DRepActive

DraculaDAO

drep1ygs9...3s6qmu3p

16,313,121 ₳16.3M ₳voting power

41 delegators0.32% of active voting power

About

Objectives

We believe in taking an ultra long-term approach to important decisions. We will not vote for what we believe are short sighted decisions and will generally not support proposals for treasury funds being used for venture capital or short-term marketing efforts, unless there is a compelling benefit to the ecosystem and there is low risk. Burning ADA tokens is a non-starter.

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Qualifications

General experience in crypto since 2012 and specifically Cardano since 2018. Experience working with Bitcoin, Ethereum, most of the EVM L2's, Near, Solana and of course Cardano.

Governance record

Participation81%Voted on 120 of 149 concluded actionsAhead of 74% of 351 active DReps
Votes with rationale63%77 of 123 votes with rationaleAhead of 75% of 334 active DReps with votes
Vote timingDay 10.9Median point after submission across 123 timed votes
Voting pattern
123votes
  • Yes80 (65%)
  • No40 (33%)
  • Abstain3 (2%)

No vote changes

Percentiles compare active DReps with at least five concluded actions since their registration. What these numbers mean

Voting power trend<0.1%vs last epoch
785K ₳19.4M ₳41Epoch 510Epoch 654
15.5M ₳over 145 epochsDelegators41-1over 8 epochs

Recognition (10)

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Activity

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YesGovernance Incentives Framework 2026Submitted epoch 649View rationaleActive4d ago

Vote: YES

This is a Treasury Withdrawal (gov_action174l...67pvcp), proposed in epoch 649 and expiring epoch 656, requesting ₳4,207,967 for a twelve-month research program into Cardano's governance incentive mechanisms. The work is led by Seomon, Sebastian Pereira and Cerkoryn of the Governance Incentives Working Group, structured across seven milestones producing an incentives mapping, actor-specific models, simulations against real governance data, a governance activity dataset and dashboard, one controlled pilot, and a final framework submitted as a CIP. No compensation scheme is enacted by this action; the deliverable is evidence and a recommendation the community can then accept or reject on its merits.

Dracula DAO judges research proposals on whether the question is worth answering, whether the answer is worth its price, and whether it will actually improve governance. On the first test this clears comfortably. The problem is documented rather than speculative: the number of active DReps has declined in every twelve-epoch period since governance went live, and between eleven and sixteen DReps now control fifty-one percent of voting power. Concentration at that level is a threat to the legitimacy of on-chain governance itself, and it is precisely the sort of slow-moving structural risk that an ultra long-term approach demands be addressed before it hardens. The alternative to funding this work is not saving ₳4.2M; it is deciding DRep compensation reactively, under pressure, with no evidence base — and a badly designed incentive that rewards superficial voting or further entrenches large holders would cost the ecosystem far more than this proposal asks.

On the third test the proposal is better hedged than most research asks. A framework CIP can be ignored, and Dracula DAO does not assume this one will be adopted. But the governance activity dataset, the dashboard, and the pilot results retain their value independently of whether the framework is ratified: they become shared infrastructure for anyone reasoning about participation, and they outlast this particular team's conclusions. The commitment to test one mechanism in a controlled pilot with predefined termination conditions, rather than modeling in the abstract, is the right methodology. The proposal also returns unused contingency and pilot reserves to the treasury, and refunds proportionally where deliverables are cancelled or reduced.

The honest concern is price. ₳472,000 for administration and ₳437,328 held as contingency together account for roughly a fifth of the ask, ₳253,333 for a website and dashboard is generous for what it is, and the proposal states that the detailed operational budget is maintained separately rather than exposing it here. The seven milestones read as a delivery plan rather than as payment gates, and the ₳126,239 audit and oversight allocation is thinly specified. Dracula DAO's standing preference remains payment against signed-off delivery with unspent funds returning to the treasury, and this proposal approximates that only partially. Dracula DAO expects the oversight function to be independent of the delivery team and the milestone reporting to be public, and will judge any follow-on request from this working group against what was actually produced.

Weighed against the value of the question, the durability of the artifacts, and an amount that sits below other governance and infrastructure work this DREP has supported, the concerns are about efficiency rather than merit. The health of the DRep body is foundational to everything else Cardano governance decides, and it is currently deteriorating on measurable trend. Dracula DAO votes YES.

YesReimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit.Submitted epoch 649View rationaleActive4d ago

Vote: YES

This is a Treasury Withdrawal (gov_action105m...l5raht), proposed in epoch 649 and expiring epoch 656, requesting 103,000 ADA to reimburse the governance-action deposit lost by the submitter of the September 2024 Info action "Cardanoの生きがい - Ikigai." The 100,000 ADA deposit was trapped by a Cardano node defect that permitted an unregistered stake key to be used in a governance action, defeating the standard refund path. The remaining 3,000 ADA compensates approximately two years of foregone staking rewards on the stranded principal at roughly 2% annually.

Dracula DAO has already supported this remedy once, on the 100,000 ADA action that closed in July 2026, and the reasoning has not changed. This is not discretionary spending; it is remediation of a protocol failure. Cardano's governance deposit is designed to be fully refundable, and that guarantee is what makes it a legitimate anti-spam bond rather than a fee. The submitter posted the required bond in good faith within weeks of the Chang hard fork and lost access to it solely through a node-level defect. When the protocol breaks a refund guarantee it made, making the affected party whole preserves the integrity of the deposit mechanism and the credibility of participating in governance at all. The amount is fixed and small, the cause and recipient are clearly identified, there is no ADA burning, and there is no open-ended commitment.

The one new element is the 3,000 ADA rewards component, and Dracula DAO judges it reasonable rather than opportunistic. Delegated ADA earns staking rewards; ADA frozen in a broken deposit does not. Two years at roughly 2% on 100,000 ADA would be closer to 4,000 ADA, so the request is conservatively stated rather than padded. That said, Dracula DAO treats opportunity-cost compensation as acceptable here only because the delay is attributable to the protocol and to the community's own failure to resolve the matter promptly across multiple attempts, including the Cardano in Oceania budget action that was not approved. This is not a precedent for interest accruing on ordinary treasury claims.

Precedent and scope remain the real concern. A treasury reimbursement of a governance deposit must be understood as bounded strictly to funds stranded by a documented protocol bug, not as a general policy of socializing normally-refundable deposits, which would gut the deposit's anti-spam function by removing the submitter's skin in the game. The cleaner long-term fix is at the ledger level, so that stranded deposits are recoverable directly rather than requiring a treasury draw; a treasury withdrawal is the practical remedy available today, not the ideal one. Dracula DAO will oppose any future attempt to generalise this into routine deposit reimbursement absent a genuine protocol failure.

Dracula DAO's treasury philosophy centres on funding delivered work rather than operating budgets, and this action sits outside that frame entirely: it is neither a grant nor a budget, but the correction of a bond wrongly withheld by the system. Judged on fairness, low risk, and the health of the governance process, it clears the bar. Dracula DAO votes YES.

YesReduce minPoolCost to 75 ada and increase Plutus Memory Limits (Part 2)Decided epoch 653View rationaleExpired22d ago

Vote: YES

This Protocol Parameter Update (ab474223d40e2e3540555364be27e161a809c33651408f43d84acff10c0ba306), submitted by Intersect on August 3, 2026, makes two changes. It reduces minPoolCost from 170 ada to 75 ada, a 55.9% cut to the flat fee every stake pool deducts from block rewards before splitting with delegators. It also raises maxTxExecutionUnits[memory] from 16.5 million to 17.5 million units and maxBlockExecutionUnits[memory] from 72 million to 77.5 million units, completing the second half of a 25% cumulative increase from the original 14 million and 62 million limits, the first part of which was enacted on February 18, 2026. No ADA is requested and no treasury funds are involved. The action expires September 1, 2026 and requires 67% of active DRep stake and 51% of active SPO stake.

