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Treasury Withdrawals (4b10e579#0)

System6mo ago1 post
DReps 187SPOs 0

187 DReps voted · 72 with a rationale · 4 changed their vote

Open a row to read the rationale.

  • Yoroi W₳llet
    Yes584.2M ₳Rationale

    Summary

    Yoroi DRep votes YES on Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget – Withdrawal 1, as the initial withdrawal under the approved Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget.

    Rationale

    • Proportionate withdrawal
    This action withdraws 500,000 ADA as an initial tranche, representing a controlled and incremental use of the treasury focused on setup rather than liquidity deployment.

    • Defined use of funds with security safeguards
    The requested amount is allocated to specific preparatory work, including legal structuring, administrative smart contract development, and a 75,000 ADA independent audit, reducing operational and security risk before scaling.

    • Strong on-chain controls and oversight
    All funds are managed through an Amaru smart contract with a 5 of 9 multisignature approval requirement, milestone-based disbursements, and continued dRep and tDAO oversight.

    Conclusion
    Yoroi supports this withdrawal as a measured implementation step that remains consistent with the scope and intent of the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget previously approved by Yoroi, and therefore votes Yes.

  • YUTA
    Yes435.8M ₳Rationale

    I will vote YES on “Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget – Withdrawal 1”.
    The reasoning is consistent with my position on the previous information action. While this proposal will not resolve all existing issues, it has the potential to reasonably mitigate some of the current challenges facing the ecosystem. At present, I am not aware of any critical or fatal downsides associated with this proposal.

    「Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1」にYESを投票します。

    理由は以前のinfo actionと同様で、これが全ての問題を解決するわけではありませんが、少なくとも現状の問題を合理的に軽減できる可能性があります。また、致命的なデメリットを認識していません。

  • Blockdaemon
    Abstain332.2M ₳No rationale
  • EMURGO
    Yes293M ₳Rationale

    Summary
    EMURGO as a DRep votes YES on the treasury withdrawal titled “Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget – Withdrawal 1”, with rationale outlined below.

    Rationale
    This withdrawal is a direct implementation step of the previously approved Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget Info Action. It funds the minimum foundational work needed to operationalize the program, specifically the legal vehicle setup, the administrative smart contract and interfaces, and an independent security audit, without expanding scope or changing objectives.

    EMURGO also supports the proposed accountability structure. Funds are received and managed on chain through an Amaru contract with a 5 of 9 multi-signature requirement, disbursed based on milestones, and subject to tDAO oversight with dRep governance controls. With these safeguards in place, EMURGO views Withdrawal 1 as a reasonable and constitutionally aligned step to execute what the community has already approved. For these reasons, EMURGO votes yes.

  • Eternl DRep Committee
    Yes222.9M ₳Rationale

    TL;DR: EDC voted YES on gov_action1fvgw27fjpr9c7g582mszzyez0jgkqgjgatzdnyngrg8wwc9kcn3qqxtz8r7;

    In line with our decision to vote YES on this budget (gov_action1u4jrcvlkppjzuv5j9z5ksacwtvv77h6glu0knpcjut8gvjjfu0cqqt3alsy) we also vote YES on the first withdrawal.

  • Everstake
    Yes165.7M ₳No rationale
  • Cardano Foundation
    Yes120.2M ₳Rationale

    The Cardano Foundation votes YES on the first TW for the establishment of the project’s legal framework and smart contract infrastructure. We commend the team’s disclosure of their risk management policies and recommend further refinements in transparency and reporting before subsequent withdrawals.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    Our support for this Treasury Withdrawal is based on the following factors:

    • Improved Risk Mitigation: Proposers have demonstrated a willingness to incorporate community feedback, specifically regarding "what-if" scenarios, pro/con analyses for DeFi protocols, and deployment principles designed to minimize liquidity shocks.

    • Legal Appropriateness: The legal structure established within the Cayman Islands is viewed as an appropriate and justified setup for this type of ecosystem initiative.

    • Balanced Guiding Principles: The four pillars of the framework - Public Good Orientation, Open Source & Composability, Decentralization, and Risk-Adjusted Returns - are well-balanced and strategically sound.

