Aichi/Tokai_DRep

This proposal provides essential maintenance and Dijkstra hard‑fork readiness for Scalus, a public‑good infrastructure already embedded in major Cardano developer tools such as MeshJS, Lucid, Evolution SDK, Yaci, and Cardano Client Lib. The scope and budget have been significantly reduced in direct response to prior DRep concerns, focusing strictly on maintenance, interoperability, and hard‑fork alignment. Given the ecosystem-wide dependency on Scalus and the proven delivery record of the team, continued support is necessary to preserve developer experience and platform safety. The reduced budget is appropriate for the narrowed scope. I vote Yes.

Daedalus is Cardano’s only full-node wallet and therefore constitutes critical, life-support infrastructure for the ecosystem. Maintaining protocol compatibility, hard fork readiness, security updates, and multi-platform support is essential to ensure users can continue to access the chain without disruption. The requested amount (1,785,333 ADA) is reasonable for a year-long maintenance contract, the deliverables are measurable, and the governance structure provides strong oversight. As a public good under an open-source license, this proposal directly supports Cardano’s operational integrity and merits approval.

Blockfrost is a valuable and widely used piece of developer infrastructure, and I appreciate the team’s long-standing contribution to the Cardano ecosystem. The transition toward a community‑governed, not‑for‑profit model is a positive direction, and the public‑good intent is clear. However, the requested amount of 9,832,979 ADA is difficult to justify under a financial‑prudence framework, especially given that Blockfrost is not part of Cardano’s life‑support infrastructure and multiple alternative API and indexing solutions exist. While I support the vision of strengthening community‑owned infrastructure, the scale of this withdrawal exceeds what I consider appropriate at this time.

While the proposal demonstrates clear adoption potential and strong KPI measurability, the requested amount of 4,969,231 ADA is disproportionately high for a non‑critical, non‑infrastructure initiative. This work does not qualify as life‑support infrastructure for Cardano, and the cost structure—covering extensive labor, marketing, and conference expenses—does not meet a reasonable cost‑effectiveness threshold. The repayment mechanism is USD‑denominated and dependent on future revenue, introducing uncertainty and weakening Treasury protection. For these reasons, I cannot support this withdrawal.

NO — This proposal requests an exceptionally large withdrawal (₳120M) for a DeFi incentive program rather than core infrastructure. Under my criteria, Treasury funds must prioritize essential, non‑optional infrastructure that preserves network reliability and user access. PRIME is an application‑layer liquidity initiative with uncertain long‑term impact, high Treasury dependency, and significant depletion risk. While governance controls are strong, the scale, volatility exposure, and non‑infrastructure nature of the program make it incompatible with responsible Treasury stewardship. I therefore vote NO.

NO — This proposal requests 4M ADA to establish and operate a new independent organization, which is not core, non‑optional infrastructure required for Cardano’s reliability or user access. While open‑source sustainability is important, creating a new administrative entity with staffing, operational costs, advisory councils, and multi‑program funding introduces long‑term Treasury dependency and significant ongoing financial obligations. The impact on adoption and protocol safety is indirect and uncertain, and the proposal overlaps with existing ecosystem structures such as Intersect’s open‑source programs. Under my criteria, Treasury funds must prioritize essential infrastructure and avoid large, recurring operational commitments. For these reasons, I vote NO.

This is a necessary investment in core developer infrastructure.
Plutarch and Ply are widely used SDKs that many existing Cardano dApps depend on.
Without ongoing maintenance and compatibility updates, developers face migration risk,
increased friction, and potential breakage as the ledger evolves.
The deliverables are technically measurable, and the governance/oversight structure
(Intersect + smart contract controls + independent committee) is strong.
This is maintenance of existing infrastructure, not new expansion, and does not
increase Treasury depletion risk. I therefore vote YES.

Mithril is core protocol infrastructure essential for Cardano’s decentralization, scalability, and long‑term sustainability. Fast, verifiable chain sync reduces reliance on centralized indexers and directly improves onboarding for wallets, exchanges, and monitoring tools. The deliverables are technically measurable, and the governance and oversight structure through Intersect and the smart‑contract framework is strong. This proposal maintains critical infrastructure rather than expanding scope, and does not increase Treasury depletion risk. I therefore vote YES.

Title
Withdraw 1,193,000 ada for Intersect Technical Steering Committee Support

Abstracts
This Treasury Withdrawal funds Intersect Technical Steering Committee Support.

This Treasury Withdrawal is submitted by Intersect on behalf of the vendor. The content for the following sections; Abstract, Motivation and Rationale have been sourced from the approved proposal submitted by the Vendor as part of the Intersect budget process.

