Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget
220 DReps voted · 88 with a rationale · 10 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes584.2M ₳Rationale
Summary
Yoroi DRep votes YES on the governance action to fund Stablecoin Liquidity Fund (50M ADA).
Rationale
Yoroi believes that deeper and more reliable stablecoin liquidity will strengthen the reliability of DeFi protocols on Cardano and making the ecosystem more dependable for both new users and long-term participants
Transparency matters. With a tDAO and dRep oversight, plus regular audits and open reporting, this fund gives the community clear visibility and control.
Instead of spreading liquidity too thin, Yoroi values the focus on a few protocols per category, which creates a bigger impact and helps Cardano compete more effectively.
Conclusion
Yoroi supports this initiative as a practical and timely step to strengthen DeFi on Cardano, making it more accessible, trustworthy, and impactful for the community.
- Yes435.8M ₳Rationale
Supporting liquidity provision may not be a magic bullet that will dramatically improve the ecosystem on its own, and I recognize that various concerns have been raised by certain communities. However, I believe that for now, the benefits likely outweigh the various disadvantages analyzed by the community, and therefore I am voting YES.
As a DeFi user myself, there have been many situations where I would have executed on-chain transactions if liquidity had been higher than it is now.
As tentatively stated in the Cardano Vision 2030 (draft), if we are to expect 250,000 transactions per day as an ecosystem, lack of liquidity is certainly an obstacle.
Of course, the requested amount is not small, so I will recheck the rationale for other DRep's NO votes during the governance action period and reevaluate my vote. Specifically, I plan to review the reasons for voting NO submitted by DRep as of October 6th. I plan to review the NO voting grounds submitted by DRep by October 6th after October 7th.
流動性供給のサポートは、それ単独でエコシステムを劇的に改善する魔法の薬ではないかもしれませんし一定のコミュニティにより様々な懸念が提起されていることを認識していますが、今のところ、コミュニティに分析されている様々なデメリット以上にメリットが上回りる可能性が高いと考えているため、YESを投票します。
私自身、Defiユーザーの一人として、仮に流動性がより現状より高かったらオンチェーントランザクションを実行したと思える場面は何度もありました。
Cardano Vision2030（ドラフト）にも暫定的に記載されているように、エコシステムとして1日25万のトランザクションを期待したい場合、流動性不足は確かに障害の１つです。
もちろん、要求金額は少なくないため、他のDRepのNOの投票の根拠をガバナンスアクション期間中に再度確認し、自身の投票を再検証する予定です。 具体的には10月7日以降、DRepが10月6日までに提出した反対票の根拠を検討する予定です。
- Yes293M ₳Rationale
Summary
EMURGO as DRep votes YES on the governance action titled Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget.Rationale
EMURGO supports this proposal as we believe it directly strengthens the foundations of Cardano’s decentralized finance ecosystem. Deep, reliable liquidity, especially in fiat-backed stablecoins, is critical for onboarding new users, enabling developers, and ensuring that DeFi protocols can scale sustainably.This proposal introduces a balanced model: revenue generation for the treasury through protocol deployment, legal structures to safeguard community funds, and transparent oversight via the tDAO with dRep participation. Importantly, it creates public goods such as open-source governance contracts and legal frameworks that will benefit future initiatives beyond this single fund.
The mechanism to minimize ADA price impact through OTC deals and gradual liquidation demonstrates responsibility and foresight. By seeding liquidity now, Cardano positions itself to attract professional market makers, spur innovation, and increase long-term adoption.
Conclusion
EMURGO believes this initiative is well-structured, constitutionally compliant, and crucial for Cardano’s growth trajectory. As one of the interim committee members, EMURGO is committed to ensuring this fund is administered responsibly, transparently, and always in the best interest of the community.
- Yes254.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes222.9M ₳Rationale
TL;DR: EDC voted YES on gov_action1u4jrcvlkppjzuv5j9z5ksacwtvv77h6glu0knpcjut8gvjjfu0cqqt3alsy.
This info action was discussed internally quite extensively and only narrowly received a YES vote.
To keep it brief, the main concerns were:
Adding this small amount of liquidity will likely not significantly improve DeFi activity on Cardano. Only easily accessible minting of stablecoins will meaningfully enhance liquidity once the ADA price rises and users shift from ADA into stablecoins.
It remains unclear how much actual work the board members will contribute to this effort.
A 5-of-9 multisig setup is not sufficiently secure. If the board members are expected to actively manage substantial funds, a 7-of-9 configuration would be preferable — 50 M ADA is a strong incentive target.
Establishing such a structure could lead to centralization in decision-making over which protocols “win” or “lose” on Cardano.
Nevertheless, the majority felt that the potential positive impact justified giving this initiative a chance.
- Abstain174.6M ₳Rationale
while I support this project directionally, I'm abstaining as this is not a technical proposal (so I'm not the best expert on this topic)
However, here are my thoughts:
there are two types of parties you might care to onboard with this:
- Whales (ex: large entities) who are looking to deploy who are just looking for good yield (don't necessarily care about Cardano)
- Many small people (ex: everyday users) who are doing nothing with their ADA, and you want them to start using DeFi
If the target audience is (1), my question is: will $50m in liquidity really convince them to onboard onto ADA? How do we know if it's true or not? Have we talked to any of these larger entities, and have they committed to deploying capital onto ADA if we get this 50m? I know of entities that commit to deploying capitals to various chains as long as we meet some set of metrics they'd like to see. If we can't get the same thing for ADA, then low liquidity was not the blocker for them. If that's the case, 50m on liquidity is a waste of money because we don't have the product-market fit that companies are looking for in the first place
If the target audience is (2), my question is: why are we doing this DeFi liquidity management solution, when other approaches like Arbitrum which are less managed have had good success in attracting TVL? Crypto is filled with failed liquidity incentives so it's not a clear win, but instead of picking winners and losers, it may be better to do like Arbitrum and incentivize liquidity across the board (I'm not an expert on this topic though)
- Yes165.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes120.2M ₳Rationale
Cardano Foundation votes YES - at this time. We do support the strategic goal of enhancing DeFi liquidity, but we have requirements that must be satisfied for us to vote YES on any treasury withdrawal. In particular, the proposal must address concerns around governance, security, and operations.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
We commend the proposing team for their effort and for tackling the challenge of stablecoin liquidity on Cardano. The initiative to establish a structured, on-chain governance process for liquidity deployment is very welcome and lines up with our own efforts. Our YES vote is a recognition of these facts and a reflection of the willingness by the proposers to collaborate on solving the remaining practical challenges.