Dracula DAO votes YES. The Plutus half of this action is uncontroversial foundational work: it completes a capacity increase the ecosystem already approved in principle and enacted half of six months ago, it has been validated on testnet, and the 6.1% and 7.6% steps are deliberately conservative. The minPoolCost half addresses a problem that is real, quantified, and getting worse. The 170 ada floor was calibrated against a reward environment that no longer exists; as reserve-funded emissions decline, a fixed fee consumes a steadily rising share of a small pool's rewards, and Intersect's figures put the resulting delegator penalty at roughly 52.8% today and on a path to 100% by February 2028. A parameter that trends toward making an entire class of operator unviable is not a neutral default. The precedent also weighs in favour: the 2023 reduction from 340 ada produced none of the predicted race to the bottom, with larger pools largely holding at the prior level while smaller operators used the headroom. Lowering a floor grants flexibility; it does not compel any pool to charge less.

Two objections deserve to be recorded rather than waved away. The first is bundling. Combining an economic parameter with an unrelated execution-unit change forces DReps into a single package vote on questions that merit separate deliberation, and several DReps have objected to this on procedural grounds. Dracula DAO shares that objection. Governance quality depends on votes being answerable to one question at a time, and this action is worse for having been assembled the way it was. The second is that this is a symptomatic fix. As GAIA and TriangleForces have argued, the underlying cause is declining reserve emissions and the calibration of k and a0, and adjusting minPoolCost leaves that structure untouched. That criticism is correct. Dracula DAO also notes the Sybil concern — a lower floor reduces the cost of fragmenting stake across multiple pools — and regards it as real but modest at this magnitude, given that the 2023 precedent did not produce it.

Dracula DAO's philosophy is to take an ultra long-term view, and that view resolves this in favour. The viability of small independent stake pools is not a tactical concern; it is the substrate of Cardano's decentralisation, which is the property the entire security argument for this chain rests on. Allowing that base to erode on a known trajectory while awaiting a more complete redesign of the incentive structure would be the short-sighted choice, not the patient one. A stopgap that preserves optionality is preferable to a principled abstention that lets the problem compound for another two years. Dracula DAO supports this action while stating plainly that it is not a substitute for the structural work on k, a0, and the reward equation, and we expect that work to continue rather than be considered discharged by this vote.

Dracula DAO discloses that Vampyre Fund, the stake pool operator affiliated with this DREP, operates the VAMP pool and would benefit from a lower minPoolCost. We judge the change on its merits for the ecosystem and record the interest so delegators can weigh this rationale accordingly. This action falls in the Network group and therefore requires SPO ratification at 51%; as of the most recent tallies available, SPO support stood at 5.1% and DRep support at 37.7% against a 67% threshold, with the action expiring September 1. The VAMP pool has voted YES in the SPO track. Dracula DAO opposes the bundling of unrelated parameters and will say so again if the practice recurs, but will not withhold support for a beneficial change on procedural grounds alone.

YesUpdate Constitutional Committee 2026Decided epoch 654View rationaleEnacted22d ago

Vote: YES

This Update Committee governance action (729daaf2f9f89f842a61f6e3ebf7e57d16d6fa4116e29c13114780cb39090850) seats the four members elected in Cardano's 2026 Constitutional Committee election — Philip DiSarro, Leandros BSP, Marek Mahut (deliberative.cc), and Cardano Curia — replacing the four of seven seats whose terms expire at epoch 653. The new terms run to epoch 799, the 146-epoch maximum the protocol permits. It was submitted on-chain July 31, 2026 following an off-chain election conducted on the Ekklesia platform that closed July 13 and was verified by an independent third-party auditor. No ADA is requested and no treasury funds are involved.

Dracula DAO votes YES. This is the routine, scheduled renewal of a core constitutional body, and it arrives through the process the ecosystem built for exactly this purpose: an open candidacy period, a stake-weighted DRep election, an independent audit of the raw voting data, and on-chain ratification by DReps and SPOs. Dracula DAO voted YES on July 1, 2026 to reduce committeeMinSize from 7 to 5, and stated in that rationale that we would continue to weight the full and prompt seating of the Constitutional Committee as a governance priority. This action is the direct discharge of that commitment. The consequence of failure is concrete rather than theoretical: with four seats vacated and no replacements ratified, three members remain — below the minimum of five — and every CC-dependent action, including treasury withdrawals and protocol-parameter changes, stalls regardless of how DReps vote on them. Cardano has already lived through one such shutdown following the Cardano Atlantic Council's retirement in November 2025. Repeating it by inaction would be a self-inflicted failure.

The honest weakness here is the thinness of the electoral mandate. Only 38 DReps participated in the election, representing 2.332 billion ada of delegated voting power, and the fourth-placed candidate was seated on 55.26% of participating power — a majority of a small turnout, not a broad expression of ecosystem will. The on-chain tallies show the same pattern: as of August 17, DRep support stood at 32.46% against a 67% threshold and SPO support at 1.95% against 51%. Dracula DAO reads these numbers as apathy rather than opposition, since no substantive case against any of the four candidates has been advanced. That is not reassuring. A constitutional body seated by default, on turnout this low, carries less legitimate authority than the role demands, and the ecosystem should treat the 2026 turnout figures as a problem to fix before the next cycle rather than a quirk to note in passing.

Dracula DAO's ultra long-term view of Cardano's institutions resolves this cleanly. A thin mandate is a weakness to be corrected through better participation in future elections; an inquorate Constitutional Committee is a governance failure with immediate effect on every other action before the chain. Withholding support to protest turnout would punish the ecosystem for a defect the candidates did not cause and cannot remedy. The election was properly run, independently audited, and produced a result. Dracula DAO ratifies it.

Dracula DAO notes that this action requires SPO ratification at a 51% threshold, and that SPO participation as of mid-August was 1.95% — the more urgent of the two shortfalls. The VAMP stake pool, operated by Vampyre Fund, has voted YES in the SPO track. We urge all SPOs who have not yet voted to do so before epoch 653. Abstention here is not neutrality; on an action with a hard expiry and a quorum cliff behind it, a vote not cast is a vote to freeze Cardano's governance.

AbstainName the Protocol Version 12 hard fork “von Bergen“Decided epoch 651View rationaleClosed22d ago

Vote: ABSTAIN

This is a non-binding Info Action proposing that the Protocol Version 12 hard fork be named 'von Bergen', in honour of Fabian von Bergen, a departed member of the Cardano community. It requests no treasury funds, involves no ADA burning, and changes no protocol parameter. Intersect's Hard Fork Working Group has separately stated its intent to name the next hard fork after Alexander Esgen while adding an In Memoriam section to the governance action metadata honouring other recently departed contributors — and has explicitly acknowledged this Info Action, inviting community input on names for that section.

Dracula DAO holds the impulse behind this action in genuine respect. Cardano has, in the naming of the 'van Rossem' hard fork, established a practice of commemorating the people who built and defended this network, and that practice is worth keeping. The community members who sustain a protocol across years of unglamorous work deserve to be remembered in the permanent record of the chain, and an on-chain Info Action is a legitimate way for the community to raise a name that a working group might otherwise overlook.

Dracula DAO abstains because this is not a question our mandate equips us to arbitrate. Our voting philosophy governs the stewardship of treasury funds and the long-term technical direction of the protocol. It offers no principled basis for ranking one departed contributor's memorial against another's, and we will not manufacture one. The Hard Fork Working Group has proposed a resolution that honours both nominees — Esgen in the fork name, von Bergen among the names recorded in memoriam — and that process is already open to the community feedback this action is seeking. A DRep vote weighted by delegated stake is a poor instrument for settling a matter of remembrance; the working group's consultative process is a better one.

Dracula DAO records no objection to the name 'von Bergen' and would raise none were the Hard Fork Working Group to adopt it. We register this abstention as deference to that process, not as indifference to its subject. On the substance of Protocol Version 12 — its ledger changes, its readiness thresholds, and its activation — Dracula DAO will vote on the merits when the hard fork action itself comes before us.

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YesScalus 2026: Maintenance, Dijkstra Readiness, Interoperability & Application RuntimeDecided epoch 647View rationaleExpired1mo ago

Vote: YES

This is a Treasury Withdrawal, "Scalus 2026: Maintenance, Dijkstra Readiness, Interoperability & Application Runtime" (gov_action1xg6...qa63yc), submitted June 29, 2026 with voting closing August 2, 2026. Lantr Engineering requests ₳2,464,844 (approximately $394,375 at the $0.16/ADA reference rate) over nine months, July 2026 through March 2027, to maintain the Scalus toolchain — a JVM-native development stack for writing, evaluating, testing, and deploying Cardano smart contracts — keep it compatible with the Dijkstra hard fork including Plutus V4 and new builtins, improve Java/Kotlin and JavaScript/TypeScript interoperability, and deliver a scoped first application runtime. No ADA burning is involved.