Rationale
Strategic Pillar Alignment
The work of the Technical Steering Committee is cross-cutting and aligns to all five strategy pillars. This reflects the TSCʼs role as foundational governance infrastructure rather than a single-focus initiative. The strongest alignments are with Pillars 1 and 3, where the connection to specific 2030 KPIs — particularly the 99.98% uptime target and the DRep participation rate — is most direct. The proposal will be fundamental to ensuring that meaningful progress can be made in 2026/2027 for all KPIs.

Pillar 1: Infrastructure & Research Excellence

This is where the proposal has its strongest and most direct alignment. The Parameter Committeeʼs evidence-based advice on protocol settings (WP2) directly supports the scalability and security focus of this pillar, particularly through the commissioning of independent benchmarking studies. Critically, this evidence is gathered independently of node vendors and other implementation teams, ensuring that parameter recommendations are grounded in objective analysis rather than the interests of any particular supplier. The Hard Fork Working Group (WP2) ensures that protocol upgrades — which are the primary mechanism for delivering infrastructure improvements — are coordinated safely and effectively. The CIP editors (WP2) keep the improvement pipeline flowing, ensuring that research and innovation can be translated into protocol changes in a structured way. While the Security Council itself is funded through the main Intersect budget, the TSC provides the technical oversight and governance framework within which the Security Council operates, and TSC members play active roles in security incident response and vulnerability management. This technical leadership contribution supports the reliability KPI of 99.98% uptime that the 2030 strategy sets as a baseline target.

Pillar 2: Adoption & Utility

The commissioning of technical reports on topics such as throughput improvements, finality protocols, governance improvements, quantum resistance, economic utility, and partner chains (WP1) helps develop the broader understanding that ultimately supports adoption. Expert attendance at key community events (WP1) puts leading technical voices from across the Cardano ecosystem — including but not limited to TSC members — in direct contact with developers and builders, surfacing the technical needs of those building applications that drive on-chain utility. While technical workshops are organised and funded through the main Intersect budget, they are delivered under the technical leadership of the TSC — meaning the TSCʼs expertise directly shapes the content that builds developer capability. The TSCʼs technical oversight of the Security Council and Bug Bounty Programme — both funded separately through Intersect — also contributes to the enterprise-grade security posture that the 2030 strategy identifies as essential for attracting institutional users.

Pillar 3: Governance

The Technical Review work package (WP3) directly supports informed DRep decision-making, which is central to the 2030 strategyʼs goal of achieving over 70 % DRep participation in governance actions. Independent technical evaluations of core infrastructure proposals ensure DReps have access to clear, accurate information when voting. The Parameter Committeeʼs transparent, evidence-based approach to protocol recommendations (WP2) helps resist governance capture by ensuring decisions are grounded in independent analysis rather than vested interests — with evidence gathered independently of node vendors and implementation teams so that no single supplier can unduly influence the direction of protocol parameters. The proposalʼs commitment to returning unspent funds to the treasury also demonstrates the kind of fiscal discipline the 2030 strategy calls for under its Treasury Seasons framework.

Pillar 4: Community & Ecosystem Growth

Expert attendance at events like the Cardano Summit and Africa Summit (WP1) speaks directly to the global engagement dimension of this pillar, putting leading technical experts from across the Cardano ecosystem — including but not limited to TSC members — in conversation with community stakeholders across geographies. Technical reports commissioned under WP 1 contribute to the evidence base that supports informed community participation in ecosystem development. Technical workshops, while organised and funded through the main Intersect budget, are delivered under TSC technical leadership — meaning this proposal is the mechanism through which that leadership capacity is sustained and directed towards community capability-building.

Pillar 5: Ecosystem Sustainability & Resilience

The Technical Review work package (WP3) protects the integrity of treasury expenditure by ensuring that core infrastructure proposals are subject to independent expert scrutiny before DReps vote on them — directly supporting the financial stewardship dimension of this pillar. The commitment to full expenditure accounting and treasury return of unspent funds reinforces this alignment. The TSCʼs technical oversight role in relation to the Security Council and Bug Bounty Programme — both separately funded through Intersect — also contributes to the long-term operational resilience of the network.

Intersect Budget Process
This proposal achieved the required 67% support threshold during the 2026 Intersect Budget Process Hydra Voting phase and has therefore been advanced for on-chain Treasury Withdrawal Governance Action submission in accordance with the approved Budget Process Framework.

Net Change Limit Compliance
The requested amount does not at time of submission, on its own or in aggregate, breach the applicable 350M Net Change Limit covering Epoch 613 to Epoch 713.
In accordance with the guardrail TREASURY-02a, this withdrawal does not exceed the NCL at the moment of submission.