    While we are voting YES on this initial withdrawal, we recommend that the following concerns be addressed in the subsequent treasury withdrawals:

    • Transparency & Reporting: We advocate for a public dashboard to track rewards and liquidity positions in real-time.

    • Conflict of Interest (COI): The COI policy should be expanded to include the Directors of the legal vehicle. Relevant disclosures and committee decisions (redacted for personal information) should be available to the community.

    • Operational Clarity: Further definition is needed regarding committee election mechanisms, rotation, and wind-down plans for un-allocating the funds.

    • Fiscal Accountability: The committee compensation model requires adjustment to ensure "Proof of Contribution" rather than fixed sums.

    • Calculations Accuracy: The current 0.4$ ADA price used for budget projections is significantly above the market exchange rate. Future proposals must use augmented and data-backed market rates or provide contingencies for a fluctuating ADA price.

    We request that the proposers take these recommendations into account in subsequent treasury withdrawals.

    The Cardano Foundation votes YES. We view this withdrawal as a necessary step to activate the DeFi Liquidity Budget while emphasizing the need for future withdrawals to contain enhanced transparency, refined eligibility criteria, and more robust reporting standards.

    NOTE on 'Internal Voting':
    The fields constitutional and unconstitutional below reflect the CF governance teams' individual opinions whether they are for or against the proposal. Reason for this inconsistency is, that CIP-136 is at the moment only applicable to CC rationales, but we want to record the internal opinions of our DRep assessment transparently as well.

  • JAZZ
    Yes92.2M ₳No rationale
  • CardanoYoda (MANDA Pool)
    No91.5M ₳Rationale

    As a DRep, I decided to vote NO on the proposal: Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1

    Rationale for Rejection

    I want to state clearly at the outset that I support the objective of this proposal. Cardano needs deeper and more reliable stablecoin liquidity, and I appreciate the work the team has put into advancing this discussion.

    My decision to reject this withdrawal is not opposition to the goal, but a concern about the chosen architecture, sequencing, and cost structure.

    The core issue for me is that this proposal asks DReps to approve a substantial amount of ADA for establishing an off-chain legal entity to deploy liquidity in DeFi.

    Paying approximately 400k ADA to establish and operate a legal entity, including professional directors and ongoing compliance, represents a clear shift away from decentralized, trust-minimized design towards CeFi-style execution. If we are building DeFi, I believe we should first exhaust on-chain solutions and invest Treasury funds into code, protocols, and governance mechanisms rather than importing legacy legal layers as a starting point.

    I fully understand that legal entities are required when interacting with OTC desks, fiat rails, or direct stablecoin issuer minting. However, it has not been convincingly demonstrated that this institutional path is cheaper or more efficient than a trust-minimized, on-chain approach once all costs are considered.

    When the fixed legal overhead of roughly 400k ADA is added to OTC spreads, operational friction, and ongoing compliance, the institutional route may in fact be more expensive than a well-designed on-chain strategy at the scale currently being discussed. At approximately $32M of deployment, phased DEX and bridge-based execution can plausibly achieve comparable or lower total cost without introducing permanent administrative overhead.

    I am also concerned that we are creating a new legal entity despite already having founding entities that are legal persons. The Cardano Foundation, for example, has publicly indicated plans to use Genesis ADA to mint stablecoins. This raises the question of whether all existing options have been explored and whether these entities have explicitly declined participation. My impression is that they do not wish to bear the legal and operational risk for this program, which is understandable, but that alone does not automatically justify establishing a new, Treasury-funded legal structure without further exploration or explanation.

    I also believe that all major entities within the Cardano ecosystem share a vested economic interest in preserving ADA in the Treasury and using those funds as efficiently as possible. For that reason, I would expect openness to cooperation and reuse of existing structures wherever feasible. If the ecosystem ultimately decides that a new legal entity must be established, it should be designed as a reusable, shared resource for future initiatives rather than a single-purpose structure created solely for this proposal.