This is a resubmission that took DRep feedback seriously rather than repackaging it. The ask fell from ₳8,503,000 over twelve months to ₳2,464,844 over nine — a 71% reduction — with the team cut from 8.25 to 2.25 FTE, the standalone L1 node and L2 integration removed from scope, the formal verification track dropped, the contingency buffer eliminated entirely, and pricing set at a conservative $0.16/ADA. Few proposals in this cycle have responded to rejection by actually shrinking. The accountability apparatus matches the strongest structures Dracula DAO has seen: funds held in audited SundaeSwap escrow contracts, disbursements requiring approval from a three-member independent oversight board drawn from Blink Labs, the Cardano Foundation, and IOG, quarterly technical review by No.Witness Labs, public quarterly reports and transaction journals, and automatic return of unused funds to the treasury. Lantr's disclosed track record supports the request: ₳328,000 across two Catalyst F11 projects and ₳657,692 from the 2025 Treasury, both fully received with all milestones delivered. The tooling has real users — Scalus is already a dependency of Gummiworm L2, the Bifrost bridge, SugarRush DEX, Vela stablecoin, and DID/DIDComm work — so the maintenance milestone protects infrastructure the ecosystem already depends on rather than speculating on adoption that has not happened.

The structural objection still applies. This is priced as 2.25 FTE of a named team's time for nine months, not as a grant paid against completed features, and there was no competitive bidding — Scalus is Lantr's own product, and the treasury is funding its upkeep. Dracula DAO names that gap plainly. The application runtime component is also the weakest part of the request: unlike maintenance and hard-fork compatibility, it is new scope whose demand is asserted rather than demonstrated, and it is the piece most likely to consume budget without producing something the ecosystem misses if it never ships. DRep sentiment is currently against, at roughly ₳1.97B no to ₳1.16B yes.

Dracula DAO votes YES. Developer tooling that keeps working through a hard fork is unglamorous, foundational, long-term infrastructure — exactly the category this DREP exists to favor over tactical spending. If Scalus breaks at Dijkstra, every project built on it breaks with it, and the cost of that failure lands on builders who made no such request of the treasury. At ₳2.46M this is one of the smallest asks of the cycle, roughly a fifth of the Bifrost Phase 1 request and under half of the Hydra v2 hardening grant, for work with immediate and verifiable consequences. Money moves only when an independent board with no stake in the outcome signs off against a defined quarterly milestone, and undelivered funds return automatically. That is not the competitive completion-grant model Dracula DAO would prefer, but it is honest gating on real deliverables from a team that has delivered before.

Dracula DAO will judge any 2027 continuation on whether the runtime component found genuine users and whether the Dijkstra compatibility work shipped on schedule. Maintenance funding earns renewal by keeping things working; new scope earns it by being adopted.

YesBifrost: Unlocking Bitcoin DeFi on Cardano — Road to Mainnet (Phase 1 of 2)Decided epoch 647View rationaleExpired1mo ago

Vote: YES

This is a Treasury Withdrawal, "Bifrost: Unlocking Bitcoin DeFi on Cardano — Road to Mainnet (Phase 1 of 2)" (gov_action1mlv...ms7jwt), submitted July 3, 2026 with voting closing August 2, 2026. FluidTokens and Lantr Engineering request ₳12,332,031 (approximately $1.97M at the $0.16/ADA reference rate) over nine months, July 2026 through March 2027, to harden Bifrost — a permissionless Bitcoin-Cardano bridge that brings BTC onto Cardano as a native asset (fBTC) with custody distributed across 400+ SPOs using FROST threshold signatures — through external audits, formal verification, penetration testing, and private mainnet deployment. Public launch and operations are deferred to a separate Phase 2 proposal. No ADA burning is involved.

The accountability structure is the strongest Dracula DAO has seen in the 2026 cycle. Funds are held in a SundaeSwap treasury-contracts escrow previously audited by TxPipe and MLabs; every disbursement requires co-signature from a three-person independent oversight board drawn from Blink Labs, the Cardano Foundation, and IOG; No.Witness Labs provides quarterly technical review and an independent financial auditor reviews fund use post-delivery; unused funds return automatically to the treasury on contract expiration, and the 10% contingency (₳1.12M) is explicitly refundable. The three milestones are concrete and verifiable — M1 an audit-ready hardened release candidate, M2 completed external audits and formal verification with both custody modes tested, M3 private mainnet with real BTC. The project is not vapor: the bridge is live on Bitcoin Testnet4 and Cardano Preprod with peg-ins occurring, five SPOs participating, and seven dApps expressing integration interest. There is no bridge token, no founder allocation, and no extractive tokenomics; the code is Apache 2.0. Lantr has disclosed prior treasury funding of ₳657,692 fully received and delivered on the Scalus platform. Distributing bridge custody across the SPO set rather than a small signer committee is the right architectural instinct, and it creates a revenue stream for stake pool operators beyond block production.

The concerns are real. ₳12.33M is priced as a team operating budget — $210K per FTE-year across 52.5 FTE-months — rather than as a grant against completed features, and there was no competitive bidding for the work. Phase 1 produces no public deliverable: at its end there is a privately deployed, audited bridge and a further Phase 2 request for public launch and 24 months of operations, so a YES here is the first half of a commitment whose full cost is not yet on the table. Cross-chain bridges are the single most exploited category of infrastructure in this industry, and stake-weighted SPO threshold custody is unproven at scale — the residual risk is bounded by the private-mainnet rollout and an early TVL cap, but it is not eliminated. The withdrawal also lands with ADA near multi-year lows, so the treasury pays in its weakest currency. DRep support is currently narrow, at approximately ₳939M yes against ₳909M no.

Dracula DAO votes YES. Treasury funds should be awarded as grants paid on completion of well-defined features, and this proposal does not fully meet that standard — it is a budget, and Dracula DAO names that gap plainly. But the gap is narrower here than in anything else this cycle: money moves only when an independent board with no financial stake in the outcome signs off against a defined milestone, undelivered funds go back to the treasury automatically, and what is being bought in Phase 1 is precisely the thing Dracula DAO has demanded of every bridge proposal — audits, formal verification, and adversarial testing completed before a single retail user is exposed. Paying for security before launch rather than after an exploit is the ultra long-term posture this DREP exists to defend. Dracula DAO's NO on Pogun in May 2026 was structural, not technical: Bitcoin DeFi infrastructure on Cardano is worth building, and the objection was to pre-funding a team roadmap with no delivery gating. Bifrost answers that objection directly.

Dracula DAO will judge Phase 2 entirely on delivery. If M1 through M3 are not completed and independently verified on the stated schedule, or if the audits surface material findings in the custody model, the Phase 2 request for public launch and operations will be opposed. This vote funds proof, not permission.

NoNet Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713)Decided epoch 647View rationaleClosed1mo ago

Vote: NO

This is a non-binding Info Action, "Net Change Limit: Cardano Treasury (Epochs 613-713)" (gov_action15at...hakceq), submitted July 2, 2026 with voting closing August 2, 2026. It proposes replacing the existing 350,000,000 ADA Net Change Limit for Epochs 613-713 (February 13, 2026 through July 3, 2027) with a 500,000,000 ADA limit — a 43% increase in the ceiling on treasury withdrawals for a period already more than a third elapsed. The NCL caps total lovelace removed from the treasury by enacted Treasury Withdrawals; treasury inflows are not netted against it.

The proposal is correct on one point of framing: an NCL is a ceiling, not a mandate, and DReps retain full discretion to reject every individual withdrawal beneath it. It is also legitimate to revisit a limit mid-period if the limit is demonstrably binding — that is, if worthy, well-structured proposals are being turned away for want of headroom rather than for want of merit. Dracula DAO would consider that case seriously if it were made.