Audit & Oversight
Independent audits and assurance for this proposal will be provided by Appold.

This assurance function is intended to provide the Cardano community with additional confidence that Treasury funds are being used in line with the approved mandate, that reported milestones are supported by appropriate evidence, and that financial controls are operating effectively. Reviews may include deliverable verification, control testing, spend validation, and assessment of milestone evidence where appropriate.

Intersect will continue to operate milestone-based drawdowns, evidence-backed reporting, and transparent disclosures alongside this external assurance process. Where recommendations are identified through audit or assurance reviews, Intersect will seek to implement reasonable improvements to strengthen accountability, efficiency, and public trust.

Prior Treasury Funding Disclosure
The Technical Steering Committee has not received funding from the Cardano Treasury within the past 24 months.
As a committee operating under Intersect MBO, we disclose that Intersect and its committees have received funding from the Cardano Treasury within the past 24 months through previously approved Treasury Withdrawal governance actions.
The following governance actions are relevant to this disclosure:

Governance Action Governance Action ID Amount (ada)
Withdraw ₳15,750,000 for a MBO for the Cardano Ecosystem: Intersect gov_action13tf...tyw3h6 15,750,000
Cardano Product Committee: Community-driven 2030 Cardano Vision and 2026 Roadmap Insights Collection via Workshops and Structured Product Research gov_action13tf...t5eumh 750,000
OSC Budget Proposal - Paid Open Source Model for Sustainable Development gov_action13tf...qx0ecg 5,885,000
Total treasury funding received by Intersect and its committees through the governance actions listed above 22,385,000
Budget Summary
Work Package Total (ADA)
WP 1 — Community-Facing Technical Coordination 256,000
WP 2 — Protocol Governance and Evolution 832,000
WP 3 — Technical Review 105,000
Total 1,193,000
Intersect Budget Management Tooling
To administrate treasury funds on-chain, Intersect will utilize the treasury management smart contract framework developed by Sundae Labs. A new instance of these smart contracts has been deployed for 2026, mirroring the contracts from the 2025 budget cycle.

The 2026 Treasury Reserve Smart Contract stake address: stake1784sdxt6jjennmstphgdu7l7c2scf5d02a6cve2dgn5s2kq5u3j9v
The 2026 Treasury Reserve Smart Contract payment address: addr1x84sdxt6j...mxs59w
The 2026 Project Specific Smart Contract payment address: addr1x9d6k9z6t...048cay
Specifics
Intersect will utilize a single Treasury Reserve Smart Contract (TRSC), with one Project-Specific Smart Contracts (PSSC). Intersect’s management consists of five ‘admin’ and three Intersect ‘leadership’ roles. An Oversight Committee consisting of six external, independent third-party entities will provide checks and balances on Intersect, and safeguard against errors and unilateral control. The administration of both TRSC and PSSC will be managed by Intersect, with external oversight on certain actions from the Oversight Committee.

The Oversight Committee consists of Sundae Labs, Cardano Foundation, Dquadrant, NMKR, Sundial and Eternl. Their role is to independently verify key administrative actions using on-chain logic, ensuring accuracy and consistency without exercising discretion over governance decisions.

For all details on Intersect’s configuration please see the Smart Contract Guide on the knowledgebase.

The high level permissions are as follows:

TRSC Fund and PSSC Modify
Two of the five Intersect admins, two of the six trusted entities and one of the three Intersect leadership sign-off must authorize
TRSC Disburse
Two of five Intersect admins, three of six trusted entities and two of three Intersect leadership sign-off must authorize
TRSC Pause and Resume
Two of five Intersect admins, and one of three Intersect leadership sign-off must authorize
TRSC Sweep
One of five Intersect admins, and one of three Intersect leadership sign-off must authorize
TRSC Reorganize
Two of five Intersect admins and three of six trusted entities must authorize
Processes
Upon enactment of this governance action, funding for this project will be directed into the TRSC’s stake address. All instances of TRSC and PSSC can not be staked with a SPO and are delegated to the auto-abstain predefined DRep. From here funds will be withdrawn into a UTxO remaining at the TRSC payment address.

When the Legal contract is prepared and the vendor is ready, funding for this project will be transferred using the Fund action to the PSSC. All milestones will be outlined within the metadata.

A dashboard is available (treasury.sundae.fi) for the community to audit the TRSC or PSSC and track metrics related to this withdrawn ada as well as being immutably verifiable on chain.