However, to proceed successfully from the proposal stage to withdrawals, a treasury request of this magnitude that also establishes new governance mechanisms, must provide satisfactory answers on all key challenges. In its current form, the proposal does not yet do this. We provide an overview of our requirements and recommendations below.
Recommendations for a Revised Proposal
Our support for any future treasury withdrawal is contingent upon the proposing team addressing the key remaining challenges. We have separated these into requirements for our future support and an additional set of recommendations.
Minimal Requirements
The following are the key challenges the team must provide satisfactory answers for in the subsequent treasury withdrawal requests. For the Phase 2 requirements, we may add additional or further clarify existing requirements subsequent to Phase 1 results.
For the Phase 1 Treasury Withdrawal Request - 500k ada:
- Legal and Operational Structure: The proposal must detail the legal structure and jurisdiction that will be used as a legal nexus for the committee and associated governance mechanisms and provide a rationale for the choices made.
- Conflict of Interest Policy: A conflict of interest policy for committee members and any other decision makers, outlining consequences for non-disclosure.
- Selection Framework: The specific, detailed criteria for evaluating and selecting stablecoins, DeFi protocols, and DEXs, including any limitations on such selections, must be published before any treasury withdrawals are submitted. The protocol application (RFP) process must also require applicants to disclose any relationships with committee members. If a conflict of interest (COI) is discovered after the fact, we expect the affected protocol to be blacklisted and the involved committee member to be removed from the committee.
- Clarification of Metrics: The metrics currently provided to measure success and manage community expectations (e.g. "4% Annual Returns") must be clarified (e.g. to distinguish between portfolio APY and the actual distribution yield to the treasury). This includes the intended improvements to the user experience in Cardano DeFi. Additionally a clear formula for calculating monthly revenue must be provided.
- Asset Management Strategy Principles: An outline of the overall approach to the asset management lifecycle for the fund.
For the Phase 2 Treasury Withdrawal Request - 49.5M ada:
- Legal and Operational Structure: The governance and contractual framework for the legal structure and its constituent components (e.g. board, committee(s), other) must be fully developed and publicly available. This includes but is not necessarily limited to e.g. articles of association, organisational regulations, other internal policies and regulations (insofar as they are not security relevant; e.g. custody setup), etc.
- Projections and Simulations: Suitable projections and simulations that map out the likely outcomes of the liquidity injections for the Cardano ecosystem and by extension provide a justification for the withdrawal amount.
- Advisors & Service Providers: The advisors and service providers envisaged for the operational phase must be identified and a rationale should be provided for the selection of each one.
- Risk Management: A formal risk management framework and assessment, including contingency and disaster recovery plans (e.g. committee out of action) for the legal structure must be available.
- Asset Management Strategy: A fully fledged strategy to address the lifecycle of liquidity positions must be available, including an approach and strategy for unwinding and reallocating capital over the long term.
- Operational Procedures: An operational framework with associated processes must be available (e.g. for committee operations, voting, eligibility selection, wind-up etc.).
Recommendations
The following are recommendations that we would strongly suggest for consideration by the proposal team going forward. We believe they are critical for strengthening the proposal’s safety and viability.
- Governance and Security Design:
- Fund Return Process: The administrating smart contract should include a technical failsafe that allows a tDAO vote to directly and automatically trigger the return of funds to the treasury without committee cooperation.
- Committee Member Qualifications: The proposal should establish minimum requirements for committee candidates (e.g., KYC, Sanctions Checks) and allow for voluntary resignation.
- tDAO Action Prioritization: A clear process for prioritizing tDAO votes should be defined to prevent the mechanism from being used to deliberately block urgent actions.
- Governance Protocol Flexibility: A plan should be outlined for how critical updates could be made to the "immutable section" of the Governance Protocol if a vulnerability is discovered.
- Time Delays and Vetos: To minimize the opportunity for frontrunning and provide an additional safeguard for committee overreach, suitable time delays between committee decisions and on-chain execution should be considered, possibly alongside tDAO veto power as a backstop.
- Dual-Approval for Key Decisions: Simply increasing the committee voting threshold does not sufficiently mitigate the risk of a captured committee. We recommend implementing a dual-approval mechanism for critical decisions (e.g. deploying funds to a new protocol). This would require both a majority vote from the administrative committee (e.g. 5/9) AND a separate approval from the tDAO (e.g., a 33% active stake 'yes' vote). This or similar mechanisms would introduce a vital check and balance on the decision making process and increase operational security for the committee, ensuring alignment between the expert committee and tDAO.
- tDAO Integrity and Mechanics:
- Membership Rules: The rules should explicitly prevent administrative committee members from simultaneously serving as DReps within the tDAO.
- Voting Power Snapshots: The proposal should commit to a high-frequency (e.g., daily) snapshot of DRep voting power to accurately reflect the state of delegation.
- Clarification of tDAO Voting Mechanics: The proposal should specify how non-votes are treated and should consider establishing minimum quorum requirements.
DRep and Committee Compensation and Liability: The proposal should address if, why and how DReps and committee members will be compensated for their oversight role, how to ensure that they “turn up for work” if they do receive compensation and what, if any, legal exposure they could have.
Note on Governance and Oversight
To ensure transparency, we acknowledge the participation of our CTO, Giorgio Zinetti, as a member of the administrative committee for this proposal. We view his involvement as providing critical technical expertise and oversight to the initiative, helping to ensure its operational soundness.The Cardano Foundation votes YES at this time. Assuming the proposal passes this stage, we have outlined our clear and actionable requirements for subsequent Phase 1 and Phase 2 treasury withdrawal governance actions.
