear overstated.
The proposal also lacks sufficient budget transparency. It provides large lump sums without a detailed breakdown of contributors, FTE allocations, rates, audit costs, infrastructure expenses, and other relevant costs. Without this information, it is difficult to assess whether approximately ₳1M per major work package is proportionate.
Finally, the Treasury bears most of the development and market risk, while Dano retains most of the potential upside. The proposed return of 5% of net fees for only 12 months is too limited relative to the ₳2–3M being used to develop the commercial products and their supporting SDK.
If the products fail to attract users, the Treasury absorbs the loss. If they succeed, Dano retains control of the products, their strategic position, and almost all future revenue.
I could reconsider a revised proposal under the following conditions:
- Unbundle the public-good infrastructure from the two commercial Dano products.
- Provide stronger evidence of independent demand and concrete integration commitments.
- Offer the Treasury a larger and significantly longer revenue share from the Treasury-funded commercial products.
- Publish a detailed breakdown of team members, FTEs, rates, audit expenses, infrastructure costs, and other major budget items.
If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.
MANDA Pool ID:
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https://pay.cexplorer.io/pay/c0410d5b237b6ec0 - No88.4M ₳Rationale
SIPO DRep votes NO on the treasury withdrawal "Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction" (3,333,000 ada), and invites a narrower resubmission.
This is a vote against the structure of the request, not against the team. Dano Finance has a real delivery record on Cardano - the Danogo protocol since 2023, the daken and stdlib Aiken libraries, and continuing public development. The proposal came through the Intersect Budget 2026 process, its scope was reduced from that version, and its accountability design is sound: milestone gating, security review before mainnet, unused funds returned, Minswap Labs as budget administrator, and 5% of protocol fees returned to the Treasury for twelve months. SIPO records all of this as creditable.
SIPO's objection is that the public-good case and the proposer's own product build are bundled into a single, non-separable request. Of the 3,300,000 ada delivery budget, 300,000 funds the DeFi Kernel registry and 1,000,000 funds the SDK - the components that serve the whole ecosystem. The remaining 2,000,000, roughly 61%, funds two new standalone protocols belonging to the proposer: a Spot Leverage Order Book and an American Options market-making protocol. A proposal whose stated purpose is to reduce fragmentation devotes most of its budget to adding two more venues, and DReps cannot approve the shared infrastructure without also funding the proposer's product line.
Two further points bear on the ecosystem case. The DeFi Kernel's three rules - permissionless, composable, discoverable - restate CIP-0089, Distributed DApps and Beacon Tokens, which is already an active CIP; four of the eight contracts currently in the registry are that CIP author's own reference implementations. Building a registry and an SDK on top of CIP-89 is legitimate and useful work, but it should be presented as that rather than as a new standard. And the first rule, requiring that no batcher be involved, structurally excludes the batcher-based automated market makers that hold most of Cardano's DeFi liquidity today, which limits how much fragmentation this standard can actually resolve. Separately, the American Options work package overlaps cardano-options, an existing CIP-89 options protocol that the proposal's own registry lists.
Adoption evidence is thin. The registry repository has received no commits since 8 April 2026 and has no forks, no pull requests, no issues, and no external submission; the website loads that same static file set. Fund control is the weakest class among the withdrawals before DReps this epoch: the on-chain recipient is a single key credential at stake1u9h9w7ssk3zne7mchccz8kugsncn2muhx2p2v26s9gysyqquxfv3z, not a script, and not a milestone-gated treasury contract.
SIPO would support a resubmission limited to the registry and the SDK - the components that are genuinely shared infrastructure - paid to a script-controlled recipient and accompanied by evidence of adoption, meaning independent protocols that have actually submitted to the registry rather than been listed in it. A shared SDK for CIP-89-style contracts is a real gap in Cardano's tooling and is worth funding on its own terms. This vote is SIPO DRep's recorded position.