References
Project Proposal via Intersect Budget Process Hydra Voting
Intersect Budget Process Hydra Voting Documentation
Intersect Budget Process Hydra Voting Auditor Guide
Intersect Budget Process Hydra Voting Final Audited Results (Gitbook)
Intersect Budget Process Hydra Voting Audit Report (PDF)
Automating Accountability: Cardano's Smart Contract Framework Blog
Sundae Labs Budget Management Smart Contracts Github Repository
Budget Management Smart Contracts TxPipe Audit Report
Budget Management Smart Contracts MLabs Audit Report

Hardware wallet maintenance is essential infrastructure that preserves secure user access, signing reliability, and compatibility as Cardano, Ledger, and Trezor evolve. Breakage in hardware‑wallet flows directly impacts user safety, developer integrations, and ecosystem utility. The requested amount is modest, the scope is clear, and the work maintains critical security infrastructure rather than expanding new functionality. Strong governance controls, milestone‑based drawdowns, and independent oversight further reinforce accountability. As this proposal protects core user‑access infrastructure without increasing Treasury depletion risk, I vote YES.

While the proposal includes strong governance controls, reporting, and milestone‑gated deployment, the overall structure places substantial financial and volatility risk on the Cardano Treasury. The request is large (10M ADA), directed toward a new BTCfi protocol rather than core infrastructure, and relies on Treasury‑provided launch liquidity that is exposed to BTC price movements. This makes the Treasury a risk‑bearing participant in a new market category rather than a beneficiary of essential maintenance or protocol‑level infrastructure. The proposal does not reduce long‑term Treasury dependence and does not qualify as foundational “life‑support” infrastructure under my criteria. For these reasons, I vote NO.

UTxO RPC is a core developer‑facing integration standard used across multiple node implementations and SDKs. Maintaining this interface is essential for reliable chain data access, multi‑language tooling, and a healthy developer ecosystem. The requested amount is modest, the scope is clear, and the work directly supports Cardano’s infrastructure and adoption by reducing integration friction. Governance controls, milestone‑based drawdowns, and independent oversight further strengthen accountability. As this proposal maintains critical developer infrastructure without increasing Treasury depletion risk, I vote YES.

The technical coordination, incident response, and core node stewardship included in this proposal constitute essential infrastructure required to maintain Cardano’s operational continuity. Under my voting criteria, these functions fall within “life‑support infrastructure,” which must be prioritized for Treasury funding. The proposal also provides measurable outputs, on‑chain verifiable fund flows through TRSC/PSSC smart contracts, and independent oversight via Appold and the Oversight Committee, satisfying my requirements for accountability and transparent governance.

While Intersect’s current reliance on Treasury funding remains a long‑term concern, the organization demonstrates strong governance controls and milestone‑based disbursement. I expect continued progress toward diversified funding models.
Based on the above, this proposal meets the threshold for approval under my consistent evaluation framework, and I vote Yes.

I vote No on this proposal because the current governance framework for Treasury withdrawals is fundamentally insufficient.
First, the Net Change Limit (NCL) does not function as a meaningful financial guardrail. Whenever the limit becomes insufficient, a new proposal to raise the NCL is simply submitted and approved, which undermines the purpose of having a limit in the first place.
Second, the recent decline in ADA’s price suggests that past Treasury approvals may have weakened market confidence, highlighting the need for stronger financial governance.
Third, Treasury funding decisions should follow a holistic annual process, as previously suggested by Charles, where all proposals are submitted together once per year and prioritized based on the full budget picture. This approach would allow DReps to make strategic, well‑informed decisions. Under the current ad‑hoc approval model, DReps cannot accurately assess priorities, and projects that should be lower priority may receive funding merely due to timing.
For these reasons, improving the governance framework must come before raising the NCL, and I therefore vote No on this proposal.

I vote NO.
I recognize the value of Tx3 and TxPipe’s strong track record, and I understand the importance of standardized, agent‑ready interfaces for Cardano’s future.
That said, given the current Treasury balance and Net Change Limit utilization, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not strictly essential to Cardano’s operational continuity. To preserve long‑term financial sustainability and prioritize life‑support infrastructure, I must vote against this proposal.

I vote NO.
I acknowledge the importance of UTxO RPC as a core integration standard for Cardano and appreciate TxPipe’s ongoing open‑source maintenance work.
That said, given the current Treasury balance and Net Change Limit utilization, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not strictly essential to Cardano’s life‑support infrastructure. To preserve long‑term financial sustainability and prioritize core operational continuity, I must vote against this proposal.

I vote NO.
I recognize the value and importance of the work presented in this proposal. However, given the current Treasury balance and the remaining Net Change Limit, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not essential to Cardano’s operational continuity.
To preserve long‑term financial sustainability, I must vote against this proposal.