- YesChanged92.2M ₳History
Earlier votes
Abstain9mo agoSuperseded
- Yes91.5M ₳Rationale
As a DRep, I have decided to vote YES for the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget proposal.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
In the global crypto landscape, expanding Cardano’s stablecoin supply is essential to remain competitive. Stablecoins now represent a $282 billion market, with Ethereum alone hosting $164 billion. Solana and BNB Chain each hold around $10 billion.
Cardano’s native USD-backed stablecoins—USDM and USDA—currently total just $25 million in market cap. At today’s ADA price, allocating 50 million ADA could roughly double that amount. But even then, Cardano’s stablecoin footprint would remain tiny compared to other ecosystems.
While 50M ADA may seem significant in the context of this year’s Net Change Limit, it’s actually the bare minimum needed to support Cardano’s growth. Personally, I’d support an even larger withdrawal if it helps build real utility.
TIMING
Timing is critical. The coming months may offer the best opportunity to mint stablecoins, as ADA could be nearing its bull market peak. If ADA rises further, minting becomes cheaper. But if ADA drops, we’ll get fewer stablecoins for the same amount—making this window especially valuable.
I believe it would be irresponsible to reject this proposal, especially from the perspective of monetary responsibility. A thriving DeFi ecosystem is not optional—it’s a core pillar of Cardano’s mission and critical to the protocol’s long-term sustainability.
Superior technology alone isn’t enough. We need users, liquidity, and real-world adoption. If we build brilliant services that no one uses, we fail. That’s the risk—and this proposal helps mitigate it.
Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem faces multiple challenges—not just low liquidity and the high slippage that comes with it. These issues are interconnected: solving one can help alleviate others.
MY CONCERNS
While I support this proposal, I believe it’s important to highlight a few concerns.
By injecting liquidity into selected protocols, we are inevitably picking winners and losers. The supported protocols will likely thrive, while others may struggle to survive. In extreme cases, we risk losing builders—or creating a situation where they remain dependent on Catalyst and Builder DAO subsidies, rather than building sustainable businesses.
This kind of market distortion could have unintended consequences, and the committee members carry significant responsibility for the outcomes of their decisions.
I understand the need for efficiency, which is why concentrating funds in two protocols makes sense. However, I believe the current rule—limiting allocations to only two protocols per category—is too rigid.
Supporting multiple protocols may be more advantageous from a risk diversification perspective.
My suggestion: remove the hard limit. The committee can still choose to fund only two protocols if that’s optimal, but they shouldn’t be bound by the rule. Flexibility will allow for better judgment and adaptability as the ecosystem evolves.
RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF ADA IN GOVERNANCE
The committee will control a significant amount of ADA—up to 35% of the 50 million ADA. While they’ve committed not to use this ADA for staking, they haven’t made any commitment regarding other activities, such as governance voting or delegation to DReps. To avoid any ambiguity or misuse, I believe this should be explicitly addressed in the rules.
UNELECTED COMMITTEE
I’ve spent a long time weighing whether to support the creation of yet another unelected committee—especially one tasked with making high-impact decisions that could significantly affect individual protocols.
Ultimately, I chose to support it, primarily due to the urgency of the issues this proposal aims to address. In this case, DReps may lack the time or specialized expertise needed to make fully informed decisions. Under these circumstances, a commission is an acceptable solution.
That said, I believe the ideal model would be a collaborative structure—where DReps work alongside a group of experts, combining democratic legitimacy with deep domain knowledge.
COMMITTEE MEMBERS
There is this rule in the document:
“Committee members should have broad knowledge across many domains including finance, Cardano DeFi, smart contracts, communication, business, and regulations.”
This reads like a superhuman job description. Realistically, no single person can be an expert in smart contracts, finance, and regulation all at once. Current committee members should disclose whether they meet these conditions.
This relates to remuneration. While the expectations for committee members are extremely high, the proposed compensation of 1,000 ADA per month seems inadequate.
First, it’s not attractive to new candidates. If we want qualified experts in key positions, we can’t rely on volunteers. We need to offer compensation that reflects the importance and complexity of the role.
It’s possible the committee will only make a few major decisions, with the heaviest workload concentrated in the first month. After that, their role may shift to oversight and occasional adjustments. In practice, one member might carry a full-time workload, while others only attend periodic online meetings.
Unfortunately, the proposal provides no estimates or breakdowns of expected workload, which makes it difficult to assess whether the remuneration is fair or sufficient.CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
Another big issue is conflict of interest. The rules are too lenient in this regard.
For example, see this rule:
“All committee members should disclose any conflicts of interest when deliberating on any proposal sent to the committee. ”
This wording leaves too much wiggle room. Disclosure is expected, but not enforced. The phrase “should disclose” should be replaced with “must disclose” to ensure accountability.
It’s also possible that there are already unacknowledged ties between committee members and certain protocols.
WEAK POINTS
There are many such weak points in the “Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget” document.
My understanding is that the approval proposal makes this document binding, and any changes would require an on-chain proposal. Therefore, it’s essential to amend the document before it becomes binding, ideally before the withdrawal proposal is submitted.
If we’re going to choose winners and losers, we must ensure that decisions are made professionally and transparently.
Even if committee members act in good faith, the optics matter. People may still say: “Of course, Protocol X got funding — their employee sits on the committee.” This kind of perception can erode trust in governance and lead to accusations of capture.
A similar example of weak phrasing is:
“The committee should also consider the following factors when selecting DeFi protocols:”
This wording leaves too much discretion in the hands of the committee and opens the door to potential favoritism. Because it’s not binding, there’s no guarantee that these factors will be applied consistently or transparently.
To ensure fairness and accountability, I would expect the proposal to include a formal scoring system with weighted criteria. This would make the selection process objective, repeatable, and easier to audit.
CONCLUSION
The intention to inject liquidity into Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem is undeniably important. But for it to succeed, the execution must be flawless—and the community must have full confidence in the process.
