Cardano Builder DAO
141 DReps voted · 56 with a rationale · 2 changed their vote
Open a row to read the rationale.
- Yes5.9M ₳Rationale
Consistent with my 2026 Intersect budget process votes, I am voting YES. This is part of the bulk proposals submitted by Intersect from that process.
Hydra Evidence IPFS: https://bafybeie6yykngvn5xsq6va6nwz3sdeadgxd45yhsoeqpuiyxh4tky5tuzi.ipfs.inbrowser.link/
X-Post: https://x.com/mr_cata/status/2063660464450527709?s=20 - Yes5.7M ₳No rationale
- No5.4M ₳No rationale
- No5.3M ₳No rationale
- No4.7M ₳No rationale
- No4.6M ₳No rationale
- No4.4M ₳Rationale
I respect the team behind this initiative.
However, with ADA currently at the all-time low of this market cycle, the annual NCL nearly depleted, and no clear results yet from the previous 11 million ADA allocation, requesting another 20 million ADA feels excessive at this time.
Furthermore, a pilot round of Catalyst has been announced, which appears to be a more structured process.
I am also looking forward to Charles’ upcoming initiative, which similarly seeks to define a shared vision for Cardano’s future.
For these reasons, I must vote NO on this governance action. - Yes4.1M ₳Rationale
[Portuguese]
Optamos por votar "SIM" nesta ação de governança "Cardano Builder DAO" (gov_action1fdatlfcdnzzcw5x9pnt9r42v992nqw65zze57s8tyk0jll78eyusqccn9gc), pois entendemos que a proposta fortalece um mecanismo já testado de financiamento para projetos capazes de impulsionar o crescimento mensurável do ecossistema Cardano, com foco em indicadores como usuários ativos, transações on-chain e valor total bloqueado (TVL). O orçamento solicitado apresenta uma relação custo-benefício favorável, considerando o histórico da Builder DAO, que já distribuiu 11,1 milhões de ADA para 34 projetos e demonstrou capacidade de execução, governança e participação ativa da comunidade. Também avaliamos positivamente os mecanismos de governança, controle e transparência previstos na proposta, incluindo liberação de recursos condicionada ao cumprimento de marcos, custódia em carteira multisig independente, supervisão por membros da dRep DAO, acompanhamento público de indicadores de desempenho (KPIs) e devolução ao Tesouro dos recursos não utilizados. Esses mecanismos contribuem para uma gestão mais responsável dos recursos e oferecem à comunidade meios adequados para acompanhar e fiscalizar a execução do programa.
[English]
We chose to vote "YES" on this governance action "Cardano Builder DAO" (gov_action1fdatlfcdnzzcw5x9pnt9r42v992nqw65zze57s8tyk0jll78eyusqccn9gc), because we believe the proposal strengthens a funding mechanism that has already demonstrated its ability to support projects capable of delivering measurable growth across the Cardano ecosystem, with a focus on key metrics such as active users, on-chain transactions, and total value locked (TVL). The requested budget offers a favorable cost-benefit profile, considering the Builder DAO has already allocated 11.1 million ADA to 34 projects while demonstrating effective execution, governance, and strong community participation. We also view the proposal’s governance, oversight, and transparency mechanisms positively. These include milestone-based fund disbursements, custody through an independent multisignature wallet, oversight by members of the dRep DAO, public tracking of key performance indicators (KPIs), and the return of any unused funds to the Treasury. Together, these measures promote responsible stewardship of Treasury resources while providing the community with effective tools to monitor and verify the program’s execution. - Yes3.8M ₳Rationale
I do not believe BuilderDAO is the best way of supporting projects and it is ripe for collusion and fraud with its small size, and overlap among organizations and relationships.
However, management of ecosystem members by guilds has a long and storied past as a way to make sure that promising members survive and thrive. Cardano must offer a path to surviving for those who build on it, especially when the economics are hard. The guild model is much more fit for purpose to support builders than the DRep vote on direct treasury withdrawals by non-negotiated vendor priced single-bid proposals.
Thus, between our two functioning models - BuilderDAO is a better choice to deal with funds than the current DRep process. Thus, I support it and what I consider its modest and justifiable ask.
- Abstain3.5M ₳No rationale
- No3.1M ₳Rationale
I originally voted NO on Ekklesia for this, and once again have to vote NO.