SIPO DRep は、トレジャリー引き出し提案「Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction」（3,333,000 ADA）に反対（NO）を投じ、範囲を絞った再提出を促します。
これは要求の構造に対する反対であり、チームに対する反対ではありません。Dano Finance は Cardano における実績を持つ開発体です。2023 年からの Danogo プロトコル、Aiken ライブラリ daken および stdlib、そして継続的な公開開発があります。本提案は Intersect Budget 2026 プロセスを経ており、その版から範囲が縮小されています。アカウンタビリティ設計も健全です。マイルストーンゲート、メインネット前のセキュリティレビュー、未使用資金の返還、予算管理者としての Minswap Labs、そしてプロトコル手数料の 5% を 12 ヶ月間 国庫へ還流させる設計。SIPO はこれらをいずれも評価すべき点として記録します。
SIPO の反対理由は、公共財としての論拠と提案者自身のプロダクト開発が、分離不能な一つの要求に束ねられている点にあります。3,300,000 ADA の実施予算のうち、DeFi Kernel レジストリが 300,000 ADA、SDK が 1,000,000 ADA で、これらがエコシステム全体に資する部分です。残る 2,000,000 ADA、約 61% は、提案者に帰属する新規の独立プロトコル 2 本、すなわち Spot Leverage Order Book と American Options のマーケットメイキングプロトコルに充てられます。断片化の解消を目的として掲げる提案が、予算の大半を新たな取引の場を 2 つ増やすことに充てており、DRep は提案者のプロダクトラインを同時に資金供与することなしに共通インフラだけを承認することができません。
エコシステム上の論拠について、さらに 2 点あります。DeFi Kernel の 3 ルール（パーミッションレス、コンポーザブル、ディスカバラブル）は、既に有効な CIP である CIP-0089「Distributed DApps & Beacon Tokens」を言い換えたものです。現在レジストリに掲載されている 8 件の contract のうち 4 件は、その CIP 作者自身の参照実装です。CIP-89 の上にレジストリと SDK を構築すること自体は正当かつ有用な仕事ですが、新しい標準としてではなく、そのようなものとして提示されるべきです。また第一のルールであるバッチャー不要という要件は、現在 Cardano の DeFi 流動性の大半を保持しているバッチャー方式の AMM を構造上除外します。これは本標準が実際に解消し得る断片化の範囲を限定します。加えて American Options のワークパッケージは、本提案自身のレジストリが掲載している既存の CIP-89 オプションプロトコル cardano-options と重複します。
採用の実証も乏しい状況です。レジストリのリポジトリは 2026 年 4 月 8 日以降 commit がなく、fork も pull request も issue も外部からの提出もありません。ウェブサイトは同じ静的ファイル群を読み込んでいるだけです。資金統制は、本エポックで DRep の前にある引き出しの中で最も弱い類型です。オンチェーン受領先は script ではなく単一鍵の credential（stake1u9h9w7ssk3zne7mchccz8kugsncn2muhx2p2v26s9gysyqquxfv3z）であり、マイルストーンゲートを備えた treasury contract でもありません。
SIPO は、真に共通インフラである レジストリと SDK に限定した再提出であれば支持します。その際は script 統制下の受領先とし、採用の実証、すなわちレジストリに掲載されただけでなく実際に自ら提出した独立プロトコルの存在を伴うことを求めます。CIP-89 型の contract に対する共通 SDK は Cardano のツーリングにおける実在のギャップであり、それ単独で資金供与に値します。本投票は SIPO DRep の記録上の立場表明です。
- No85M ₳Rationale
I am unconvinced this is prudent spending given competing demands on the Cardano Treasury and how quickly the Treasury will reach zero given current spending levels.
- No75.9M ₳Rationale
I appreciate the vision behind the DeFi Kernel and agree that improving standardization and composability within Cardano DeFi could provide long-term value. Open standards are important, and I recognize the technical merit of the proposal.
