Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal
Discussed in the Governance Review for epochs 647 to 649.
130 DReps voted · 55 with a rationale · 1 changed their vote · 1 re-voted unchanged
Open a row to read the rationale.
Changed votes: 1 to no, together voting with 5.4M ₳ of voting power.
Voting concentration
6 of 130 DReps cast half of the voted power.
Largest voter 14.9%, top 5 combined 47.8% of 3.9B ₳ voted.
The 9 largest voters together held as much voting power as the 67.0% threshold required in yes votes.
- NoChanged5.1M ₳Rationale
Reviewed and voting no. I suggest the team reach out to intersect and move from there.
Earlier votes
Abstain2mo agoSuperseded
Needs further review. Will revisit.
- No4.9M ₳Rationale
Reason: The proposal identifies a real ecosystem need—long-term sustainability for critical open-source infrastructure—and is substantially improved from earlier versions, with stronger governance, reporting, and accountability. However, it still creates a new treasury-funded allocation institution centered around a single administrator with broad discretionary authority. While the expertise and methodology are credible, I believe the Cardano Treasury should preferentially fund the infrastructure itself rather than establish additional organizations responsible for deciding how treasury funds are distributed. Strengthening direct, proposal-based funding of critical open-source projects would achieve the same objective with less institutional complexity and lower governance risk.
- No4.2M ₳Rationale
[Portuguese]
Optamos por votar "NÃO" nesta ação de governança "Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal" (gov_action19ap...637y3t), pois, embora reconheçamos a importância de criar mecanismos sustentáveis para a manutenção de infraestrutura open source e para a formação de novos mantenedores no ecossistema Cardano, consideramos que o valor solicitado, de ₳4.094.000 por 12 meses, é elevado para uma estrutura que ainda precisa demonstrar sua efetividade operacional na prática. Reconhecemos que a proposta apresenta mecanismos relevantes de transparência, controle e prestação de contas, incluindo auditorias trimestrais, relatórios públicos, registro on-chain das decisões, devolução de recursos não utilizados e possibilidade de substituição do administrador pelos DReps. Ainda assim, entendemos que a concentração inicial da autoridade financeira em um único administrador, combinada ao custo total do programa e ao caráter ainda experimental do modelo, resulta em uma relação entre risco e benefício que consideramos insuficiente para justificar o financiamento solicitado neste momento.
[English]
We chose to vote "NO" on this governance action "Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal" (gov_action19ap...637y3t), because although we recognize the importance of creating sustainable mechanisms for maintaining open-source infrastructure and developing new maintainers within the Cardano ecosystem, we believe the requested ₳4,094,000 over 12 months is substantial for a structure that has yet to demonstrate its operational effectiveness in practice. We acknowledge that the proposal includes meaningful transparency, oversight, and accountability mechanisms, including quarterly audits, public reporting, on-chain publication of decisions, the return of unused funds, and the ability for DReps to replace the administrator. Nevertheless, we believe that the initial concentration of financial authority in a single administrator, combined with the program’s overall cost and the still-experimental nature of the model, results in a risk-benefit profile that does not sufficiently justify the requested Treasury funding at this stage. - No4.2M ₳No rationale
- No4M ₳Rationale
I can't support projects like this which need to be part of a centralized coordination layer being on-off direct treasury withdrawals. This should be run under the umbrella of either Intersect or the Cardano Foundation and isn't appropriate to be stand-alone.
- No3M ₳Rationale
I have to vote NO on this proposal for a few reasons:
My personal NCL has been met, and I will not be approving any more spending for research/building related proposals. Only serious on chain tx volume and financial benefit proposals to the blockchain would get me to reassess.
I don't support the idea of taking away control from DReps when it comes to deciding funding. Proposals like this create middle men, which I feel are unnecessary. I would rather have proposals with real merit submit for funding through either the Intersect budget process, or via an on chain GA.
It is unclear even within this proposal whether or not there is an overlap of Open Source funding:
For transparency: this proposal is informed by lessons learned from the OSC Paid Open Source Model, which received Cardano ecosystem treasury funding through the Open Source Committee, which went to INtersect MBO directly, not directly to Christian Taylor personally or nor did he receive any allocation of that treasury funding directly or indirectly. This new budget is intended to replace and evolve that prior work through a more decentralized structure.