    Another important point is that the proposal does not specify whether the legal entity is intended to exist only for a single year or to operate on an ongoing basis. While only year-1 costs are budgeted, there is no stated sunset clause, dissolution condition, or estimate of operating expenses for years 2 and beyond. In practice, this means approving not only a one-time expense, but the creation of a recurring cost center with no defined end. This lack of clarity makes it difficult to assess the true long-term commitment being made on behalf of the Treasury.

    I am also uncomfortable with the way this withdrawal is positioned as the first in a sequence of withdrawals. When I approved the Info Action, I highlighted several shortcomings, as did many other DReps. I expect the team to address them. Before approving this withdrawal, I would like to see a second withdrawal with attachments that would be considered final and binding.

    I have read the attachments to the first withdrawal, but I am not sure of their status. I give the team credit for addressing some of my concerns.

    Under the current governance process, meaningful changes or clarifications can realistically only be acted upon in subsequent proposals/withdrawals. Approving this first withdrawal without visibility into the full set of planned withdrawals effectively pressures voters to approve later ones to avoid stranding sunk costs. Rejecting a later withdrawal after approving the legal entity would likely result in a loss of Treasury funds.

    This is a systemic governance issue rather than a fault of the team, but it makes it impossible for me to responsibly approve this withdrawal in isolation. I would strongly prefer to see all planned withdrawals submitted with sufficient detail so the entire project can be evaluated coherently.

    Finally, I want to emphasize that I remain supportive of this project and of the broader goal of improving Cardano's liquidity. However, I am not comfortable approving a large upfront expenditure for legal structuring before attempting a trust-minimized, on-chain-first approach.

    My understanding is that the legal entity primarily exists to shield the committee from liability and to enable off-chain execution. If decisions were made directly by DReps and execution were limited strictly to on-chain transactions, neither a legal entity nor a committee would be strictly necessary. There are viable paths to bootstrap USDM or USDA liquidity using DeFi-native mechanisms such as DEXs, bridges, and phased deployment without exposing individuals to off-chain liability.

    For these reasons, I am rejecting this proposal at this time. I encourage the team to explore an on-chain-first design, clarify the lifetime and cost of any legal entity, and present the full set of withdrawals together.

    I remain open to supporting a revised approach that better aligns with decentralized principles while still addressing Cardano's liquidity needs.

    I will continue to carefully review the rationales and arguments presented by other dReps and follow the ongoing discussion across community channels and social media.

    Governance decisions of this magnitude benefit from broad scrutiny and diverse perspectives, and I remain open to refining my position should new information, clarifications, or materially different approaches emerge through that process.

  • SIPO
    Yes86M ₳Rationale

    SIPO DRep votes Yes on the proposal “Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget – Withdrawal 1.”

    I do not evaluate this proposal as a short-term DeFi growth initiative or a TVL-driven spending decision. Instead, we see it as a foundational institutional cost required for Cardano to transition from an experimental DAO ecosystem into a public, institution-grade blockchain infrastructure.

    1. Why this matters now

    Across the blockchain industry, many DAO treasuries and DeFi systems remain structurally limited:
    • They lack clear legal personality
    • Accountability is ambiguous
    • Interaction with states, institutions, and regulated entities is difficult or impossible

    As a result, DeFi often remains confined to an experimental or semi-private domain.

    This proposal directly addresses that bottleneck by combining:
    • A legally recognized Foundation Company structure
    • On-chain constitutional governance
    • dRep-based democratic oversight

    This is a serious attempt to bridge decentralized governance with real-world institutional requirements.

    1. Key reasons for support

    (1) Treasury treated as public funds

    The proposal clearly frames Treasury assets as public funds, not discretionary capital:
    • 5-of-9 multisignature control
    • dRep authority to appoint, remove, or shut down operations
    • Mandatory reporting and independent audits
    • No delegation of funds to SPOs

    This reflects a mature and responsible approach to treasury governance.