I vote NO.
I recognize the value of this proposal in bringing real‑world payments infrastructure to Cardano and appreciate Wirex’s track record and the open‑source components it would deliver. This would clearly contribute to adoption and utility.
That said, given the current Treasury balance and Net Change Limit utilization, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not strictly essential to Cardano’s operational continuity. To preserve long‑term financial sustainability and prioritize core life‑support infrastructure, I must vote against this proposal.

I vote NO.
I recognize the value and importance of the work presented in this proposal. However, given the current Treasury balance and the remaining Net Change Limit, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not essential to Cardano’s operational continuity.
To preserve long‑term financial sustainability, I must vote against this proposal.

I vote NO.
I recognize the value and importance of the work presented in this proposal. However, given the current Treasury balance and the remaining Net Change Limit, I cannot support funding for initiatives that are not essential to Cardano’s operational continuity.
To preserve long‑term financial sustainability, I must vote against this proposal.

I vote YES.
This parameter change improves the operational resilience of Cardano governance by preventing governance halts due to temporary Constitutional Committee inactivity.
It introduces no financial burden, maintains decentralization, and strengthens the reliability of the governance system.

I vote NO.
I agree with the overall direction of improving treasury governance and recognize the importance of establishing a more strategic and structured process. However, this information action does not define the concrete implementation process required to move from concept to execution.

In particular, the proposal does not specify the responsible entity, the method for selecting such an entity, or the scope of authority it would hold. Without clarity on these foundational elements, it is difficult to assess how the proposed reforms would function in practice.

For these reasons, I cannot support this action at this stage.

I vote YES.
Hydra is the only production-grade Layer 2 currently operating on Cardano, supporting live workloads such as Delta DeFi, Masumi, Intersect voting, and Blockfrost micropayments. This proposal strengthens Hydra through performance optimization, operational hardening, ecosystem support, and developer experience improvements, enabling a feature-complete Hydra v2 that directly contributes to Cardano’s adoption, TVL, transaction volume, and user growth.

The funding is milestone‑based, independently assured, and administered through Intersect’s treasury governance framework, ensuring transparency and accountability. Given Hydra’s strategic importance as core scaling infrastructure and its direct impact on Cardano’s competitiveness and long‑term sustainability, I support this proposal with a YES vote.

This proposal delivers essential L1 infrastructure, including Peras finality, History Expiry, and conformance testing. These are critical for Cardano’s security, performance, and long‑term sustainability. Deliverables are measurable, open‑source, and governed through strong oversight. I support this proposal.

I appreciate the value this event brings to the community, but the proposal does not align with the top‑priority criteria for financial sustainability. Its outcomes focus mainly on off‑chain visibility rather than measurable on‑chain adoption, and the cost is significant relative to the expected impact. For these reasons, I am unable to support it at this time.

I am voting NO.
While this proposal is well‑designed and potentially impactful in the long term, my voting framework supports Treasury spending only for infrastructure that is essential to Cardano’s ongoing operation.
Although valuable, this proposal does not address operational continuity risks for Cardano itself, and therefore does not meet my criteria for Treasury funding.

I am voting YES.
This proposal maintains Cardano’s critical Tier‑1 integrations—USDCx, LayerZero, Pyth, Dune, and Fireblocks—which are essential for liquidity, cross‑chain connectivity, institutional access, and overall ecosystem functionality.
These systems form the operational backbone of Cardano, and their continuity is vital.
The governance structure is strong, with Intersect management, smart‑contract‑based treasury controls, independent oversight, and clear refund conditions.
As foundational infrastructure required for Cardano’s ongoing operation, this proposal merits support.

I am voting YES.
Eternl is a critical wallet for payments, staking, governance, and dApp interactions across Cardano. This proposal ensures stable maintenance and development at a modest cost, providing clear ecosystem value.
The team’s sustainability plan through a Pro subscription model demonstrates reduced long‑term Treasury dependence. As a low‑cost yet essential piece of infrastructure, this proposal merits support.

I am voting NO.
While I recognise the value of Scalus as an application platform for Cardano, I believe that at this stage treasury funding should prioritise concrete dApps and real-world use cases over additional developer platforms and infrastructure.
Cardano already has multiple strong tools and frameworks, and I consider it more important now to fund teams that ship production applications on top of this existing foundation, directly contributing to adoption, transactions, and TVL.

I am voting NO (with a positive stance).
This proposal presents a highly valuable vision for strengthening Cardano’s open‑source infrastructure,
with data‑driven prioritization, dual advisory councils, and strong transparency mechanisms.
The overall direction is something I strongly support.