That’s why it’s essential for DReps to carefully review the “Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget” document and propose necessary changes. Strengthening this foundation will help ensure transparency, fairness, and long-term impact.
Thank you to everyone who contributed to this proposal. Your work is deeply appreciated. - Yes86M ₳Rationale
Conditional Support for the “Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget” Proposal — A Necessary Step Toward a Sustainable Financial Layer for Cardano
As DRep SIPO, I recognize the strategic importance of this proposal and its potential to significantly strengthen Cardano’s DeFi and stablecoin infrastructure.
The proposal aims to deploy 50 million ADA from the Treasury to bootstrap stablecoin liquidity, support decentralized exchanges (DEXs) and lending protocols, and establish a sustainable liquidity management framework governed by a hybrid model of an interim committee and a Treasury DAO (tDAO).Positive Aspects
This initiative represents a bold and necessary experiment for Cardano’s economic maturity.
Deep and stable liquidity for fiat-backed stablecoins (such as USDM, USDA, or future compliant assets) is essential to:
• enhance trading depth and price stability,
• enable safer on/off ramps for users, and
• encourage professional market makers and DeFi builders to participate.The proposal also intends to establish public goods — including an open-source governance contract and a legal structure — that could serve as reusable templates for future community-led treasury initiatives.
Such frameworks could later empower regional or municipal-level DeFi projects (e.g., AIRA) to build upon Cardano’s public financial infrastructure with legal and operational clarity.
From a strategic perspective, this is a significant step toward Cardano as a financial operating system (“Civilization OS”).Concerns and Conditions
However, despite the clear vision and technical competence, several governance and transparency issues must be addressed before any large-scale disbursement:
1. Interim Committee Structure
• The current 9-person committee (including representatives from CF, EMURGO, IOHK, and community members) holds temporary authority to manage the fund.
• While diversity is commendable, the committee was not elected by the community.
• The proposed oversight mechanism via tDAO — requiring 51% of dReps with a 25% quorum — may be too high to ensure effective accountability in practice.
2. Legal Entity Ambiguity
• The jurisdiction (Cayman Islands, BVI, Switzerland, or Wyoming DUNA) is not finalized.
• Without clear legal anchoring, liability and fund recovery processes remain uncertain.
• 200,000 ADA from the first 500,000 ADA withdrawal is allocated to legal setup, but no contracting entity is disclosed.
3. ADA-to-Stablecoin Conversion Risks
• Converting up to 65% of the fund (~32.5M ADA) to fiat-backed stablecoins may create temporary sell pressure on ADA.
• While OTC and DCA mechanisms are mentioned, the actual market impact should be simulated transparently before execution.
4. Committee Compensation and Fund Management
• Monthly compensation (1,000 ADA × 9 members) and operational expenses (legal, audit, rebalancing) will be paid from the fund.
• This introduces a potential self-managed fund risk unless tDAO oversight and auditing are enforced rigorously.
5. tDAO Operational Design
• The design allowing the tDAO to impeach or freeze committee actions is innovative,
but the smart contract governance and emergency protocols must be tested publicly before full deployment.Governance and Constitutional Evaluation
From a constitutional perspective, the proposal aligns with Article III and IV of the Cardano Constitution — fulfilling requirements for purpose, duration, and treasury management structure.
However, it pushes the boundaries of Article IV(2) regarding “delegation of spending authority.”
The DRep oversight function must not become merely symbolic. Real-time monitoring and transparency dashboards should be implemented from day one.Financial Evaluation
• Requested Budget: 50,000,000 ADA
• Expected Treasury Yield: ~4% annually (≈2M ADA/year)
• Initial Setup Cost: 500,000 ADA (smart contracts, legal, audits)
• Risk Level: High (due to governance and liquidity management complexity)
• Potential Ecosystem Benefit: Very High (DeFi liquidity, stablecoin depth, institutional onboarding)SIPO DRep Position
In principle, I support the direction and vision of this initiative — to build a self-sustaining liquidity mechanism that strengthens Cardano’s financial foundation.
However, I will condition my approval on the following:
• Full public disclosure of the legal entity structure before withdrawal.
• Publication and independent audit of smart contracts managing the fund.
• Demonstration of tDAO’s practical oversight capability (mock governance or testnet trial).
• Guarantee that all liquidity positions and transactions are on-chain and publicly auditable.If these transparency and governance standards are met, this initiative could serve as a historic precedent — establishing a decentralized and legally sound liquidity model for Cardano, paving the way for future public financial infrastructures such as AIRA and regional stablecoin rails.
→ My Vote: Conditional YES (Support in principle, pending full transparency and governance readiness).