    (2) Institutional groundwork, not short-term liquidity

    While this withdrawal does not deploy liquidity directly, it establishes the legal, technical, and governance infrastructure required for future:
    • Stablecoin DeFi
    • RWA initiatives
    • Institution-facing DeFi use cases

    The value lies in reusability and precedent, not immediate financial metrics.

    (3) A distinctly Cardano approach

    This proposal avoids both extremes:
    • Centralized foundation control
    • Unaccountable, permissionless DAO spending

    Instead, it operationalizes Cardano’s long-held principles:
    decentralization with responsibility, autonomy with accountability.

    This is a long-term credibility investment, not a short-term optimization.

    1. Final position of SIPO DRep

    SIPO DRep views this proposal as:

    The first institutional design cost for Cardano’s transition from an experimental DAO ecosystem to a public blockchain capable of engaging with states and institutions.

    Just as nations invest early in legal frameworks and public infrastructure before economic returns are visible, Cardano must invest in governance and institutional readiness.

    For these reasons, SIPO DRep votes Yes on this proposal.

    SIPO DRepは、本提案 「Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget – Withdrawal 1」 に対して Yes（賛成） を投じます。

    本提案を評価するにあたり、私はこれを「短期的なDeFi活性化施策」や「TVLを増やすための支出」としては捉えていません。本提案の本質は、Cardanoが“実験的DAO”の段階を超え、“公共的ブロックチェーン基盤”として機能するための制度設計コストにあると考えています。

    1. なぜ「今」この支出が必要なのか

    現在、多くのブロックチェーンやDeFiエコシステムは、オンチェーンでは高度に分散化されている一方で、オフチェーンの現実世界との接続において重大な課題を抱えています。
    • DAO Treasuryは存在するが、法的主体が曖昧
    • 誰が責任を負うのかが明確でない
    • 国家・機関投資家・規制環境と接続できない

    この状況では、DeFiはいつまでも「実験段階」に留まり、公共性や持続性を獲得することができません。

    本提案は、こうした構造的課題に対して、
    「法的器（Foundation Company）」「オンチェーン憲法」「dRepによる統治」
    を組み合わせることで、初めて真正面から解決を試みるものです。

    1. 本提案の評価ポイント

    （1）公共資金としてのTreasury運用を前提にしている点

    本提案は、資金の管理・支出・監査・停止権限をすべて憲法とオンチェーンガバナンスの枠内に置いています。
    • 5-of-9マルチシグ
    • dRepによる任免・停止権
    • 月次報告と第三者監査
    • SPOへの委任禁止

    これは、Treasuryを「誰かの裁量資金」ではなく、公共資金として扱う姿勢の明確な表明です。

    （2）「DeFiを制度として成立させる」ための前例になる点

    このWithdrawalは流動性そのものを供給するものではありません。
    しかし、**将来のステーブルコインDeFi、RWA、機関向けDeFiを実装するための“土台”**を作ります。

    これは単発の支出ではなく、
    • 今後の公共ファンド
    • 国際連携
    • 規制環境下でのDeFi展開

    に再利用可能な制度設計の雛形になると考えています。

    （3）Cardanoらしいアプローチである点

    本提案は、
    • 中央集権的な財団モデルでもなく
    • 無責任な完全放任DAOでもありません

    分散と責任、自由と統治を両立させようとするCardanoの思想を、初めて現実的な制度として落とし込んだ試みです。

    これは短期的な成果指標では測れませんが、長期的な信認と持続性において非常に重要です。

    1. SIPO DRepとしての結論

    SIPO DRepは、本提案を

    Cardanoが「実験的DAO」から
    「公共的ブロックチェーン国家」へ移行するための、最初の制度設計コスト

    として評価しています。

    国家が最初に道路や橋、会計制度を整える際、それがすぐに黒字になるかどうかでは判断しないように、
    この支出もまた「将来にわたって使われ続ける制度を作るか」という観点で判断すべきものです。