However, approving ₳12,000,000 over a 36‑month period in a single withdrawal feels too large and too long from a treasury sustainability and governance accountability perspective.
A structure that allows annual evaluation and renewal would provide clearer checkpoints, reduce risk, and help the community validate progress before committing to multi‑year funding.

I support the intent of this program and would be eager to reconsider a one‑year version of this proposal in a future submission.

I am voting YES.
This proposal supports several research areas that are essential for Cardano’s long‑term evolution, including PQ security, ZK, L2 scalability, and governance.
While some components align with existing research roadmaps, I view this as additional resourcing to maintain and accelerate the pace of critical research, which is important for Cardano’s future competitiveness.
I look forward to continued improvements in transparency and progress reporting as the work advances.

I am voting YES.
This proposal delivers high‑value public goods for Cardano, including the TypeScript ecosystem and the Pebble compiler.
The funding structure is transparent, with escrow, third‑party oversight, and clear refund conditions, which significantly reduces risk.
All outputs are open‑source and directly strengthen Cardano’s developer experience and long‑term competitiveness.

I am voting NO.

While I recognize the technical value of this proposal, my current priority is to support projects that drive real‑world adoption and create practical, socially impactful use cases on Cardano.
With that focus in mind, I will not support this proposal at this time.

After careful review, I will vote No on this proposal.

While I appreciate the real-world adoption focus and alignment with Cardano technologies such as DID, Hydra, and CIP-68, I am not convinced this is an appropriate Treasury investment at this stage.

The proposal appears closer to a private business operation than a public good. Key components such as MAGIC credits, LampNet, and operational infrastructure remain highly centralized and dependent on a specific organization.

I am also concerned about long-term sustainability and future Treasury dependency. It is still unclear whether the project can become fully self-sustaining without continued ecosystem funding.

In addition, for a 2.4M ADA request, I believe the transparency and proven large-scale execution track record of the team are currently insufficient.

I support Cardano real-world adoption, but Treasury funds should prioritize decentralized, reusable public infrastructure with clear long-term value for the entire ecosystem.

I initially opposed this due to concerns about overlap with existing tools and unclear cost effectiveness, but after reassessing the role of developer experience in Cardano’s growth, I decided to change my vote to Yes.

Additional Note:
I had already changed my vote from No to Yes, but I mistakenly forgot to update the voting message. To correct this, I temporarily switched to Abstain in order to revise the comment, and then restored my vote to Yes.
The sequence is No → Yes → Abstain → Yes.

While I still have meaningful concerns about the proposal’s limited urgency, high cost, and the lack of clear prioritization, I ultimately decided to support it after considering Cardano’s long‑term stability and the importance of maintaining high‑assurance research for future protocol safety.

Although I still have significant concerns about the proposal’s broad scope, cost, and the limited clarity around prioritization, I ultimately decided to support it after considering Cardano’s long‑term stability and the importance of maintaining reliable core infrastructure.

I am voting No on this proposal.

While this top-up upgrade increases Cardano’s visibility at TOKEN2049, the event remains heavily investor‑focused with relatively few developers present. As a result, the expected impact on real adoption—such as attracting new builders or expanding actual usage of Cardano—appears limited.

The additional 1.76M ADA requested for the Title Sponsorship does not present a clear or measurable return on investment, especially when compared to more balanced, chain‑neutral events where both developers and investors are present in meaningful numbers.

Given the weak adoption pathway and the unclear cost‑effectiveness of this upgrade, I cannot support the proposal.

I am voting Yes on this proposal.

Tweag has consistently delivered high‑quality work on Plutus, Plutus Core, formal methods, and other core components that directly support the safety and long‑term reliability of Cardano. This proposal continues that essential infrastructure work over a multi‑year period, providing clear public‑goods value to the entire ecosystem.

The requested budget is significant, but it is reasonable for a highly specialized research and engineering team operating at this level. Strengthening Cardano’s core infrastructure is foundational for future adoption, developer experience, and ecosystem resilience.

For these reasons, I support this proposal.

I am voting No on this proposal.

While TOKEN2049 provides visibility among investors and media, it does not offer a balanced environment for both developers and investors. The event is heavily investor‑focused, with relatively few developers present, which limits its potential to drive meaningful adoption or attract new builders to the Cardano ecosystem.

Given the high cost of the Platinum sponsorship and the lack of clear, measurable return on investment—especially compared to more balanced, developer‑inclusive, chain‑neutral events—I do not believe this proposal provides sufficient external value to justify Treasury funding.

For these reasons, I cannot support the proposal.

I am voting No on this proposal.

The cost-effectiveness of the revised Summit plan remains unclear, and the proposal does not demonstrate a convincing level of external value for Cardano. While community events have internal benefits, the expected impact on real-world adoption—bringing new users, developers, or enterprises into the ecosystem—appears limited.