That case has not been made. Roughly 68M ADA has actually been withdrawn against the existing 350M ceiling; the current limit is not the constraint on ecosystem funding, and there is no evidence that a single qualifying proposal has failed because the cap was reached. The 2026 cycle's approximately 331.6M ADA of requests failed on their merits and on DRep judgment, not on headroom. Raising a ceiling that has been utilized at under 20% does not unlock funding — it removes a discipline, and it does so at a moment when the treasury's purchasing power is depressed and every ADA spent today is sold into weakness. Dracula DAO's position has been consistent since the 2025 NCL votes: ADA not spent today is ADA available tomorrow, when priorities and conditions have clarified. A lower NCL is the better long-term posture, and 350M is already generous relative to demonstrated, accountable demand. The stake-weighted signal so far reflects this — SPOs have voted against by a margin exceeding forty to one, and DReps remain net negative.

Dracula DAO votes NO. The problem the 2026 cycle exposed is not an insufficient spending ceiling; it is the absence of a credible allocation mechanism beneath it. Treasury funds should be awarded as grants paid on completion of well-defined features — the ecosystem specifies what it wants built and pays once it exists and has been verified. It should not fund team operating budgets, roadmaps, or projected work, however that funding is scheduled or subdivided. A ceiling governs how much can leave the treasury; it says nothing about whether anything of value comes back. Until the community is paying for delivered features rather than financing intentions, a larger ceiling raises the cost of governance failure without improving the quality of what gets funded. Fix what the treasury buys before raising what it may spend; Dracula DAO will revisit the limit when there is evidence the limit — and not the process — is what binds.

NoGlobal Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transactionDecided epoch 647View rationaleExpired1mo ago

Vote: NO

This is a Treasury Withdrawal, "Global Order Book connect Cardano DeFi to increase transaction" (gov_action1cpn...4h586r), submitted June 30, 2026 with voting closing August 2, 2026. It requests 3,333,000 ADA — 3,300,000 ADA for delivery plus 33,000 ADA in administration fees — for Dano Finance to build four work packages over a 12-month window: a DeFi Kernel contract-metadata registry, a spot leverage order book, an American options protocol, and an SDK. No ADA burning is involved.

The proposal is better specified than much of what has come before it. It names concrete deliverables rather than a research direction, attaches measurable KPIs — a registry with at least two documented contracts, $1M rolling 30-day volume on each of the two trading protocols within 90 days of launch, an SDK with at least one external integration — and phases each work package through testnet, security review, and mainnet adoption. It carries return-of-funds language for unearned or surplus amounts, an administrator, and a requested amount that is modest against the treasury. The DeFi Kernel registry component is also the most defensible piece: shared contract metadata standards and a discovery SDK are genuine public goods that benefit builders who are not Dano Finance.

The structure is nonetheless a 12-month program budget for a single pre-selected team, not a grant paid on completed features. The return clauses are generic rather than structurally enforced — they describe an administrator process, not an escrow that releases only against verified delivery and returns the remainder automatically. No individuals are named; the team is a corporate identity with self-reported figures of roughly $18M TVL and 10,000+ transactions and no disclosed prior treasury track record. Two of the four work packages — a leveraged spot order book and an options market-making protocol — are Dano Finance's own commercial product line, and public funds would build private trading venues whose economics accrue to their operator. The KPIs measure trading volume, which is the easiest metric in DeFi to manufacture and among the weakest evidence of durable ecosystem value. DReps have so far voted approximately ₳3.06B against and ₳699M in favor.

Dracula DAO votes NO. Treasury funds should be awarded as grants paid on completion of well-defined features — the ecosystem specifies what it wants built and pays once it exists and has been verified. It should not finance a named team's twelve-month roadmap, and it should not underwrite the construction of leveraged trading products that compete with other Cardano venues receiving no such public backing. Dracula DAO's standing position is that it will not support treasury funds used for speculation unless the ecosystem benefit is compelling and the risk is low; leverage and options infrastructure, built by its future commercial operator on public money, does not clear that bar.

The DeFi Kernel registry and SDK are a different matter. Resubmitted on their own, as a defined public-good deliverable paid on verified completion rather than as a slice of a team's operating budget, that work would receive serious consideration from Dracula DAO.

YesBlockfrost's transformation to not-for-profitDecided epoch 646View rationaleExpired1mo ago

Vote: YES

This proposal (governance action 5439b614162543...9997#0) requests a one-time treasury grant of ₳9,832,979 (~$1.57M USD at the ~$0.16/ADA reference rate) to transition Blockfrost — today a private company's product — into a free, community-governed public good under an independent not-for-profit. The plan commits to a free, open public API across mainnet, preview, and preprod with no paid tier, a minimum 99% monthly uptime, a legal transfer of source code, trademarks, and domains into community stewardship, and an on-chain-elected community board, phased across Q3 2026 (architecture and public dashboard), Q4 2026 (board elected), and Q1 2027 (traffic migrated, IP legally transferred). Any unspent funds are returned to the Cardano Treasury.

Dracula DAO votes YES. Blockfrost is not optional tooling — it is load-bearing infrastructure that a large share of Cardano wallets, dApps, and builders query every day. Its current status as a single private company's product is itself a systemic risk: the ecosystem's most widely used API is a single point of failure controlled by one commercial entity, and that entity has already returned to the treasury and to Catalyst for funding more than once. Converting that dependency into a neutral, openly governed public good — with the source, trademarks, and domains irreversibly transferred into community stewardship and a community-elected board directing it — durably removes that single point of failure. This is foundational, long-term infrastructure of exactly the kind the DREP exists to support, and a free, no-paid-tier API directly lowers the cost of building on Cardano for every team that follows.

The value accrues to ADA holders, not to a private balance sheet. Rather than the ecosystem paying rent in perpetuity to a company it does not control, this transition puts a critical piece of Cardano's infrastructure into the hands of the people who depend on it and gives them governance over how it is run and funded. The commitment to a public usage dashboard, quarterly technical and budget reporting, a minimum 99% uptime SLA, and the return of unspent funds to the treasury reflects a level of transparency and accountability that a lump-sum request would not carry. The ₳9.8M is a one-time cost to acquire and open-source an asset the ecosystem will own outright — a fundamentally different proposition from an operating subsidy for a private venture.

Dracula DAO registers its standard concerns and does not let them override the vote. The funding is structured as a one-time transition grant to the incumbent team without competitive bidding, and while deliverables are staged by quarter, staged reporting is weaker than per-milestone smart-contract release with independent sign-off of the kind that secured the IO Hydra withdrawal; we would have preferred escrowed, completion-gated disbursement. The free-forever, no-revenue model also leaves the long-term operating cost of the service unresolved, and the withdrawal is made at a depressed ADA price. These are real, and Dracula DAO expects the incoming community board to treat a sustainable funding path — an endowment, usage-based revenue, or a defined route off treasury dependence — as a first-order priority, and to make good on the transparency commitments in this proposal. On balance, the strategic value of moving Cardano's most critical API into permanent community ownership outweighs these structural gaps, and Dracula DAO votes YES.

References:

NoEternl: Path to Sustainability - v2Decided epoch 645View rationaleEnacted2mo ago

Vote: NO

This is Eternl: Path to Sustainability - v2 (gov_action1lwu...lgmhse), a Treasury Withdrawal submitted June 16, 2026 with voting closing July 18, 2026. It requests 10,000,000 ADA over a 12-month horizon to sustain Eternl, a widely used non-custodial Cardano wallet, disbursed as 5,000,000 ADA on approval and a further 2,000,000 ADA and 3,000,000 ADA gated on observable evidence at milestones M1 and M2. It is administered by Intersect via the standardized Treasury Reserve / Project-Specific Smart Contract framework built by Sundae Labs, with a five-entity independent Oversight Committee verifying administrative actions. This v2 revises the expired 2026-2027 version by adding the clarification on audit-fund spending and oversight metrics that Constitutional Committee members requested in their vote rationales. No ADA burning is involved.

Eternl remains foundational user-facing infrastructure with a demonstrated delivery record under prior treasury disbursements, and this proposal answers the specific accountability gap that sank the prior version: the audit-spending and oversight-metric clarifications the CC asked for are now present, the disbursement runs through a standardized smart contract with milestone gating, and an independent five-member Oversight Committee sits over administration. On project merit, and on governance structure, this is a materially better-formed proposal than most treasury requests, and Dracula DAO recognizes the responsiveness.