However, under the current Net Change Limit (NCL), Treasury funding should be prioritized toward proposals with the highest strategic impact.
At this stage, I am not convinced that there is sufficient demonstrated demand or ecosystem commitment to justify this level of investment. Building a standard does not guarantee that wallets, protocols, or developers will adopt it, and the proposal does not provide strong evidence of broad adoption commitments.
I am also concerned that the proposal combines public infrastructure with the development of Dano Finance's own DeFi products, making the distinction between ecosystem investment and private product development less clear.
Furthermore, the proposal does not sufficiently demonstrate that the platform can become commercially sustainable after Treasury funding ends. If adoption and liquidity fail to reach expectations, there is a risk of continued dependence on Treasury support.
More importantly, I question whether this is the right priority for Cardano today.
Cardano's DeFi ecosystem is still relatively small in terms of liquidity and user activity. I am not convinced that building increasingly sophisticated financial infrastructure should take precedence over initiatives that are more likely to attract new users, liquidity, developers, and businesses into the ecosystem.
In particular, I currently see greater strategic potential in areas such as Bitcoin DeFi and RealFi, which may have a clearer path toward expanding Cardano's adoption beyond its existing user base.
The purpose of the NCL is not only to distinguish good proposals from bad ones, but also to prioritize the proposals that will have the greatest impact on Cardano's long-term growth.
For these reasons, I vote No.
DeFi Kernelが目指す方向性や、Cardano DeFiの標準化・相互運用性を向上させようとする考え方自体には賛同します。また、オープンスタンダードの整備が長期的に価値を持つ可能性も理解しています。
しかし、限られたNet Change Limit（NCL）の中でTreasury資金を配分する以上、私はより優先順位の高い提案へ資金を配分すべきだと考えます。
現時点では、この標準やSDKを実際に採用する十分な需要やコミットメントが示されているとは判断できません。「開発すれば採用される」という前提で投資を行うには、根拠がまだ弱いと感じます。
また、本提案には公共インフラだけでなく、Dano Finance自身が提供するDeFiプロダクトの開発も含まれており、エコシステム全体への投資と特定事業者への投資の境界が曖昧になっている点にも懸念があります。
さらに、Treasuryによる支援終了後も、この仕組みが市場原理の中で持続可能に運営されるビジネスモデルであることは十分に示されていません。利用者や流動性が想定どおり集まらなかった場合、再びTreasuryへの依存が生じるリスクも考慮すべきだと考えます。
そして何より、現在のCardano DeFi市場の成熟度を考えると、本提案が今、本当に優先すべき投資なのかという点に疑問があります。
Cardano DeFi全体の流動性は依然として限定的であり、このような高度な金融インフラを整備しても、十分な利用が伴うという確信を持つことができません。
むしろ現時点では、Bitcoin DeFiやRealFiなど、新たなユーザー・流動性・企業をCardanoへ呼び込む可能性が高い分野への投資の方が、Treasury全体として高いリターンを生むと考えています。
NCLは「良い提案」を選ぶためだけではなく、「今、最も優先すべき提案」を選ぶための制約でもあります。
私は限られたTreasury資金を、Cardanoへ外部から新たな需要・流動性・開発者・企業を呼び込むことが期待できる提案へ優先的に配分すべきだと考えるため、本提案には反対します。
- No74.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes73.6M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES to support Dano Finance’s request to accelerate the DeFi Kernel, SDK, and new financial primitives.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting YES to support Dano Finance’s request to accelerate the DeFi Kernel, SDK, and new financial primitives.
As the protocol holding the largest TVL on Cardano, Dano Finance has proven its ability to deliver high-utility DeFi infrastructure.
Standardizing shared liquidity and contract metadata directly addresses critical fragmentation across our ecosystem.
I am happy to support our builders and back reusable, open tooling that drives long-term value for Cardano. - Abstain53.8M ₳Rationale
I am voting Abstain on the Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction proposal.