⸻
「Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget」提案への条件付き支持 — カルダノの持続可能な金融レイヤーへの一歩
SIPO DRepとして、本提案がカルダノのDeFiおよびステーブルコイン基盤を強化するうえで極めて重要であると認識しています。
本提案は、トレジャリーから5,000万ADAを活用し、ステーブルコイン流動性のブートストラップ、分散型取引所（DEX）やレンディング市場への流動性供給、そしてtDAO（Treasury DAO）による分散的な資金管理構造の確立を目指すものです。評価点
この試みは、カルダノ経済圏を成熟させるための大胆かつ必要な実験です。
USDM・USDAなどの法定通貨裏付けステーブルコインの流動性を深めることは、以下の点で大きな意義があります。
• 価格の安定とスリッページ削減
• 新規ユーザーのオン・オフランプの改善
• プロフェッショナルなマーケットメイカーやDeFi開発者の参入促進また、本提案ではガバナンス契約のオープンソース化や法的枠組みの整備といった「公共財」も同時に構築する計画であり、
これらは将来的に他のトレジャリープロジェクトや**地方自治体型DeFi（例：AIRA）**などが再利用できるテンプレートとして価値があります。
戦略的には、「Cardano＝文明OS（Civilization OS）」の金融基盤化に向けた重要な一歩です。懸念点と条件
一方で、明確なビジョンを持ちながらも、いくつかのガバナンス・透明性リスクが解消されない限り、
大規模な資金執行には慎重を期す必要があります。
1. 9名委員会とtDAOの権限設計
• 委員会は暫定メンバーで構成され、コミュニティ選挙による正統性がまだ確立されていません。
• tDAOによる監視が定足数25%、過半数51%投票を必要とするため、実際の監査機能としては実効性が限定的になる懸念があります。
2. 法的主体の不確定性
• 管轄地（ケイマン・BVI・スイス・米ワイオミングDUNAなど）が未確定で、法的責任の所在と資金回収プロセスが不透明。
• 法務設立費用として20万ADAが見込まれるものの、契約相手や具体的手続きが提示されていません。
3. ADA→USD変換の市場リスク
• 約3,250万ADA（最大65%）をステーブルコイン化する過程で、一時的なADA売り圧が発生する可能性があります。
• OTCやDCA戦略で緩和できるものの、市場影響の事前シミュレーションが必要です。
4. 報酬と運用コストの妥当性
• 委員報酬（月1,000ADA×9名）や法務・再調整コストがファンドから直接支払われる設計で、
自己運用型ファンド化のリスクを含みます。tDAOによる監査体制が必須です。
5. tDAOの実装テスト不足
• 委員会停止や弾劾を可能にする設計は革新的ですが、実運用に耐えるスマートコントラクト検証が必要です。憲法・ガバナンス評価
本提案はカルダノ憲法の第III・IV条に形式的には適合していますが、
「支出権限の委譲」に関する第IV条第2項において限界に近い設計です。
DRep監視が形式的にならないよう、リアルタイムなダッシュボード監査とオンチェーン報告機構を必須とすべきです。財務評価
• 要求額：5,000万ADA
• 期待利回り：年率約4%（約200万ADA/年）
• 初期コスト：50万ADA（スマートコントラクト・法務・監査）
• リスク水準：高（統治構造・流動性運用の複雑性）
• 潜在的効果：極めて高（DeFi深度・ステーブル軸の強化）SIPO DRepとしての立場
本提案の方向性と理念には賛同します。
特に、カルダノのトレジャリーを自律的かつ公共的な流動性供給メカニズムとして進化させる試みとして高く評価します。
ただし、承認にあたって以下の条件を明確に求めます。
• 法的主体の公開と監査の完了（Withdrawal前に実施）
• スマートコントラクトの独立監査と公開テスト
• tDAOガバナンスの実運用検証（模擬投票・テストネット試験）
• 全ての資金移動をオンチェーンで公開・監査可能にすることこれらの条件が満たされるならば、本提案はカルダノにおける分散型・法的に持続可能な流動性運用モデルの歴史的前例となり、
将来的にAIRAなどの地域金融インフラを支える中核構造となるでしょう。→ 投票方針：条件付き賛成（原則支持・透明性とガバナンス体制の確認後に完全承認）
- No84.3M ₳Rationale
See X post at https://x.com/ArmySpies/status/1977565495302996409.
- Yes75.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes75.2M ₳No rationale
- Yes74.5M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on this proposal.
A lack of deep stablecoin liquidity is one of the biggest challenges currently facing Cardano. Without sufficient liquidity, onboarding new users, growing DeFi, and providing a safe haven during volatility are all severely constrained. This proposal addresses the problem by establishing a transparently managed liquidity fund, implemented through a smart contract and overseen by a tDAO of dReps, with monthly reporting and on-chain auditability.
The proposal also considers the potential price impact of ADA liquidation. It presents mitigation strategies and a simulation showing that gradual liquidation could minimize market shock, providing confidence that the impact can be managed.
This proposal represents a rare opportunity to bootstrap a positive liquidity flywheel for Cardano DeFi. The oversight mechanism ensures that the community retains ultimate control, with the ability to pause or shut down the fund if needed. For these reasons, I strongly support this proposal as an essential step toward making Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem competitive and sustainable.
僕はこの提案に対して賛成（YES）票を投じます。
ステーブルコインの流動性不足は、今のCardanoにとって最大の課題のひとつです。流動性が薄いままでは、新規ユーザーのオンボーディング、DeFiの成長、相場急変時の退避先の確保が難しく、エコシステム全体の発展が阻害されます。この提案は、スマートコントラクトで管理される流動性ファンドを設立し、dRepで構成されるtDAOによる監督と月次レポート、オンチェーン監査を伴う透明な仕組みで、この課題を根本から解決しようとするものです。
ADA売却による価格への影響についても、提案の中で緩和策とシミュレーションが提示されており、段階的な売却などで市場へのショックを抑えられる可能性が説明されています。
この提案は、Cardano DeFiにおける流動性の好循環を生み出すための貴重な機会です。監督機構が備わっており、必要に応じてファンドを一時停止または解散できるため、コミュニティが最終的なコントロールを保持しています。これらの理由から、僕はこの提案を強く支持し、CardanoのDeFiエコシステムを競争力と持続性を備えたものにするための重要な一歩と位置付けます。
- Yes73.1M ₳Rationale
This significant spend was a difficult decision. However, our lack of stablecoin liquidity is a critical barrier to growth. To remain competitive, we must invest in ourselves. I credit the DRep-led tDAO oversight and will vote YES as an exception, with clear expectations for treasury replenishment.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
This was an exceptionally difficult decision due to the significant spend, which I would have preferred to avoid under normal circumstances. However, I am voting a cautious YES as an exception, recognizing that our ecosystem currently suffers from a lack of deep stablecoin liquidity. The result is substantial price impact even on swaps involving the most liquid stablecoins.
To grow our ecosystem and remain competitive, we must invest in ourselves. Major stablecoin providers have sidelined Cardano, favoring ecosystems in which they hold vested interests. Their support strengthens competing chains while Cardano is left to build without equivalent backing. To shift this imbalance, strategic investment in our own ecosystem is not optional—it’s essential. This conviction is exactly why I became a DRep: to advocate for Cardano’s self-determination and long-term growth.