Dracula DAO votes NO on grounds of treasury timing, consistent with our vote on the prior version dated June 14, 2026. That vote was explicit that our objection was timing, not merit, and that we would support a substantively similar proposal once market conditions improved. One month later the condition that drove that NO has not changed: ADA trades near multi-year lows, and approving a 10,000,000 ADA withdrawal at a cyclical price trough destroys treasury purchasing power — the same twelve months of Eternl operations funded after a price recovery would cost the treasury materially fewer tokens in real terms. Preserving the treasury's token base through a bear market is itself the ultra-long-term action; the treasury exists to be deployed across decades, not drawn down at its weakest point. The audit clarification, welcome as it is, does not touch this objection.

A secondary concern reinforces the NO. Half the request — 5,000,000 ADA — is front-loaded on approval, before any milestone delivery. Milestone-gating with independent sign-off on the remaining 5,000,000 ADA is a real improvement over a lump sum, but a 50% up-front tranche is far from Dracula DAO's standard that treasury funds follow delivered, verifiable work rather than pre-fund a single team's operating runway; there is no competitive bidding, and the up-front tranche is not delivery-gated. We would prefer a structure weighted toward completion-gated payments with a smaller or eliminated front-load. Dracula DAO reaffirms its standing commitment: we expect to vote YES on a substantively similar Eternl proposal once ADA prices recover, and we encourage resubmission at that point, ideally with more of the total gated on observable delivery. This is a position on treasury timing discipline, not on Eternl's work.

YesReimburse Ikigai Info Governance Action Deposit.Decided epoch 643View rationaleExpired2mo ago

Vote: YES

This is a Treasury Withdrawal (gov_action1654...7qtkhq), submitted June 9, 2026 with voting closing July 13, 2026, requesting 100,000 ADA to reimburse Ikigai Technologies for a governance-action deposit it can no longer recover. The deposit was trapped by a Cardano node bug that permitted an unregistered stake key to be used in a governance action, so the standard deposit-refund mechanism — which normally returns the 100,000 ADA on ratification or expiry — could not return the funds. The requested amount matches the standard deposit exactly, and the community has signalled since the Plomin hard fork that reimbursing this specific stranded deposit via a treasury withdrawal is the appropriate remedy.

Dracula DAO votes YES. This is not discretionary spending; it is remediation of a protocol failure. Cardano's governance deposit is designed to be fully refundable — that guarantee is what makes it a legitimate anti-spam bond rather than a fee. Ikigai, a long-standing Cardano builder, submitted a governance action in good faith, posted the required bond, and lost access to it solely because of a node-level defect, not through any error or bad faith of its own. When the protocol itself breaks a refund guarantee it made, making the affected party whole preserves the integrity of the deposit mechanism and the credibility of participating in governance at all. The amount is fixed and small — 100,000 ADA, roughly $26,000 at prevailing prices — the recipient and cause are clearly identified, and there is no ADA burning and no open-ended commitment.

The honest concerns are precedent and scope. A treasury reimbursement of a governance deposit must be understood as bounded strictly to funds stranded by a documented protocol bug — not as a general policy of socializing normally-refundable deposits, which would gut the deposit's anti-spam function by removing the submitter's skin in the game. This action reads as the narrow, one-time correction, but the DREP will oppose any future attempt to generalize it into routine deposit reimbursement absent a genuine protocol failure. It is also worth stating plainly that the cleaner long-term fix is at the ledger level, so that stranded deposits are recoverable directly rather than requiring a treasury draw; a treasury withdrawal is the practical remedy available today, not the ideal one.

Dracula DAO's treasury philosophy centers on funding delivered work, not operating budgets, and this action sits outside that frame entirely — it is neither a grant nor a budget but a correction of a bond wrongly withheld by the system. Judged on fairness, low risk, and the health of the governance process, it clears the bar. Dracula DAO supports reimbursing Ikigai's trapped 100,000 ADA deposit and votes YES.

YesReforming Treasury GovernanceDecided epoch 643View rationaleClosed2mo ago

Vote: YES

This is a non-binding Info Action titled "Reforming Treasury Governance" (gov_action1t5a...3z2c22), submitted on June 9, 2026 with voting closing July 13, 2026. It requests no funds and changes no protocol parameter. It diagnoses treasury governance as being in a poor state — a persistent funding impasse, and a treasury process that is pivotal to Cardano's stability and growth yet only indirectly addressed and barely supported by the existing governance system — and it calls on the community to collaborate on reforming that process, outlining guardrails for strategic direction that would require further refinement and eventual amendments to the current process and the Constitution.

Dracula DAO votes YES. The diagnosis is correct and overdue. The 2026 cycle made the dysfunction concrete: 69 proposals requesting roughly 331.6M ADA against a Net Change Limit debated between 350M and 500M, an IOG research roadmap that drew opposition from a large majority of DReps, and a Cardano Summit that won a majority but died for lack of a stake-weighted supermajority. That is not a healthy allocation process; it is a series of unstructured, high-stakes standoffs. Treasury governance today decides who gets paid before it has decided what should be built, and it does so with almost no machinery for reconciling competing claims. An Info Action that names this problem and opens a structured reform track carries essentially zero risk — no ADA leaves the treasury, no parameter moves, no ADA is burned — and real option value in shaping what comes next. Supporting the direction costs nothing and forfeits nothing.

The honest limitation is that this is a signal, not a solution. An Info Action "sketches basic ideas"; it commits no one to anything, and its guardrails are stated at a level of generality that could later be filled in well or badly. A YES here is a vote for the conversation, not a blank endorsement of whatever emerges from it. Dracula DAO will judge every concrete instrument that follows — constitutional amendments, revised budget frameworks, new NCL structures — on its specific merits, and will oppose any "reform" that concentrates discretionary spending authority, weakens on-chain DRep ratification, or substitutes a standing executive's judgment for verifiable delivery.

Dracula DAO enters this reform process with a specific position already on record. Treasury funds should be allocated as grants paid on completion of well-defined features — not as pre-funded team operating budgets. The DREP's proper role is to vote on what to build, while who gets paid and how much is pushed to competitive, sprint-based bidding: work broken into short stories that teams bid on, funded per sprint through a smart contract that pays out only on signed-off delivery and returns undelivered funds to the treasury. That model directly answers the two failures this action identifies — it breaks the funding impasse by separating feature prioritization from team financing, and it gives treasury governance the direct, accountable support the current system lacks. Milestone-gating with independent sign-off is a partial approximation of this, better than a lump sum but short of true competitive per-sprint bidding. We vote YES to reform treasury governance, and we will press for reform of this shape.

YesReduce the committeeMinSize parameter from 7 to 5Decided epoch 643View rationaleEnacted2mo ago

Vote: YES

This governance action is a protocol-parameter change that reduces committeeMinSize from 7 to 5. Submitted by Intersect on June 5, 2026 on behalf of the Civics Committee and the Technical Steering Committee, with the recommendation of the Parameter Committee, it lowers the minimum number of active Constitutional Committee members required for the committee to ratify governance actions. It does not shrink the Constitutional Committee itself and does not change the committee's vote threshold: the intent is to continue seating a full seven-member committee through regular elections while creating an operational buffer against vacancies. No ADA is requested and no treasury funds are involved.

Vampyre Fund votes YES.

This is foundational governance infrastructure, and the risk it addresses is not hypothetical. When the Cardano Atlantic Council retired effective November 25, 2025, the Constitutional Committee fell below its required membership and Cardano experienced its first governance shutdown: CC-dependent actions — including treasury withdrawals and protocol-parameter changes that require concurrent majorities from DReps and the committee — could not be ratified until the committee was replenished, even where DReps approved them. A governance system that can be paralyzed by a single resignation, term expiration, or vacancy is structurally fragile. Reducing the functional quorum to five while continuing to target a full seven seats is a conservative, sensible hardening of the mechanism. Vampyre Fund takes an ultra long-term view of Cardano's institutions, and resilience of the ratification process is exactly the kind of durable, non-tactical improvement that view favors.