    以上の理由から、SIPO DRepは本提案に Yes を投じます。

  • Army of Spies
    No84.3M ₳Rationale

    I voted "NO" on the related Info Action and I am voting "NO" on this withdrawal. Please see my X post related to the info action https://x.com/ArmyofSpies/status/1977565495302996409. I do not believe the DReps should be abdicating the power of the purse. Since we already have a "pentad" of founding entities in the greater Cardano Ecosystem, I also question the wisdom of creating yet another foundation entity (this time a "Cayman Islands Foundation Company" that will feature at least "2 Cayman-based professional directors who manage the FC's business and affairs"). We do not need to increase the entity count to a "Hextad". We have enough centralized entity drama as it is given that a decentralized ecosystem should really be...well...decentralized. I also do not believe this is currently the best use of treasury funds when the Cardano Treasury is already trending toward zero within a decade and there are significant questions around yet another centralized foundation entity picking winners and losers when "[c]rypto is filled with failed liquidity incentives" as Sebastian Guillemot succinctly put it in his abstention rationale as to the Info Action. The free markets always do a better job of identifying the best cases of product-market fit than centralized decision-by-committee. Adam Smith taught us this lesson 250 years ago in his 1776 work "The Wealth of Nations".

  • ranket
    Yes75.2M ₳No rationale
  • SASA_nagamaru_ながまる
    Yes74.5M ₳Rationale

    I vote YES on “Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget – Withdrawal 1”.

    I am fundamentally bullish on the role of stablecoin liquidity in Cardano’s long-term growth. Insufficient and shallow stablecoin liquidity continues to limit DeFi usage, capital efficiency, and the participation of more sophisticated market actors. Improving this area is not optional but a prerequisite for meaningful ecosystem maturation.

    This proposal represents the first step of a two-phase approach. Crucially, it does not inject capital directly into DeFi markets. Instead, it focuses on establishing the legal, governance, and technical foundations required to manage future liquidity in a controlled, transparent, and accountable manner. By clearly defining responsibility for off-chain contracts, enforcing multi-party approval through on-chain fund management, and incorporating independent third-party audits, this phase reduces structural and operational risk before any significant capital is deployed.

    The requested funds are confined to these preparatory activities, such as legal structuring, contract development, and audits. Any subsequent liquidity deployment will be subject to separate proposals and renewed community scrutiny, allowing DReps to reassess market conditions and outcomes at that time rather than committing prematurely.

    While this step alone will not transform Cardano’s DeFi landscape, establishing a robust operational foundation meaningfully improves the quality of future decisions and avoids ad-hoc or poorly governed interventions. On that basis, I consider this proposal justified and vote YES.

    「Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget – Withdrawal 1」にYESを投票します。

    僕は、Cardanoの中長期的な成長において、ステーブルコイン流動性の強化は不可欠だと考えています。十分で安定したステーブルコイン流動性が不足していることは、DeFiの利用拡大や資本効率、さらにはより高度な市場参加者の参入を妨げている大きな要因の一つです。この課題への対応は、エコシステムの成熟に向けた前提条件だと認識しています。

    本提案は、二段階で進められる施策の第1段階に位置づけられています。重要なのは、現時点でDeFi市場に直接資金を投入するものではなく、将来の流動性運用を適切に行うための法的・ガバナンス・技術的な基盤整備に焦点を当てている点です。オフチェーン契約における責任主体を明確にし、複数人承認を必須とするオンチェーンの資金管理を採用し、第三者による監査を組み込むことで、本格的な資金運用に先立って構造的なリスクを抑える設計になっています。

    本Withdrawalで求められている資金は、法務対応、スマートコントラクトの構築、監査といった準備段階に限定されています。実際の流動性配備については、今後あらためて提案され、その時点の市場環境や実績を踏まえて、コミュニティとDRepsが改めて判断する余地が確保されています。

    この一手だけでCardanoのDeFiが完成するわけではありませんが、将来の判断をより健全なものにし、場当たり的な資金投入を避けるための基盤を整えるという点で意義は大きいと考えます。以上の理由から、本提案を妥当と判断し、YESを投票します。

  • Dave
    No73.1M ₳Rationale

    I vote NO. This is a painful vote as I see the solid benefit and hard work in this proposal. However, I must prioritize fiscal responsibility ahead of upcoming budgets. The proposal assumes $0.40/ADA; at current prices, this withdrawal is significantly underfunded. ADA is currently $0.2865.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    I am voting NO on this withdrawal. This is a difficult decision, as I recognize the immense hard work behind this proposal and the solid benefit this brings to Cardano. I previously voted YES on the governance action and I fully support the strategic intent.