Is the Intersect Open Source Committee still in effect? Is this proposal designed to (if passed) replace that committee and its funding by using this as a signal of voters wishes to end that committee? There are not clear details whether Intersect will end the Open Source Committee if this budget passes, or if this discussion was even had with Intersect.
I am not interested in double funding open source tooling on Cardano, so I would appreciate a clear breakdown of what is expected here and what is being assumed by the proposer.
- Yes2.8M ₳No rationale
- No2.8M ₳No rationale
- No2.7M ₳Rationale
I have a lot of respect for the grind and continued effort on making this happen.
I unfortunately have to vote NO on this proposal. Even with a potential NCL raise, it is still not within my personal budget to pass.
- No2.7M ₳Rationale
私は本Treasury Withdrawalに反対します。CardanoにおいてOSS支援は不可欠であり、maintainer支援や後継者育成の方向性は高く評価します。しかし、OSS支援の本質は「hobbyistに寄付すること」ではなく、Cardanoが依存するOSSを、責任ある有償maintenance projectへ進化させることです。本提案は、最終的な資金配分権限が単一administratorに集中し、Intersect既存支援との重複整理、二重受給防止、Smart Contract Disbursement、multisig、pause、未使用資金返還の設計が十分明確ではありません。
I vote No on this Treasury Withdrawal.
I strongly recognize the importance of open-source support for Cardano. Maintainer funding and succession planning are necessary for the long-term health of the ecosystem.
However, the purpose of OSS support should not be simply to donate to hobbyists. It should be to help OSS projects that Cardano depends on evolve into responsible, paid maintenance projects.
In this proposal, final allocation authority is concentrated in a single administrator. The overlap with existing Intersect OSS programs, safeguards against double funding, Smart Contract Disbursement, multisig controls, pause mechanisms, and return of unused funds are not yet sufficiently clear.
- Abstain2.5M ₳No rationale
- No2.5M ₳Rationale
Due to rationales becoming stressful and the bear market vibes - I will not be providing rationale. I voted the way that I did bc we need a 'no stress' environment more than ever.
- No2.2M ₳No rationale
- No2.1M ₳Rationale
I am voting NO on the Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal.
I want to be clear that this is not a vote against open-source sustainability, maintainers, public goods, or the need to improve long-term support for Cardano’s open-source dependencies.
The problem this proposal is trying to solve is real. Cardano does rely on open-source software, libraries, tools and maintainers that need better continuity, succession planning, dependency awareness and long-term support.
I also recognise that this revised proposal is materially improved from the earlier version. It is smaller, shorter, more focused, and more pilot-like. The proposal requests 4,094,000 ADA over 12 months and is structured around a Maintenance Fund, Maintainer Development Program, CodeForUs Bounty Program, and Ecosystem Activation Reserve.
However, I do not believe this is the right treasury allocation at this time.
My main concern is that this remains a secondary allocation structure rather than direct funding of clearly identified critical infrastructure. The proposal creates a new programme layer that will later decide which open-source dependencies, maintainers, bounties and ecosystem activities receive funding.
That may become a useful model in future, but I believe Cardano should first agree the broader NCL and treasury framework within which this type of programme would sit.
I have recently advocated for shorter NCL windows, category-level budget buckets, market-aware spending, sovereign reserves in stronger markets, and clearer rules for any treasury investment or programme-allocation function. This proposal is exactly the type of action that should be considered inside a pre-agreed open-source maintenance or ecosystem sustainability bucket, not from one long, undifferentiated NCL pot.
Until that framework exists, I am more comfortable supporting direct, specific, measurable infrastructure and tooling proposals than approving new meta-funding structures.
I am also cautious about precedent. I have been reluctant to support broad secondary funding bodies where DReps delegate substantial allocation discretion to another programme or administrator. Even where the intention is good, DRep accountability over treasury spending should remain direct unless the mandate, category budget, governance controls and selection rules are exceptionally clear.
A future version of this proposal could be stronger if it were submitted after NCL reform, inside an agreed open-source sustainability budget, with clearer pre-identified dependency priorities, tighter disbursement criteria, and stronger evidence that this programme structure is the best way to fund those public goods.
As submitted, I do not believe this proposal should be prioritised ahead of preserving remaining NCL capacity and improving the treasury framework first.