The honest trade-off is that a lower floor allows governance to proceed on a smaller active base, which modestly reduces the redundancy of the constitutional safeguard: five members rather than seven would suffice to keep CC-dependent actions moving. This deserves acknowledgment rather than dismissal. It is materially mitigated by three facts — the committee's vote threshold is unchanged, the standing intention remains a fully seated seven-member committee, and the alternative on display in late 2025 was not a stronger safeguard but a complete stall. A committee that cannot act is not a safer committee; it is an absent one. Five active members remains a substantial and credible quorum.

Vampyre Fund supports this change as a matter of operational resilience, not as a step toward a smaller committee. We would oppose any subsequent action that used this lower floor as cover to leave seats unfilled or to erode the committee's vote threshold, and we will continue to weight the full and prompt seating of the Constitutional Committee as a governance priority.

YesHard Fork to Protocol Version 11 ('van Rossem' Hard Fork)Decided epoch 644View rationaleEnacted2mo ago

Vote: YES

This governance action initiates a hard fork to Protocol Version 11, named the 'van Rossem' hard fork in honour of Max van Rossem, a Cardano community member, developer, SPO, DRep, and Constitutional Convention delegate who passed away in 2025. The upgrade is an intra-era hard fork — no new ledger era, no treasury withdrawal, no ADA requested. It delivers five new Plutus CIPs: CIP-138 (Array type), CIP-153 (MaryEraValue type), CIP-109 (modular exponentiation), CIP-132 (dropList), and CIP-133 (multi-scalar multiplication over BLS12-381). The action was submitted by the Intersect Hard Fork Working Group in June 2026 and requires ratification by DReps, the Constitutional Committee, and SPOs, with an activation threshold requiring 85% of active block-producing stake to run compatible nodes before the fork executes.

Vampyre Fund votes YES.

This is foundational protocol infrastructure in its purest form. The five new Plutus primitives materially expand what builders can accomplish on-chain: modular exponentiation and BLS12-381 multi-scalar multiplication are prerequisites for practical zero-knowledge proof systems; the Array and dropList builtins improve execution efficiency and reduce script costs; MaryEraValue optimises multi-asset handling. These are not features that generate marketing impressions over a single event cycle — they are the substrate on which the next generation of Cardano applications will be built. Vampyre Fund exists to support exactly this kind of work.

The governance structure of this hard fork merits specific recognition. This is the first hard fork in Cardano's history to be initiated through the Voltaire on-chain governance framework rather than by IOG acting unilaterally. The 85% SPO node-readiness threshold before activation is a meaningful safety mechanism — it prevents chain fragmentation and ensures the upgrade executes only when the network is genuinely prepared. Preview testnet forked successfully on May 8, 2026. DRep ratification reached 68.57% of active stake. The Constitutional Committee provided 5-of-7 sign-off. These are the governance processes Cardano has been building toward, and they are working as designed.

Vampyre Fund casts this YES vote also as an SPO. The VAMP stake pool has upgraded to the required node version and voted YES in the SPO track. We encourage all remaining SPOs who have not yet upgraded to do so. The 85% threshold exists to protect the network; crossing it promptly benefits every participant in the ecosystem.

NoRare Evo and Dev Gov Day 2026: Cardano Title SponsorshipDecided epoch 640View rationaleExpired2mo ago

Vote: NO

This proposal requests treasury funds for Cardano to serve as title sponsor of Rare Evo 2026, a blockchain and AI conference held in Las Vegas, alongside a co-located Dev Gov Day event. The proposal is a direct marketing and event spend with no infrastructure deliverable, no treasury repayment, and no on-chain accountability mechanism tied to outcomes.

Vampyre Fund votes NO.

The Vampyre Fund DREP does not support treasury funds being used for short-term marketing efforts. A conference title sponsorship is precisely that — a brand spend whose value is measured in impressions and attendee counts over a single event cycle. It does not build infrastructure, does not return value to the treasury, and does not compound over time. The 6.89% DRep support this proposal has received as of June 2026 reflects broad community alignment with this assessment.

The inclusion of a Dev Gov Day component does not change this judgment. Governance education and developer outreach are worthwhile goals, but they do not require treasury-funded conference sponsorship to achieve. Community-led governance events have historically operated without top-tier sponsorship budgets. Bundling a developer day with a Las Vegas conference sponsorship does not transform the proposal into infrastructure spending.

Vampyre Fund's position is consistent: treasury funds should be reserved for long-term foundational work. Event sponsorships, regardless of the event's quality or the sincerity of the organizers, are not the appropriate use of ADA held in trust for the long-term benefit of the Cardano ecosystem.

YesTweag Core Cardano Infrastructure: Treasury Withdrawal 2026–2027Decided epoch 641View rationaleEnacted2mo ago

Vote: YES

This proposal requests ₳18,263,496 (~$4.57M USD) for Tweag by Modus Create to deliver three infrastructure work packages in 2026–2027: Peras v1 mainnet deployment (reducing finality from ~12 minutes to ~2 minutes), History Expiry (enabling partial-history nodes for sustainable SPO economics as throughput scales), and Conformance Testing for Peras and Leios protocols. Intersect administers the proposal; disbursement is managed via Treasury Reserve Smart Contracts with multi-signature authorization, overseen by a five-member committee including Sundae Labs, Cardano Foundation, Dquadrant, Xerberus, and NMKR.

Vampyre Fund votes YES.

This proposal sits at the core of what Vampyre Fund exists to support: foundational long-term protocol infrastructure. Peras faster finality is a prerequisite for Cardano to compete as a serious DeFi and settlement layer. History Expiry addresses a structural economic problem for stake pool operators that will worsen as throughput increases under Leios. These are not features that produce marketing impressions or short-term token price movement — they are the infrastructure on which the next decade of Cardano activity depends.

The accountability structure is meaningfully stronger than most treasury proposals Vampyre Fund has reviewed. Treasury Reserve Smart Contracts with multi-signature authorization provide on-chain disbursement controls. Intersect's role as administrator adds a credible third-party layer. The five-member oversight committee represents genuine diversity of ecosystem stakeholders. Tweag by Modus Create brings deep Haskell and Cardano protocol credentials.

We note two concerns without letting them override the vote. First, there is no competitive bidding for this work — Tweag is pre-selected. Vampyre Fund continues to believe the long-term health of the ecosystem requires open, competitive team selection for funded work. We would prefer a future model where Intersect issues open RFPs and the community selects among competing proposals. Second, ₳18.26M is a material withdrawal at a time when ADA price is depressed; the real-cost burden on the treasury is elevated relative to what this work would cost if funded at a higher ADA price. Both concerns are structural and apply across the 2026 budget process broadly. They are not unique to Tweag, and they do not outweigh the merits of funding infrastructure that Cardano genuinely needs.

NoCardano Critical Integrations V2Decided epoch 639View rationaleEnacted2mo ago

Vote: NO

Critical Integrations V2 requests approximately 23 million ADA to fund Year 2 of an integrations program that delivered a published V1 closure report. Native L1 Fireblocks integration and ongoing maintenance of prior integrations are credible institutional-grade infrastructure work. On project merit, the program is the kind of long-horizon infrastructure investment Vampyre Fund generally supports.

Vampyre Fund votes NO on grounds of treasury timing.

23 million ADA is a significant withdrawal in absolute terms, and at present ADA prices it represents real terms value destruction relative to executing the same scope after market recovery. Approving multi-million-ADA treasury draws during cyclical price lows monetizes the treasury at its weakest point and undermines the long-term capital base the ecosystem will need for far larger commitments in subsequent cycles.

Separately, we continue to hold that treasury funds should not function as multi-year team operating budgets. Year 2 renewals of this size, even with a delivered V1, reinforce a continuous-disbursement model rather than a competitive, milestone-bid model in which work units are funded as completed. We would prefer to see V2 broken into smaller tranches with independent renewal votes tied to specific delivered integrations.

We encourage resubmission, either at a smaller scope or after market conditions improve, and we will reassess on its own merits at that time.