    However, my duty of care requires strict fiscal responsibility for the security, sustainability and investments of ADA holders, especially with significant budget requests on the horizon. The proposal relies on a $0.40 ADA peg. With the current price significantly lower (~$0.286), this withdrawal is underfunded upon execution. I cannot justify this treasury spend at this moment in time, and I welcome this withdrawal's re-submission when the ADA price improves and the timing is right.

    As a DRep, I accept the responsibility of making these difficult decisions to ensure our spending never outpaces current market conditions.

  • Peter Bui
    Yes62.7M ₳Rationale

    Voting yes on this one, although the price of ADA at the moment is well below where we thought it would be. Taking it and deploying now could be detrimental to the provisiong but the team knows this. There is more to the process than just deploying to protocols. Please use the funds wisely at this point in time.

  • Dori
    Yes53.8M ₳No rationale
  • hix_coffeepool
    No50.4M ₳Rationale

    I am voting No for DeFi Liquidity Budget GA. The ecosystem has spent nearly 350M NCL line, and I believe no more than 250M ADA should be spend on this year.

  • AdaStat
    Yes50M ₳Rationale

    I'm voting Yes on the Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1. I believe DeFi liquidity is crucial for the ecosystem, helping applications grow, users interact, and the network thrive. This step is necessary to make it all possible.

  • Chris-O
    Yes49.5M ₳No rationale
  • Tempo.Vote
    Yes48.6M ₳No rationale
  • PoolTool
    Yes47.6M ₳No rationale
  • Patrick_Tobler
    Yes40.1M ₳Rationale

    Since the budget proposal has already been approved, the withdrawal should also be approved.

  • drep1yffcjs0njfe...
    No38.1M ₳Rationale

    I voted against the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget because I believe current DeFi demand on Cardano is still weak and the absence of native USDT/USDC is the real bottleneck. Since this proposal builds infrastructure for that same direction, my position remains consistent and I also vote no on this Treasury withdrawal.

  • Linda - Cryptofly
    Yes37.8M ₳No rationale
  • MUEN
    Yes34.6M ₳No rationale
  • Socious
    Yes34.3M ₳Rationale

    Socious votes YES on the "Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1" proposal. We recognize this as a critical foundational step to safely manage the community-approved Stablecoin Liquidity Budget. The proposed Cayman Islands Foundation Company structure offers a robust legal wrapper that aligns with DAO principles, ensuring limited liability and separate legal personality without centralized ownership. We value the strong security measures, including the 5-of-9 multisig Interim Committee, professional oversight, and the allocation of 75,000 ADA for an independent smart contract audit by Invariant0 LLC. This approach ensures operational readiness and constitutional compliance—specifically regarding fund management and non-delegation to SPOs—before substantial assets are deployed.

    Sociousは、「Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1」提案に賛成（YES）します。私たちは、これをコミュニティが承認したステーブルコイン流動性予算を安全に管理するための重要な基礎的ステップであると認識しています。提案されているケイマン諸島財団法人（Foundation Company）の構造は、DAOの原則に合致した堅牢な法的枠組みを提供し、中央集権的な所有権を持たずに有限責任と独立した法人格を保証するものです。9名中5名の承認を必要とするマルチシグ暫定委員会、専門家による監督、そしてInvariant0 LLCによる独立したスマートコントラクト監査への75,000 ADAの割り当てなど、強力なセキュリティ対策が講じられている点を高く評価します。このアプローチにより、多額の資産が展開される前に、運用体制の整備と（特にSPOへの委任を行わないという資金管理に関する）憲法の順守が確実に保証されます。

  • HOSKY
    Abstain33.5M ₳Rationale

    Deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Committee, I nevertheless believe this could represent a responsible use of funds if it demonstrably drives meaningful adoption and is resubmitted in full compliance with the required governance and constitutional standards.