For these reasons, I vote NO.
- No1.9M ₳No rationale
- No1.8M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.6M ₳Rationale
I am not against the proposal but do not see an urgent need for it to be funded now. There are other funding needs that are higher priorities.
- No1.6M ₳No rationale
- No1.3M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.3M ₳No rationale
- No1.2M ₳Rationale
I vote NO on this proposal. Supporting open-source maintainers matters, and this revised one-year plan is an improvement. But it would give 4.094 million ADA to one administrator, while the councils can only advise and cannot stop payments. It also overlaps with Intersect's existing POSM programmes. I would rather support a smaller, clearly scoped plan with shared control and clear milestones.
- No1.2M ₳No rationale
- Abstain1.2M ₳No rationale
- No1.1M ₳No rationale
- No1.1M ₳Rationale
This proposal feels like a remix of past OSC efforts, but with a bunch of buzzwords and an inflated budget that’s hard to believe. Asking for over 4M ADA without solid proof that this new “independent entity” will do better than the current systems is a careless use of treasury funds.
The applicant talks about transparency and accountability, yet hides these behind layers of advisory councils and legal jargon. The U.S.-focused charity model adds a geopolitical angle that will complicate governance without any clear advantage. The supposed dependency audit and maintainer development programs are crammed in without explaining why the current ecosystem initiatives can’t scale or improve first. To me, this seems more like duplication than real innovation.
Swapping out one slow, politicized structure for another packed with committees isn’t really progress. This proposal needs real proof, not just promises, before we should invest millions to reinvent the wheel at a higher cost.
- No984.8K ₳No rationale
- No969.9K ₳No rationale
- No966.3K ₳No rationale
- No929.9K ₳Rationale
We vote NO on this proposal. We recognize that open-source maintenance is important for Cardano. Critical libraries, tooling, developer infrastructure, wallets, indexers and governance tools need sustainable support, and we appreciate that this revised proposal is smaller, shorter and more focused than the previous version. However, we are still not convinced that creating another dedicated funding and coordination structure is the right approach at this stage. The proposal asks the treasury to fund a new operational layer that would then decide which projects and maintainers receive support. In our view, this delegates too much allocation authority away from direct DRep evaluation and into a secondary structure.
We are also concerned that the advisory councils and legal entity are program deliverables rather than fully established preconditions. At the moment of withdrawal, final allocation authority remains concentrated with the designated administrator, even if reporting and advisory feedback mechanisms are planned. Cardano should support critical open-source infrastructure, but we prefer focused proposals tied to specific repositories, tools, maintainers, deliverables and measurable outcomes. Treasury funding should be as direct, transparent and accountable as possible. For these reasons, we do not believe this proposal is the right use of treasury funds at this stage and vote no.
- No927.7K ₳No rationale
- No926K ₳No rationale
- Abstain884.5K ₳No rationale
- Yes829.9K ₳Rationale
Our recommendation is YES because open-source sustainability is a critical vulnerability for the Cardano network. For years, the ecosystem has struggled to adequately incentivize the unsung maintainers of core libraries, SDKs, and developer APIs.
The dOSPO and OMF program introduces a pragmatic, data-driven approach to addressing this issue by segmenting projects into strict retainer tiers based on dependency centrality. This ensures that treasury capital directly prevents failures in our shared technical foundations.
Importantly, the proposal respects the power of DReps by offering an unprecedented "kill switch"—promising to sponsor a sunsetting Info Action if requested by just 15 DReps. This high level of accountability, paired with third-party legal auditing, makes it a calculated risk worth taking to secure the long-term technical health of the blockchain.
- No796.1K ₳No rationale
- Abstain622K ₳No rationale
- No604.7K ₳Rationale
I Vote No. Mission is valid but structure doesn't earn ₳4.09M: single-key custody, advisory-only councils, non-binding replacement, mixed-proposal bundling. Would support revised version with script escrow, pre-formed oversight, narrower pilot.
A PDF version of this rationale is also made available.
I vote No on the Revised Cardano dOSPO and OMF Program Proposal.
Cardano's open-source infrastructure does need systematic support. Unpaid maintainers, decaying dependencies, and quiet erosion are real problems that eventually become loud failures. Christian Taylor understands this space and has the execution history to back it up. The quarterly reporting commitment and dependency-centrality selection are genuine improvements over ad-hoc funding.