I want to credit the proposers and the DRep-led tDAO participants for stepping up to design and lead this initiative. My support is contingent on a focused, outcome-driven strategy. Initially, I believe this investment should prioritize protocols that have already contributed the most liquidity to Cardano, as this is a meaningful and measurable indicator of value added to the blockchain.
While I believe more than one DEX should be supported, funding should be limited to a maximum of three ideally we should avoid liquidity fragmentation and ensure users benefit from reduced price impact. I also strongly recommend that recipient protocols open-source their batchers to further promote decentralization and transparency.
Finally, I expect frequent and transparent updates on treasury replenishment, liquidity growth, and ecosystem performance metrics, so that the community can clearly assess the impact and accountability of this investment. I look forward to seeing this initiative drive meaningful growth across the Cardano ecosystem.
- Yes69.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes66M ₳Rationale
DeFi liquidity is needed in Cardano and therefore we support this initiative.
- Yes53.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes50.5M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget proposal because it directly addresses one of the most critical issues in the Cardano ecosystem: the lack of deep and reliable stablecoin liquidity.
Right now, when an ADA or CNT holder tries to swap to stablecoins, they face high slippage and significant value loss due to insufficient liquidity. This makes it expensive and unattractive to use Cardano stablecoins, creating a negative cycle where liquidity cannot deepen because it’s too costly to use in the first place.
The current USD-based stablecoin market cap on Cardano is around 48M ADA (≈ $0.034B), with only 16M ADA deployed on DEXs. The rest is either deployed on other DeFi protocols or held privately. Compared to other top layer-1 blockchains, Cardano is far behind: Ethereum has a stablecoin market cap of $161B, Solana has $16B, BNB Smart Chain has $14B, and Tron has $78B. In other words, the ratio of stablecoins to protocol market cap is roughly 15–30% for Solana and Ethereum, but less than 0.2% on Cardano — nearly 100x lower.
By deploying 50 million ADA to improve Cardano’s stablecoin liquidity, this proposal would effectively double the current stablecoin market cap. This will help reduce slippage, make trading cheaper and more secure, and incentivize more liquidity providers to deposit tokens. It will also unlock new use cases for DeFi users and builders who currently have to rely on other chains for proper treasury management.
It’s important to note that doubling the stablecoin market cap on Cardano is only a first step toward building truly deep liquidity markets. Much more will still be needed over time.
I’m also supporting this proposal because it’s an investment in our own ecosystem. The fund will remain on-chain, generate yield, and return 15% of earnings to the Treasury monthly. If managed correctly, it will strengthen the DeFi economy while growing the Treasury’s long-term value — similar to the Snek Loan proposal.
This is exactly the kind of strategic capital deployment the Treasury should be used for: supporting critical infrastructure, improving user experience, and generating sustainable returns.
- Yes50.4M ₳Rationale
Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget → Yes
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I am voting "Yes" on this Governance Action in order to allow it to pass through the Treasury Withdraw stage. Stablecoin liquidity is indeed an important pillar for Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem, and this proposal aims to address that need. My support, however, is conditional. For this initiative to be sustainable and trustworthy, there must be clear identification of the fund recipients and allocation of resources, transparent monitoring and accountability for the use of treasury funds, and safeguards against conflicts of interest with independent oversight where possible. Therefore, my Yes vote should not be read as unconditional endorsement of the funding model, but rather as support for moving this proposal forward under the expectation that these accountability mechanisms will be put in place. [Japanese Version Follows] 私はこのガバナンスアクションに対して賛成（Yes）を投票します。これはあくまで、Treasury Withdraw に進めることを承認する票であり、ガバナンスアクションとしての承認には一定の条件を提示します。ステーブルコインの流動性はカルダノのDeFiエコシステムにとって重要な柱であり、本提案がその課題に取り組もうとしている点については賛同します。ただし、この支持は条件付きであり、持続可能で信頼できるものとするためには、資金受領主体と資金配分の明確化、トレジャリー資金の利用に関する透明なモニタリングと報告・説明責任、そして利益相反を防ぐための独立した監督体制が確保される必要があると考えます。そのため、今回の賛成票は、この資金モデルを無条件に支持するものではなく、これらの説明責任の仕組みが整えられることを前提とした前向きな承認となります。
- Abstain50M ₳Rationale
I find the Info action step adds unnecessary delays and confusion, given that 67% approval is already required at the final vote. But since it's now a mandatory part of the process, I'm voting Abstain just to let it proceed - the actual decision will be made at the final vote.
- Yes49.5M ₳Rationale
Using ADA from Cardano’s treasury to boost DeFi liquidity offers key benefits:
- Improved Trading: Adding 50M–140M ADA to stablecoin pools reduces slippage (e.g., from 6% on $100K trades), enabling efficient, large-volume transactions.
- Increased TVL and Adoption: Tripling stablecoin liquidity (from ~18M to 68M ADA) attracts dApps, yield farming, and users, rivaling Ethereum/Solana’s ecosystems.
- Treasury Revenue: 5–10% yields from liquidity provision or lending, with 15% returned monthly, create sustainable, non-inflationary income for future projects.
- Institutional Appeal: Deeper liquidity draws VCs, RWAs, and TradFi, stabilizing pegs and enabling Bitcoin DeFi or cross-chain bridges.
- Governance and Resilience: There is sufficient Decentralized and organizational oversight which ensures accountability
This turns the treasury into a growth engine, addressing Cardano’s low DeFi liquidity while enhancing adoption and sustainability.
For this reason I voted yes
- Yes48.6M ₳Rationale
We are supportive of this proposal but we would like to see further detailed guidelines of fund allocation into various DeFi protocol on Cardano. These guidelines should be cast in stone, and the committee should have to strictly follow this guideline, rather than leaving decision making to the committee members, which effectively create a centralized body picking winner & losers for Cardano DeFi.
- Yes47.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes40.1M ₳No rationale
- No38.1M ₳Rationale
I oppose this proposal. Trading demand on Cardano DeFi is currently weak, and existing DEX liquidity already serves most retail needs. The absence of native USDT/USDC is the fundamental bottleneck; deploying 50M ADA now is premature and an inefficient use of treasury funds. I recommend waiting for clear growth in demand and then phasing in liquidity.