    A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.

    Deemed unconstitutional by the Constitutional Committee, I nevertheless believe this could represent a responsible use of funds if it demonstrably drives meaningful adoption and is resubmitted in full compliance with the required governance and constitutional standards.

  • Aichi/Tokai_DRep
    No31.4M ₳Rationale

    I am voting No on this proposal.

    My reasons are as follows:

    • The Interim Committee, which will control 500,000 ADA, has not disclosed its member list or their qualifications. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess accountability and governance safety.
    • The requested budget is extremely large, with a significant portion allocated to legal costs. From a treasury preservation perspective, the scale of spending is not sufficiently justified.
    • I believe the project should proceed in smaller, incremental steps. Clear transparency and demonstrated progress at each stage would make future proposals easier to evaluate and support.

    For these reasons, I cannot approve the proposal at this time.

  • FIMI
    Yes31.1M ₳No rationale
  • NEDSCAVE.IO
    Yes30.7M ₳No rationale
  • Cerkoryn
    Yes27.9M ₳Rationale

    The budget for this proposal was already approved prior to the Constitution changing that no longer requires it. It is unfortunate that this governance action will likely be deemed unconstitutional due to this technicality and the expiration of the NCL. However, I still believe that using some treasury funds to subsidize DeFi stablecoin liquidity will be a huge boon to the Cardano ecosystem. I am especially glad to see that the smart contract development costs have shrank since the original budget due to some volunteer work by community devs, even though legal costs have increased slightly and the USD valuation of ADA has dropped. One other piece of feedback I'd like to leave is that I think technically the smart contract should be called a Pragma Contract instead of Amaru Contract, since the latter refers to node software. I hope to see this proposal make it through a future withdrawal in the near future.

  • TERA DRep
    Yes27.9M ₳No rationale
  • Drep One
    Yes27.5M ₳No rationale
  • Florian Volery
    Yes26.3M ₳Rationale

    DeFi is the primary source of value creation for Cardano as a decentralized and secure blockchain for financial applications. It represents a big part of the economic activity and the revenues created for the treasury,and, as such, must be reinforced and prioritized.

  • Blockjock (James Meidinger)
    Yes26.1M ₳Rationale

    This is part of the Liquidity funds overall strategy which was already overwhelmingly approved in the BIA, you can look to my past vote for rationale as it has already been supplied there

  • Kyle Solomon
    Yes25.3M ₳Rationale

    I am voting YES on Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1. I think deepening liquidity is important as well as strengthenig the footing of our home players. We will learn a lot from this initiative both on executiona and in revenue.

  • wolf31o2 (Chris Gianelloni)
    Yes23.5M ₳No rationale
  • DINO
    Yes21.5M ₳No rationale
  • Hephaestus Stake Pool [HEPHY]
    Abstain21.5M ₳Rationale

    I vote ABSTAIN on the Treasury Withdrawal proposal for “Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1” (gov_action1fvgw27fjpr9c7g582mszzyez0jgkqgjgatzdnyngrg8wwc9kcn3qqxtz8r7) following the recent enactment of the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem Constitution v2.4.

    Article II, Section 6, part 1 states that a governance action proposal format “shall include a URL hosting a document that outlines additional context for the proposed governance action, and the hash of this document. The document hosted by such a URL shall be immutable and incapable of being altered after submission, and the content of every on-chain Governance Action must be identical to the final off-chain version of the proposed action.” Whereas under the previous Constitution, immutable metadata was a “nice to have” or “recommended standard”, the newly enacted Constitution makes it mandatory. While it is reassuring to see all of the supporting links provided using the GitHub permalink format, the main rationale metadata is a standard GitHub url link (likely due to a GitHub permalink possibly breaking the --anchor-url character limit). As such I anticipate the CC deeming this one unconstitutional as a result and so I will abstain from spending further time on this proposal until it is re-submitted in-line with the newly enacted Constitution.