This proposal bundles two tracks of different nature: the DeFi Kernel standard and registry, and two new commercial protocols from Dano Finance. My positions on these two are clearly different, and since the structure does not allow separate evaluation, I am voting Abstain.
I believe the DeFi Kernel has real value. Its three principles, permissionless operation without a privileged batcher, publicly documented datum schemas, and on-chain discoverability, could be a practical answer to Cardano DeFi's fragmentation, and running the registry as free, CC0 public domain is exactly what a public good should look like. Had this been proposed on its own, I would have voted Yes.
However, 60% of the budget, 2,000,000 ADA, funds fee-generating products, a Spot Leverage Order Book and American Options, whose fees accrue entirely to the operator after a 5% return for just twelve months. There is no commitment to open-source the code, and beyond the stated purpose of proving the standard, there is no guarantee that these protocols remain public goods. If they were meant as reference implementations, an open-source commitment would have been the natural choice.
I recognize the value of the DeFi Kernel, but I cannot support public funds building commercial products, so I vote Abstain. If the registry and standard work were resubmitted standalone, I would gladly support it.
- Abstain51M ₳Rationale
Because of fundamental concerns with the current treasury process, I vote Abstain on all Treasury Withdrawal proposals until the treasury budgeting process undergoes fundamental reform.
More information: https://x.com/ada_stat/status/2068315882539921703
- No50.2M ₳Rationale
I do not believe this is the right use of Treasury funds at the current stage of the ecosystem, especially given the current price of ADA. I will vote NO.
- No49.5M ₳No rationale
- Yes48.9M ₳No rationale
- No47.5M ₳No rationale
- No37.4M ₳No rationale
- No37.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes34.5M ₳Rationale
財務省の資金を単に一つのアプリの開発に消費するのではなく、エコシステム全体で再利用できる共通インフラと開発キットを同時に整備するアプローチであるため、投資対効果が非常に明確な提案だと言えます。予算管理者として大手であるMinswap Labsが入り、マイルストーンごとに厳格に成果物を確認する体制が敷かれている点も安心材料かと考えます。
- No33.5M ₳Rationale
Vote: No. This action requests 3,333,000 ADA for a DeFi Kernel registry, transaction-building SDK, leveraged spot order book, and American options protocol.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Cardano needs better DeFi composability, shared liquidity standards, and reusable transaction tooling. The problem identified by this proposal is valid. The Cardano First framework nevertheless reads No under Economic Sustainability and Adoption.
The proposal asks the treasury to fund too many unproven layers at once. It combines the proposed standard, its public registry, an integration SDK, a leveraged trading product, and an American options market. The treasury would finance both the underlying framework and the products intended to prove that framework.
The adoption case is not strong enough for the combined scope. Product-volume targets begin only after development and launch, while the external SDK target may be satisfied by an integration merely being started. The proposed return of 5 percent of protocol fees for 12 months provides limited compensation for the treasury assuming the development and market risk.
A narrower proposal could fund the registry and SDK after securing committed integrations, or fund one protocol after demonstrating demand. This action instead asks the treasury to finance the standard, products, and hoped-for adoption together.
I vote No. - No31.4M ₳Rationale
While the DeFi Kernel registry and SDK provide public‑good value, the majority of this 3.33M ADA request funds new proprietary protocols (Spot Leverage Order Book and American Options). This mixes ecosystem standards with product development, and the expected outcomes depend heavily on market adoption, making the value‑for‑money case uncertain. Given the scale of the budget, limited public‑good proportion, and risk profile, I vote No.
- Abstain30.6M ₳No rationale
- No28M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.9M ₳Rationale
As a huge fan of the DeFi Kernel, my first impression was that this would be an easy YES. However, I do have some concerns about using public funds to subsidize commercial ventures. Dano Finance makes up for this by providing a 5% royalty to for the first 12 months for the order book and options platform to pay back the treasury, which may not be enough to pay it back in full, but it is enough for me to lean YES on this proposal.