- Yes37.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes34.6M ₳No rationale
- Abstain34.3M ₳Rationale
We abstained on this proposal. It outlines a comprehensive framework with clear fund management, oversight, and KPIs. However, given the unprecedented scale and complexity of the initiative, we believe it is appropriate to remain neutral at this stage and monitor its implementation.
- Yes33.5M ₳Rationale
Cardano’s DeFi ecosystem continues to suffer from shallow stablecoin liquidity, limiting user adoption and real-world usability. This proposal establishes a 50 million ADA budget to bootstrap stablecoin depth across the ecosystem, helping strengthen on-chain markets and long-term ecosystem stability
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
Cardano needs deeper and more reliable stablecoin liquidity to compete with other ecosystems and support real economic activity. This proposal directly addresses that gap by deploying treasury funds through transparent smart contracts and dRep-supervised governance.
The framework keeps funds under community ownership, introduces monthly audits and reporting, and uses liquidity to both stabilize markets and generate modest returns for the treasury.
From a Cardano First perspective, this aligns with fiscal conservatism and responsible growth, using treasury resources to solve a structural weakness rather than fund speculation.
- Yes31.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes30.7M ₳No rationale
- Yes27.9M ₳Rationale
DeFi liquidity for stablecoins on Cardano is without a doubt one of the most important issues to address in our ecosystem. This proposal has gone through the ringer as individuals within the community have come forth with valid criticisms regarding DEX choices, stablecoin selection, multisig centralization risks, committee management expertise, and governance oversight mechanisms. Due to this feedback, the proposal has undergone multiple rounds of revision and improvement that has led us to the current iteration.
There are still many arguments that could be made for making further improvements to the proposal, but it is entirely possible that this could go on forever, leaving us locked in governance bureaucracy that has us constantly trying to satisfy every community concern. However, I don't think it would be reasonable to expect perfection out of the very first iteration of a proposal of this type, and the need to improve stablecoin liquidity is heavy. For these reasons, I believe the best path forward is to vote YES on this proposal and offer grace to the committee members if it doesn't work out perfectly. Voltaire himself phrased this the best I think...
"Perfect is the enemy of good." -Voltaire
- Yes27.9M ₳No rationale
- Yes26.3M ₳Rationale
I support this proposal, as it is open to any DeFi project to apply. Also the Fund will be managed within a proper governance structure, while also giving the Cardano ecosystem the much-needed push on liquidity.
It is, in many ways, a “chicken and egg” situation: liquidity must come first to enable growth. Importantly, these assets will not be spent or lost—they will remain in USDA/ADA and USDM/ADA pools, as well as within lending protocols.
- Yes26.1M ₳Rationale
Rationale for Voting YES on the Stablecoin Liquidity Reserve Proposal
As someone who has spent years building within Cardano and advocating for responsible, forward-thinking governance, I believe this proposal represents a watershed moment for our ecosystem. It’s more than a budget, it's a blueprint for sustainable growth, institutional readiness, and user-focused DeFi infrastructure.
Why This Matters for Cardano
Cardano has made incredible strides in decentralization, governance, and protocol-layer innovation. Indigo and Djed gave us our first real liquidity here on Cardano with Synthetics and Algos, finally legitimizing Cardanos blockchain with new stable coin liquidity (see future iteration section for more). But one of its most critical missing components is deep, resilient stablecoin liquidity, Cardano’s current DeFi TVL sits around $375M (1), significantly lower than Ethereum or Solana. Stablecoin liquidity is even more limited at just ~$39M, making up only 9–10% of total TVL (2). That imbalance leads to slippage, weak peg defense, and low institutional traction (3) * Links for these statements at bottom of rationale. Without it, we face persistent barriers to user onboarding, real-world adoption, and financial use cases. This proposal directly addresses that by creating a Decentralized Sovereign Liquidity Reserve, “seeded” with 50M ADA, governed by a 9-person interim committee, and overseen by a tDAO composed of dReps.
This is not a short-term yield farm. It’s a long-term ecosystem investment strategy with enforceable community oversight, clear execution phases, and full transparency. The smart contract holding the funds will be public, auditable, and tied to monthly reporting, setting a new standard for accountability in on-chain treasury deployment.
Strategic Impact
This initiative delivers product-market fit infrastructure for Cardano. It mirrors what worked on other chains,while remaining true to our decentralized governance principles.
Product-Market Fit Improvements:
Structured 2-phase rollout reduces risk and increases transparencyDAO-led oversight with real veto power ensures decentralization
Protocol RFP model creates competitive, merit-based fund allocation
Stablecoin-first strategy makes Cardano attractive to TradFi, RWAs, and DeFi users
Legal structure protects the fund, dReps, and committee members, future-proofing the entire operation
Retention & Growth Levers:
85% of DeFi yield compounds into the ecosystem, growing liquidity over time15% flows back monthly to the Treasury, supporting future governance decisions
KPI-driven performance (slippage reduction, revenue targets) creates a culture of measurable impact
Legal clarity builds confidence for institutional players and compliant DeFi developers
Open-source contract design encourages future replication and experimentation
Future Iteration & Ecosystem Inclusion
This fund is not static. It’s designed to evolve. The interim committee is explicitly temporary, tDAO elections will follow, allowing new voices and experts from across the community to guide future fund strategy. This democratized structure ensures alignment with Cardano’s long-term vision of decentralized governance.
Importantly, while this first phase focuses on fiat-backed stablecoins, the framework is flexible. It can be iterated to include decentralized and crypto-native stables (e.g., iUSD, DJED, or rLUSD equivalents), once market depth and reliability are proven. This modularity is crucial for balancing centralization risk with capital efficiency.
It also includes a RWA readiness clause, opening the door for future integrations of real-world assets like tokenized treasuries, real estate, or invoices, assets that require stable payment rails to function effectively.