Given the lack of clear return on investment and the weak pathway to meaningful external adoption, I cannot support this proposal.

I am voting No on this proposal.

Sundial already provides a public-good foundation for a BitVM-based BTC bridge on Cardano.
Given this existing work, the requested amount in this proposal presents an unfavorable cost‑to‑risk balance, and the public‑good value of the project is relatively limited.

For these reasons, I cannot support the proposal.

I support this proposal because improving Plutus performance is critical for dApp growth, developer adoption, and Cardano’s competitiveness as a smart‑contract platform.

I support this proposal as it advances Ouroboros research, enhances Cardano’s security guarantees, and aligns with the core roadmap for long‑term resilience.

I support this proposal because it directly strengthens Cardano’s L1 roadmap, improves protocol reliability, and delivers essential upgrades that protect long‑term network value.

I am voting No on this proposal.

Key reasons:

• The proposal asks the Treasury to subsidize Blockfrost’s ongoing operational costs, creating a risky precedent for funding private infrastructure.
• Funding a Bitcoin indexer with Cardano Treasury resources lacks clear justification and falls outside Cardano’s public‑goods mandate.
• The proposal increases ecosystem dependence on a single private provider, which raises centralization and resilience concerns.
• The requested amount is large, and the cost-effectiveness of the spending is not sufficiently demonstrated.

For these reasons, I cannot support the proposal at this time.

I support this proposal since Hydra and Mithril scalability improvements complement L1 development and help Cardano handle future demand without compromising decentralization.

I am voting NO on this proposal.
Based on the outcomes and impact of previous Cardano Summit events, I do not believe that continuing the Summit at its current scale is justified. The Summit primarily functions as an internal Cardano community gathering, with limited measurable influence on broader ecosystem adoption or external engagement. Going forward, the Summit should be reduced in scope or restructured to better align with ecosystem needs.
Cardano’s most urgent priority is not marketing exposure or event presence, but the development of practical, real-world products and infrastructure that individuals and enterprises can actively use. Without useful tools, applications, and services, increased visibility at external events will not translate into sustainable adoption or meaningful ecosystem growth.
Treasury resources should be directed first toward initiatives that create tangible utility—products that solve real problems and infrastructure that supports everyday use. For these reasons, I am voting NO on this proposal.

I am voting NO.
While I acknowledge that both Gerolamo and Pebble may provide value to the Cardano ecosystem, the highest‑priority needs are already being addressed. Amaru, as a Rust-based node implementation, meaningfully contributes to client diversity, and Aiken is already widely adopted as a practical and mature smart contract language. Given this existing foundation, the urgency and priority of this proposal appear lower.
I do not consider this work unnecessary; however, with limited Treasury resources, I believe funding should prioritize practical dApps and initiatives that drive real-world adoption and user-facing utility.

I am voting YES.
There are still projects in Funds 10–14 awaiting milestone reviews and payments, and a pause in Catalyst operations would cause real harm to these teams. Without approving this transition, further delays in reviews and payouts are likely, which would negatively impact the broader community.
At the same time, I remain concerned that a clear plan for Catalyst’s redesign has not yet been presented. I expect the Cardano Foundation to provide greater transparency and to outline concrete steps for improving Catalyst going forward.

I am voting YES because this withdrawal establishes the essential foundation—legal structure, independent audit, and multisig contract—needed for Cardano’s DeFi growth. The proposal includes strict refund conditions and strong transparency requirements, ensuring unused funds return to the Treasury. Going forward, the community must continue to closely monitor how all funds are used, especially as we move toward the larger liquidity deployment.

I am voting YES.
This proposal introduces a new investment approach that complements Catalyst and brings professional capital allocation into the ecosystem. The structure provides a reasonable level of transparency and accountability, and I see potential value in diversifying how Cardano supports builders. At the same time, it will be important for the community to closely monitor investment decisions and the fund’s execution to ensure long‑term trust and alignment with Cardano’s goals.

I am voting Yes on this proposal.

Network decentralization and security benefit greatly from having multiple independent node
implementations, and Dingo contributes meaningfully to that diversity. Blink Labs has a strong
track record, having delivered several important projects such as gOuroboros and Plutigo, and
their consistent contributions demonstrate the capability required for this work.

While Amaru (Rust implementation) is currently ahead, having an additional implementation—or even
two—strengthens Cardano’s long‑term resilience and reduces reliance on any single codebase.

Although 6.9M ADA is a substantial amount, the detailed budget breakdown shows that the costs are
allocated to essential areas such as engineering, auditing, infrastructure, and operations. The
structure appears reasonable and not inflated. For these reasons, I support this proposal.