- Yes26.1M ₳Rationale
This proposal is one that I am on the fence about, on one hand I do know both the Dano team and of course Fallen-Icarus (Rusty) and how much time and effort they are putting into this. I also know that it has been tried in the past in various forms with order book style dexs etc. with very little effect. This isnt a large ask in the grand scheme of things and considering some of the questionable funding approvals for larger infra teams and whether those proposals could move the needle, I'd say this easily warrants initial funding to explore more
- No21.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain21.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- No20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes20M ₳Rationale
I would love to see this come to realization and which the team best of luck.
- Yes17.4M ₳Rationale
Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction
- Abstain16.9M ₳Rationale
We see value in the direction of this proposal. Cardano DeFi needs better composability, shared standards, and reusable tooling that can make integrations easier for wallets, dApps, bots, and other builders.
However, we are not fully comfortable voting YES. The proposal mixes public infrastructure with the product roadmap of one specific DeFi team. Only part of the budget is clearly dedicated to the shared DeFi Kernel, while most of the funding supports Dano-related products.
We would also like stronger evidence of ecosystem-wide demand, including clearer commitments from wallets, dApps, liquidity providers, indexers, or other protocols. The current KPIs are measurable, but they mostly track the success of Dano’s own products rather than broad adoption of a Cardano DeFi standard.
We also have concerns about long-term sustainability after treasury funding and whether the 5% fee return for 12 months is strong enough value capture for the treasury.
- No16.3M ₳Rationale
Vote: NO
This is a Treasury Withdrawal, "Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction" (gov_action1cpn...4h586r), submitted June 30, 2026 with voting closing August 2, 2026. It requests 3,333,000 ADA — 3,300,000 ADA for delivery plus 33,000 ADA in administration fees — for Dano Finance to build four work packages over a 12-month window: a DeFi Kernel contract-metadata registry, a spot leverage order book, an American options protocol, and an SDK. No ADA burning is involved.
The proposal is better specified than much of what has come before it. It names concrete deliverables rather than a research direction, attaches measurable KPIs — a registry with at least two documented contracts, $1M rolling 30-day volume on each of the two trading protocols within 90 days of launch, an SDK with at least one external integration — and phases each work package through testnet, security review, and mainnet adoption. It carries return-of-funds language for unearned or surplus amounts, an administrator, and a requested amount that is modest against the treasury. The DeFi Kernel registry component is also the most defensible piece: shared contract metadata standards and a discovery SDK are genuine public goods that benefit builders who are not Dano Finance.
The structure is nonetheless a 12-month program budget for a single pre-selected team, not a grant paid on completed features. The return clauses are generic rather than structurally enforced — they describe an administrator process, not an escrow that releases only against verified delivery and returns the remainder automatically. No individuals are named; the team is a corporate identity with self-reported figures of roughly $18M TVL and 10,000+ transactions and no disclosed prior treasury track record. Two of the four work packages — a leveraged spot order book and an options market-making protocol — are Dano Finance's own commercial product line, and public funds would build private trading venues whose economics accrue to their operator. The KPIs measure trading volume, which is the easiest metric in DeFi to manufacture and among the weakest evidence of durable ecosystem value. DReps have so far voted approximately ₳3.06B against and ₳699M in favor.
Dracula DAO votes NO. Treasury funds should be awarded as grants paid on completion of well-defined features — the ecosystem specifies what it wants built and pays once it exists and has been verified. It should not finance a named team's twelve-month roadmap, and it should not underwrite the construction of leveraged trading products that compete with other Cardano venues receiving no such public backing. Dracula DAO's standing position is that it will not support treasury funds used for speculation unless the ecosystem benefit is compelling and the risk is low; leverage and options infrastructure, built by its future commercial operator on public money, does not clear that bar.
The DeFi Kernel registry and SDK are a different matter. Resubmitted on their own, as a defined public-good deliverable paid on verified completion rather than as a slice of a team's operating budget, that work would receive serious consideration from Dracula DAO.