This proposal also supports public goods beyond DeFi. It funds the development and open-sourcing of governance and treasury smart contracts, legal frameworks for DAO structures, and community-defined best practices for asset management, all of which can be reused by future Catalyst proposals, DAOs, and Cardano-native protocols.
Closing Thought
I’m voting yes because this is exactly the kind of high-leverage, responsibly structured, community-governed proposal that we need right now. It reflects everything I believe in: transparent governance, on-chain accountability, treasury sustainability, direct community involvement and the ability to evolve over time.
This is how we bridge Cardano’s foundational strengths into mainstream adoption, by building infrastructure that creates value today, while preparing for what’s next.
Let’s set the precedent.Links for each portion quoted in rationale
- Yes25.3M ₳Rationale
I am voting YES on the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget proposal. The existance of a tDAO governed by a broad selection of dreps capable of adding/removing administrators or even shutting down the tDOA and retuning funds back to the treasury is a critical component. I have witnessed firsthand the progression and depth of community collaboration associated with this initiative, and believe both the intent and administrative skillsets reuired for successful execution are present. While aspects may appear imperfect, the tDAO structure appears to support adaptive management. As there is much we will learn of great value from this initiative to further our path towards sustainability, the initial team is well-known and trusted (reputations are valuable), and YOYO, LFG fam.
- Yes23.5M ₳No rationale
- No22M ₳Rationale
While the potential reward of this initiative is immense, our primary duty as dReps is the prudent management of Treasury risk. This proposal, in its current form, asks the community to accept an unnecessary level of risk upfront.
The fundamental issue is that we are being asked to fund the cargo (49.5M ADA) before the ship (the governance smart contract) has been built, inspected, and proven seaworthy. The security and functionality of that contract are not promises to be accepted, but deliverables to be verified.
A security-first approach requires us to sequence this differently. Let’s first commission the construction of the ship. We can fund the legal setup, development, and a rigorous, independent audit. Only when that secure vessel is delivered and ready should we vote on loading it with 49.5M ADA from our collective Treasury.
This NO is a vote for risk mitigation. It’s a call to proceed with this excellent idea in a manner that prioritizes the safety of community funds above all else.
- Yes21.5M ₳No rationale
- Abstain21.5M ₳Rationale
I am choosing to vote ABSTAIN on the Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity Budget info action. I find myself conflicted with regards to this proposal. My heart says yes while my head has its doubts. While I naturally want what is best for the Cardano ecosystem and hope that this proposal delivers as it intends to, I have reservations about the utilisation percentage of the NCL and whether the proposal will actually achieve what it intends to, especially when evaluated in the context of the wider cryptocurrency space.
I have always regarded the Net Change Limit as a spending cap and not a spending target. There is currently 77,968,493 ada remaining and using 64.12% of that (or 14.28% of the total NCL) on what is an as yet untested experiment feels too much.
One comment from the Cardano Summit 2024 has stuck with me over the past year and it came from the panel “Does Liquidity Bring Users Or Do Users Bring Liquidity?” no less. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z1nw7munfXY). The comment was made by Senad Dilji and it was that regarding Cardano, “I don’t think it’s really a marketing issue, I think it’s more of a perception issue”. It was absolutely true, while we see our progress and growth within our own ecosystem, there is no denying the fact that the larger crypto space, to date, simply has not cared, largely because Cardano is rarely present where it needs to be. Thankfully recent months have seen moves to correct this with the unified front at Token 2049, the recent Asia tour and Discover Cardano presence at Gitex, Dubai.
To argue that Cardano isn’t taken seriously because of TVL and liquidity and that this proposal is needed to “first fix it ourselves, in order to attract others” potentially invites critics and naysayers to once again move the ever-moving goalposts and claim that the ecosystem is merely “propped up from within”.
With regards to many of the actual DeFi mechanics, I also choose to vote abstain in recognition of the fact that my knowledge and experience in this area is not at a level where I feel comfortable making the decision one way or another.
I do however wish the proposal the best of success and sincerely hope that it achieves what it sets out to do. I just cannot in good conscience throw my full weight behind it given my personal doubts and the shortcomings of my own knowledge on the topic.
- YesRevoted21.1M ₳Rationale
This action targets Cardano’s most practical bottleneck—stablecoin depth—by time-boxing ADA to seed liquidity across key venues, reducing slippage and improving UX. Execution includes staged releases and public reporting, enabling clear KPIs and accountable course-correction.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
This action targets Cardano’s most practical bottleneck—stablecoin depth—by time-boxing ADA to seed liquidity across key venues, reducing slippage and improving UX. Execution includes staged releases and public reporting, enabling clear KPIs and accountable course-correction.
Earlier votes
Yes10mo agoSuperseded
- Yes20.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes20.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes19.9M ₳Rationale
Stablecoin DeFi Liquidity is very important and a current weak point of Cardano. This proposal helps to address that with a strong team. The funds are much better spend on our own ecosystem than paying for inclusion of e.g. USDC or Tether. Just paying for integration does not mean liquidity will come automatically, plus these centralizeed solutions have freeze and claw-back functionality, which are against the ethos of crypto.
- Yes17.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes16.7M ₳Rationale
As Cardanians DRep, we believe this proposal tackles a systemic weakness in Cardano DeFi and introduces important long-term infrastructure for treasury capital deployment. That said, ₳50M is a serious ask, and at this level of funding, execution must be bulletproof.
We urge the team to:
- Provide detailed milestone-based plans before each withdrawal
- Finalize and publish the legal framework and jurisdictional implications
- Use transparent, public RFPs for DeFi protocol selection with clear scoring criteria
- Ensure the committee’s actions are logged and monitored in a verifiable on-chain way
- Establish community review and feedback mechanisms beyond just dReps
Treasury capital must be treated with the same seriousness as VC or institutional funds — with governance, transparency, and measurable ROI.
With these measures, we believe this experiment can set a new benchmark for responsible DeFi funding from the treasury.
YES with eyes wide open and accountability baked in.
- Yes16.4M ₳No rationale
- Yes14.2M ₳No rationale