  • Ha-Nguyen
    Abstain21.4M ₳Rationale

    As a DRep, I vote ABSTAIN on this Treasury Withdrawal.

    I support the objective of this proposal and agree that improving stablecoin liquidity is important for Cardano’s long-term DeFi growth. The team has made a serious effort to design a legally compliant and accountable structure.

    However, I remain undecided about whether establishing a new off-chain legal entity at this stage is the most appropriate first step. The proposal raises open questions around sequencing, long-term cost commitments, and whether sufficiently robust on-chain or existing-entity alternatives have been fully explored.

    I am also cautious about approving an initial withdrawal that may create path dependency for subsequent withdrawals without full visibility into the complete execution plan.

    Given these unresolved considerations, I am neither comfortable voting YES nor prepared to vote NO. I will continue to follow the discussion and reassess my position as more clarity emerges.

  • Moonstake
    Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
  • CTEC-Stake-Pool
    Yes20.3M ₳No rationale
  • Chris [STR8] - Straightpool
    Yes19.9M ₳Rationale

    Let's move this forward. I still believe this is helpful for the ecosystem.

  • ADA Ocean
    Abstain18.2M ₳No rationale
  • drep1ytf9f78k7rk...
    No17.4M ₳No rationale
  • Rodrigo-[CHIL]
    Yes17.3M ₳Rationale

    Cardano DeFi Liquidity Budget - Withdrawal 1

  • Cardanians
    No16.7M ₳Rationale

    For a ₳1.5M / 6-month “core trading infrastructure” ask, the proposal explains the direction, but it lacks the level of specificity and verifiable delivery standards expected at this budget.

    What’s missing for a proposal of this size:

    1. Milestone acceptance criteria: Each phase should have objective “done” checks (benchmarks, uptime/SLOs, latency targets, load profiles, rollout gates, go/no-go criteria), not just general outputs.

    2. Operational and trust model clarity: Clearly state who operates Hydra heads and production services, what users must trust, failure scenarios (downtime, dispute handling, fund safety), incident response, and runbooks.

    3. Security plan proportional to risk: “Security reviews/targeted audits” needs scope, auditor selection plan, timelines, threat model, and explicit in-scope components (on-chain + Hydra integration + infra).

    4. Liquidity/adoption mechanics: A credible plan for market quality (market makers, initial pairs, incentive/distribution design if any) rather than KPI targets alone.

    5. Budget benchmarking and itemized cost model: Not just a high-level split. Provide an itemized budget with roles + headcount, expected hours/man-days per workstream, rate per man-day, and major non-labor costs (audit quotes/estimates, infra, legal, tooling). Include brief benchmarking against comparable deliverables and typical engineering rates to justify proportionality.

    6. Public-goods commitments: If positioned as “core infrastructure,” specify durable ecosystem value (licensing/IP, open interfaces, integration commitments, and a post-funding maintenance plan).

    Resubmission request: Keep the governance safeguards (multisig, milestone-based releases, return of unused funds), but resubmit with (1) measurable acceptance criteria per phase, (2) explicit trust/risk + ops model, (3) audit scope/vendor plan, (4) credible liquidity/adoption plan, (5) itemized budget with hours/headcount/man-day rates, and (6) concrete public-goods + maintenance commitments.

  • DraculaDAO
    Yes16.4M ₳No rationale
  • drep1ytaunswwpyt...
    Yes14.2M ₳No rationale
  • π Lanningham
    Abstain13.9M ₳Rationale

    I am voting ABSTAIN on governance action 4b10e5793208cb8f228756e02113227c91602248eac4d992681a0ee760b6c4e2, which disburses 400,000 ADA, less than 2 basis points of the treasury. As a direct recipient of funds in this withdrawal, as a service provider for the treasury management platform, I feel I must abstain from the vote. Were it not for this conflict of interest, however, I would vote yes, as I believe this proposal is well structured, reasonably priced, and in line with the longer term goal of fostering deeper and more active liquidity within the Cardano DeFi ecosystem.

    You can find a larger writeup of my beliefs and values here.