I have already reached my personal NCL and there is very little room left for anything else in the current NCL anyways.
Since the majority of voters decided to pay for research and for IOG's proposals, builders are sadly going to suffer. I hope this mindset changes in the future.
My initial no vote was primarily based on 2 things:
- There was an entire bundle of DAOs being pushed, with Builder DAO being a part of this. Those bundles did not get funded, so Builder DAO is on its own again. I did not personally see the value in establishing a bunch of DAOs when on chain voting does essentially the same thing but leaves the power in the hands of DReps.
- I had voted YES on Jaromir Tesar's smaller builder DAO which seemed like better value for ADA overall, but this also didn't get funded.
Reading the comments of other no voters, there is some important feedback there for Builder DAO to take into account.
- No3.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.8M ₳Rationale
Already voted yes for this via Intersect
- No2.8M ₳No rationale
- Yes2.6M ₳Rationale
私は本Treasury Withdrawalに僅差で賛成します。
Cardano Builder DAOは、CardanoのVision 2030におけるMAU、monthly transactions、TVLという実利用KPIに沿って、実績あるbuilderへ資金を配分する専門DAOです。過去には、2025年のCardano Treasury funding processにおいてCardano Builder DAO向けに12,000,000 ADAが承認され、その資金をもとに2 roundsを運用しました。過去2 roundsでは34 proposalsへ約11.1M ADAを配分し、未使用資金354,790 ADAをTreasuryへ返還した実績があります。また、smart contract governanceとKPI dashboardを用いる方向性は、Treasury資金をより測定可能・透明に使う仕組みとして重要です。
Cardano Builder DAOには、builder同士による審査という意味で、利益相反や内輪化のリスクはあります。しかし、過去2 roundsを見ると、Round 1では27件中7件が不採択、Round 2では約29件中14件のみ採択されており、全員に広く配る仕組みではなく、一定の競争と選別が働いています。Cardano上で実際に構築しているbuilder同士が、peer review、debate、temperature check、final votingを通じて評価する構造は、専門性のある資金配分モデルとして評価できます。
一方で、20M ADAは非常に大きな支出であり、これは単なる個別プロジェクト支援ではなく、Cardano内の大型資金配分機構を承認する判断です。そのため、各funded projectのKPI baseline、成果後KPI、配分先、利益相反管理、milestoneごとの支払い解除条件、未使用分のTreasury返還、dashboardでの継続公開を強く求めます。--
I narrowly support this Treasury Withdrawal.
Cardano Builder DAO is a specialized DAO that allocates funding to proven builders aligned with Cardano’s Vision 2030 KPIs, including MAU, monthly transactions, and TVL. In 2025, 12,000,000 ADA was approved for Cardano Builder DAO through the Cardano Treasury funding process. Using that funding, the DAO operated two rounds, allocating about 11.1M ADA to 34 proposals and returning 354,790 ADA of unused funds to the Treasury. I also value its direction of using smart contract governance and KPI dashboards to make Treasury spending more measurable and transparent.
There are risks of conflicts of interest and insider bias because builders evaluate other builders. However, the past two rounds show that this was not simply broad distribution to everyone. In Round 1, 7 of 27 proposals were not funded, and in Round 2, only 14 of around 29 proposals were funded. This suggests that meaningful competition and selection took place. A process where active Cardano builders evaluate proposals through peer review, debate, temperature checks, and final voting can be seen as a specialized funding model with domain expertise.
At the same time, 20M ADA is a very large expenditure. This is not just support for individual projects; it is approval of a major funding allocation mechanism within Cardano. Therefore, I strongly expect clear KPI baselines and post-funding KPI results for each funded project, transparent allocation records, conflict-of-interest management, milestone-based release conditions, return of unused funds to the Treasury, and continuous public dashboard reporting.
- Abstain2.5M ₳No rationale
- No2.5M ₳Rationale
Due to rationales becoming stressful and the bear market vibes - I will not be providing rationale. I voted the way that I did bc we need a 'no stress' environment more than ever.
- Yes2.1M ₳Rationale
The proposal is addressing a structural problem in treasury governance:
How can the Cardano ecosystem allocate treasury capital efficiently, when DReps realsitically are not able to perform due diligence checks on hundreds of projects?