But ₳4.09M in a single-key wallet is not a governance structure. It's a trust exercise. The two advisory councils give feedback but cannot block disbursements. The Info Action replacement mechanism sounds good on paper but does not transfer keys, terminate agreements, or enforce fund returns. That makes it a request for cooperation, not a circuit breaker. For a very-large treasury withdrawal, I need on-chain enforceable controls and not documented intentions.
The proposal also bundles five distinct workstreams into one ask. Maintenance retainers, mentor programs, bounties, hackathons, and legal entity formation each serve different purposes and deserve independent scrutiny. WP3's ₳1M mentor program costs roughly ₳31K per participant, CNCF's LFX Mentorship (LFX Mentorship program is a specialized, paid, 12-week initiative by the Linux Foundation and CNCF designed to connect aspiring open source contributors with experienced mentors) operates at a fraction of that with proven results. Bundled together, weaker components ride on stronger ones without facing the evaluation they'd get alone.
I don't doubt the mission. I doubt whether this specific structure earns ₳4.09M of public money. The custody model, the mixed-proposal bundling, and the non-binding governance safeguards are all fixable. I'd support a revised version with script-enforced escrow, pre-formed independent oversight, and a narrower pilot scope focused on the dependency audit and limited maintenance retainers first.
The treasury is finite. A proposal must earn its allocation from zero. This one hasn't done that yet.
- No591.1K ₳Rationale
While this has value, I dont see this as the highest priority to approve right now - other proposals have stronger merit and should preferentially be included within this NCL.
- No579.1K ₳No rationale
- Abstain573.2K ₳No rationale
- No568K ₳Rationale
No. ATM.
- No503.6K ₳Rationale
Open source funding is a real problem and Christian has a real track record.
But strip away the 90 pages of whitepapers and here is the structure: one man, through his own consulting company, holds sole authority over ₳4M from the moment of withdrawal. Both councils are advisory with no veto. The charity that is supposed to make this decentralized does not exist yet and is not due until Month 6.
So the pitch is essentially: DAOs are too political, therefore give everything to me. That is not a decentralized OSPO. That is a trust fall with treasury money.And the safety net, replacing him via Info Action, is non-binding on-chain. If things go wrong, our enforcement mechanism is his goodwill. He may well have plenty of it. I am not sure voting treasury funds on may is a good idea.
- No501.3K ₳Rationale
- Abstain481.2K ₳No rationale
- No433.2K ₳No rationale
- No393.6K ₳No rationale
- No379.5K ₳Rationale
Much too centralised on only one person. Promised committees are only advisory. Possibility to abort or replace operator by Info action is non-binding and depends on trusting the operator to be replaced. Promised legal entity does not change this control over the money. Not even a simple multi-sign with trusted people from the community is done.
- No356.1K ₳Rationale
The action names no script-enforced escrow, discloses no recipient or contract address, and gives neither advisory council authority to stop a disbursement - both are explicitly "Advisory - No veto authority" while the administrator designation is "Unconditional" with final allocation authority. The only check is a dRep Info Action, which is non-binding signalling with no on-chain enforcement, so removal is a promise rather than a mechanism; on-chain verification of the prior version found a single-key stake address rather than audited escrow, meaning funds sit under one individual's key control for at least six months before the receiving 501(c)(3) exists. The rest of this cycle uses the audited Sundae contracts with contract-level pause and failsafe sweep, and this withdrawal should not be held to a lower standard. The top-line now reconciles, but WP3's internals don't - Core Track describes 9 participants at 17,500 ADA (157,500) yet is budgeted 280,000, Tooling Track describes 12 at 10,000 (120,000) yet is budgeted 253,000 - and WP1 budgets 100,000 for councils whose stated maximum composition costs 168,000. WP3's 333,000 reserve still carries no return commitment, unlike the other three, and Mill Law Firm is again named for quarterly financial reviews, which is an accounting function rather than a law firm's. Repayment is limited to ~319,000 of unused reserves (~8%). Therefore I cannot accept the proposal structure as presented.
- No342.8K ₳No rationale
- Abstain330.6K ₳No rationale
- No297K ₳Rationale
This should probably fall under Intersects responsibilities