No5am.earth Trust Layer Targeting Vision 2030 KPIsDecided epoch 640View rationaleEnacted2mo ago

Vote: NO

5am.earth proposes a 10 million ADA treasury withdrawal to build a Cardano-anchored trust layer for agricultural supply chains across India, Cambodia, and Kenya. The proposal is administered through Intersect's standardized Treasury Reserve Smart Contract framework developed by Sundae Labs, with disbursement gated by an independent five-entity Oversight Committee. The administrative structure is among the strongest we have seen — it is precisely the milestone-gated, externally-overseen model Vampyre Fund has called for, and we want to commend the proposing team for it. The underlying work — establishing verifiable real-world data anchored on Cardano — is also aligned with the long-term utility vision we support.

Vampyre Fund votes NO on grounds of treasury timing.

At current ADA prices, a 10 million ADA withdrawal represents an avoidable cost in real terms. Treasury preservation during depressed market conditions is itself a long-term position: the treasury's purchasing power compounds when we resist drawing it down at cyclical lows. We would rather fund well-structured proposals after price recovery than approve a wave of multi-million-ADA disbursements at present valuations.

This vote is not a judgment on 5am.earth, its team, or its administrative framework, all of which we view favorably. We encourage resubmission once market conditions support deployment, and Vampyre Fund expects to support a substantively similar proposal at that time.

NoEternl: Path to Sustainability (2026-2027)Decided epoch 638View rationaleExpired2mo ago

Vote: NO

Eternl is foundational user-facing infrastructure. A reliable non-custodial wallet covering payments, staking, governance, and DApp interaction is exactly the kind of work the ecosystem depends on, and the team has a delivery record under prior treasury disbursements. On project merit, this proposal is the type of work Vampyre Fund supports.

Vampyre Fund votes NO on grounds of timing, not merit.

ADA's market price is presently depressed. Funding any multi-million-ADA treasury withdrawal under these conditions destroys treasury purchasing power: the same deliverable funded after price recovery costs the treasury materially fewer tokens in real terms. Treasury preservation under bear-market conditions is itself a long-term action — the treasury exists to be deployed across decades, not to be drawn down at cyclical lows.

We encourage Eternl to resubmit, or to extend operations through alternative bridging arrangements, with the expectation that Vampyre Fund will vote YES on a substantively similar proposal once market conditions improve. This vote is a position on treasury timing discipline, not on Eternl's work.

NoRevised Cardano Summit 2026 SingaporeDecided epoch 634View rationaleExpired3mo ago

Vote: NO

  • The revision is genuinely improved over the rejected original (14M ADA → 7.8M ADA, decoupled from TOKEN2049, better oversight)
  • Core objection: $450K revenue against $2.26M budget — treasury absorbs ~80% with no repayment obligation
  • Cardano Foundation's own contribution is only $380K; the organizer asks far more from the treasury than it contributes itself
  • A one-time event produces no compounding infrastructure value — 7.8M ADA at current prices should go to work that persists
  • Encourages resubmission with treasury as a minority funder and a revenue-share or repayment structure
NoPogun: Capital Without CompromiseDecided epoch 633View rationaleExpired3mo ago

Vote: NO

Pogun addresses a genuine strategic need. A non-custodial Bitcoin credit market and trust-minimized bridge would give Cardano access to the largest pool of idle capital in crypto. The technical design is sound: an oracle-free bilateral lending protocol avoids the failure modes that have plagued conventional DeFi lending, and the 1-of-N BitVM bridge security model is theoretically robust. The repayment structure — 20% of earnings returned to the treasury until full repayment, then 5% in perpetuity — is the most treasury-positive funding structure we have seen from IO to date.

Despite these strengths, Vampyre Fund votes NO.

Our objection is structural, not technical. Vampyre Fund believes treasury funds must not be used as team operating budgets. The correct model is to separate features from budgets: DREPs vote on what to build, not who to pay. Funding should be released incrementally, gated on delivered work, with teams bidding competitively for each unit of work. Pogun, as submitted, asks the treasury to pre-fund IO's team roadmap for the year. There is no competitive bidding, no sprint-based accountability, and no on-chain enforcement of feature delivery before disbursement.

This is not a judgment on Pogun's merit as a project. Bitcoin DeFi infrastructure on Cardano is worth building. But the mechanism matters. Voting YES here reinforces a budget process that Vampyre Fund believes is fundamentally broken and that concentrates treasury disbursements in incumbent teams rather than creating an open, competitive, and accountable development ecosystem.

We encourage IO to resubmit Pogun as a feature prioritization request under a sprint-based funding model, and we commit to voting YES on such a resubmission if the delivery structure meets the standard described in our published governance blog.

NoIO & VacuumLabs: Enhancing Plutus - Performance, Correctness, and UsabilityDecided epoch 634View rationaleEnacted4mo ago

IO has been funded by a significant amount of premine tokens.

NoIO: Cardano High Assurance Technical CollaborationDecided epoch 634View rationaleEnacted4mo ago

IO has been funded by a significant amount of premine tokens.

NoIO & Midgard Labs: L2 Scalability InitiativeDecided epoch 633View rationaleExpired4mo ago

IO has been funded by a significant amount of premine tokens.

NoIO & Ensurable Systems: Cardano Maintenance InitiativeDecided epoch 634View rationaleEnacted4mo ago

IO has been funded by a significant amount of premine tokens.

NoIO: Consensus InitiativeDecided epoch 634View rationaleEnacted4mo ago

IO has been funded by a significant amount of premine tokens.

NoIO: Cardano UpgradesDecided epoch 634revotedView rationaleEnacted4mo ago

IO has been funded by a significant amount of premine tokens.

Earlier votes

No4mo agoSuperseded

IO has been funded by a significant amount of premine tokens.

NoIO: Developer Experience InitiativeDecided epoch 634View rationaleEnacted4mo ago

IO has been funded by a significant amount of premine tokens.

YesCardano Critical Integrations BudgetDecided epoch 604View rationaleClosed9mo ago

This infrastructure is needed and it's great to see the entities working together.

YesBudget: ₳5M Loan for Cardano's Global Listing Expansion - Powered by SnekDecided epoch 587View rationaleClosed1y ago

This is an experimental loan, which is innovative and a creative potential use for Cardano treasury funds. We do not in general support treasury funds used directly for budgets and believe this is an innovative solution that will bring value to the ecosystem.

YesWithdraw ₳99,600 for BloxBean Java Tools Maintenance and EnhancementDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳104,347 for MLabs Research towards Tooling for Elliptical Curves...Decided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳750,000 for Cardano Product Committee: Community-driven 2030 Carda...Decided epoch 578View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳314,800 for PyCardano administered by IntersectDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳199,911 for OpShin - Python Smart Contracts for CardanoDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳26,840,000 for Input Output Research (IOR): Cardano Vision - Wor...Decided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳4,000,000 for Expanding Stablecoin / Cardano Native Asset Support...Decided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳3,000,000 for High-yield RWA Asset for Cardano: Tokenized Real EstateDecided epoch 577View rationaleExpired1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳889,500 for Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions at ExhibitionsDecided epoch 578View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

NoWithdraw ₳3,126,000 for Ecosystem Exchange Listing and Market Making service...Decided epoch 578View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳1,500,000 for Complement Catalyst: Extended Quadratic Funding---Zer...Decided epoch 577View rationaleExpired1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

NoWithdraw ₳12,000,000 for Cardano Builder DAO administered by IntersectDecided epoch 577View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳6,000,000 for Unveiling the First Unified Global Events Marketing S...Decided epoch 577View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳6,000,000 for Cardano Summit 2025 and regional tech eventsDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

NoWithdraw ₳69,459,000 for Catalyst 2025 Proposal by Input Output: Advancing De...Decided epoch 575View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳592,780 for Beyond Minimum Viable Governance: Iteratively Improvin....Decided epoch 578View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳15,750,000 for a MBO for the Cardano ecosystem: IntersectDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳212,000 for AdaStat.net Cardano blockchain explorerDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳605,000 for A free Native Asset CDN for Cardano DevelopersDecided epoch 578View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳266,667 for Cexplorer.io -- Developer-Focused Blockchain Explorer...Decided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳657,692 for Scalus - DApps Development PlatformDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳583,000 for Eternl Maintenance administered by IntersectDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳700,000 for ZK Bridge administered by IntersectDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