Despite the risks lying in a large budget, the introduction of another meta-governance layer and a concentration of decision-making, my vote is "Yes" here.
- No2.1M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on the Cardano Builder DAO proposal.
I want to be clear that this is not a vote against builders, dApps, ecosystem growth, or the idea that Cardano needs better outcome-based funding. I recognise that the Cardano Builder DAO has already operated funding rounds, distributed capital to projects, built a community of builders, and returned unused ADA to the treasury.
However, I do not believe this proposal is the right allocation of treasury funds in the current environment.
The request is very large at 20,000,000 ADA, and it effectively asks DReps to allocate a significant amount of treasury capacity to a secondary funding body. In my view, that creates accountability, prioritisation and delegation concerns.
Cardano is now in an environment where the Net Change Limit is under significant pressure and many live proposals are competing for limited remaining capacity. Under those conditions, I believe DReps should prioritise direct, clearly scoped, critical infrastructure and public-good maintenance before large meta-funding mechanisms.
My concern is not that Builder DAO has done nothing. My concern is that allocating such a large amount to another funding layer weakens direct DRep accountability over treasury spending. DReps were elected and delegated to make difficult prioritisation decisions, not to pass a major portion of that responsibility to another committee or DAO unless the mandate, limits, governance protections, conflict controls and measurable return profile are exceptionally strong.
I also have concerns around potential conflicts of interest in builder-led funding structures. Even where processes are transparent and well-intentioned, a DAO composed of ecosystem participants allocating funds to ecosystem participants needs an extremely high governance bar. In this case, I do not believe the structure justifies the size of the ask while the treasury budget is so constrained.
I support targeted funding for builders when proposals are direct, specific, measurable and proportionate. I am not comfortable supporting a 20M ADA treasury withdrawal into a broad secondary allocation mechanism at this time.
For these reasons, I vote NO.
- Yes2.1M ₳No rationale
- No1.9M ₳No rationale
- No1.8M ₳Rationale
I would prefer to see resources focused on strengthening Cardano’s other funding mechanisms, such as the Intersect budget process, Catalyst, and the Orion Fund.
- No1.8M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.6M ₳No rationale
- No1.6M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.6M ₳Rationale
From the perspective of innovative products and builders, Cardano is bleeding out. Many sources of funding for builders have been discontinued and the current market is not effective at fostering successful companies who operate primarily on Cardano. The CB DAO has shown a concerted effort for fair, effective, outcome-based funding for builders that have a track record and practical path towards sustainable revenue and long-term growth. Cardano's history has been marred with grifts, inefficient grants, and excessive administrative overhead. The CB DAO tackled all of those problems and continues to constantly evolve towards a better system. Many case studies of funded projects have shown tangible, meaningful growth for Cardano's 2030 vision KPIs. The DAO is not only a source of funds, but also a collaborative environment where Cardano companies are able to drive business development through partnerships and competition alike. Without funding of the CB DAO, we will see many Cardano products -- several on the cusp of profitability and sustained success -- shut down. Cardano does not actively have a user base that makes it financially viable to focus a company's operations in the ecosystem. Subsidizing application/product development in a responsible way is the only path towards adoption, and the CB DAO is the only vessel we trust to meet our standards and operate effectively for this purpose.
- No1.3M ₳Rationale
While acknowledging the project's efforts, we recommend voting NO on the Cardano Builder DAO proposal based on the following core reasons:
- Incomplete Measurement Mechanism: The proposal emphasizes linking funding to measurable KPIs (MAU, on-chain transactions, TVL), however, the monitoring mechanism is still in "Version 2" and not fully on-chain. This means transparency and verifiability are not up to par, forcing us to rely on an incomplete measurement system.
- Signs of Conflict of Interest: We note that the Clarity team, which develops the operational tools for DAO initiatives, was funded by CB DAO in 2025 and continues to play a central role. The fact that the same group is involved in both building the infrastructure and directly benefiting from the funding raises serious questions about the independence of the monitoring process.
- Lack of data on actual impact: "Success" metrics such as participation rates of 83-88% or total ADA allocated do not directly reflect the actual impact on Cardano's MAU, transactions, or TVL. The proposal still lacks specific data demonstrating how previously funded projects have actually improved these core metrics.