- No14.1M ₳No rationale
- Abstain13.3M ₳Rationale
Agreed. I’d frame it as a constructive ABSTAIN, not a rejection of the idea.
Draft rationale:
RCADA votes ABSTAIN on Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction.
This is a constructive abstention.
RCADA supports the proposal’s overall goal of improving Cardano DeFi composability, liquidity discovery, and transaction coordination. Cardano DeFi remains fragmented across separate protocols, contract formats, datum and redeemer schemas, discovery methods, and integration paths. A shared registry, clearer contract metadata, and reusable transaction-building tools could help wallets, bots, indexers, dApps, and protocols integrate with each other more easily.
RCADA sees particular value in the DeFi Kernel registry and the idea of publishing script hashes, datum and redeemer schemas, integration instructions, discovery mechanisms, audit or security status, and other metadata in a public, fee-free, royalty-free format. This kind of shared infrastructure could reduce duplicated integration work and make Cardano DeFi easier to build on.
RCADA also recognises that Dano Finance has practical experience in Cardano DeFi. The proposal states that Dano Finance has approximately $18 million in TVL and more than 10,000 on-chain transactions, and the team’s experience across lending, concentrated liquidity, oracle aggregation, borrowing, and composable transaction flows is relevant to the proposed work.
However, RCADA is not comfortable voting YES on the proposal in its current form because the public-good boundary is not clear enough. Only 300,000 ADA is allocated to the DeFi Kernel registry and submission process, while 3,000,000 ADA is allocated to a transaction-builder SDK and two new DeFi protocol primitives: a Spot Leverage Order Book and American Options Market-Making Pools. These may become useful for Cardano, but they are also closely connected to Dano Finance’s own product expansion.
RCADA is cautious about using the Cardano Treasury to fund product-specific DeFi development where the benefits, risks, and future value capture are not clearly separated from the proposing team’s own commercial or protocol interests. Leveraged trading and options markets are high-risk DeFi primitives. They introduce smart-contract risk, oracle and pricing risk, liquidation risk, liquidity risk, market-risk complexity, user-protection concerns, and potential reputational risk if users misunderstand the products or if risk controls fail.
RCADA also has concerns about standard-capture risk. The DeFi Kernel may be valuable as an open standard, but an ecosystem standard should be governed neutrally and should not become primarily a pathway for one protocol builder’s own products to receive Treasury-funded development support. The registry, metadata standard, SDK, and compatibility process should be clearly independent, transparent, and open to all builders on equal terms.
The proposal includes positive accountability features, including Minswap Labs as budget administrator, milestone-based work packages, security review or audit before mainnet deployment, public reporting, KPIs, non-disbursement or return of unused funds, and a commitment to return 5% of protocol fees from the Treasury-funded Spot Leverage Order Book and American Options contracts for 12 months after launch. RCADA views these as helpful safeguards.
Even so, those safeguards do not fully resolve the concern that the Treasury is being asked to fund a package that combines neutral ecosystem infrastructure with protocol-specific DeFi products. The proposed 5% fee return for 12 months is positive, but it does not by itself make the funding model feel sufficiently aligned with the scale of Treasury support requested for product-level risk.
RCADA would be more comfortable supporting a future version that more clearly separates the public-good components from the product-specific components. A stronger proposal could focus on the DeFi Kernel registry, schema standards, documentation, neutral governance, open-source SDK, reference adapters, integration support, and independent audit standards, while leaving Dano-specific leverage and options products to be funded separately through protocol revenue, private capital, user incentives, or a more clearly separated commercial-risk proposal.
On balance, RCADA abstains because the proposal contains useful ideas and potentially valuable infrastructure, but the current structure does not provide enough separation between open ecosystem standards and Dano Finance’s own DeFi product development. RCADA encourages the team to continue developing the DeFi Kernel concept and to return with a clearer public-good proposal that better isolates shared infrastructure from protocol-specific product funding.