NoWithdraw ₳11,070,323 for TWEAG's Proposals for multiple core budget project...Decided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳243,478 for MLabs Core Tool Maintenance & Enhancement: PlutarchDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳578,571 for Gerolamo - Cardano node in typescriptDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳5,885,000 for OSC Budget Proposal - Paid Open Source Model...Decided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

NoWithdraw ₳600,000 for Complete Web3 developer stack to make Cardano the smart...Decided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳300,000 for Ledger App Rewrite administered by IntersectDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳220,914 for Dolos: Sustaining a Lightweight Cardano Data NodeDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳1,161,000 for zkFold ZK Rollup administered by IntersectDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳130,903 for Lucid Evolution Maintenance administered by IntersectDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳220,914 for UTxO RPC: Sustaining Cardano Blockchain IntegrationDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳220,914 for Pallas: Sustaining Critical Rust Tooling for CardanoDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳424,800 for Hardware Wallets Maintenance administered by IntersectDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

AbstainWithdraw ₳1,300,000 for Blockfrost Platform community budget proposalDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

AbstainWithdraw ₳96,817,080 for 2025 Input Output Engineering Core Development ProposalDecided epoch 575View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳2,162,096 for Midgard - Optimistic Rollups administered by IntersectDecided epoch 575View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

YesWithdraw ₳45,217 for MLabs Core Tool Maintenance & Enhancement: Cardano.nixDecided epoch 576View rationaleEnacted1y ago

Treasury withdrawals

Software Development Proposals:
Development budgets should not be funded from the treasury. Instead, the treasury should be used to incentivize feature completion through grants. The treasury should not operate as a venture capital fund or to fund ongoing development budgets. It should be results oriented and decoupled from budgeting. Dracula DAO Deep will make exceptions this round for projects that deliver specific, high value features or results at a reasonable ask amount.

Marketing Proposals:
Marketing budgets are the best way to fund these types of efforts. Judgement should be used based on the ask amount and value proposition.

Research Proposals:
Research budgets should be evaluated based on the track record of the team being funded, the value proposition and whether the results are released to the public.

DAO Funding:
DraculaDAO believes DAOs should find other ways to support operations other than public treasury funds.

Bitcoin:
Dracula DAO Deep is against purchasing Bitcoin with treasury funds, and are generally not in favor of a tight Bitcoin / Cardano partnership. Bitcoin DeFi is ok as long as the value proposition remains with Cardano. Cardano is already Bitcoin++ and treasury funds should not be used to encourage or sustain BTC energy waste and outdated consensus model.

Yes - MLabs Core Tool Maintenance. Ask is reasonable.
Yes - Midgard Optimistic Rollups. This is urgently needed as an L2 solution for Cardano and the ask is reasonable.
Yes - Hardware Wallets Maintenance. This is necessary and ask is reasonable.
Yes - Pallas Rust Tooling. Core tooling used by many projects and ask is reasonable for the specific deliverable.
Yes - UTxO RPC
Yes - Lucid Evolution Maintenance
Yes - zkFold ZK Rollup
Yes - Dolos. Ask is reasonable with specific deliverable.
Yes - Ledger App rewrite
Yes - Paid Open Source Model. This looks like a nice way to take the VC function out of the treasury and start towards incentivizing projects through features and benefits like bug bounties. Willing to take a chance on this, but will vote no in the future if results are disappointing.
Yes - Gerolamo node in typescript
Yes - MLabs Core Tools: Plutarch. Ask is reasonable
Yes - ZK Bridge
Yes - Eternal maintenance
Yes - Scalus Development Platform
Yes - Cexplorer.io
Yes - Native Asset CDN
Yes - Adastat.net
Yes - Intersect MBO. DraculaDAO does not like the high ask amount and the budgeting approach, but for Intersect MBO there may not be a better way like there is with software development. Therefore DraculaDAO supports this proposal, realizing this possibly breaks with the general guidelines DraculaDAO described above.
Yes - Beyond Minimum Viable Governance. Focused feature set and reasonable ask. IOHK should use this approach for all its teams.
Yes - Cardano Summit
Yes - Unified Global Events Marketing
Yes - Quadratic Funding. Reasonable ask for a specific feature.
Yes - Cardano Ecosystem Pavilions
Yes - High-yield RWA Asset. Direct communication with this vendor increased our faith in this project and have changed our stance on this.
Yes - Expanding Stablecoin / Native Asset Support. This was marginal in terms of ask amount and number of features grouped together.
Yes - OpShin
Yes - PyCardano
Yes - Cardano Product Committee
Yes - BloxBean Java Tools
Yes - Input Output Research
Yes - MLabs Research

Abstain - Input Output Core Development. This is simply a warning shot as DraculaDAO expects this proposal will pass. We are generally in favor of the initiatives and features being delivered by IOHK, but believe the ask is too high as a single budget line item and do not want to set a precedent of another ask of similar magnitude for the next budget cycle. Instead, IOHK should divide its deliverables into features and ask the treasury for grant incentives delivered on completion of the each feature (see Beyond Minimum Viable Governance as what we see as a good example). We are not in favor of such a large withdrawal encompassing such a large number of features. In general we do not support using the treasury for budget line items as mentioned in the introduction to this rationale.
Abstain - Blockfrost Community Budget. We support Blockfrost and operate an icebreaker node. There are no specific features mentioned, just an ongoing budget line item, which we do not support. We will support Blockfrost in other ways.

No - Web3 developer stack for Bitcoin integration. DraculaDAO does not support a tight integration with Bitcoin.
No - TWEAG Proposals. We see value there but the ask is too large and too many deliverables bundled together.
No - Catalyst 2025. Ask is too large as a single budget request.
No - Cardano Builder DAO. Treasury should not be used to incentivize features, not fund ongoing budgets for software development or DAOs.
No - Market making should have other ways to fund operations.

NoTempo for Cardono Governance - Maintenance & Development Budget for 2025Decided epoch 576View rationaleClosed1y ago

Tempo is a good tool and needs UI work, however, the ask amount is overpriced for a 6 month operating budget. We run relay nodes, preview and preprod testnet nodes plus a midnight node for a small percentage of that. We also believe in general that development should be incentivized through the treasury, not have the entire budget come from the treasury.

NoCardano Blockchain Ecosystem Budget - 275M ada Administered by IntersectDecided epoch 564View rationaleClosed1y ago

The budget process itself is flawed. Features need to be decoupled from budget amounts using an Agile approach as described here: https://github.com/Dracula-DAO/cardano-drep/blob/main/blog/2025/2025-04-24.md

Yes2025 Cardano NCLDecided epoch 561View rationaleClosed1y ago

Dracula DAO strongly supports a conservative approach to budgeting and the lower NCL is better for the ecosystem long-term. ADA not spent today is ADA available tomorrow when priorities and conditions change. In general we also believe the treasury should provide funding in the form of incentive grants awarded upon project completion, and not a project's entire operating budget.

No2025 Net Change LimitDecided epoch 554View rationaleClosed1y ago

We voted 'yes' on the 300M Net Change Limit proposal and are choosing to support the lower limit over the higher limit because that represents the more conservative approach.

YesSet 2025 Net Change Limit of 300M ADA, 2026 Net Change Limit of 250M ADADecided epoch 553View rationaleClosed1y ago

We believe there needs to be a cap in place, even if it gets changed later. Setting this cap at the projected inflow ensures the treasury will not be depleted while the community debates a longer-term or more refined approach. Therefore, we support this proposal.

YesDefining the Cardano Vision and Roadmap for 2025 and beyondDecided epoch 549View rationaleClosed1y ago

Dracula DAO is generally in favor of most of the items in this roadmap and we respect the effort being put in by the Intersect Product Committee. We believe Leios, Hydra, Midgard and developer tools / experience are items that definitely belong on the near-term roadmap.

The roadmap as a whole is hard to distill down into a simple Yes / No vote, especially without any budgets and timelines. However, since this is simply a non-binding info action we are choosing to vote "Yes" to indicate to the governance community our general support of the roadmap as presented.

On-chain profile details

DRep ID
drep1ygs9...3s6qmu3p
Payment address
addr1q8h8...5srh77p0
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On-chain data as of 4d ago