Due to these shortcomings, we believe the proposal currently lacks sufficient transparency and accountability to warrant further expansion of funding at this time.
- No1.3M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.2M ₳Rationale
I vote YES on "Cardano Builder DAO" because Cardano needs a practical funding path for smaller established builders that can struggle to compete with large Treasury
proposals, and this DAO has already completed two funding rounds, allocated funds across 34 proposals, and returned unused ADA. I see the model as a useful way to bring
expert builder review and proposed DRep oversight closer to projects that can grow users, transactions, and TVL. The 20M ADA ask and delegation of funding decisions are
significant risks, so I expect transparent recipient-level reporting, independent KPI verification, clear conflict disclosures, milestone gates, and a credible path to
sustainability. This vote gives a proven but still evolving model a chance; it is not an automatic endorsement of recurring Treasury funding. - No1.2M ₳No rationale
- No1.2M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes1.1M ₳No rationale
- Yes991.7K ₳Rationale
We vote YES on this proposal.
While we initially had concerns about adding another funding layer between the Cardano Treasury and individual projects, we believe the Cardano Builder DAO has a strong enough track record and ecosystem relevance to justify support.
A key reason for our support is that the DAO includes many well-known Cardano projects and builders with a long-standing history in the ecosystem. This reduces the risk of funding an unproven structure and increases our confidence that the funds can be allocated toward teams that already understand Cardano, have delivered before, and are capable of creating measurable ecosystem value.
We also believe that an additional coordination layer for builders and DAOs can be useful. Cardano’s ecosystem is becoming more complex, and not every funding decision can be handled efficiently through isolated treasury withdrawals. A well-structured Builder DAO can help coordinate funding, align projects around shared goals, and support initiatives that improve adoption, on-chain activity, TVL, and user growth.
We still believe that transparency, reporting, milestone tracking, and accountability are essential. However, given the track record of the participating projects, the previous work already completed by the Builder DAO, and the potential value of stronger builder coordination, we support this proposal.
- No988.4K ₳No rationale
- Abstain964.2K ₳No rationale
- No923.9K ₳No rationale
- No881.6K ₳No rationale
- No867.4K ₳No rationale
- No861.7K ₳No rationale
- No827.9K ₳Rationale
We would like to see a more results-oriented program. We see no incentive for builders to deliver upside for the ecosystem while the treasury bears the risk.
- No798.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes794.9K ₳Rationale
I'm for an alternative builder-centric funding mechanism aligned to Cardano Vision 2030 goals.
- Abstain626.1K ₳Rationale
ABSTAIN, 20M is disproportionate to scale and can creates permanent intermediary dependency. KPIs are still immature. However, current NCL lacks funding to fulfill ask responsibly. Voting yes would breach fiscal capacity. Reconsider at smaller scale when headroom exists.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
My substantive assessment of this proposal remains negative. The Builder DAO has a genuine track record with two completed rounds, eleven million ADA distributed across thirty-four projects, and verified return of unused funds. However, the twenty million ADA ask creates a concerning permanent intermediary dependency between the Treasury and builders. The budget is behind a DocSend link rather than embedded in on-chain metadata, and the KPI verification is still immature. The Treasury can fund a DAO to fund builders, the pattern is correct. That said, I am abstaining because the current Net Change Limit lacks the available funding to fulfill this ask responsibly. Voting yes would be fiscally impossible without breaching the constitutional spending cap. My substantive concerns about meta-funding and scale remain, but the immediate reason for abstention is fiscal constraint. The proposal should be reconsidered at a smaller scale when both fiscal headroom and clearer differentiation from Catalyst exist.
- Abstain619.9K ₳No rationale
- No605.9K ₳No rationale
- Yes589.9K ₳Rationale
Yes - proposes to brings much needed MAU, monthly transactions and TVL to the chain.
- Yes587.7K ₳No rationale
- No534.1K ₳Rationale
Not ready.
- No501.1K ₳Rationale
DAO of grant recipients voting on grants is a room full of people with a shared interest in the money flowing.
This was funded last year, and I can not surface a clean independent accounting of what those 34 funded companies actually delivered against their KPIs, or how many became the profitable and self-sustaining projects the model exists to produce.
So I am afraid I am going to have to pass on this one.