RCADA's full vote assessment can be found here:
https://brolloks.github.io/rcada-drep-votes/ - No12.1M ₳Rationale
We acknowledge that liquidity fragmentation and interoperability remain important challenges for Cardano's DeFi ecosystem. The vision of a shared order-book infrastructure capable of connecting decentralized exchanges, lending protocols, and other financial applications is strategically interesting and could potentially contribute to greater composability in the long term. However, treasury funding decisions require a high degree of confidence that the proposed solution is technically sound, broadly supported by the ecosystem, and capable of delivering measurable public value. In its current form, the proposal does not provide sufficient evidence to justify the requested allocation of treasury resources, and we therefore vote No.
Our primary concern is the absence of clear evidence that the proposed infrastructure will achieve the central objective of increasing transaction activity on Cardano. The proposal asserts that a global order book will improve liquidity efficiency and stimulate network usage, but it does not provide concrete projections, benchmarks, or economic analysis demonstrating how these outcomes will be measured or achieved. What evidence supports the claim that the DeFi Kernel will materially increase transaction volume, total value locked, or overall economic activity on Cardano, and what specific metrics and targets will be used to evaluate success?
We are also concerned about ecosystem adoption risk. The value of a shared liquidity layer depends entirely on widespread integration by existing and future protocols, yet the proposal does not clearly identify which projects have formally committed to adopting the standard or how adoption barriers will be addressed. Which Cardano DeFi protocols have explicitly committed to integrating the DeFi Kernel, and what mechanisms or incentives exist to ensure ecosystem-wide participation?
The proposal further lacks sufficient transparency regarding the requested budget of ₳3.33 million. While infrastructure initiatives can require substantial investment, the proposal does not adequately break down how funds will be allocated across engineering, audits, operations, maintenance, and ecosystem onboarding. How is the budget distributed across individual workstreams, and how will the community determine whether the expected return on investment justifies the expenditure?
Another critical issue is governance and long-term stewardship. A shared financial infrastructure layer must remain neutral, transparent, and resilient beyond the initial development period, yet the proposal does not clearly explain how future upgrades, standards decisions, or disputes will be managed. Who will govern the evolution of the DeFi Kernel after deployment, and what safeguards will ensure that control remains decentralized and aligned with the interests of the wider Cardano ecosystem?
Finally, the proposal does not sufficiently address sustainability and operational continuity beyond the funding period. Treasury-funded infrastructure requires a credible long-term maintenance model to prevent abandonment or ecosystem dependency on a single team. What sustainable funding, maintenance, and support structure will exist once treasury funding has been exhausted, and how will the infrastructure continue to operate if the original team is no longer involved?
- No10.9M ₳No rationale
- No10.4M ₳No rationale
- Abstain8.6M ₳Rationale
本提案が目指す方向性や、Cardano DeFiの相互運用性向上を目指す取り組みには一定の価値があると考えます。しかし、現時点では提案内容を踏まえて賛成または反対のいずれかを判断するだけの確信を持つことができません。そのため、本提案については棄権します。\n\nI recognize the potential value of this proposal and its goal of improving interoperability within the Cardano DeFi ecosystem. However, based on the proposal as presented, I do not have sufficient confidence at this time to vote either Yes or No. Therefore, I abstain on this proposal.
- No7.4M ₳Rationale
Voting NO as the package is too much - would vote YES for a resubmitted version (details below)
DRep Assessment Rationale
I am using a personal Cardano DRep Commercial Treasury Rule Book v6 that I created to reflect some of my thinking and help me assess commercial and commercial/hybrid proposals more consistently.
This framework may still evolve. I am being assisted with AI in this process because I want to create a process that I can apply relatively neutrally across the large number of proposals requesting funding. If a proposal is borderline, I will look at it even more closely.