I am voting Yes on this proposal.

Requiring more detailed and structured documentation at the submission stage makes it easier for DReps to evaluate proposals. It also allows various community groups to review drafts in advance, enabling proposers to incorporate feedback and improve the quality of their submissions.

By clarifying the process and reducing inconsistencies between proposals, this framework enhances comparability and transparency. These improvements are essential for a healthy and accountable budget process, and therefore I support this Info Action.

I am voting Yes on this proposal.

Compared with other core development initiatives in the Cardano ecosystem, the overall budget and FTE cost assumptions appear reasonable and consistent with industry standards. The team has also demonstrated a strong commitment to transparency through clear reporting, on‑chain treasury management, and the return of unused funds in the previous cycle.

While I acknowledge that some parts of the 2025 roadmap experienced delays, I will continue to monitor the project’s delivery pace and technical progress closely. Even so, I believe the work Amaru is doing is strategically important for node diversity and long‑term network resilience, and I want to support their continued development.

I look forward to seeing the technical advancements they bring to Cardano in the coming year.

I support the establishment of a Net Change Limit as a necessary fiscal guardrail. However, given the current level of ADA price volatility and the evolving nature of on-chain governance, I believe it would be prudent to incorporate a mid-term review mechanism. I would support this proposal if it included a formal commitment to reassess and, if necessary, adjust the NCL halfway through the proposed period (for example, after 6–12 months). This would preserve predictability while maintaining fiscal flexibility in changing market conditions.

I am voting No on this proposal.

My reasons are as follows:

• The Interim Committee, which will control 500,000 ADA, has not disclosed its member list or their qualifications. This lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess accountability and governance safety.
• The requested budget is extremely large, with a significant portion allocated to legal costs. From a treasury preservation perspective, the scale of spending is not sufficiently justified.
• I believe the project should proceed in smaller, incremental steps. Clear transparency and demonstrated progress at each stage would make future proposals easier to evaluate and support.

For these reasons, I cannot approve the proposal at this time.

I am voting Yes for the following reasons:
• Developer feedback collected through PCP‑003 indicates clear support for increasing Plutus memory limits.
• The change reduces unnecessary complexity in dApp development and improves the overall developer experience.
• Benchmarking and technical evaluations show that the associated risks to network performance are minimal.

I support naming Protocol Version 11 the “van Rossem Hard Fork” in recognition of Max van Rossem’s meaningful contributions to Cardano’s governance and community.

I’m supporting this Net Change Limit proposal for a few simple reasons:

1. The proposed limit feels appropriate when compared with the treasury’s actual inflows, and it maintains a healthy balance for the ecosystem.
2. The amount is in line with previous NCLs, which helps keep Cardano’s financial governance steady and predictable.
3. The longer timeframe makes sense, as it aligns better with the mid‑year budgeting cycle and allows decisions to be based on complete annual data.
   Overall, this NCL strikes a good balance between respecting past commitments and preparing for the development needs ahead.

While DeltaDeFi has shown steady progress in developing Hydra‑based infrastructure, the requested 1.5M ADA budget does not appear proportionate to the current stage of the project. The justification provided is not sufficient to demonstrate that this level of funding is appropriate.
For these reasons, I oppose this proposal.

In v2.4, the roles and responsibilities of proposers have been clarified, including stricter requirements for immutable documentation, audit funding, and transparent fund management. These changes increase accountability to the community and improve the overall transparency of Treasury-related activities.
For DReps and SPOs, the clearer standards and strengthened procedural requirements make it easier to evaluate proposals consistently.
Therefore, I support this proposal.

This document establishes guidelines for the future direction of Cardano's development and its societal applications. I believe sharing these guidelines collectively is meaningful as it provides a basis for steering governance. I generally agree with the content.

The primary reason is that the vote margin between Cardano Curia and Christina in the snap election was extremely close. I believe this demonstrates that Christina is a trustworthy individual. Furthermore, maintaining a committee size above the baseline value ensures governance stability.

I support this version of the Cardano Constitution because it provides clearer definitions and a more inclusive governance framework. The roles and responsibilities of DReps, SPOs, and general Ada Holders are expressed in a flexible and accessible manner, which encourages broader participation while maintaining transparency and accountability. This balance between clarity and openness strengthens the foundation for sustainable, decentralized governance.

Further enhance Cardano's reliability and recognition.

Reasons for opposing this proposal:
The changes are too drastic. There has been insufficient discussion within the community, and it is difficult to summarize multiple perspectives and determine whether the overall proposal should be approved or rejected. Each individual case should be examined more thoroughly.