The document is here:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fXaNY3L8oGWEGJmMubTKn7FnyhXCzOhiophXzFQFC_c/edit?usp=sharing
Assessment
I think Work Package 3 (WP3): American Options is currently the weakest and riskiest part of the proposal. It probably has the highest market-adoption risk. I would vote No on a proposal that includes WP3.
WP1 and WP4 are much cleaner public infrastructure.
- WP1 maintains DeFi Kernel as a public standard.
- WP4 gives wallets, bots, indexers, and dApps SDK tooling.
WP2 is still commercial, but it is the better product bet. Leveraged spot trading has a clearer user story than American options.
Scorecard
Category Score Public value, additionality, ecosystem gap 11 / 13 Business quality and traction 4 / 6 Price versus value 5 / 7 Applicant integrity and past delivery 6 / 8 Public asset, open-source, data rights 8 / 12 Treasury upside, instrument fit, risk sharing 8 / 15 Milestones, verification, anti-gaming 9 / 13 Risk management, margin of safety 8 / 12 Sustainability and exit plan 6 / 9 Opportunity cost and competitive neutrality 3 / 5 Base score 68 / 100 DRep conviction adjustment +2 Final score 70 / 100
Conditional Support Terms
I would consider Conditional Support only if the proposal were revised to include the following terms as binding conditions, not merely as general intentions.
WP1 and WP4 should be true public assets
The registry, SDK, adapters, schemas, documentation, examples, and related tooling should be published in public repositories under a permissive license such as MIT or Apache-2.0, with clear documentation, tests where applicable, tagged releases, and practical fork rights before final payment.
WP2 should provide stronger Treasury upside
The current 5% protocol-fee return for 12 months is not enough for a Treasury-funded commercial DeFi primitive. I would want either a longer protocol-fee share, a higher fee share from the Treasury-funded leverage product, a repayment trigger, or another enforceable economic return to the Treasury.
Disbursement should be milestone-based with low upfront exposure
The proposal should define payment amounts per milestone, acceptance criteria, deadlines, evidence required, and failure rules. Upfront funding should be limited, especially for WP2.
Verification should be independent and evidence-based
Milestones should not rely only on applicant dashboards or self-reporting. Verification should use public repositories, audit reports, on-chain data, published script hashes, independent milestone review, and clear evidence that each deliverable was completed.
The trading-volume KPI should include an anti-wash covenant
The $1M rolling 30-day trading-volume KPI for WP2 should exclude related-party trading, subsidized trading, circular volume, bot farming, applicant-funded activity, rebate-driven usage, wash trading, and other artificial volume.
Security review should remain mandatory before mainnet release
WP2 involves leverage, collateral, borrowing, liquidation, and debt accounting. A bad design could harm users quickly.
Mainnet deployment should require a completed security review or audit, an issue-resolution report, and a rule that unresolved critical issues block release.
Plain-English Rationale
With WP3 removed, the proposal becomes focused enough to consider. It funds a public registry, reusable SDK tooling, and one serious DeFi primitive instead of trying to fund a full leverage-plus-options roadmap.
I would still not treat it as a normal grant. WP2 gives Dano commercial upside. The Treasury should receive stronger protection and stronger public assets.
Conditional yes if the open-source, milestone, anti-gaming, audit, and Treasury-upside terms are tightened.
- No7.2M ₳No rationale
- Abstain5.9M ₳Rationale
Abstaining at this time while I seek additional feedback from the team.
From my review, the technical, delivery, and financial risks appear relatively low. The primary uncertainty for me is adoption. The value proposition depends on the DeFi Kernel becoming a shared standard across the Cardano DeFi ecosystem rather than simply being implemented by Dano Finance. Can you point to existing commitments, partnerships, or intentions from major protocols, wallets, or other builders to adopt or integrate the DeFi Kernel? Without meaningful ecosystem adoption, much of the proposal’s intended value becomes difficult to realize.
- No5.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes5.4M ₳No rationale